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See Talk:Central Intelligence Agency/Country Article Style Rules

Quality

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Does anyone see how big the reliability issues are here? This page is an embarrassment to wikpedia 162.213.136.97 (talk) 04:22, 18 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

POV

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The treatment of the Kurdish issue is very POV. If you quote Kissinger, why not quote his memoirs?— Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.149.79.49 (talk) 23:52, 2 November 2012 (UTC)[reply]

I have removed the deeply flawed section for now, and intend to rewrite it shortly.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 22:44, 16 March 2016 (UTC)[reply]

Seems to have a huge gaping hole in actual historical coverage--from 1996 to 2002. This just screams BULLSHIT! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 220.213.102.186 (talk) 03:32, 9 March 2016 (UTC)[reply]

No, the U.S. "tilt" towards Iraq really did not begin until 1982

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While I fully admit that this is not my area of expertise, I am not aware of any evidence in any reliable source to suggest that the U.S. began tilting towards Iraq until the Iranian invasion of Iraq in 1982. Of course, Left-wing bloggers and Wikipedia editors who have written about the temporary U.S.-Saddam alliance tend to completely obscure all of the relevant context (assuming, perhaps too generously, they even possess the most cursory knowledge about the subject), to the point of pretending that the West was supporting Iraqi aggression against Iran—rather than trying to prevent Iran from completely overrunning and conquering all of Iraq. Yet the only "weapons" the U.S. ever sold Saddam were a few hundred million dollars worth of helicopters, and it was not until 1984 that the U.S. and Iraq resumed diplomatic relations. (Conspiracy nuts will tell you that the President Carter secretly "green-lit" Saddam's attack in September 1980, but there's not much evidence to suggest this occurred.) Now, to the CIA's role: I confess I haven't read Charlie Wilson's War, but (as is too often the case with seemingly-impeccably sourced content on Wikipedia) there is nothing in the quote provided to assuage my doubts that Wilson actually says what Wikipedia would lead readers to believe: Namely, that the CIA began "militarily and monetarily" supporting (itself an odd formulation) Iraq as early as 1980. In Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988 (pp. 21, 113-115), former CIA Near East and South Asia Division deputy chief and later division chief Thomas Twetton recounts in detail how he "was sent to Baghdad in the summer of 1982 to deliver satellite imagery—maps, battle line imagery (ten or fifteen miles behind the battle lines)—to the Iraqis." According to Twetton, this was "the first U.S. provision of intelligence to Iraq" during the war, leaving his Iraqi counterparts in "shock" and "disbelief at discovering that they had a CIA officer in their midst," and sparking a short-lived debate over whether Iraq would even allow a CIA presence. Twetton reiterates that "the beginning of the tilt toward Iraq did not happen until the summer of 1982." Therefore, I am considering removing the current reference, although it would probably take someone with greater knowledge about the Iran-Iraq war to offer a more comprehensive account of the CIA's role in the conflict (if it can even be considered a distinct topic given the sheer number of U.S. agencies involved). (Finally, I am aware of the more serious challenge to my argument; namely, that the U.S. policy of strict neutrality that prevailed prior to 1982 was itself tilted towards Iraq because the U.S. refused to condemn Iraq's aggression. Alas, the origins of the Iran-Iraq war are sufficiently muddled that ascertaining who was the aggressor is not as clear-cut as anyone on either side of the Iraq debate would like to admit.) I'd add that the U.S. policy was never actually to prolong the war and thereby bleed both sides in equal measure, notwithstanding all mythology to the contrary; U.S. policy-makers were hardly smart enough or in enough control of events to even attempt such a stratagem. Western aid prolonged the war in the sense that it saved Iraq from collapse, but this did not contradict the official U.S. position that there should be an immediate ceasefire, because after 1982 Iraq was constantly calling for an immediate ceasefire even on terms favorable to the other side.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 05:47, 7 April 2016 (UTC)[reply]

There is so much here that is either inaccurate or misleading that I don't know where to begin. Before beginning, let me recommend to the editor above that you refrain from caricaturing those who disagree with you with empty political labels. From my experience, the recourse to labeling often foreshadows (and is the hallmark of) vacuous arguments and lack of familiarity with the facts among those who use them; it will be to your credit, therefore, to avoid labeling those whose opinions you may be at odds. Onto the issues of fact that plague the above discussion and the Wikipedia articles that border on this topic.
The first point may seem like one of nomenclature, but I think it's important for those lacking familiarity with this topic. Namely, at no point did the State Department and Pentagon really tilt toward "Iraq" or its people. This is how the discussion is framed in much of the literature, in which of course "Iraq" is often shorthand for Saddam and his cohort as elements within the Iraqi political and military establishment. For those outside with this context, particularly, it is important to restate this obvious point.
Second, the existing diplomatic record is not an area that researchers are likely to find particularly amenable to new information on claims of the kind that are given as the header of this section of the talk page, "the US tilt toward Iraq did not really begin until 1982." There are at least two reasons for this. First, the Carter administration was particularly interested in representing itself as a leader and international advocate of bolstering human rights standards. International aggression (formally waged by Iraq against Iran in September 1980) is often called the Supreme Crime in international affairs, and no regime representing itself as a human rights defender is going to want to (either by overt or covert action) be known as an instigator for such a crime. Second, in invading Iran, Hussein was in fact viewed as a tool of the executive branch of the US Federal Government by the government of Iran, as was vocalized at the time. Thus it was in neither regime's interest to make any direct or indirect support for Iraq's invasion of Iran known.
Third, and relatedly, this is why the point made above about formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq is irrelevant--both countries wanting to downplay any connection between the United States and Iraq's attack on Iran. But the existence of formal diplomatic relations--outward acknowledgment of a relationship is only one (and perhaps the least important) form of relationship that any serious look of relations between Iraq and the US at the time of the Iran invasion.
Fourth, even among students of this topic inside the Washington foreign policy establishment, there has been increasing acknowledgment of facts indicating US-Iraq collaboration leading up to September. Thus Hal Brands at SAIS writes that "American exports to Iraq climbed from $23 million in 1972 to nearly $450 million in 1976" (what were these numbers closer to 1980?) and more importantly, that Carter in early 1980 had undertaken military sales to Iraq (General Electric frigate engines for the Iraqi Navy) and attempts to restore diplomatic relations in February and April of 1980 (which by at least June had gained some kind of positive, private response from Iraqi officials) (citing 'Before the Tilt,' Diplomacy and Statecraft, March 2015, pp. 106, 113-4). Though Brands maintains that both the Carter military sales he cites and efforts at restoring diplomatic relations at this time fell through, to dwell on this misses the point: of these moves by the Carter administration as signals to top Iraqi officials of the amenability of Washington for direct aid to Iraq. It also raises the possibility of further cooperation, perhaps covert, between Washington and Baghdad at that time. So even if a direct 'green light' was not given by Washington in September 1980 in any form, there is certainly no dearth of signals from Washington that year of eagerness for renewed patronage.
Fifth, given that Saddam has been on CIA payroll since 1959, it seems to me that the burden should be on anyone claiming the lack of any connection between the actions of Saddam and the instructions of Washington (even during the period of a dormant or apparently nonexistent public or officially acknowledged relationship between the two regimes), rather than vice versa.
Sixth, the statement that "the only 'weapons' the U.S. ever sold Saddam were a few hundred million dollars worth of helicopters" is false. Let me close this comment with an extended quotation detailing several counterexamples to this claim from as listed in a US Senate hearing.
U.S. exports of biological materials to Iraq
Included in the approved sales are the following biological materials (which have been considered by various nations for use in war), with their associated disease symptoms:
Bacillus Anthracis: anthrax is a disease-producing bacteria identified by the Department of Defense in the The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, as being a major component in the Iraqi biological warfare program.
Anthrax is an often-fatal infectious disease due to ingestion of spores. It begins abruptly with high fever, difficulty in breathing, and chest pain. The disease eventually results in septicemia (blood poisoning), and the mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced, antibiotic therapy may prove useless, probably because the exotoxins remain, despite the death of the bacteria.
Clostridium Botulinum: a bacterial source of botulinum toxin, which causes vomiting, constipation, thirst, general weakness, headache, fever, dizziness, double vision, dilation of the pupils and paralysis of the muscles involving swallowing. It is often fatal.
Histoplasma Capsulatum: causes a disease superficially resembling tuberculosis that may cause pneumonia, enlargement of the liver and spleen, anemia, an influenza-like illness and an acute inflammatory skin disease marked by tender red modules, usually on the shins. Reactivated infection usually involves the lungs, the brain, spinal membranes, heart, peritoneum, and the adrenals.
Brucella Melitensis: a bacterial which can cause chronic fatigue, loss of appetite, profuse sweating when at rest, pain in joints and muscles, insomnia, nausea, and damage to major organs.
Clostridium Perfringens: a highly toxic bacteria which causes gas gangrene. The bacteria produce toxins that move along muscle bundles in the body killing cells and producing necrotic tissue that is then favorable for further growth of the bacteria itself. Eventually, these toxins and bacteria enter the bloodstream and cause systemic illness.
In addition, several shipments of Escherichia Coli (E.Coli) and genetic materials, as well as human and bacterial DNA, were shipped directly to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided by the American Type Culture Collection, which were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant to the issuance of an export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department:
Date: February 8, 1985
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Agency
Materials Shipped: Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup.
Date: February 22, 1985
Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education
Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulanum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136). Class III pathogen.
Date: July 11, 1985.
Sent to: Middle And Near East Regional A.
Materials Shipped: Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136). Class III pathogen.
Date: May 2, 1986.
Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education.
Materials Shipped:
1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10). Batch #08-20-82 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
2. Bacillus Subtitlis (Ehrenberg) Cohn (ATCC 82). Batch #06-20-84 (2 each).
3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502). Batch #07-07-81 (3 each). Class III Pathogen.
4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et al (ATCC 3624). Batch #10-85SV (2 each).
5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051). Batch #12-06-84 (2 each).
6. Francisella tularensis, var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC 6223) Batch #05-14-79 (2 each). Avirulent, suitable for preparations of diagnostic antigens.
7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441). Batch #03-84 (3 each). Highly toxigenic.
8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564). Batch #03-02-79 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779). Batch #04-24-84S (3 each).
10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916). Batch #08-14-80 (2 each). Agglutinating type 2.
11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124). Batch #07-84SV (3 each). Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lechitinase C.J. Appl.
12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185). Batch #01-14-80 (3 each). G.G. Wright (Fort Dertick) V770-NP1-R. Bovine anthrax, Class III pathogen.
13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578). Batch #01-06-78 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581). Batch #04-18-85 (2 each).
15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945). Batch #06-21-81 (2 each).
16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855. Batch #06-21-71. Class III pathogen.
17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213). Batch #3-84 (2 each).
18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397). Batch #08-18-81 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450). Batch #08-02-84 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455). Batch #02-05-68 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
21. Brucella melitensis Biotype 1 (ATCC 23456). Batch #03-08-78 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458. Batch #01-29-68 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
23. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763. Batch #8-83 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415). Batch #02-02-84 (2 each). Class III pathogen.
Date: August 31, 1987.
Sent to: State Company for Drug Industries.
Materials Shipped:
1. Saccharomyces cerevesia (ATCC 2601). Batch #08-28-08 (1 each).
2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype typhia (ATCC 6539). Batch #06-86S (1 each).
3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633). Batch# 10-85 (2 each).
4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031). Batch# 08-13-80 (1 each).
5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536). Batch# 04-09-80 (1 each).
6. Bacillus cereus (11778). Batch# 05-85SV (2 each).
7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228). Batch# 11-86s (1 each).
8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884). Batch# 09-08-90 (2 each).
Date: July 11, 1988.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303). Batch# 04-87S. Phage host.
2. Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC 45031). Batch# 06-14-85. Plant virus.
3. Plasmid in Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (ATCC 37349). (Tiplasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in E Coli). Batch# 05-28-85.
Date: April 26, 1988.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57236) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.
2. Hulambdal 14-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57240) Phage vector; Suggest host: E.coli.
3. Hulambda 15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57242) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli.
Date: August 31, 1987.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846). Batch# 07-29-83 (1 each).
2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694). Batch# 05-87 (1 each).
Date: September 29, 1988.
Sent to: Ministry of Trade.
Materials Shipped:
1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240). Batch# 05-14-63 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938). Batch# 1963 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629). Batch# 10-23-85 (3 each).
4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009). Batch# 03-30-84 (3 each).
5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705). Batch# 06-27-62 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
6. Brucella abortus (ATCC 9014). Batch# 05-11-66 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388). Batch# 06-01-73 (3 each).
8. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 11966). Batch# 05-05-70 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
9. Clostridium botulinum Type A. Batch# 07-86 (3 each). Class III pathogen.
10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018). Batch# 04-83 (3 each).
11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019). Batch# 03-88 (3 each).
Date: January 31, 1989.
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57057)
2. plambda500, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase pseudogene (HPRT). Chromosome(s): 5 p14-p13 (ATCC 57212).
Date: January 17, 1989
Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission.
Materials Shipped:
1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57237) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57240) Cloned from human lymphoblast. Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). Chromosome(s): X q26.1 (ATCC 57241) Phage vector; Suggested host: E. coli.
Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled a listing of biological materials shipped to Iraq prior to the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from October 1, 1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13, 1993. The following materials with biological warfare significance were shipped to Iraq during this period:
Date: November 28, 1989.
Sent to: University of Basrah, College of Science, Department of Biology.
Materials Shipped:
1. Enterococcus faecalis.
2. Enterococcus faecium.
3. Enterococcus avium.
4. Enterococcus raffinosus.
5. Enterococcus gallinarium.
6. Enterococcus durans.
7. Enterococcus hirae.
8. Streptococcus bovis (etiologic).
Date: April 21, 1986.
Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid (non-infectious).
Date: March 10, 1986.
Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69 House 28/I, Baghdad, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1. 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2 (non-infectious).
Date: June 25, 1985.
Sent to: University of Baghdad, College of Medicine, Department of Microbiology.
Materials Shipped:
1. 3 yeast cultures (etiologic) Candida sp.
Date: May 21, 1985.
Sent to: Basrah, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed (etiologic).
2. West Nile Fever Virus.
Date: April 26, 1985.
Sent to: Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad, Iraq.
Materials Shipped:
1.8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi) to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious).

--https://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_cr/s092002.html Ussliberty (talk) 09:34, 18 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, but biological materials are not weapons; the Iraqis had to turn them into weapons. As to the rest:
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More to the story

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I don't yet have the time to purchase, read through, and incorporate all relevant material from Nathan J. Citino's Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in US-Arab Relations, 1945–1967 (2017) into this and other Wikipedia articles. However, based on Google Books snippets, it appears that Citino's book provides many important new insights into the dark and sordid history of U.S. support for the first Ba'thist government in Iraq, which remains a stain on U.S.—Iraq relations quite apart from whether or not the CIA directly arranged the coup itself. (In addition, there was a tantalizing glimpse that there may be yet more to the CIA's spring 1960 poisoned handkerchief scheme.) "The more you know, the more you know you don't know."TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:30, 31 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Can you spot the huge error I made in "Iraq 1960"? Compare the blockquote with the original source. Look very carefully! Any idea? (Hint: Isn't it a bit odd that the CIA said that Mahdawi's assassination occurred "not very long after our handkerchief proposal was considered," if in fact there was a three-year gap between the two?)
Read on for spoilers:

If you check the date of the cited memo in which Barnes approved the "special operation," you will see that approval was not given until April of 1962, more than two years after Critchfield first broached the idea. Given that Mahdawi was stricken with "influenza" in early 1962, it is possible that the CIA successfully poisoned him, after all.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:57, 27 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Fabricated citation

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According to Aleiraq Aleazim, "Likewise, more than a decade prior to the UPI report, an anonymous former high-ranking State Department official had told scholars, Marion and Peter Slugett (sic), that Saddam and other Ba'athists made contact with American authorities some time during the late 1950s and early 1960s," citing Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (one of the standard histories of Iraq), p. 297. I had only read a few snippets from this book and one article by Peter Sluglett previously (namely Sluglett's review of Batatu's Old Social Classes), but I was about 99% certain that the book does not contain any such sensational claim about Saddam—and now I'm at 100%. Anyone can check the Google Books link and confirm for themselves that p. 297 (from the chapter "The Invasion of Kuwait and Its Aftermath") says nothing of the kind; I also checked p. 97 before commenting here in case the issue was a simple typo or innocent misunderstanding, finding—you guessed it–nothing! It seems undeniable that Aleiraq Aleazim fabricated this citation, if not out of whole cloth then by copying a fabricated citation from somewhere else on the Internet (and most likely conflating these fictional assertions about Saddam personally meeting with Americans in the late 1950s with the discussion of the anti-communist purge of 1963 on p. 86 and what the Slugletts characterize as "conjecture" about how it was organized). The Slugletts briefly summarize the attempt on Qasim's life on pp. 72–73, never suggesting that it was anything but an internal Iraqi affair or going beyond what you would expect to see in a standard history of Iraq (despite it having received significant coverage for decades, Sale in April 2003 was the first source to allege American involvement in the attempted assassination, and no RS has since been able to corroborate Sale's report). If there are any admins watching this page: What, if anything, can be done about an editor caught abusing Wikipedia as a venue to perpetuate blatant WP:HOAXes like this?TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 07:55, 5 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Actually no, I didn't make up any citation and you are making false allegations. The quote exists. The quote in question doesn't appear on page 97 or 297, it was actually 327. Although I had made a typo and did not notice, you could've still tried to use the search function. (https://books.google.ca/books/about/Iraq_Since_1958.html?id=F_A9ZQMP79oC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Saddam%20American%20authorities&f=false) I am re-adding the quote. Aleiraq Aleazim (talk) 10:04, 5 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]
Okay, so it's buried in a footnote in the "Bibliography" section (and a full preview doesn't appear to be available online, so I'm not sure if there is any other context to consider), but the "quote" (which, again, you didn't put in quotation marks) does exist. The Slugletts don't suggest that this information is terribly significant for a general history of Iraq (or they would presumably have included it in the main text), but it is relevant to this article and Iraq Since 1958 is by far the most reputable source that you've cited, so it is likely to remain in some form. With that said, the Slugletts do not indicate that any "contacts" between Ba'ath Party members and "American authorities" developed into a working collaborative relationship or that the U.S. played a role in the Ba'athist assassination attempt of October 1959, so it still seems needlessly argumentative (as well as a form of WP:OR/WP:SYNTH) to introduce this text with "Likewise, more than a decade prior to the UPI report ... "—the Slugletts simply do not corroborate any of the salacious details from Sale's article, beyond a general willingness on the part of U.S. officials to meet with Qasim's opponents. (You might recall that various "contacts" between al-Qaeda and Saddam's government later fueled conspiracy theories about a collaborative relationship that were never proven and are unsupported by the Iraqi archives.) As far as I can tell, the closest that the Slugletts come to addressing collaboration can be found on p. 86: "Although individual leftists had been murdered intermittently over the previous years, the scale on which the killings and arrests took place in the spring and summer of 1963 indicates a closely coordinated campaign, and it is almost certain that those who carried out the raid on suspects' homes were working from lists supplied to them. Precisely how these lists had been compiled is a matter of conjecture, but it is certain that some of the Ba'th leaders were in touch with American intelligence networks, and it is also undeniable that a variety of different groups in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East had a strong vested interest in breaking what was probably the strongest and most popular communist party in the region." (Footnote 3 here may very well correspond to the same citation on p. 327, especially because the partial excerpt also quotes King Hussein's allegations, although that cannot be confirmed from the Google Books preview—in other words, the Slugletts describe U.S.–Ba'athist cooperation during the 1963 anti-communist purge as "a matter of conjecture" and do not hint at U.S. participation in the assassination attempt of 1959.) On a side note, most scholars (even those, like Karsh, who say that Saddam may have visited the U.S. embassy in Cairo—and Karsh is careful to present that as a rumor, not a confirmed fact) do not believe that Saddam personally would have had occasion to "contact" U.S. authorities prior to his Egyptian exile (it would be very surprising if the Slugletts said otherwise, but, technically, they do not)—after all, as Osgood says, Saddam was a last-minute addition to the hit squad in 1959. Innuendo aside, even proof that Saddam once visited a U.S. embassy wouldn't establish far-reaching conspiracy theories about Saddam's alleged collusion with America.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 20:47, 5 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]
Slugletts, as well as Osgood renders Sale's report to be much more plausible. The quote: "Likewise, more than a decade prior to the UPI report" is referring to the when Slugetts first published their book (1990) in a time where no one (not that I know of) has come forward regarding CIA links to Saddam pre-1960s or links to the assassination (that I know of). There is no OR, I'm not coming to my own conclusions, I'm simply stating the time-gap between the UPI report and Slugetts book. Aleiraq Aleazim (talk) 00:30, 6 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]
Yeah, but this isn't "Historiography of CIA activities in Iraq". Anyone that wants to know when a source was published can easily check the citation. Furthermore, mentioning the time gap between the publication of Iraq Since 1958 and Sale's article implies a connection between those two sources in particular, even though neither source mentions the other and the Slugletts don't corroborate Sale's specific allegations about the 1959 assassination attempt. By way of comparison, another editor at United States involvement in regime change criticized me simply for including the year of publication for Sale and Gibson (2003 and 2015, respectively), possibly because he felt that I was implying that Sale's publication so close to the Iraq War was suspicious or that Gibson gets the last word because he was published more recently, even though I would never have dreamed of including any argumentative OR text to that effect (as you are currently doing). If the connection that you are drawing is so obvious, then there is surely no reason for such a heavy-handed editorial interjection: a.) I want to include the additional context provided by the Slugletts in a reasonable and balanced "UPI report" section, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions; b.) While I object to you including your own analysis in this article, all it would take is a single secondary source making the same point to sell me on inclusion.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 19:22, 6 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Requested move 1 August 2021

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The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: not moved. While there is some policy-based support for expanding the names, there far stronger support for the status quo. After the relist, shortly before which a stronger oppose rationale was presented, most comments have been in opposition. (closed by non-admin page mover) Elli (talk | contribs) 04:03, 24 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

– Expand abbreviation. The corresponding Category:CIA activities tree will need to be renamed at CfD if this goes through. –LaundryPizza03 (dc̄) 01:07, 1 August 2021 (UTC) — Relisting. Shibbolethink (♔ ♕) 03:47, 17 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Why? —⁠ ⁠BarrelProof (talk) 02:00, 1 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
    Because MOS:ACROTITLE specifically states that the Central Intelligence Agency should not be abbreviated in article titles. –LaundryPizza03 (dc̄) 03:16, 1 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
    MOS:ACROTITLE states: "consensus has rejected moving Central Intelligence Agency to its acronym, in view of arguments that the full name is used in professional and academic publications."
    1) There does not seem to be any link to where this consensus is.
    2) Is 'rejecting moving moving Central Intelligence Agency to its acronym' the same as 'supporting moving the acronym to Central Intelligence Agency'? Based on the reasoning given there, "the full name is used in professional and academic publications", it would seem that either way is fine, as surely the acronym is used in professional and academic publications as well. Does there have to be uniformity on this?
    3) When searching Google Scholar, "CIA activities" has over 3,300 results, while "Central Intelligence Agency activities" has 75. For the 21st century, the results are ~2,000 vs 28. In Google Books, among books published by university presses: over 2,500, vs 172. In the 21st cent: 1,450 vs 8.Yaakovaryeh (talk) 06:03, 1 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
    There was such a consensus declared in an RM on 15 May 2008 – see Talk:Central Intelligence Agency/Archive 8#Requested move. That's a long time ago in Wikipedia history. Also, even if that consensus might persist (which I am unsure about), I think that does not necessarily mean that all article titles that have that agency's name in them need to use the long form – e.g., article titles should be WP:CONCISE. —⁠ ⁠BarrelProof (talk) 15:24, 1 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Support in principle, but suggest "Central Intelligence Agency and Foo" as a shorter alternative. Common sense suggests that we avoid acronyms where possible, especially since we use "United States" rather than "US" in similar titles. —Brigade Piron (talk) 20:47, 2 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • oppose per WP:CONCISE, and WP:COMMONNAME (user:Yaakovaryeh has provided sources above). The consensus OP is talking about, and MOS:ACROTITLE, is about the article of the agency itself. That consensus doesnt apply to the use of acronym in other titles. Nobody is going to get confused, or "surprised" because of the acronym here. Regarding Brigade Piron's comment above, their suggested title would imply the article is about the relation between "CIA and foo", and will also change the scope of article. —usernamekiran (talk) 20:33, 10 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • relisting comment: after my own arguement above, there is clearly no consensus for closing (involved editors are allowed to relist under such circumstances). Also, there was a delay in the notification for move discussion (which directed me here). —usernamekiran (talk) 20:42, 10 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Calidum: Last line of the first paragraph of WP:RMRELIST states If you want to relist a discussion and then participate in it, be prepared to explain why you think it was appropriate. Even without my argument, the discussion needed input from more editors (one "why", and one "support in principle", with alternate title suggestion). —usernamekiran (talk) 18:13, 11 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
"after my own arguement above, there is clearly no consensus for closing" strongly implies a WP:SUPERVOTE as contemplated by WP:RMRELIST because you are giving undue weight to your own opinion. -- Calidum 18:58, 11 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
— Relisting. Big decisions affecting lots of articles often need wider input to reach the clearest possible consensus.  Shibbolethink (♔ ♕) 03:47, 17 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Leaning support - per Category:Inter-Services Intelligence operations (Inter-Services Intelligence activities in Afghanistan, Inter-Services Intelligence activities in the United States, etc), which is the only other intelligence category that their main page doesn't use an acronym (Inter-Services Intelligence and not "ISI"). Gonnym (talk) 08:53, 17 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
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