User:Emiya1980/sandbox

Hirohito's Responsibility in World War II

•"The coming of the Meiji Restoration in Japan once again placed national power into the hands of the emperor — but Hirohito was supposed to remain above politics, as befitted his semi-divine status. Thus the Emperor. had little real control over his military subordinates."

•"The Japanese system shared many affinities with the regimes of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. But there were also significant differences. Here, no possibility of arbitrary decision-making fell to any individual. in fact, of the six systems examined, this was in many respects the most overtly collective form of government. The Emperor was more than a figurehead, but had no dictatorial, or genuinely regal, powers to force decisions upon his country. Nor did he attempt to do so. Rather, he backed — sometimes, hesitantly, even fearfully — the decisions of his government. Imperial majesty was only upheld by posing as the last resort of regime consensus, not by risking confrontation with his government, even less with his military. The Achilles heel of the system was, in fact, the position of the military. Constitutionally subject only to the Emperor, not the civilian government, the armed forces enjoyed a high degree of autonomy to shape national policy. Ministers falling faoul of the military were soon ousted — or assassinated. The Prime Minister, therefore, had to act largely at the behest of the dominant forces in the army and navy. These, in turn, in a peculiarity of the Japanese system, were heavily influenced by the views percolating upwards from factions based in the middle echelons of the officer corps."

•"[There is a]...theory [which] holds that the emperor Hirohito played an active, indeed a key role in preparing and planning for Japan's aggression in China against the Western powers, even taking a personal interest in germ warfare experimentation. Actually, there is something to this, but not as much as has been averred. The nineteenth-century Meiji Constitution did not create a constitutional monarchy in JApan, with a figurehead sovereign. Behind a facade of parliamentary rule, Japan was essentially an authoritarian monarchy, much as Imperial Germany or Tsarist Russia had been before World War I. The emperor retained enormous power, although he usually refrained from exercising it. ¶ This is where Hirohito's responsibility for the war lay. Not only did he fail to oppose the imposition of a militaristic regime on Japan during the early 1930s, he raised no objections to the militarists' adventurism in China. And when the armed forces asked him for a declaration of war against the Western powers, he did not hesitate to grant it. It is worth recalling in this regard that when, in mid-August of 1945, —in the aftermath of Hiroshima, the Russian invasion of Manchuria, and Nagasaki — the emperor ordered Japan to surrender, the country and its armed forces did so quickly and efficiently, despite the efforts of some militaristic fanatics to prevent it from ending. So at most, Hirohito's responsibility for the war was a sin of omission, rather than one of commission. That said, it well to remember that for most of Japan's history, the emperor was kept around as a sort of p[et by the military strongmen who actually ran the country. For the emperor to go against the generals was to risk all the power he had."

•"[Emperor Hirohito's] reign was at first characterized by a strong pro-Western stance and [he] endorsed the parliamentary• system which in practice restricted his own extensive prerogatives as Japan's supreme sovereign. The political system allowed Hirohito very limited room for initiative and when the military came to dominate politics in the 1930s, Hirohito was usually asked to endorse policies already approved by the army and the navy. He was personally opposed to the war with China and the declaration of war on the United States, but was presented in both cases with a fait accompli which he could not easily reverse. He was nevertheless unwilling for Japan to abandon its empire or to accept dishonour and as a result was a reluctant partner in the military imperialism of his cabinets."

•"Charismatic leadership was a defining characteristic of European fascism. Unlike Germany after the First World War, however, Japan retrained its monarchy, embodied in Emperors Yoshihito and Hirohito. Ultimate political authority in Japan rested in theory if not in fact— in a dynastic ruler who claimed to be descended from a goddess. For many of the ruling elite, the kokutai—the concept of national polity, based on the perceived cultural and political legitimacy of the Emperor — was the essence of Japanese politics. The cultural underpinnings of Hitler's public leadership were demonstrably different from Hirohito, whom the Japanese public never saw and whose voice was not heard until he announced Japan's surrender over the radio in 1945. In Japan, there was also no equivalent to the position of the Führer or Il Duce. Day-to-day decision-making authority was not centred in the power of one individual but in the collective decisions of the Japanese cabinet, the military, and bureaucracy. There were fifteen Japanese Prime Ministers during the Sino-Japanese War, and none came close to accumulating the power and authority of Hitler. Even one of the more powerful Japanese Prime Ministers of the period, the militarist general Tojo Hideki, was constrained by existing constitutional practices, especially the 'independent supreme command.' "

•"Prewar photographs of Emperor Hirohito (1901-89) were almost invariably formal — he was usually in uniform, often astride a white stallion. Photographers were not allowed within 45 m (50 yds). A genuine liberal, he was often blamed for not acting to stop Japan's mad rush to war. Though theoretically supreme, he had, in practice, limited powers. He appointed prime ministers, and cabinets were responsible to him —not the Diet (parliament) — as were the military. But his divine, priestly role kept him aloof from political and military decisions and he rarely expressed an opinion to his ministers."

•"Emperor Hirohito made one decision of consequence during the [Pacific] war — the decision to throw in the towel. Above all he sought to preserve the imperial line. The imperial Japanese system of government in which emperors legitimized power exercised by others has been called variously 'government by acquiescence' or a 'system or irresponsibility.' If everyone is responsible for policy then policy formation becomes anonymous so that no one is actually accountable. The primary value emphasized in decision-making was consensus reached through informal procedures."

•"Hirohito's role in operational deliberations and in policy formulation remains controversial, some claiming he rubber-stamped military policy, others that he initiated it. There is no doubt that Hirohito tried to influence policy, but he rarely displayed the type of leadership associated with strong wartime leaders. Rather, he questioned details to indicate his inclinations during the policy process. A lack of information also restricted the emperor. The privy seal and courtiers were well connected and gathered information from a number of sources. But they were few in number compared to the service staffs' and civilian ministries' bureaucracies. Those agencies offered the emperor selective, and sometimes contradictory, data in order to gain imperial support for their programs. Hirohito thus often operated on incomplete or biased information, and sometimes in near isolation. Perhaps a stronger leader could have brought the ministries and staffs into line, but that person would not be Hirohito."

•"...Compared to the almost unlimited power held by the throne under the Meiji Constitution, Emperor Hirohito, in reality, occupied a precarious and ambiguous position that existed above the highly complicated relations of a powerful political triangle composed of three sometimes competing power centers: court advisers and senior statesmen (jushin); government ministers and bureaucrats; and military leaders...The triangular power struggle was further complicated by divisions within each group between the moderates and the hardline ultranationalists and militarists. To make the situation even more complicated, the military's decisions were constrained by a twofold division within the military organization — namely, a division stemming from interservice rivalry between the army and the navy, and another division between moderate senior officers and younger militant groups within each military branch...[¶]The emperor's effectiveness at any particular time depended upon which of the three power centers had the strongest pull in a three-way political tug-of-war...[B]etween the emperor and the military (especially the army) lay complex networks of ambivalent loyalties, both personal and organizational. Although military officers had internalized the virtue of unquestioned loyalty to the emperor, they also had the audacity to believe that their expert knowledge made their judgment superior to that of the emperor when he disagreed with their recommendations. The military officers circumvented the emperor's opposition on the grounds that he had been misled by his court advisers and by politicians. By the mid-1930s the emperor became fully cognizant of the army's habitual failure to comply with his wishes: in fact, on a number of occasions the military did not follow the emperor's orders that were formally supported by the supreme command in Tokyo...[¶]After the government, military, and court advisers had reached a consensus, the emperor's personal opinion carried little weight, and imperial audiences and conferences would often result in something that was 'all show, mere eyewash for the public,' as the emperor recalled in his 1946 'Monologue.' However, in some circumstances, as when the government and the military disagreed over important national issues such as war and peace, the emperor and his court advisers could collectively tip the power balance one way or the other..."

•"...As for [Emperor Hirohito's] responsibility for Japan's war crimes in Asia, including mass executions, the use of gas and biological weapons, it seems unlikely that Hirohito was totally unaware of atrocities, particularly in China. However, there is no proof and certainly no evidence that he was in any way an instigator of policies which in the case of China, where an estimated twenty million civilians died, were in effect genocidal."

Dunnigan, James F.; Nofi, Albert A. (1995). Victory at Sea: World War II in the Pacific. New York City, NY: William Morrow & Company, Inc. ISBN 0-688-14947-2.

Drea, Edward J. (2009). Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1663-3.

Kawamura, Noriko (2015). Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War. University of Washington Press. ISBN 978-0-295-99517-5.

Kershaw, Ian (2008). Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World. London, UK: Penguin Group. ISBN 978-0-14-311372-0.

Lee, Steven Hugh (2015). "The Japanese Empire at War, 1931-1945". In Overy, Richard (ed.). The Oxford Illustrated History of World War II. Oxford University Press. pp. 35–73. ISBN 978-0-19-960582-8.

Overy, Richard (2010). World War II: The Complete Illustrated History. Carlton Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-84732-658-4.

Paine, S.C.M. (2017). The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-01195-3.

Pike, Francis (2015). Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941-1945. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. ISBN 978-1-4275-9670-3.

Wiest, Andrew; Mattson, Gregory Louis (2001). The Campaigns of World War II: The Pacific War. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company. ISBN 0-7603-1146-3.

Wright, Michael (Ed.) (1989). The World At Arms:The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II. London,UK: The Reader's Digest Association Limited. ISBN 0-89577-333-3.

Appeal by Emiya1980

Appealing user

Emiya1980 (talk · contribs · deleted contribs · logs · filter log · block user · block log) – Emiya1980 (talk) 00:09, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

Sanction being appealed

Topic-ban from infoboxes and infobox-related editing for six months, as the result of a discussion at ANI.

Editor who imposed or found consensus to impose the sanction

[[User:<Username>|<Username>]] ([[User talk:<Username>|talk]] · [[Special:Contribs/<Username>|contribs]] · [[Special:Log/block/<Username>|blocks]] · [[Special:Log/protect/<Username>|protections]] · [[Special:Log/delete/<Username>|deletions]] · [[Special:Log/move/<Username>|page moves]] · [[Special:Log/rights/<Username>|rights]] · [[Special:PrefixIndex/Wikipedia:Requests for adminship/<Username>|RfA]]) / [[User:<Username>|<Username>]] ([[User talk:<Username>|talk]] · [[Special:Contribs/<Username>|contribs]] · [[Special:DeletedContributions/<Username>|deleted contribs]] · [[Special:Log/<Username>|logs]] · filter log · [[Special:Block/<Username>|block user]] · block log)

Notification of that editor

The appealing editor is asked to notify the editor who imposed or found consensus to impose the sanction of this appeal, and then to replace this text with a diff of that notification. The appeal may not be processed otherwise.

Statement by Emiya1980

I am writing this post to appeal the 6-month topic ban on all infobox-related editing imposed on me by a body of editors and admins over on the administrative noticeboard.

Summary

When my editing was originally brought to WP:ANI in a discussion thread entitled “Emiya1980’s use of RFCs”, an admin named “Cullen328” told me to “consider [my]self formally warned for [my] suboptimal conduct regarding RFCs” and “behave appropriately regarding RFCs in the future”. When I requested specifics on what I should and should not do going forward, Cullen328 replied “I am under no obligation to instruct you on the precise circumstances when you can or cannot open an RFC” and that it was “incumbent on [me] to be fully conversant with dispute resolution procedures more broadly and RFC procedures, more specifically”. However, he also noted that his warning was “by no means an indefinite ban on my ability to open Rfcs.”

Later, at the recommendation of another editor named Remsense who contested my edits on World War II, I started a discussion on that article’s talk page concerning the order of Allied leaders listed within the infobox. During this discussion, Nick-D, an admin significantly involved in editing said page, posted that the current order of Allied leaders reflected the consensus of “dozens” of prior discussions and should not be discussed further without the involvement of “fresh surveys of references.” In the same post, Nick-D notified other editors viewing the thread that “Emiya1980 appears to have a history of starting these types of disputes and may want to comment at WP:ANI#Emiya1980's use of RFCs".

After the discussion had gone dormant for nearly a week without a consensus being reached, I proceeded to ping editors who had previously participated in a prior discussion concerning this issue; a practice seemingly allowed for by Wikipedia's guidelines. A day later, one of the editors whom I had pinged to take part in the discussion, Grandpallama, threatened to "pick the discussion of sanctions right back up" against me if I did not "drop the stick on this quasi-RfC". Nick-D subsequently posted in the thread "It's very disappointing that Emiya1980 indicated in the ANI thread that they would stop these pointless RfCs.....only to try to re-open this discussion a week after it went dormant." Viewing such replies as threats designed to silence further discussion on the matter, I dismissed them as shrill objections while pointing out said editors "conveniently failed to mention...that a significant minority in the prior [discussion] thread raised the concern that listing leaders in ANY order that was not alphabetical or chronological would only invite further dispute and at least one other editor had raised similar concerns in the current thread. I also argued that there was "not a snowball consensus in favor of listing Joseph Stalin at the top" in the prior discussion on the matter and that the lack of an official closing for said discussions suggested that this issue had not been decided in the Rfc process at all.

Result of the appeal by Emiya1980

This section is to be edited only by uninvolved administrators. Comments by others will be moved to the section above.

Discussion on WW II Talk Page

Of the two Rfcs for which you have set forth links, there is only one which concerns the placement of Allied leaders. Based on my review, the tally is as follows:

Stalin (1st): 11

Alphabetical/Chronological: 7

FDR (1st): 5

Neutral/Two Separate Boxes:

Davis, Norman (2006). No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939–1945. Viking. ISBN 978-0-670-01832-1.

•"Wars cannot be fought without regard for 'the sinews of war'. And here is another sphere in which the Western Powers, and one Western power in particular, excelled. Though the USA was the last of the major combatant states to enter the fray and its delayed contribution to ground fighting was relatively limited, there can be no doubt that its contribution to the war's logistics was of primary significance."

Response to WhatAmIDoing

Yes, I do have other interests besides changing the lede image. However, that is not the point here.

In addition to accusing me of wasting other editors' time in nearly all the Rfcs I've opened this year, Nemov has begun resorting to turning said threads into a referendum of my conduct as an editor (whether directly by making a mini-discussion of how disruptive my pinging of other editors is or indirectly by making links to what they see as unproductive conduct on my part in another thread). One trend I have noticed in all this editor's posts in the threads I have participated is they are consistently in favor of status quo and are dismissive of any rationale offered in opposition to it (regardless of how justified).

I admit to testing the limits of what I can get away with in regards to building consensus. However, as evidenced by my recent interaction with you......

Counterargument in RFC About WSS

I disagree. The fact the article does not flat-out state that U.S.-WSS collaboration contributed to the outbreak of the Korean War is beside the point. Alleging the existence of an alliance between the U.S. terrorists engaged in hostilities with North Korea since its inception reframes Pyongyang's aggression towards the South as acts of self-defense. This is especially the case given that the article alleges that the first instance of such collaboration transpired from January to September 1946, a timeframe which not predates all North Korean attacks on South Korea but coincides with the WSS's numerous assassination attempts on North Korean leaders.

Existing Scholarship Re: the Origins of the Korean War

(a) Halberstam, David (1993). The Fifties. New York City, New York: Random House Publishing Group. ISBN 0-449-90933-6.

• "It was a war that no one wanted, in a desolate, harsh land. The same policymakers who decreed the necessity for fighting there had only months before declared it of little strategic value and outside our defense perimeter...South Korea became important only after the ?North Korean Communists struck in the night; its value was psychological rather than strategic — the enemy had crossed a border"

• "Eventually, [the U.S.] created a government in the South, headed by Synghman Rhee, a volatile, manipulative figure, whose main appeal to us was the he had spent most of his life in exile in America. He spoke good English, had three degrees from American universities, and since he had been out of the country for most of his life, he had not collaborated with the Japanese. He was one of the early postwar anti-Communist dictators, with an instinctive tendency to arrest almost anyone who did not agree with him. Only by comparison was his counterpart in the North, Kim Il Sung, did he gain: Sung not only arrested his enemies; he frequently had them summarily executed. Though Rhee, by dint of his intense anti-Communism, had something of a political base in the American Congress, no one who dealt with him directly, either in Washington or Seoul, seemed to like him, certainly not the people at State or Defense. He made them particularly nervous by constantly boasting of his desire to roll back the 38th parallel and rule the entire country. As we were desperately cutting back our military forces, the 30'000 Americans troops assigned to Korea seemed a disproportionate number to many. General Hodge pushed constantly for the removal of combat troops (most significantly himself). By the fall of 1948, we struck a deal with the Russians: We would both withdraw our regular troops , in effect leaving behind proxy armies. At Rhee's request, we left only one regimental combat team until June 1949. Our role was to be solely advisory and Rhee's troopers were to become combat-ready, but because of Rhee's jingoism and his constant threats to strike above the 38th parallel, we deliberately limited his force, minimizing his air power and tanks."

• "...[The United States] seemed to want no part of the country, and yet we had planted the flag. Deigning to come to Seoul to participate in Rhee's inauguration, [Douglas] MacArthur told Rhee with casual but typical grandiosity, 'If Korea should ever be attacked by the Communists, I will defend it as I would California.' That being said, America was rapidly withdrawing from South Korea, leaving only an advisory mission behind. We were leaving behind something of an unloved and unattrative government with a new, uncertain ragtag army; the Soviets, by contrast, were leaving behind the real thing: a tough, modern dictatorship with a strong, well-trained well-armed military force."

• "With the aid of the Soviets, [Kim Il Sung] created the North Korean People's Army, or In Min Gun. It was composed of ten divisions, some 135,000 men; its commanders were , more often than not, Koreans who had fought along with the Chinese Communists during their historic defeat of Chiang's army. Most importantly,the Russians left behind about 150 T-34 tanks, one of the most effective weapons against the Germans in World War Two. [¶] Rhee was not the only Korean leader who boasted he would conquer the entire peninsula; Kim Il Sung was every bit as audacious. In the fall of 1949, his boasts escalated. A nervous Rhee pushed the Americans for an exanded army and more hardware; but the Americans, suspicious of Rhee's real intentions, refused. In late 1949 and in the early months of 1950 there was an increasing number of border clashes, almost all of them initiated by the North, whose forces seemed to be probing the Republic of Korea's (ROK) positions. Reports of an imminent North Korean invasion began coming back to American intelligence officers in Seoul. Those reports proved true on the night of June 25. Why Kim Il Sung chose to invade the South no one has ever been entirely sure. Certainly, he was contemptuous of the leaders of the South and their army. There is some evidence he was encouraged by both the Soviets and the Chinese (in his memoirs, Khrushchev noted that Kim had promised Stalin a quick victory), and it seems that Mao told Kim the Americans would not intervene. Certainly, a statement made by Dean Acheson at the National Press Club in January 1950 left Korea out of the American defensive perimeter in Asia. 'Dean really blew it on that one,' Averell Harriman said years later."

(b) Jennings, Peter; Brewster, Todd (1998). The Century . Doubleday. ISBN 0-385-48327-9.

• "...[T]here was plenty [of evidence] to suggest that the Russians meant to press communism on a growing portion of the world's geography, that Korea might be just the first of several Asian nations on the Soviet wish list, and that only America was in a position to stop them. As such, the Korean war would mark a turning point in American life, the initiation of the nation into its new self-appointe3d status as the free world's protector. How times had changed. Wishing to avoid foreign commitments, America had argued vigorously before entering the century' two world wars. Now, seizing their new identity, they left the serenity of their prefabricated homes and marched off willingly to defend a nation most of them had never even heard of. [¶] The Korean War began when the North, with the blessing of Stalin, invaded the South, but it took a bloody turn for the worse when the Chinese Communists joined in, led by stome of the same fighting men who had defeated Chiang only months before. The attitude of the American soldier was naive, at best. Many figured they would be but a week in Korea,...then head home. They believed Truman when he described their mission as a 'police action', as if they were going to Asia not for war, but to bang the heads of a few delingquents discovered breaking into the corner drugstore. In fact, three years would pass before the fighting in Korea was done, leaving that nation ravaged, but divided politically much as it had been when the conflict began. And for that outcome, fifty-four thousand Americans and over two million Koreans would die."

(c) Zelizer, Julian (2010). Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security — From World War II to the War on Terrorism . Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-02850-4.

• "...The tensions in Korea dated back to the end of World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union divided that country. Korea had been annexed by Japan in 1910, and FDR, Churchilll, and Stalin had agreed in 1943, at a meeting in Cairo, that the allies would take control of Japanese holdings after the war. Based on the argument that Korea was not yet ready for independence, the Soviets and Americans retained control over the territory, dividing it into two zones in August 1945. In 1948 the Soviets helped establish a government in the North under Premier Kim Il Sun, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Based on a 1947 U.N. resolution calling for elections, which the United States pushed, a vote was held in South Korea in 1948, in which Syngman Rhee, an ally of the United States, became president. The U.N. recognized Rhee's Republic of Korea as the legitimate Korean government. While the United States and the Soviet Union withdrew their forces after their puppet governments were established, clashes between the North and South continued at the 38th parallel. Kim Il Sung pressured Stalin to provide military and economic support for a northern invasion of the South to unify the country under communism, but the Soviet leader initially opposed the request because he feared triggering war with the United States. [¶] Those fears diminished by the summer of 1950, however, due to the perception that American interest in defending South Korea was not strong. During the late 1940s, American policy makers in both parties had seemed uninterested in Korea. In January 1950, the House had rejected an administration request to provide $150 million in economic and military aid to South Korea. The opposition included many Republicans and southern Democrats who had been persuaded by Pentagon warning that the money would not have any effect on Korean civil tensions and who were angry the administration was not using those funds to support Chiang Kai-shek. In a speech in January 1950, Secretary of State acheson did not include South Korea in the 'defensive perimeter' he envisioned for the region. Soviet and North Korean officials took this to mean that the United States would not respond to aggression. Stalin finally agreed to the invasion, and four months later Mao Zedong gave his support."

Lowell family holdings

• Boott Mills
• Boston Manufacturing Company
• Putnam, Bell & Russell

Pre-War Politics of the Japanese Navy

Rise of the Fleet Faction

• "The upshot of the London treaty was a divided navy. According to an estimate by the naval intellectual Rear Admiral Takagi Sōkichi, the navy's political influence in national affairs, which normally amounted at most to one-third that of the army, was reduced to a fourth or a fifth. Yet from this weakened position, the navy contended with the army to increase its share of the budget and war materiel. After the mid-1930s, Japan's national policy was increasingly influenced by army-navy rivalry."

• "The navy's division after the London Conference gave the Katō-Suetsugu group a chance to expand its influence, with the backing of disgruntled senior officers. Behind Katō were Fleet Admiral Tōgō—the naval demigod— and his minion, Vice Admiral Ogasawara (Ret.). Both had strenuously opposed the treaty.In January 1933 the fleet faction was strengthened when Admiral Ōsumi, a hardliner and opponent of naval limitation was appointed navy minister with the backing of Tōgō, Ogasawara, and Katō Kanji. The first step to strengthen the fleet faction was to install imperial Prince Fushimi, the only remaining fleet admiral after Tōgō died as chief of the Naval General Staff in February 1932. Already at the time of the London Naval Conference, Prince Fushimi had sided with the fleet faction...During his long and undistinguished tenure as chief of the Naval General Staff, February 1932 to April 1941, his vice chiefs invoked the august name of the prince to press the navy minister into acquiescing in the demands of the Naval General Staff. Further, as a member of the imperial family, Fushimi was not to be held accountable for any error or misjudgment. Because nobody could restrain him, he tended to be dogmatic, which only impeded the navy's policy making. As relations with the United States deteriorated, he displeased the emperor with his hard-line recommendations. In October 1941, Fushimi presented 'extremely belligerent arguments' about policy toward the United States, profoundly disappointing the emperor. In April 1941, Navy Minister Oikawa Koshirō told Vice Admiral Inoue, head of the Naval Aviation Department, that the ailing Fushimi wished to retire and asked his opinion. Inoue supported his retirement . As he explained, a prince of the blood was simply not brought up to assume such a position at such a critical time. But even after he retired in April 1941, Fushimi retained the right to have his say in the appointment of top leaders, especially navy ministers."

• "A second important move to strengthen the fleet faction was to restructure the Naval General Staff after the manner of the army. Traditionally, the power of the chief of the Naval General Staff had been subordinate to that of the Navy Minister. Even regarding high-command matters (operations), the chief had customarily sought the consent of the minister before making a presentation to the throne. This tradition of the Navy Ministry's primacy over the Naval General Staff had prevailed until the London Naval Conference."

•"As already noted, Rear Admiral Satō Tetsutarō, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, attempted in 1915 to enhance the authority of the chief of the Naval General Staff and angered Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō, then vice chief and absolutely opposed to a system of civilian navy ministers, planned to revise the regulations of the Naval General Staff to expand its authority. He ordered his protégé, Captain Takahashi, a leader of the fleet faction, to draft a plan, but he did not dare present it as long as Katō Tomosaburō was alive. The plan was revived when Takahashi became vice chief of the Naval General Staff in February 1932. Fushimi ordered Takahashi to revise the Naval General Staff regulations to enlarge its power. Disgruntled with the Washington and London treaties, Prince Fushimi believed these treaties were a result of the weak-kneed policy of Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō and his successors. The only way to rectify the deplorable situation, Prince Fushimi, believed was to strengthen the Naval General Staff.

"This time, circumstances were far more favorable. The London treat controversy had given rise to a demand, inside and outside the navy, to establish the right of the supreme command. The 15 May (1932) Incident in which a group of young naval officers played a leading role in the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, had an electrifying effect upon the navy, dramatizing the need to placate young malcontents. A revision of the Naval General Staff regulations would help appease hot-blooded young officers. Japan's external situation also favored the revision. In a postwar reminiscence, Takahashi admitted that one of his aims was to be prepared for war with the United States; he feared that the Shanghai Incident of 1932 might cause a Japanese-American War."

Road to Pearl Harbor

• "In August 1938 the navy took up the question of a military alliance with Germany proposed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi Party's foreign minister. Germany's objective was to use the Japnese navy to deter American intervention in the European war against Germany. Any German alliance would be an ill-fated match between sea power and land power, and no faithful disciples of Mahan would condone such a marriage of convenience. Yonai, Yamamoto and Inoue opposed the alliance because of the risk of alienating, even fighting, the United States. [¶] But the Yonai-Yamamoto-Inoue trio was from the beginning a minority within the navy. They were outnumbered by the pro-German faction and also had to contend with army supporters of an alliance with Germany. Among the middle-echelon pro-German forces were Captain Oka Takazumi, chief of the First Section of the Naval Affairs Bureau; Commander Shiba Katsuo of the same section; Commander Shiba Katsuo of the same section; Commander Kami Shigenori of the Operations Section; Commander Fujii Shigeru of the Second Section; and Yokoi Tadao, war guidance officer. Kami, Shiba, and Yokoi were Nazi sympathizers, having returned from the attache's office in Berlin. Their views were revealed in a remark made in the summer of 1938 by Rear Admiral Inagaki Ayao of the Naval Aviation Department to German naval attache Paul W. Wenneker: 'For different reasons, Germany and Japan have the same interest in 'smashing' England. Both countries need a few more years before they are sufficiently armed for this.' Such an anti-British sentiment would soon be imbued with an anti-American view. In July 1939 Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake, who had been stationed in Germany in 1935—1937 and would soon be vice chief of the Naval General Staff, told Wenneker that he 'did not believe that it will come to a war with England and America. Even if it should, it is manifest that the one opponent worthy of attention, America, can do practically nothing to get the better of Japan militarily.' "

• "On October 27, Prince Fushimi urged Shimada to decide on war. 'Unless we speedily open hostilities, we shall lose the opportune moment to strike.' Prince Shimada was more responsive to Prince Fushimi's war advocacy than to the emperor's desire for peace. Shimada succumbed, and on October 30 he reached his decision to go to war, although he admitted that it had been barely ten days since he was appointed and that he had not had time to study the matter carefully. He told Sawamoto and Oka, 'As it is, there is no telling when the United States will make a preemptive strike.' The U.S. fleet would steam out across the Pacific in full force as soon as Japan ran out of fuel and its fleet was stranded. 'Japan's operational plan will be completely nullified and our chance for victory will disappear.' "

Oka Takazumi

Oka Takazumi (1890 – 1973) was a Japanese admiral and politician. He served as Chief of the Navy Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau from 1940 to 1944.

Oka graduated from the Naval Academy in 1911 and subsequently completed his education at the Naval Staff College in 1923. In October 1940, he was appointed Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, an office whereby he presided over all policy-making within the Japanese Navy.

In the years leading up to the outbreak of the Pacific War, Admiral Oka.....

Links

https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/lord-stokes-of-leyland-19142008-150333

http://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Wikipedia:Splitting

Excerpts about Union Pacific Railroad

•"The Central Pacific Railroad existed prior to the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, but the act itself established the Union Pacific. It was the first corporation chartered by the federal government since the Bank of the United States, and initially it was a mere shell. The Union Pacific would not take on a real existence until commissioners appointed by Congress opened its subscription books and sold two thousand shares. Only then could the purchasers organize the railroad."

•"When the company opened its subscription books in September of 1862, it sold only twenty shares of stock, and the Union Pacific remained moribund until 1863 when Thomas Clark Durant took hold of it...¶With no one else investing, Durant and [George Francis] Train could take control with little investment of their own. They purchased shares, paid for in part from speculations in contraband cotton, and lent the 10 percent initial subscription price to others. This, too, was a speculation and a relatively small one. Durant's fifty shares had a par price of $50,000, but his 10 percent down represented an investment of only $5,000, and since only $500, or $10 per share,, had to appear in the corporate treasury in cash , it is unclear how much actual money was ever involved. By 1863,Durant had gotten enough stock subscription to organize the Union Pacific."

Harriman family

Harriman family
E.H. Harriman William Averell Harriman Kathleen Harriman
Current region	New York, U.S.
Place of origin	England
Founder	Orlando Harriman
Connected families	Digby family Mortimer family
Estate(s)	Arden (estate)

•"In the early twentieth century [Edward H.] Harriman controlled a network of 25,000 miles which included the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific, and the Illinois Central."

List of businesses owned by the Harriman family

• Avco
• Brown Brothers Harriman
• Central of Georgia Railway
• Illinois Central Railroad
• Log Cabin Stable
• Merchant Shipbuilding Corporation
• Pacific Mail Steamship Company
• Polaroid Corporation
• Silesian-American Corporation
• Southern Pacific Railroad
• St. Joseph and Grand Island Railway
• Union Banking Corporation
• Union Pacific Railroad
• United American Lines
• Wells Fargo (1852–1998)

List of businesses owned by the Biddle family

• American Tobacco
• Bailey Banks & Biddle
• Cumberland Valley Railroad
• Detroit & St. Joseph Railroad
• Philadelphia Age
• Philadelphia Savings Fund Society
• Second Bank of the United States
• St. Regis Hotels & Resorts
• Supplee-Biddle Hardware Company
• Thomas A. Biddle & Co.

Fish Family

• Illinois Central Railroad
• Kean, Taylor & Co.
• Manhattan Company
• The Nation

Duke family

Duke family
Washington Duke James "Buck" Duke Angier Biddle Duke
Current region	North Carolina, U.S.
Place of origin	England
Founder	Thomas Duke
Connected families	Biddle family
Estate(s)	Benjamin N. Duke House James B. Duke House Falcon Lair Shangri La

Duke family holdings

• American Tobacco Company
• Duke Energy

Rudolf Hess

•Private Secretary to the Fuhrer of the Nazi Party: 26 February 1925—12 August 1935.
•Chief of the Foreign Service Office of the Nazi Party: 3 October 1933

Getty family

Businesses

• August Getty Atelier
• Getty Images
• Getty Oil
• Grove Weidenfeld
• Purplehaus Productions
• ReFlow

Leonid Brezhnev

Wikipedia Rough Draft

In 1968, Podgorny was among the loudest voices in the Politburo who pressured Brezhnev into invading Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring.

Charting Leonid Brezhnev's Consolidation of Power

•"...[O]n October 14, 1964, Khrushchev was abruptly ousted from power. His protege Brezhnev was one of the leaders of the mutiny. He was chosen as first secretary of the party, and Aleksei Kosygin was named head of the government. At the Twenty-third Party Congress in March 1966, Brezhnev's title reverted from 'first secretary' to the Stalinist-era usage, 'general secretary,' and the party 'Presidium' was renamed the 'Politburo,' symbolically concluding Khrushchev's de-Stalinization drive.[¶] Initially, the collective leadership seemed to work. Brezhnev concerned himself with party affairs and relations within the international Communist movement, while Kosygin focused on the economy and ties with the noncommunist world. But by the early 1970s Brezhnev had eclipsed Kosygin. The party leader took over Kosygin's role as the Kremlin spokesman in international affairs and its chief negotiator with foreign powers. By the time Kosygin resigned in 1980, his influence on economic issues had similarly declined.[¶] In 1976 Brezhnev was named marshal of the Soviet Union, the nation's highest military rank, and his position as chairman of the USSR Defense Council – commander in chief of Soviet armed forces – was publicly acknowledged for the first time. [¶] Brezhnev had another rival, Nikolai Podgornyi, dismissed in 1977 as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet so that he could assume the post. Also in 1977 the Soviet Union adopted a new constitution, which was drafted under Brezhnev's supervision."

•"Brezhnev's rise to power took a first decisive turn at the April 1966 Plenum of the Central Committee which reestablished the title of 'General Secretary', replaced after Stalin's death by 'First Secretary'. Even if essentially a symbolic change, it confirmed Brezhnev's ascendancy in the party apparatus, an evolution already visible at the Twenty-Third Party Congress in February of the same year. The Czechoslovak events of 1968 marked another turn in leadership politics. It was the first major external crisis that the new Politburo faced...[its] impact on Brezhnev's position of power was undoubtedly positive. The General Secretary conducted talks with the Czech leaders – a task corresponding to his top party function. In the spring, and up to the month of August, he favoured a compromise solution. When pressures toward intervention rose dramatically, he rallied the supporters of a military solution and became the man of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' of limited sovereignty in Eastern Europe. From then on, his stature in the leadership was consolidated and he further strengthened his authority by promoting his dominant role in an active foreign policy, centered on detente with the United States. It was during the initial stage of East-West detente that Brezhnev imposed himself as the supreme representative of the Soviet Union in world politics. 1971 was the crucial year. He then took precedence over Premier Kosygin in the conduct of negotiations and in summit meetings. In May 1971, Kosygin still signed the communique on SALT with President Nixon. In August, Brezhnev had his first long conversation with a Western head of government, Willy Brandt, who recalled that 'this was clearly the stage at which Brezhnev had resolved – and been empowered – to take personal charge of important aspects of Soviet policy towards the West'. The most striking sign of Brezhnev's newly-achieved 'one-man leadership' in diplomacy emerged in the conduct of Soviet-French relations. In October 1970, French President Pompidou went to Moscow on an official visit. He was welcomed by the'troika'; Podgorny made a speech on the first day of the visit, Kosygin on the second day, and Brezhnev did not speak at all. In the months that preceded the return visit of the Soviet leadership to France, due in October 1971, the French executive did not know who to expect. Would the USSR be represented by the 'troika' or by the General Secretary? Brezhnev came to Paris alone, with neither Kosygin nor Podgorny, and he was received with honours normally reserved to a head of state."

•"Brezhnev had greatly asserted his authority at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971, where he clearly acted as the dominant leader. He also enlarged the Politburo by bringing in four new members, three of whom certainly were his nominees. In the following years, he steadfastly pursued a personal strategy of power consolidation consisting of three main elements: first, to secure his own majority in the Politburo by eliminating Shelest, Voronov, Shelepin, Podgorny and Mazurov, replacing them by his proteges; second, to lead a dynamic Soviet diplomacy without antagonising the 'Foreign Policy Establishment'; third, to cumulate titles, honours and powers in a burgeoning 'personality cult'."

•"At the conclusion of the 24th Congress, Brezhnev had secured an apparent downgrading of Aleksei Kosygin in the collective leadership and had placed two of his clients on the ruling Politburo. Within the next two years, Piotr Shelest was removed from the leadership in the Ukraine and then dropped from the Politburo; Gennadi Voronov was ousted as premier of the RSFSR and later booted out of the Politburo; and Dmitri Polyansky was demoted from first deputy prime minister to minister of agriculture. During this period, Brezhnev's dominant position in foreign affairs was spotlighted by personal triumphs at the summit meetings of 1972 and 1973. Between 1971 and 1973, the three party hierarchs—Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kirilenko—appeared to form a highly cohesive bloc, and the other two members of the troika evidently fully supported Brezhnev's assumption of authority."

•"Whereas Khrushchev had taken over the control of Soviet foreign policy by circumventing to a large extent the various party and state institutions involved in diplomacy and defence policy, Brezhnev based his power on the collaboration of these institutions and on the cooption of their chiefs into the Party leadership. At the April 1973 Central Committee plenum, KGB chief Andropov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defence Minister Grechko, acceded to full membership in the Politburo. The enhanced legitimacy of these powerful institutions carried a political risk of a substantial increase also in their power, but their power ambitions seem to have been carefully moderated, at least until the very last years of Brezhnev's rule when various signs indicated tensions with the army and the KGB."

•"In close collaboration with Gromyko and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which did not exclude a predilection for working with a team of selected informal advisers, General Secretary Brezhnev conducted an active policy of detente in the early 1970s. He held numerous meetings with major Western leaders; he signed the 1972 SALT I treaty and the Helsinki Accord of July 1975. The Soviet party leader thus acted as if he were a head of state or head of government, an anomaly which did not pose serious problems in international or bilateral relations. Brezhnev nevertheless was not satisfied with what he saw as an embarrassing limitation on his authority. In June 1977, he succeeded in having Podgorny replaced by himself as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. As in the case of Malenkov, Molotov, Shelest, Shelepin and other demoted leaders, foreign policy disagreements played a part in Podgorny's ousting from the politburo and from the Supreme Soviet. He appears to have defended a 'softer' position in relations with the West and more restraint in defense spending. However, it seems reasonable to argue that such policy divergences were catalysts for, rather than a fundamental cause of, their removals which are best understood in terms of pure power politics inside the power elite."

•"Brezhnev justified the cumulation of the highest party and state functions [in his hands]. He said that it reflected the party's 'leading and guiding role' and that it was a logical legalisation' of the General Secretary's representation of the Soviet state in international relations. We may surmise that he was above all motivated by personal ambition and by his great weakness for honours and titles. His assumption of the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet occurred in a period of increased acquisition of military titles and authority. In 1976, Brezhnev was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union and for the first time referred to as the Chairman of the Defence Council. In 1977, it was revealed that he held the title of supreme commander of the Soviet Armed Forces. [¶] By the end of 1977, Brezhnev had accumulated impressive powers in his hands. But he had already reached the zenith of his career and his personal authority was not further enhanced by the personality cult which coincided in the late 1970s and early 1980s with growing inertia in domestic as well as foreign affairs. The process of authority-building had come to a halt, for the major motors of this process– personnel changes at the highest level and the personal conduct of a dynamic foreign policy — had virtually stopped, in large party because of Brezhnev's declining health. AT the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress in 1981, not a single change affected the composition of the Politburo. The remarkable stability of the top leadership reflected the immobilism which had stricken Soviet political life and socioeconomic policies; Brezhnev had consolidated and secured his power in a context of internal stagnation. The lack of policy innovation seemed to have contributed to the stability of the regime, a regime working on the basis of consensual rule, despite the personality cult which gave a distorted image of the real exercise of power. Brezhnev himself repeatedly expressed his respect for collective decision, openly sought Politburo validation for his initiatives and acknowledged the important work being done behind the scenes by party and state officials. He unveiled some of the mystery that clouds Soviet institutions and gave some information on the respective roles of the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Central Committee departments and the ministries. His efforts at 'institutionalising' the Soviet system of government found their consecration in the 1977 Constitution which defines the identity and function of the various party and state organs.n Brezhnev drew particular attention to the foreign policy machine. In his Report to the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in February 1976, he paid an unprecedented tribute to the men and institutions participating in the making of foreign policy. He thus laid special emphasis on the successes of Soviet diplomacy in the first half of the 1970s, successes which greatly assisted his drive for power."

•"The record suggest that at least up to the late 1960s the power and authority of the new General Secretary were hardly adequate to ensure coherent and expeditious top-level decision-making. From about 1969 [Brezhnev's] primacy gradually became more evident and soon a 'cult' emerged embodying formulas that marked him out as clearly superordinated over the other party and state leaders. Gradually he succeeded in insinuating old cronies into high level posts and the first of them appeared in the top executive bodies. In 1977 Brezhnev was able to add to the General Secretaryship the post of President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a post whose importance had been builty up in the preceding years. In his last years in office the 'cult' intensified and several more of his old associates were added to the top executive."

•"While the new leaders de-emphasized the kind of individual dominance that Khrushchev personified, one of them – Leonid I. Brezhnev – gradually emerged as the leading figure in fact as well as title. During Brezhnev's eighteen-year regime (1964-1982) the Soviet Union built itself into a military superpower with client states around the world. But the USSR's success in the military sphere was not matched in other areas of Soviet society. The living standard of Soviet citizens fell and internal dissent grew as the aging Brezhnev leadership resisted change into the 1980s."

•"Brezhnev's power increased as the positions of Shelepin and Pogornyi were weakened. Shelepin's downfall came about after rumors surfaced in 1965 that Brezhnev might be replaced. Shelepin's associates were believed to have started the rumors, and the other Politburo members resented this type of 'inspired leak' as Sovietologist Harry Gelman has termed it. Brezhnev rivals and allies joined to form a coalition against Shelepin. He was stripped of his deputy-premiership in December 1965 and over the next ten years gradually lost the rest of his power, as his associates were demoted. Despite this erosion, Shelepin retained enough influence for some time to help instigate anti-Brezhnev confrontations whenever Brezhnev was vulnerable on an issue. He was not removed from the Politburo until 1975. [¶] Brezhnev's other top rival, Podgornyi, also was neutralized in stages. Opportunistic fence-sitters deserted Podgornyi as Brezhnev's strength became more apparent. Podgornyi's stand on several important issues also had hurt his image among many colleagues. In particular, he had offended the military by urging cuts in defense spending and arguing for increased investment in consumer goods industries. During the 1970s Podgornyi remained an influential figure, but he was no longer a serious threat to Brezhnev's authority. In 1977 he was removed from the Politburo, and Brezhnev replaced him as president."

•"By the April 1973 session of the Central Committee of the Communist party, Brezhnev was firmly in control. Brezhnev's power had eclipsed Kosygin's, and the party boss was clearly first among equals. At this meeting, two men thought to be hard-line conservatives critical of Brezhnev's opening to the West – Petr Shelest, former first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and Gennadii Vorononov, former president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic – were dropped from the Politburo. The Central Committee on April 27 endorsed 'entirely and without reservation' the policy of detente with the West that bore Brezhnev's personal imprint. The Central Committee also cited the 'important role played personally by Leonid Brezhnev.'"

•"The consolidation of Brezhnev's personal dominance took several years as the collective leadership established in 1964 died a lingering death. Brezhnev brought in personal associates such as K.U. Chernenko to buttress his position. In May 1977 he replaced Podgorny as President, and in October 1980 the last of the triumvirate that had come to power in 1964, the ailing Kosygin, was replaced as Prime Minister by the octogenarian N. Tikhonov. Elements of the old collective leadership did not altogether disappear, as Mikhail Suslov retained his stifling guardianship of Soviet ideological orthodoxy. His death in January 1982 presaged the end of the Brezhnev era."

•"Control of the police [in the post-Khrushchev collective leadership] was once again divided. In September 1966, Brezhnev moved to establish his control over the uniformed police by appointing his long-time associate Nikolai Shchelokov as minister of internal affairs, but the security police remained outside his control. In 1967 removal of Aleksandr Shelepin from the Secretariat where he supervised the police and removal of close associate Vladimir Semichastnyi from the KGB gave Brezhnev the opportunity in 1967 to purge the police of Shelepintsy (allies of Shelepin), but he did not gain control of the secret police. Control was balanced by the collective leadership through the alternating layering of associates. Brezhnev's associate Nikolai Savinkin became head of the Party department supervising the police (Administrative Organs Department), and Brezhnev's brother-in-law (Semen K. Tsvigun) became first deputy chair of the KGB and associates Viktor M. Chebrikov and Georgii Tsinev became deputy chairmen of the secret police organization. Yet, to keep control of the police divided and to block any threat to the first-tier balance between the layers of Brezhnev associates, in the hands of independent political figure Yurii Andropov, who was not a dependent client of the general secretary"

•"...When Brezhnev succeeded in gaining the transfer of Podgorny from the Secretariat, the collective leadership still checked Brezhnev's control of Party personnel policy by bringing up Ivan Kapitonov to counterbalance Brezhnev's associate Andrei Kirilenko."

•"Brezhnev's institutional powers as General Secretary were extensive and conferred more than a primus inter pares role within the decision-making process. But as the head of a large patronage network he was able to expand that influential power base to encompass a wider range of political institutions. His power was thus unrivaled from the mid-1960s up to his death in late 1982. As a result of Brezhnev's factional strength and institutional prerogatives, loyal entourage members were promoted into top governmental organs, including the Council of Ministers Presidium. By the height of Brezhnev's authority in the mid-1970s, nearly half of the members of the Presidium were Brezhnev proteges. A number of his trusted associates and other extended network members were Vice Chairmen serving immediately beneath rival Chairman Aleksei Kosygin: Nikolai Tikhonov (Kosygin's eventual successor), I.V. Arkhipov, I.T. Novikov, V.N. Novikov, and L.V Smirnov. These politicians were all of Brezhnev's generation; several of them were part of the 'Dnepropetrovsk mafia.' Their high-level supervisory positions within the government made them responsible for important policy areas, some of which were critical to the broader Brezhnev program (e.g., foreign trade relations, defense technology, machine building, and construction). These proteges represented an important extension of the Brezhnev faction's influence into a potentially less reliable policy-implementing hierarchy: a hierarchy not only organizationally separated from Brezhnev's institutional home turf, but also headed by one of Brezhnev's rivals."

•"July 1970 to November 1982: Brezhnev exercised limited directive leadership, but he remained constrained by the leaders with whom he came to office. Through slow elimination of Shelepin (1975) and Podgornyi (1977) from the Politburo, Brezhnev strengthened his hand but then saw his grip weaken with old age and failing health."

•"Despite all these rivals for power, during the first eighteen months after Khrushchev's ouster Brezhnev managed to extend his power base in a number of ways. It was inevitable that some of Khrushchev's cronies would be replaced. These removals opened slots that Brezhnev filled to his advantage, although he sometimes was forced to compromise. ONe change that benefited Brezhnev was the promotion of his close associate, Konstantin U. Chernenko, to the post of secretary of the General Department of the Central Committee in 1965."

•"Brezhnev was [...] not so wedded to the stability of cadres that he would endanger his own position. On numerous occasions regional leaders and Politburo colleagues were removed from their posts. In his early years in office, Brezhnev oversaw the removal of half of the regional leaders in the Soviet Union. This installation of his own team was the typical move of a man familiar with the machinations of Soviet politics. Nor was he afraid to remove competitors–or simply those he deemed misplaced–from the Politburo, with the high-level careers of Polyanksy, Voronov, Podgorny, Shelepin, and Shelest all coming to an end at Brezhnev's behest. In the latter two cases at least, it appears that strong potential rivals were removed from the scene by the same sort of decisive action which had seen an end to Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet Union."'

•"...In October 1964, Brezhnev became First Secretary (renamed General Secretary in 1966) of the Party with Aleksei Kosygin taking over as USSR Prime Minister, and Nikolai Podgorny becoming Soviet President. Just as after Stalin's death there was a collective leadership but Brezhnev wanted to become boss. His opportunity came in 1968 when the Prague Spring developed to such an extent that it appeared that the Communist Party of Czechoslovaki might lose power. In August 1968 the Soviet Union and several of its allies intervened and began the process of 'normalisation'. Brezhnev, as Party leader, took prime position during the conflict because Czechoslovakia was a socialist country and therefore under the supervision of the Soviet Communist Party. Kosygin who had launched some useful reforms, was pushed aside as economic orthodoxy became the order of the day. He lacked the political guts to fight for primacy. By 1969, one can regard Brezhnev as top dog."

•"Despite the actuarial probabilities, when Leonid Brezhnev addressed the 25th Congress of the CPSU in February 1976, he appeared to be at the peak of his personal authority. Appearances were not entirely deceiving: since the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had become virtually the sole spokesman of the regime on foreign policy, and the initiation of détente had featured recognition of USSR parity with the USA as a superpower. The period had also been marked by further inroads on the party of the general secretary into the governmental sector and the elimination of several opponents from the upper echelons of the party. [¶] Long-time foe Alexander Shelepin had been ousted from the Politburo in 1975, and a few days after Brezhnev's congress speech, Dmitri Polyansky was dropped from the Politburo just before his consignment to Japan as ambassador. Clearly, there was no conceivable threat from any individual to Brezhnev's personal ascendancy...[¶] Within a few months after the congress, there were further evidences of Brezhnev's supremacy. He was named a marshal of the Soviet Union, and a bust of the leader was unveiled in his home town of Dnepropetrovsk. Subsequently, in 1976, busts of Podgorny and Suslov were unveiled in their hometowns, followed in 1977 by one for Kirilenko. The latter actions may have been dictated by the need to reassert the principle of collective leadership...But the additions did little to mar the image of Brezhnev as sole leader, particularly since the honoring of Podgorny was followed a year later by his dismissal from all party and state positions. Moreover, the accumulation of external signs of authority by Brezhnev was to continue through the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981. [¶] These visible symbols of authority did not, however, coincide with the realities of power inside the Soviet system. In retrospect, it appears that Brezhnev had achieved his fullest measure of personal power over the Soviet system between the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 and the Central Committee plenum of April 1973."

•"The political changes which took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968, saw Brezhnev play a major and discreditable part in the crushing of the Prague Spring. Since they involved another ruling Communist Party, the events of 1968 helped to propel Brezhnev into the position of principal spokesman for the Soviet Union on international policy."

•"The fourth stage of the 'further gradual consolidation of Brezhnev's power' noted by Rakowska-Harmstone came in 1973 as the representation of the 'power ministries' in the Politburo was increased. Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, and KGB Chairman Yurii Andropov were all elected voting members of the Politburo at the Central Committee plenum in April 1973, thereby balancing the influence of the party apparatus, and decreasing Brezhnev's vulnerability to opposition from that quarter."

•"To observe...that Brezhnev pursued a cautious strategy vis-a-vis other important elements of the party and that his own style of leadership stressed consensus building rather than confrontation does not obscure the fact that there were obvious, politically-motivated dismissals from the Politburo during his tenure in office. Nikolai Podgornyi, an apparent challenger in the first years after Khrushchev's fall, was neutralized late in 1965 through his transfer from the politically important Secretariat to the essentially ceremonial post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the "president" of the Soviet Union), and then dropped from the Politburo altogether in 1977 when he apparently resisted Brezhnev's attempts to assume that post. ¶A similar fate befell Alexander Shelepin, who as also regarded as a contender for higher office in the mid-1960s. From his background as head of the KGB he was initially appointed by the new leadership to head the Party/State Control Committee, a post which he held until it was restructured as the less threatening People's Control Committee in December, 1965, at which time he also lost his position as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Another telling blow came in the summer of 1967, when he was removed from the Secretariat altogether and appointed to the far less significant post of chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council. Despite these obvious demotions, e remained a member of the Politburo for a full decade until 1975. Other lesser figures were removed from the Politburo in the 1970s. Petr Shelest , the Ukrainian party chief, and Gennadii Voronov, chairman of the Russian Republic Council of Ministers, both fell in 1973 amid rumors that they had opposed the General Secretary's willingness to pursue detente with the United States even in the face of Washington's escalation of the Vietnam War. Dmitrii Polianskii, the minister of agriculture, was removed in 1976 after severe criticism at the 25th Party Congress of his performance in office. ¶Brezhnev's final sally against potential pretenders to his position came in November, 1978, with the removal from the Politburo of Kiril Mazurov, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the same time, Konstantin Chernenko was elevated to full membership in that body, and another Brezhnev crony, Nikolai Tikhonov, was advanced to candidate membership to await further advancement to the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers with the death of Kosygin."

•"Brezhnev [...] had a majority in the Central Committee Secretariat. There he could unconditionally rely on Kirilenko, Kapitonov, Kulakov, and Ponomarev and partly on Suslov and Andropov, who believed supporting the general secretary was the best bet to advance their interests. [¶] Lacking the possibility of imposing his will on the Politburo, Brezhnev pushed most of his decisions through the CC Secretariat while relying also on the Central Committee bureaucracy, where he could effect suitable personnel changes with relative ease..."

•"[Sergey] Trapeznikov was the first among those who later became known as the 'Moldavian mafia' in Moscow. The next entrant into this clique was Nikolay Shchelokov, the deputy chairman of the Counsil of Ministers of Moldavia, who in 1966 was made minister of internal affairs. Among the dozens of others subsequently brought by Brezhnev from Moldavia to join the central authorities in Moscow was Semen Tsvigun, the head of the KGB in Kishinev, who was promoted to the post of first deputy chairman of the central KGB. Thus was established the rule by clans, which became a pronounced feature of the Soviet political system. There would be two such clans: alongside the 'Moldavian mafia' there would gradually develop, expand, and gather its forces the 'Dnepropetrovsk mafia,' comprising functionaries and directors of enterprises who had once been buddies, fellow students, or fellow workers of Brezhnev in Dnepropetrovsk. Subsequently these clans would grow, collecting many (even outside Moldavia or Dnepropetrovsk Province) who had happened to meet Brezhnev on the long and tortuous path of his Party career and had succeeded in his attention or favor. This political machine, which was animated by principles of mafia psychology and tribal solidarity, was coordinated by Chernenko. Ultimately, it would enable Brezhnev to crush all his rivals."

•"Though cautious in his personnel policy, Brezhnev gradually succeeded in replacing a number of senior party and state leaders whom he had inherited by people with whom he had close ties. Even those whose relations with Brezhnev appeared to be cool survived for some years in his Politburo, and Brezhnev moved against them only when it was evidently safe to do so. Thus, Shelest and Voronov were dropped from the leadership in 1973, to be followed by Shelepin in 1975 and Podgorny in 1977. The removal of Podgorny was connected with Brezhnev's desire to have a high state office to complement his party leadership. The Central Committee plenum of O tober 1964 which had removed Khrushchev had determined that the offices of General (then First) Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers would be kept separate. Brezhnev, looking for an alternative, thus became the first Soviet party leader to be also head of state, assuming in 1977 the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet which had been held by Podgorny since 1965. [¶] Such an enhancement of Brezhnev's authority had been made possible by the gradual changes in the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee which he had engineered. Among his strong supporters in high positions were Kulakov, Kunaev and Shcherbitsky who entered the Politburo in 1971 and Konstantin Chernenko, in successive years between 1976 and 1978, became a Central Committee Secretary, candidate member of the Politburo and full member of the Politburo. When Kosygin was forced by ill-health to resign from the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in October 1980, he was replaced by Brezhnev's friend of long standing, Nikolay Tikhonov."

•"In early 1971 came the fall of Vasily Mzhavanadze, the Party boss of Georgia who was accused of corruption. The Politburo was shaken, for this was the general secretary's first move against the top Party body. Previously, Brezhnev had not dared to oust a single member of the Politburo, having no option but to defer to the collective leadership principle. Between 1964 and 1971 only three men had left the Politburo: Frol kozlov, due to illness, and Anastas Mikoyan and Nikolay Shvernik, due to advanced age. Then at one blow, at the April 1973 CC Plenum, Petr Shelest and Gennadiy Voronov were removed, to be replaced by three supporters of Brezhnev: Yuriy Andopov, chairman of the KGB, Andrey Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs, and Andrey Grechko, minister of defense. Shelest and Voronov apparently fell victim to the rivalry between Brezhnev and Kosygin. [¶] Brezhnev engaged in considerable maneuvering before he resolved to move against the Politburo. As long as he was unable to subvert it from the outside, he tried to shake it up from within. His method was to increase its members from eleven to fifteen so as to assure for himself a majority. In this, he emulated Stalin's tactics. Next, he proceeded to intrigue. By appearing to favor Shelepin, Brezhnev induced him to clash with Shelest; and by tolerating the rivalry between Kosygin and Podgorny, he isolated Voronov. Shelest was accused of nationalism and demoted from his post of first secretary the Ukrainian Communist Party. He was named one of the numerous deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. However, deprived of his political base in the Ukraine, he could without difficulty be ousted from the Politburo. [¶] Voronov lost out when, together with Kosygin, he criticized Brezhnev's agricultural plan. He was punished publicly by being denied the award of a decoration on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday (as a member of the Politburo he qualified for the star of Hero of Socialist Labor) and then by being downgraded in rank, with the listing of his name at receptions and gala events being dropped from fifth or sixth place to fourteenth."

•"...In retrospect, it appears that Brezhnev had achieved his fullest measure of personal power over the Soviet system between the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 and the Central Committee plenum of April 1973. [¶] At the conclusion of 24th Congress, Brezhnev had secured an apparent downgrading of [Premier] Aleksei Kosygin in the collective leadership and had placed two of his clients on the ruling Politburo. Within the next two years, Piotr Shelest was removed from his leadership in the Ukraine and then dropped from the Politburo; Gennadi Voronov was ousted as premier of the RSFSR and later booted out of the Politburo; and Dmitri Polyansky was demoted from first deputy prime minister to minister of agriculture. During this period, Brezhnev's dominant position in foreign affairs was spotlighted by personal triumphs at the summit meetings of 1972 and 1973. Between 1971 and 1973, the three party hierarchs – Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kirilenko – appeared to form a highly cohesive bloc, and the other two members of the troika evidently fully supported Brezhnev's assumption of authority."

•"Institutionalization of balancing made Brezhnev's breakout a more protracted process and his directive rule less complete. By early 1970 he had established his policy leadership in some issue areas, particularly in foreign policy, yet for the next decade this remained a limited or compartmentalized directorship. With time it also brought diminished levels of policy contestation as Brezhnev eased out some of the original collective leadership that had come to power with him, including Aleksandr Shelepin (1975) and Podgornyi (1977). Because he never achieved the apex role of his predecessors, his directorship never completely supplanted the policy processes of collective bargaining. Brezhnev's directorship lasted until the end of 1981, when his growing infirmity brought a contested directorship with growing challenges to his policy initiatives. Challenges from the original coalition constituencies grew — particularly from military leaders such as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov who objected to the new stringency in military spending. As first-tier leaders became more willing to exploit these opportunities, these challenges became part of the impending succession."

Brezhnev's Politburo

•"At the highest echelons of party rule, remarkable stability persisted throughout ' Brezhnev's rule. In part as a result of his strategy to coopt major institutional forces and in part as a product of his own consensus-oriented style of leadership, this stability provided an inner core of Kremlin leadership and sent a clear signal to lower-level cadres. For virtually the entire 18 years of Brezhnev's administration, that inner core was composed of Brezhnev himself, Kosygin as chairman of the Council of Ministers (the equivalent of 'prime minister'), Suslov as senior party secretary for ideology, Kirilenko as general overseer of the critically important cadres office andheavy industry, and, in the later years, Chernenko as Brezhnev's aide and alter ego. This is not to say, of course, that the five were of a single mind on policy issues."

•"In 1973, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, and KGB chief Yuri Andropov were elevated to Politburo status. When Grechko died in 1976, Dmitrii Ustinov, already a Politburo member and in charge of defense production, took his place and remained there until his own demise in 1984. Their elevation underscored the growing tendency to transform the Politburo into a functionally representative microcosm of the Soviet establishment. The 1971 appointment to the Politburo of Fyodor Kulakov, a member of the Secretariat in charge of agriculture, also confirmed the trend toward balancing regional representation with the presence of policy specialists, as did Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of the agriculture portfolio after Kulakov's death in 1978"

•"...Although Brezhnev became the most powerful man in the Soviet Union, he used his power and that of his associates to protect the interests of the various branches of the party-state bureaucracy, not to impose policy on them. Rather than being a dictator–by the mid-1970s his accumulated offices and honors put him far above any of his colleagues–Brezhnev was an enormously powerful front man and manager. His long tenure–he remained in office 18 years, until his death in November 1982–resulted from doing his job to the satisfaction of his colleagues and staying within the new boundaries of power. AS Brezhnev put it, albeit with undeserved self-flattery, 'I am a leader, not a ruler.' Fedor Burlatsky, an advisor to Khrushchev, assessed Brezhnev rather less kindly but not altogether differently by osbserving that the type of power the Soviet elite wanted for its leader fit Brezhnev so perfectly 'that he wore it for eighteen years without any fear, conflict or horror. His immediate retinue desired one thing only: that he live forever, as they were doing so well out of it.' In short, the Brezhnev years completed the transition from rule by a single dictator to oligarchic rule by the upper layers of the Communist Party bureaucracy."

•"Evidence suggest that, during most of his years in power, Brezhnev was the only member of the Secretariat who was also a member of the Defense Council (renamed from Khrushchev's Supreme Military Council). This dual membership gave him significant power. The Politburo tacitly agreed to let the Defense Council, a small Politburo subcommittee, dominate military policy. This arrangement created a subelite that other Politburo members were unable to challenge because they lacked information and expertise on most defense issues that did not have to do with broad questions of foreign policy or resource allocation. One important political disadvantage for Brezhnev in the Defense Council arrangement was that a small number of members (perhaps as few as three) could block a Brezhnev policy within the council. He had to reach an accommodation with these colleagues before a defense issue was brought to the Politburo."

"Andropov's appointment as head of the KGB in 1967 came at a time when the Brezhnev administration was anxious to restore strong leadership to an agency that had faltered in the mid-1960s. Although Andropov's personal association with intelligence and security affairs had been limited to his experiences with Eastern Europe, he was regarded as an effective administrator who would place the KGB's badly disorganized house in order and maintain party control and the agency's political neutrality in Kremlin politics. While he clearly benefitted from Brezhnev's backing in obtaining this post, Andropov was not regarded as a part of the growing entourage that surrounded the general secretary. It is probably far more likely that his selection came about as a compromise among Politburo factions, with no single top leader able to secure the appointment of his own man to the post. Brezhnev was able, however, to name two close associates, S.K. Tsvigun and G.K. Tsenev, to the posts of first deputy chairman and deputy chairman directly under Andropov. [¶] Under Andropov's tutelage, the KGB grew both in stature and professionalism as an intelligence and internal security agency. To be a 'Chekist' became once again an honorable calling, lauded by political leaders and the popular media alike. More importantly, the agency's scope of activities increased both at home and abroad. Whatever else may be said, it quickly became evident that its ability to crush the dissident movement within the USSR and to engage in weidespread military and commercial intelligence gathering and other clandestine activities beyond Soviet borders made it a force with which to be reckoned."

Brezhnev's Economic Policy

•"The Soviet economy [under Brezhnev's leadership] managed impressive quantitative growth, mainly because Brezhnev and his central planners continued to favor heavy industry over light industry and investment over consumption. By the late 1970s Soviet industry produced seven times more than thirty years earlier, and the Soviet Union led the world in the output of such basic items as steel, oil, machine tools, and heavy military hardware. The annual rate of increase in the gross national product even grew from 1966 to 1970 as compared to the previous five years inching upward from 5 percent to 5.2 percent. [¶] But then an inexorable decline set in, as the annual growth rate slipped to 3.7 percent between 1971 and 1975 and then to 2.7 percent between 1976 and 1980. Innovation lagged; much of the Soviet Union's equipment was obsolete. Also, the Soviet Union did not produced many of the finished industrial goods that in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States formed the basis for increased productivity and a far higher standard of living than Soviet citizens knew. Even when the Soviet planners committed additional resources to producing consumer goods, as in the Ninth Five-Year Plan covering 1971—1975, a variety of complications and the continued investment priority enjoyed by heavy industry and the military derailed their intentions."

•"Economic stagnation occurred in large part because the revolution's past began to catch up with it. The Brezhnev regime made a serious, and very expensive, effort to improve lagging agricultural productivity by giving that sector, for so long subject to Stalin's exploitation and Khrushchev's unworkable panaceas, about 25 percent of all investment funds between 1966 and 1975. But the infusion into agriculture was a drain on the industrial investment pool. Meanwhile, there was no significant structural reform: the kolkhoz/sovkhoz system that largely caused the problem remained a sacred cow, and the agricultural sector remained unable to meet the nation's food needs. The growing price of food imports, including grain to feed cattle, and the cost of food subsidies that were required to keep the price of food affordable to consumers added tens of billions of rubes to the soaring cost of keeping the Soviet agricultural system intact, without doing anything to improve it."

•"Equally important, the central planning system became increasingly unable to cope with the growing complexity of the Soviet Union's industrial economy. The problem was not simply coordinating the requirements of tens of thousands of individual economic units, each with its own schedule and problems; it included managing the competition among these units and among whole industries and entire regions for resources of all kinds. There was also the vexing inability to introduce new products and technologies into an enormous and unwieldy economic system, particularly when innovation carried the nightmarish risk that haunted most managers and bureaucrats: the failure to produce the number of units, kilograms, square meters, cubic meters, or whatever was required by Moscow's master plan. Another shiboleth of the Stalin era — the primacy of the military — continued to absorb vital human and material resources in prodigious quantities, dragging down growth rates for the economy as a whole. In fact, the military's share of the total economy increased substantially during the Brezhnev era. Meanwhile, the Soviet economy was being deprived of two formerly abundant resources upon which it had become dependent: cheap labor and cheap natural resources. The huge pool of cheap labor that had fueled Soviet industrialization began to dry up as urbanization and higher levels of education, themselves products of the revolution, drove down birthrates among Slavs and other European peoples, who together formed over 80 percent of the USSR's population. The labor shortage was made worse by the wasteful use of what was available, as huge numbers of excess workers unproductively passed the time on factory floors where they were not needed or went through the motions in the poorly tended fields of collective and state farms. Likewise, the cheap and easily exploitable raw materials west of the Urals that had been so vital to both prewar and postwar economic growth were being depleted. The Soviet Union still possessed enormous natural resources, but many of them — including vital oil and natural gas deposits — were deep in Siberia and required large long-term investments to make them exploitable. In the short terms, these investments represented another expensive anchor weighing down the economy as a whole."

•"Despite these problems, the old Stalinist economic structure still had enough momentum to enable the standard of living to rise from its 1964 level. Real wages rose 50 percent between 1965 and 1977. By the late 1970s the majority of Soviet families owned radios, refrigerators, and even washing machines. Yet, just as the overall economic growth rate declined, so inevitably did the growth rate in the standard of living. 1981 per capita consumption grew by less than 2 percent; the 1982 figure was 1 percent. The housing situation remained unsatisfactory, to say the least; in 1981 the Soviet Union could not meet minimum standards that had been set by the government in 1928, and 20 percent of all urban families still shared kitchen and bathroom facilities. Repair and personal care services remained exceedingly difficult to obtain. Between 1965 and 1978 the percentage of the budget devoted to health care cropped despite increased need for health services. Soviet infant mortality rates increased during the 1970, and the Soviet Union gained the dubious distinction of being the first industrialized country to see its life expectancy drop. Worst of all, Soviet per capita consumption in the late 1970s remained one-third that of the United States and less than half that of France and West Germany. Another bitter truth was that the economy's best postwar performance in terms of annual growth was during 1951—1955, before most of the reforms, experiments, and efforts of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years. Finally, what made all the post-1950 consumption figures look so good was the abysmally low standard of living in the immediate postwar ra. In short, the performance of the Soviet economy under Brezhnev was impressive for a developing country but not for an advanced socialist society, which the Soviet Union claimed to be."

Brezhnev's Succession

Struggle to Succeed Brezhnev

•"By the late 1970s, when Brezhnev's declining health and the growing immobilism of the regime were apparent to all, there were approximately a half dozen potential successors on the scene. Conventional wisdom labeled Andrei Kirilenko the likely heir apparent. A member of the Brezhnev entourage, he functioned as de facto second secretary, combining the portfolios of heavy industry and party cadres, although he was unable to use the latter as had his predecessors to build grassroots support within the party. Konstantin Chernenko was also counted among the possible successors. An even closer Brezhnev associate who had been elevated to full membership in the Politburo in 1978, he served as a personal aide to the General Secretary and headed the critically important General Department within the Secretariat. Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, was also considered a candidate for General Secretary. Although he lacked significant administrative experience within the party apparatus itself and led an agency whose previous chiefs had been viewed with suspicion by other would-be successors, his strong record as an efficient and no-nonsense administrator, as well as his knowledge and experience in foreign affairs, placed him among the contenders. The Leningrad party first secretary, Grigorii Romanov, also had aspirations to higher office, although his reputation as a strict administrator who nonetheless advocated economic and managerial reforms was balanced against the political liabilities associated with the city of Leningrad as a power base. Romanov's Moscow counterpart, Viktor Grishin, also viewed himself as a possible successor, although his generally lackluster performance and heavyhanded attempts to press his own candidacy compromised his prospects."

•"While the rivalries among the contenders were veiled by the secretive nature of Soviet politics and the need to pay public homage to the aging Brezhnev, the muted competition could be seen by those with discerning eyes. Least visible among the presumed frontrunners was Andrei Kirilenko. Perhaps because of his status as de facto second secretary and his alleged close ties to the party apparatus and heavy industry, he thought it best to pursue the quiet strategy of an insider whose candidacy required no special activism beyond his preeminence within inner party circles. Whatever his views, he made no visible effort in the year before Brezhnev's death to establish a separate political identiy or to speak out on domestic and foreign policy issues. His only public visibility beyond expected routine ceremonial activities was limited to a few noncontroversial speeches about economic affairs that departed in no way from the conventional wisdom of the last years of the Brezhnev era."

•"In contrast [to Kirilenko], both Chernenko and Andropov were far more visible and went to greater lengths to establish their own political identities, although their efforts had to be framed within acceptable boundaries. Chernenko pressed hard for the endorsement as the heir apparent that his mentor had long withheld, and was eventually rewarded by Brezhnev's visible backing in the months before his death. Andropov, on the other hand, pursued the more risky strategy of holding the present leadership's ineptness, immobilism, and personal vulnerability to charges of corruption and favoritism up for public view (cautiously, to be sure), through the indictment of the General Secretary's cronies and thinly veiled innuendo concerning his family and health"

•"While it is impossible to establish a firm date when the campaign for the succession began — rumors of Brezhnev's ill health or impending retirement had occurred periodically since the mid-1970s, and each provoked a round of speculation and maneuvering ― the emergence of Kirilenko, Chernenko, and Andropov as the frontrunners and their choices of strategies can be dated roughly from the 26th Party Congress in 1981...[¶] The congress itself, held in February 1981, was a mixed blessing for both Kirilenko and Chernenko. While he maintained his position as de facto second secretary, Kirilenko was unable to signal any increase in his stature within the inner circle. Chernenko benefitted principally from the fact that he was known to have been the organizer of the meeting, although he was unable to obtain any open endorsement from Brezhnev, who showed no signs of tapping a potential hear or or stepping down from office. Andropov slipped completely from public view. During the proceedings of the congress itself, he was the only Politburo member who was denied the privilege of chairing one of the sessions."

•"With the [26th] congress over, the contenders settled into a shadow war of innuendo and indirection. The General Secretary's ill health and unwillingness to step down were underscored in an indirect attack in the Leningrad literary journal Aurora, in December 1981. In an issue otherwise dedicated to Brezhnev's 75th birthday, a satirical story by Viktor Goliavkin entitled 'Jubilee Speech' spoke of an aging writer, now long past his prime, who 'does not plan to die.' Making it clear that the writer had outlived his usefulness and lost touch with reality, Goliavkin lamented that the rumors of his death had been 'premature'. Not surprisingly, the issue quickly sold out, as members of the Soviet intelligentsia read the story as a veiled attack on Brezhnev himself."

•"Rumors about scandals that reached directly into Brezhnev's family and the death of Mikhail Suslov in January, 1982, set the stage for the next round of confrontation. In the former case, the growing campaign to link Brezhnev's daughter, Galina, to high-level misdeeds bore the mark of Andropov's earlier use of the KGB to conduct politically significant anti-corruption efforts in Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, and the Baltic republics. By implication, the sins of the daughter, whose 'disorderly' lifestyles, as the Russians would say, had long been a topic of Moscow gossip, would be visited on the father, who would be double injured not only because of his obvious approval of efforts to cover up her activities but also because his growing weakness now permitted his opponents to shed light on her associations with known or suspected criminals."

•"The cause celebre that linked Galina [Brezhnev] to the shadowy underworld of corruption occurred in December 1981, when her close associate and rumored paramour Boris Buriatia was involved in an elaborate jewel theft and extensive corruption within the Soviet circus. Galina had long been a camp follower of the circus and its flamboyant performers, and the scandal further portrayed her as an uncontrollable enfant terrible whose actions had been concealed by the authorities. Despite her resignation from a minor post in the Foreign Ministry, the rumors continued, and it was alleged that she was a part of other corrupt activities, including efforts, undertaken along with Brezhnev's son Yuri, to sequester large sums of money abroad. Even her second husband's position as first deputy minister of internal affairs — thus de facto second in command of the national police force — could not protect her from interrogation by the KGB. [¶] The actual investigation into Galina's involvement was conducted by General Semyon Tsvigun, first deputy chairman of the KGB, although it is not possible that he would have initiated these actions without his chief's approval. From the beginning, his position was extremely sensitive. On the one hand, the responsibilities of office required that he press forward with the investigation. But on the other hand, his awkward status as Brezhnev's brother-in-law, initially placed in the KGB to monitor the agency's activities, suggested that he participate in yet another cover-up. His hesitation permitted Andropov to bring the entire matter before Mikhail Suslov, who had functioned as the guardian of the inner elite's reputation. While the stories leaked to Western sources vary on whether Suslov sought once again to conceal high level corruption or opted to pursue the case to its inevitable conclusion, it is clear that there was a heated confrontation between Tsvigun and Suslov. Within a matter of days, Tsvigun died, reputedly by his own hand, and his official obituary was published without the customary signature of the general secretary."

•"On January 21 [1982], less than a week after his confrontation with Tsvigun, Suslov suffered a severe stroke and remained completely incapacitated until his death several days later. While it is impossible to know whether the stress of his intervention into the Galina affair hastened his demise, it is certain that his departure had a major impact on the succession struggle. Not only did it remove one of the Kremlin's kingmakers who would have influenced the choice of Brezhnev's successor but also it opened up the post of chief ideologist, a position in the hierarchy that ranked third in the nominal pecking order just below Kirilenko's status as de facto second secretary. Suslov's passing triggered an intense competition between Chernenko and Andropov to assume these duties, for each had much to benefit from the move. For Chernenko, the assumption of Suslov's post would give him political status beyond his role as Brezhnev's aide and facilitate his efforts to establish a separate political identity. Andropov also stood to gain from such a move in terms of formally dissociating himself from the KGB, although there was little doubt that he would retain support from that quarter, and from the promotion to the Secretariat that would automatically follow."

•"Andropov also pressed his bid in the weeks that followed Suslov's death. Late in April [1982], he delivered the speech to mark the 112th anniversary of the birth of Lenin, an important ceremonial occasion at which Chernenko had spoken the year before. His selection was doubly significant. It not only gave him a highly visible ceremonial occasion on which to speak out on issues normally removed from his narrow responsibilities at the KGB but it also indicated that he enjoyed considerable backing within the Politburo, which chooses who is to make this annual address."

•"Rumors about Brezhnev's ill health were heard frequently throughout the eary months of 1982. Inn an effort to prove himself still in charge, Brezhnev travelled to Tashkent in March to present the Order of Lenin to the Uzbek republic for its economic advances under socialism. What as to have been a carefully staged demonstration of his continued leadership turned into a debacle. Although the presentation of the order went forward without difficulty, and the general secretary even managed to portray his comments on Sino-Soviet relations as a new step to restore better relations, he suffered a stroke on the flight from Tashken to Moscow and had to be whisked past the official greeting party into seclusion in the Kremlin's elite hospital. [¶] The General Secretary's absence from public view further fueled the rumors of his incapacity or imminent demise, as did the postponement of the Central Committee plenum scheduled for April..."

•"On the eve of the May Central Committee plenum which was to select Suslov's successor and hopefully scotch rumors that Brezhnev had lost control of events, Andrei Kirilenko suffered a major heart attack. With the de facto second secretary now effectively removed as a viable candidate, although he remained on the Politburo, the battle between Chernenko and Andropov grew even more heated, reputedly dividing the Politburo between the Brezhnev-led pro-Chernenko faction and another faction that backed Andropov, in part in an effort to stop Chernenko and part because of Andropov's perceived leadership abilities and experience in foreign and defense matters. Emigre sources report that at the Politburo session immediately before the May plenum, only 11 of the 13 members were present, with the final vote on the Suslov succession set at five for Chernenko and six for Andropov. Whatever the actual count, the session marked a clear loss not only for Chernenko, who remained within his mentor's shadow, but also for Brezhnev, who had been unable to provide his protege with a suitable institutional position to strengthen his bid to become General Secretary."

•"Although Chernenko's growing visibility signaled both his own increased stature and a greater commitment on Brezhnev's part to press his candidacy for General Secretary, he was clearly not alone in the field. Kirilenko still remained a full member of the Politburo and a potential enemy if not counter claimant to the top post, and Andropov was once again pressing his attack by demonstrating the General Secretary's diminishing powers. As with the case brought against Brezhnev's daughter, the attacks came indirectly, the first aimed at S.F. Medunov, party first secretary in Krasnodar. A close associate of Brezhnev, Medunov had been rumored to be involved in many scandals within his territory, which includes the Black Sea coastal areas where the top members of the Soviet elite have summer dachas. Attempts by the local KGB to look into his misdeeds had been barred by higher authorities, rendering him immune from prosecution. Yet in August, 1982, the investigation was reopened, and Medunov was removed from his party post and placed under house arrest. The event was read as far more than a regional tempest; Medunov's fall indicated both the growing power of the KGB and the diminishing ability of Brezhnev to protect his allies. A similar fate befell K.V. Rusakov, first secretary of the Kuibyshev region, who was allegedly involved in the illegal sale of Zhiguli and Lada cars built in the Soviet Fiat plant in his region."

Andropov's Rise to Power

•"Andropov's election to Suslov's post on the Secretariat [in May 1982] meant that a new director of the KGB would be chosen. The two front runners were G.K. Tsvinev, a member of Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk mafi, who had initially been appointed first deputy chairman of the KGB to replace Tsfigun and V.M. Chebrikov, a former Brezhnev associate who had shifted loyalties to Andropov, under whom he worked for 15 years. Evidence that Brezhnev and Andropov were locked in combat over the controlof the secret police came even before the latter's promotion to the Secretariat. Although Tsvinev had quickly been named to replace Tsvigun (and presumably to continue to monitor the KGB's activities), Chebrikov was soon promoted to the same rank within the agency, creating two First Deputy Chairmen with presumably different political loyalties. It is probable that each faction vigorously pressed its candidate, leaving the Politburo with the unfortunate choice of further politicizing the KGB or finding another solution. The dilemma was resolved through the appointment of V.V. Fedorchuk, who had headed the KGB in the Ukraine. A professional police officer whose career with the KGB long predated Andropov's association with the agency, he was viewed as not having close ties to either camp and insufficient political stature in his own right to influence the succession struggle. Not yet even a member of the Central Committee, he was denied promotion to high party rank in connection with his new duties."

•"Although he had been promoted to the Secretariat, Andropov did not assume all of Suslov's responsibilities, which included cultural affairs, ideology, and foreign affairs, especially with other socialist nations. In foreign affairs, Andropov was given responsibility for dealing with non-governing communist parties, while Chernenko inherited the task of dealing with bloc nations, a responsibility that permitted him to obtain considerable visibility in dealing with East European leaders. In cultural affairs, the two divided the responsibilities, although there is some evidence that Chernenko acquired control over the media. The division of labor on ideology was far less clear, although the publication of the second edition of Chernenko's book on the role of the party was touted as an event of major theoretical significance."

"...[T]he ailing General Secretary made his last public appearance in connection with the November 7 celebration of the Revolution. Reputedly against the advice of his doctors, he assumed the traditional position atop the Lenin mausoleum to review the parade, remaining there for three hours on a cold and windy day. Three days later, on the morning of November 10, he collapsed in his apartment on Kutuzovskii Prospect and died of a 'sudden heart failure.' "

Kirilenko's Candidacy

•"For Andrei Kirilenko, who functioned as de facto second secretary for most of the Brezhnev era, the obvious two-fold strategy was to stress the logical succession of the experienced understudy and to build upon his ties to heavy industry and the party apparatus. Clearly Kirilenko was a member in good standing of the Brezhnev entourage. His career had been linked with Brezhnev's since World War II, when both were political officers in the 18th Army of the southern front. They remained associated in party posts after the war, with Kirilenko serving under Brezhnev in Zaporozhye and then succeeding him as party secretary in Dnepropetrovsk when the future General Secretary was sent to Moldavia in 1950. From 1955 to 1961, their careers diverged. Kirilenko served as party secretary in Sverdlovsk during this period and then rose to the post of deputy chairman of the Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic). When the Bureau was abolished in 1966, Kirilenko became, along with Suslov, one of the two senior party secretaries."

•"Kirilenko's position as senior party secretary with overall responsibility for the functioning of the state apparatus and the economy placed him at a critically important control point within the intertwined party and state hierarchies, although it is questionable how far his authority descended down the administrative chain of command. But at the least, conventional wisdom would suggest that he would doubly benefit from this role. On the one hand, his wide-ranging responsibilities gave him needed experience in these two important domestic areas. His close tites to heavy industry further strengthened his position in any succession struggle. And on the other hand, he presumably was well positioned to develop a network of supporters and allies throughout both party and state hierarchies. ¶ Kirilenko also presumably had overall responsibility for senior appointments to both party and state posts through his supervision of the nomenklatura system. At least until the late 1970s, there is clear evidence that I.V. Kapitonov, who headed the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee that undertakes the day-to-day operation of the party-controlled appointments system, reported to Kirilenko, although in the last years of Brezhnev's rule, his subordination may have been shifted to the rapidly rising Chernenko. In any event, Kirilenko's influence over the cadres system, which historically had been the key to building a strong following, did not permit him to stack the deck against challengers. During the whole of Brezhnev's tenure, no subordinate was able to manipulate the cadres selection process to create a personalized political machine, much less to develop sufficient strength to challenge the General Secretary, and even under the best of circumstances, Kirilenko's ability to influence cadres selection never extended down to the middle and grassroots level."

•"...Kirilenko's candidacy promised both a continuity of Brezhnev's policies and a continued dominance of a loyal scion of the party machinery risen through the ranks to the top post. To those members of the agin elite, who saw the regime's achievements at home and abroad as a confirmation of the Soviet Union's emergence as a major industrial national and an international superpower, Kirilenko offered the promise of more of the same, untainted by any hint that their generation would be swept aside or blamed for their nation's shortcomings. Moreover, Kirilenko's eventual rise to general secretary would affirm that the conventional ladder of success that brought Soviet leaders from regional posts to national prominence remained unchanged, no small concern in a situation in which the other two frontrunners, Chernenko and Andropov, had far different career experiences. [¶] But if being de facto second secretary implied a logical succession strategy [for Kirilenko], it also carried with it a number of liabilities. Not the least of these was association with the blatant policy failures of the Brezhnev administration and the growing sense of drift and malaise within the nation. No amount of self-congratulation within top party circles could diminish the fact that others in equally important posts or at lesser levels of the party and state judged the current regime more harshly. Kirilenko suffered the inevitable problem of establishing an independent political identity. Moreover, his own career experiences and current responsibilities had been deficient in two areas: he possessed no credible credentials in foreign policy an, despite his identification with heavy industry per se, he had no ties to the military-industrial complex which fell under the supervision of Dmitrii Ustinov. In tactical terms as well, Kirilenko's posture as the presumed heir apparent established him as a target for other aspirants to the office of General Secretary. Whatever their differences, other high-ranking claimants and dark horses alike could agree that their first task was to stop Kirilenko."

•"...Kirilenko, whose own hopes for the top office were scotched by his illness, was dropped from the Politburo and the Secretariat at the Politburo session held on October 4 [1982], although no public announcement was made until after Brezhnev's death. However, the informal signs of status in the Kremlin pecking order clearly indicate when the fall occurred. On October 3, Kirilenko remained in sufficiently good standing to be permitted to sign an obituary of an important party member published on that day, but his signature was absent from another obituary that appeared two days later on October 5. In addition, his portrait was removed from the official displays of Politburo members during the first week of October, a clear sign that he had been dropped from his party posts."

Chernenko's Candidacy

•"Konstantin Chernenko's strategic options in the pursuit of the top office were also dictated by his earlier career experiences and by his close association with Leonid Brezhnev. From his less-than auspicious beginnings as a minor party ideologist in the province, Chernenko rose rapidly once he hitched his star to Brezhnev's rising fortunes. The initial contact came in 1950, when Brezhnev was named first secretary of the Moldavian party organization. The two worked in tandem in Kishinev for only two years, but Chernenko subsequently followed Brezhnev to the all-union party organization, becoming head of the mass political work section of the Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Department in 1956. When Brezhnev became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (i.e., president of the Soviet state), Chernenko was named chief of the Presidium of the Secretariat of that body, making de facto chief aide to the future general secretary. The pattern was repeated when Brezhnev rose to power in 1964, with Chernenko advancing to the post of chief of the General Department of the Central Committee. Further confirmation of his continued rise came with his appointment as a member of the party Secretariat in 1976 and his rapid promotion to candidate member of the Politburo in 1977 and full member the following year."

•"Chernenko's role as chief of the General Department placed him at a critically important position within the party apparatus. This department handles the flow of all classified information within the party, and as its chief, Chernenko controlled access to objective data about party and state affairs. Because of his close association with the General Secretary, he was thus able to function as a de facto secretary to the Politburo, in shaping the weekly agenda, one whose first loyalties clearly lay with his mentor. Evidence also suggests that he controlled the Administrative Organs Department, which oversees the police and the military, and came, at least from the late 1970s onward, to oversee the Organizational Party Work Department and at least some aspects of intraparty personnel selection, a function that he took from Kirilenko."

•"The strong, if belated endorsement by Brezhnev was in itself something of a mixed blessing [for Chernenko]. On the one hand, it was a boost to Chernenko's candidacy inasmuch as the incumbent's political weight now fell into place behind his designated successor. But on the other hand, the obvious frailty of the aging leader diminished his ability to line up support for his chosen heir. Perhaps more importantly with such a clear endorsement, the failure of the current regime could now be visited upon the would-be successor. Chernenko's candidacy implied that same sense of malaise and drift, to say nothing of blatant inefficiency and corruption, might well persist under the new leadership."

•"Chernenko quickly moved to try to fill the void left by Suslov's death. At ceremonial occasions, he assumed the position in the protocol ranking between Brezhnev and Tikhonov formerly occupied by Suslov, an action that signaled the General Secretary's willingness to acknowledge Chernenko's increased stature and strengthened the assumption that Brezhnev had tapped him as his heir. In April [1982], he published an important article in the theoretical journal Kommunist on pluralism and democracy under socialism, and he stood in for the absent Brezhnev on a number of occasions."

•"Despite the growing signals that Brezhnev had consciously tapped Chernenko as his eventual successor, the General Secretary showed no indications that he intended to step down from office. In September [1982], another trip away from the Soviet capital was scheduled to demonstrate the leader's recovery and return to active service. The location was Baku, the Azerbaidzhan capital on the Caspian Sea, where a major television address and a series of public meetings were planned...[B]oth Brezhnev's failing capabilities and the seeming connivance of the media to present him in a poor light were evident. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, a Brezhnev aide, allegedly gave him the incorrect text of his speech, an error that was discovered some seven minutes into the public address. Without comment, Aleksandrov-Agentov stopped the General Secretary and placed another text before him When he realized what had occurred, brezhnev insisted that the error was not his fault and began to read from the new document, although the balance of the speech was read by an announcer. The next day it was rumored that Brezhnev was ill once again, and the remainder of his engagements were cancelled. [¶] By October, however, the General Secretary had recovered sufficiently to make public appearances once again. On≤ most such ceremonial occasions, Chernenko was inevitably at his side, meeting foreign delegations, welcoming cosmonauts, and otherwise strengthening the perception that he was Brezhnev's anointed heir. Emigre sources report that it was rumored in Moscow that at the November Central Committee plenum, Chernenko would officially be designated de facto second secretary, succeeding the still ailing Kirilenko, and that Brezhnev himself would step down from office in his protege's favor only weeks later at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Whether accurate or not, the tales further enhanced Chernenko's standing and seemingly placed whatever weight remained of the Brezhnev entourage behind him."

•"Chernenko's candidacy received additional impetus late in October [1982] when he and Brezhnev played prominent roles at a specially convened meeting with top military officials. Although Andropov was a part of the select group of Politburo members who attended the session along with Gromyko, Tikhonov, Ustinov, and Chernenko, the latter was given preferential treatment in an altered photograph published by Pravda and Izvestiia the following day. The armed services newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda however, ran the undoctored photograph, which did not seemingly position Chernenko ahead of all others in the protocol listing. Brezhnev's comments clearly were designed to win the military to the side of his protege; although he repeated the usual commitment to detente and lambasted the Reagan administration, he assured the military leaders that the party would 'meet all your needs' and promised greater attention to 'the further strengthening of the armed forces' material base', especially in high technology weapons systems. Two days later, Chernenko made a major foreign policy statement of his own in connection with the presentation of the Order of Lenin to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, an act in which he was presented as Brezhnev's personal emissary."

•"...Konstantin Chernenko was the most publicly visible and prolific of the heirs apparent. In part because of his wide-ranging activities in party, economic and foreign affairs, and in part because he regarded such visibility as the best counterweight to the argument that he was merely Brezhnev's alter ego, he spoke out on the widest possible range of issues in ways that signaled an emerging independent identity and outlined the changes that might be expected under his tutelage. Contrary to his image as a Brezhnev crony elevated to high rank because of his loyalty, Chernenko offered a moderately reformist platform that suggested more aggressive experimentation with economic reform, greater democracy within the party, increased public involvement in policymaking, including more candid discussion of the nation's problems and a measured decentralization of political power, especially to the union republic level at the expense of central authority in Moscow. He specifically lauded the Azerbaidzhan and Georgian republics for their loosening of controls over intra-party and public discussion and called for the leadership's greater attention to sociological research and public opinion surveys. While he went further than his colleagues in lamenting the negative consequences of Stalin's repressive rule, he also tacitly reassured the party that his own brand of reform did not entail a return to the undisciplined populism of the Khrushchev era. On the most critical issue of all, the security in office of the aging Soviet elite, Chernenko reassured his contemporaries that his proposals would not end their careers."

•"While generally close to the conventional party line in foreign policy, [Chernenko] expressed a more sophisticated understanding of relations with the United States than his mentor – although he joined wholeheartedly in blaming the Reagan administration for the deterioration of superpower ties– and less of a commitment to give the military a blank check to match the U.S. arms build-up. Although the general secretary had called for increased allocations for weapons development in his comments to military leaders on October 28, 1982, two days later, speaking at an awards ceremony ostensibly having nothing to do with Soviet -U.S. ties, Chernenko asserted that the military was already 'strong enough' to deter U.S. adventurism."

Andropov's Candidacy

•"Yuri Andropov's pursuit of the General Secretaryship was governed by far different strategic considerations. Neither a close personal confidant of Brezhnev nor a member of the inner circle of the Politburo, he faced formidable problems both in terms of establishing a separate political identity and of building a broader coalition beyond his personal power base in the KGB. His campaign for the top office was a combination of increasingly transparent attacks on the ineffectiveness and corruption of the Kremlin old guard in general and Brezhnev in particular and appeals to other important constituencies such as the military and industrial interests, based on his reputation for disciplined leadership within the KGB. Unlike Kirilenko and Chernenko, who were members of the inner circle and whose candidacies promised at least a measure of continuity and stability, Andropov ran as a relative outsider whose ascension to office would signal sweeping changes."

•"Andropov's career was [...] a departure from the usual ladder of success for aspirants to the General Secretaryship. His first party post was that of first secretary of the Yaroslav Komsomol, to which he was elected in 1938. Two years later he advanced to the more responsible post of first secretary of the Komsomol in the newly created Karelo-Finnish republic, a post that he held throughout the war. In 1944 he was named second secretary of the Petrozavodsk city party organization, and in 1947 he was promoted to the post of second secretary of the Karelo-Finnish republic, making him the de facto Russian overseer in this non-Russian region. Surviving the purge of the supporters of Andrei Zhdanov, with whom he had been indirectly linked through his own patron, G.N. Kupriianov, he remained second secretary until he was transferred to the Central Committee apparatus in Moscow in 1951, eventually becoming the chief of a subdepartment that dealt with trade union and Komsomol affairs. [¶] Andropov's transfer to diplomatic work in 1953 was a clear demotion, possibly associated with Malenkov's purge of real or imagined opponents. He initially served in the office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that dealt with Poland and Czechoslovakia and was then posted to Budapest as counselor to the Soviet embassy. He was promoted to ambassador in 1954 and remained at that post until 1957, through both the Soviet invasion that crushed the Nagy regime and the restoration of party authority under Janos Kadar. Andropov's cool performance under pressure during the crisis earned him a transfer back to Mosco, where he was named to head the newly created Central Committee Department for Liaison with Socialist Nations, a post that he held for ten years. Further indication of his growing status came with his appointment to the Secretariat in 1962."

•"Andropov's appointment as head of the KGB in 1967 came at a time when the Brezhnev administration was anxious to restore strong leadership to an agency that had faltered in the mid-1960s. Although Andropov's personal association with intelligence and security affairs had been limited to his experiences with Eastern Europe, he was regarded as an effective administrator who would place the KGB's badly disorganized house in order and maintain party control and the agency's political neutrality in Kremlin politics."

•"Under Andropov's tutelage, the KGB grew both in stature and professionalism as an intelligence and internal security agency. To be a 'Chekist' became once again an honorable calling, lauded by political leaders and the popular media alike. More importantly, the agency's scope of activities increased both at home and abroad. Whatever else may be said, it quickly became evident that its ability to crush the dissident movement within the USSR and to engage in widespread military and commercial intelligence gathering and other clandestine activities beyond Soviet borders made it a force with which to be reckoned."

•"His diplomatic and intelligence background aside, Andropov still found himself in an awkward position in terms of launching a bid to become general secretary. On the positive side, his record of strong leadership at the helm of the KGB stood out in sharp contrast to the lackluster performance of others. Moreover, the wide-ranging activities of that organization at least implied that he had acquired expertise in both foreign and domestic affairs, a mixed portfolio of responsibilities that no other would-be aspirant could claim."

•"The significance of the KGB itself as a power base offered both positive and negative aspects. Clearly its growing reputation as a disciplined and effective organization boded well for its director. And the agency's detailed personnel files on all important party and state personnel must be counted an important asset, especially when it became apparent that one key element of the strategy was the selective exposure of corruption in high office. But on the negative side, the KGB undoubtedly evoked the collective fears of other players, as Beria's removal from office and execution in 1953 demonstrated. Top party leaders had gone to great lengths to neutralize its overt political role even before Andropov's tenure as its director, and it is likely that a bid for power by anyone associated with it would be viewed with suspicion."

•"Yuri Andropov's platform was the product of his reputation as an efficient and incorruptible administrator;, his more limited public pronouncements on matters beyond narrow security affairs, and an undeniable campaign on the part of his associates and supporters to paint him as a would-be reformer and closet liberal. Of the former, it can certainly be said that his reputation as an effective administrator of both the domestic and foreign activities of the secret police was well deserved. Not only did he receive high marks from conservatives for his suppression of dissent, he earned the grudging respect of more liberal elements for his sophisticated handling of the complex issue and his avoidance of a bloodbath. It was also undeniable that successful KGB efforts abroad had increased during his tenure and that confrontation with other security related and defense forces had been avoided. The KGB's reputation as a professional security and intelligence agency had grown over the same years, and the exploits of Chekists were lauded for public consumption in ways that raised the stature of the security forces to a new high."

•"...To the extent [Andropov] spoke out at all in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he utilized relatively insignificant occasions such as pro forma speeches to his constituents before Supreme Soviet elections, and he limited his comments to security-related or foreign policy issues, on which he took entirely predictable positions of warning against laxity and subversion while simultaneously endorsing detente with the West. [¶] His first significant opportunity to speak on a wide range of issues came with his selection in 1982 to deliver the Lenin anniversary speech. While he suggested that economic problems were the most important concern facing the nation, he failed to offer any concrete suggestions for reform, nor did he mention the problem of worker indiscipline and inefficiency. On the issue of investment priorities, he endorsed greater efforts for the production of food and consumer goods. His comments on the military and foreign policy had economic as well as political significance. Arguing that 'the Soviet Union has never proceeded from the assumption that only military force and a policy built upon it can ensure lasting peace,' Andropov offered the cautious formula that the nation should maintain its military capacity 'at the proper level'. Instead he lauded Soviet efforts to limit the arms race and prevent the deployment of American weapons in Western Europe. [¶] Andropov also tread lightly o the issue of corruption in Soviet society, although it is not likely that his remarks could have been missed amid the rumors of misdeeds that touched the very topof the hierarchy. He argued that 'embezzlement, bribery, bureaucratic rigidity, and a disrespectful attitude toward people' justly deserved the 'legitimate indignation of the Soviet people.'

•"Moscow's always-active rumor mills were a third source of the public persona put forward by Andropov. Because of his past association with reform-minded officials such as Otto Kuusinen and his ties to liberal scholars and think tanks such as the American and Canadian Studies Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, he was viewed as something of a closet liberal whose own immediate circle of advisors would usher in a more flexible and experimental era of economic and political reforms. His continuing interest in reforms in Eastern Europe, and especially in Hungary, which had undergone the most successful radical departure from centralized planning, prompted rumors that he would draw from that experience. While it is difficult to tell how much of this image was built for foreign consumption – the assertions that he was a man steeped in Western culture and with Western tastes in literature and music were undoubtedly a part of the attempt to build a verbal Potemkin village– its domestic impact was to suggest that he was a man cut from a very different cloth from his less sophisticated contemporaries."

Post-Khrushchev Interregnum

Removal of Nikita Khrushchev

•"In the opinion of many scholars, the selection of [Leonid] Brezhnev as Khrushchev's successor was a last-minute decision of the conspirators for want of a more appropriate or acceptable candidate. This hypothesis assumes that the initiators and planners of the coup were A.N. Shelepin and Suslov, and according to some, Kosygin as well. ¶ This version of the plot assumes more or less the following patter of events. The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee came to prefer the cautious and savvy Brezhnev to the ambitious and impulsive Shelepin, at this time head of the KGB. Furthermore, they were appalled by the plot worked out by Shelepin, which to the prudent nomenklatura oligarchs appeared too reckless and which by ordinary Soviet standards was reckless indeed. Essentially, the plot consisted of assigning precise roles to all actors involved: the CC secretaries, ministers, and the operation sectors, i.e. the army and secret police. Shelepin prepared matters much more thoroughly than had his unsuccessful predecessors, Vyacheslav Molotov and Georgy Malenkov in 1957 when the Politburo decision to oust Khrushchev (by a vote of 8 to 2) encountered opposition on the part of the Secretariat and Plenum of the Central Committee. For his attempt Shelepin succeeded in winning over the CC Secretariat to his side. His success was due to the timely death of one pro-Khrushchev CC secretary, Otto Kuusinen, and the no less timely illness of another, Frol Kozlov. According to the commonly accepted view of these events, Brezhnev was practically brought into the plot by chance due to Khrushchev's blundering in relieving him of the Supreme Soviet chairmanship (on July 15,1964). Until then Brezhnev had maintained a respectful attitude toward his patron; thereafter detestation allegedly began to dominate. Insult was added to injury when the Supreme Soviet chairmanship was taken over by the ever-obliging Anastas Mikoyan. Fear also played a role; removal from one's post by Khrushchev often foreshadowed ensuing disgrace. Khrushchev was quick to rid himself of subordinates. Like Stalin, he operated on the well-tested principle of resolutely firing associates no longer needed."

•"...[A] number of scholars have concluded that Shelepin's plot was motivated only or at least primarily by the personal failing of Khrushchev. Shelepin is understood to have won over such guardians of orthodoxy as Suslov and Boris Ponomarev by pointing to the opportunistic and dilettantish manner in which Khrushchev handled ideology and sullied its purity. In regard to technocrats like Kosygin, Kirill Mazurov, and Polyansky, he is supposed to have aroused their resistance to the importunate efforts of Khrushchev to force reforms on them by playing on their predispositions to bureaucratic order. In regard to the professional apparatchiks like V.V. Grishin, Sh. R. Rashidov, Yury Andropov and P.N. Demichev, Shelepin is supposed to have used a different argument, frightening them by the possible consequences of Khrushchev's plan of restructuring Party committees. ¶Two CC secretaries (Titov and V.I. Polyakov) remained loyal to Khrushchev, and the position of three Presidium members (Mikoyan, Voronov, and Podgorny) was unclear. In order not to jeopardize the chances of the coup, Shelepin is supposed to have agreed, under pressure from Suslov and Kirilenko, that during the transitional period after the coup Brezhnev would serve as first secretary. Such a decision could be described as farsighted on Shelepin's part; it was supposed to give him a chance to establish a base in the Politburo, to become a Politburo member himself, and then, with the help of the KGB, to advance his claim to power over the country. The choice of Brezhnev was also supposed to create the impression. of continuity, and to make the change engineered more acceptable to the masses. Indeed, it could only appear natural that the CC second secretary (Brezhnev) succeeded the first secretary (Khrushchev)."

Foundations of the Post-Khrushchev Collective Leadership

•"The aftermath of the removal Khrushchev in October 1964 bore distinct similarities to the power struggle that followed Stalin's death. Once again the newly installed leaders insisted that they would avoid 'the cult of personality'– a fault for which they blamed Khrushchev – and institute 'collective leadership,' which they assured the peoples of the Soviet Union was the only appropriate form of government for a socialist country. ¶Leonid Brezhnev assumed the most important post, the first secretaryship of the central committee, and Alexei Kosygin became premier while remaining a member of the Politburo. Nikolai Podgornyi took the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet – in other words, he became the president of the republic. Gradually, Brezhnev emerged as the supreme leader, and in appearance at least the Soviet Union once again had a single leader. While in the mid-1960s it was the premier —i.e., Kosygin — who met with important foreign leaders, as time went on Brezhnev more and more often assumed this role. It was Kosygin for example, who met with Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro, N.J.; but a few years later Brezhnev received Richard Nixon in Moscow."

•"Brezhnev did not dominate the regime immediately after Khrushchev's ouster. The Presidium was a heterogenous group and Brezhnev had only one close ally, Andrei Kirilenko. Brezhnev had limited influence within the Council of Ministers because Premier Aleksei Kosygin ran the government apparatus. Brezhnev's public role as foreign policy spokesman also was limited by Kosygin, who was primarily responsible for relations with noncommunist countries. Mikhail Suslov was another independent and influential figure who had the potential to erode or supersede Brezhnev's authority. Suslov was seen by his colleagues as the defender of the rights of the oligarchy against individual leadership, something uppermost in the leaders' minds. Nikolai Podgornyi, who was widely regarded in the West as the third-ranking leader in the Kremlin, was primarily responsible for party organization. In December 1965 he succeeded Anastas Mikoian as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (president). If Brezhnev faltered, Podgornyi would have been a logical alternative to assume the general secretaryship."

•"After Khrushchev's ousting, the new leadership focused on one major task: to reinstate consensual , collective rule and protect the system from unnecessary disruptions. The separation between party and government powers was deemed essential. The inner core of the ruling group comprised First Secretary Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, head of state Podgorny (as of December 1965) and Secretary Suslov, regarded as the ideological Number Two in the party. Even though the principle of party supremacy continued to prevail — and prevails to the present day — the Council of Ministers possessed much more authority and prestige under Kosygin than under Bulganin in 1955-1958. It was in part due to Khrushchev's revitalising of the post after 1958 as his second power base after the Party; it also derived from Kosygin's ability and special competence in economic affairs. [¶] It is significant that the four leading figures in the leadership were precisely the men who shared the making of foreign policy in the second half of the 1960s. Kosygin and Podgorny, by virtue of their respective government and state functions, exercised the role of representatives of the USSR in diplomacy. Suslov exerted prevailing influence in the International Department of the Central Committee, a party body that actively contributed to the making of foreign policy...Brezhnev had a more subdued role at the very early stage of his tenure but quickly asserted his position as supreme party leader, thereby enhancing his authority in international affairs."

•"A certain distribution of the roles was noticeable [in the post-Khrushchev troika]. Kosygin emerged as the primary interlocutor of Western statesmen. He paid official visits to the United States, France and Britain, and formally led the dialogue and negotiations with the Americans, the French and the West Germans in the early stages of detente (until 1971). As Archie Brown has noted, 'Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was for the first six or seven post-Khrushchev years much more actively involved in high-level talks with foreign leaders.' Henry Kissinger observed that 'until well into 1971 all our high-level communications with the Soviet Union were with Kosygin'. Podgorny was more prominent in relations with Third World countries. And Brezhnev as Party General Secretary represented the CPSU in exchanges with other Communist parties and socialist countries. On important occasions, the 'troika' together acted as the collective representatives of the USSR."

•"...The Soviet system had been run without either a charismatic Lenin or a despotic Stalin at the top for eleven years, and the oligarchical power structure improvised in 1953, and subsequently much modified, had survived – but only just. The troubles of its first years had demonstrated both the continued need for a clear pattern of authority within it, and the fact that only the boss of the party machine could effectively exercise primacy within such a pattern. But it had been shown that such a party boss could still exploit the enormous and ill-defined powers of the party machine and the absence of external political constraints to 'escape from the control of the collective' and potentially to make himself a new dictator: a prospect his fellow oligarchs had good reason in recent experience to fear. The challenge now was to allow the top-ranking Central Committee secretary enough status and power for him to serve as an effective primus inter pares, while fencing off the avenues via which he might acquire excessive personal dominance. [¶] The measures devised by Khrushchev's successors went some distance towards meeting this challenge. On the one hand the new First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was immediately accorded primacy of esteem and his post was soon afterwards lent greater authority by restoring the title of General Secretary. On the other hand he was substantially balanced by the new premier (Kosygin) and blocked from any possibility of adding the latter's post to his own by a resolution of the Central Committee meeting that removed Khrushchev, which declared it inexpedient that the premiership and party first secretaryship should henceforth be held by the same person. Simultaneously, Khrushchev's administrative reforms which had gravely weakened the central government machine were reversed. A rough balance of party and government office-holders in the Central Committee Presidium prevented Brezhnev from converting his dominance of the Secretariat into dominance of the Presidium. And a policy of 'stability of cadres' was adopted which (apart from cementing support for the new 'collective leadership' among the elites represented in the full Central Committee) hindered the General Secretary from making energetic use of his personnel powers to build up a following which he might then use against his fellow oligarchs."

•In 1964, Khrushchev was replaced by a group within which power was carefully balanced. No one in the group dominated the others. Brezhnev was at the top of the Party, but Podgorny had at least equal authority, for he was responsible for questions of organization and personnel in the Party, while Kosygin was in charge of the state apparatus. To this small group must be added Aleksandr Shelepin, president of the Party Control Commission. The balance of positions was strengthened by a mixed distribution of responsibilities. No individual was in charge of a single area of activity. Thus, all members of the troika had international activities, in which Kosygin played the primary role. IN 1965, when the U.S.S.R. attempted to bring the Indians and Pakistanis together at the Tashkent conference, this spectacular mediation was conducted by Kosygin.. Two years later, he was again the one who traveled to France and England and then met President Johnson at Glassboro. Thus Kosygin dominated the first Soviet-American summit conference of the post-Khrushchev period, and the government seemed to be the place where international relations were worked out. [¶] Brezhnev was in charge of another sector of foreign policy on the border between domestic and international affairs. As head of the Party, he dealt primarily with Communist countries and secondarily with the Third World. In 1969, out of the ninety-two days he devoted to international relations, only nine involved countries outside the Communist world, and they were almost all Third World countries. Until the end of the sixties, Kosygin very clearly dominated the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R, and he was the leader most visible to the external world."

•"An oligarchy took control of the Soviet Union after ousting party leader Nikita S. Khrushchev in October 1964. In contrast to Khrushchev's unpredictable and gregarious approach to governing, the oligarchy emphasized stability and collective decision making. During the second half of the 1960s the new leadership would preside over a chronically troubled economy, an acceleration of the Soviet military buildup, unrest in Czechoslovakia, an increasingly bitter dispute with the People's Republic of China, and the first tentative steps toward detente with the West...[¶] The men who replaced Khrushchev moved quickly to do away with domestic programs instituted furing their predecessor's years at the top. They dismantled Khrushchev's regional economic councils, designed to decentralize state authority by allowing local jurisdictions some say over regional matters. In addition they ended Khrushchev's confusing bifurcation of the party and government bureaucracies into industrial and agricultural units. Within two years they also had reversed Khrushchev's program of de-Stalinization. Among other actions, the new leadership curbed public criticism of Stalin. At a November 3, 1967, ceremony marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Brezhnev referred to Stalin's reign of terrors as 'temporary setbacks and errors.'"

•"In the wake of Khrushchev's ouster, Petr Shelest was promoted to the Politburo, a move that benefited his associate Podgornyi. Aleksandr Shelepin, who had provided the 'muscle' for the Khrushchev ouster through his contacts in the Committee for State Security (KGB), also was rewarded with a Politburo seat."

•"Following Khrushchev's removal, a new 'troika' (Brezhnev, Podgorny and Alexi Kosygin) took power and named Brezhnev First Secretary of the Communist Party where he shared power with Podgorny (who was then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet)."

•"In the mid-1960s appraisals of Brezhnev centered on the new leadership of the Soviet Union as a whole. Just as in the early Khrushchev years, it was not immediately apparent after 1964 who wielded how much power in the Soviet hierarchy. The immediate talk was of a triumvirate of Brezhnev at the head of the Communist Party, Kosygin as prime minister (Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers), and ― after December 1965 ― Podgorny as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet... [¶]For the first years after Khrushchev's removal from power, this collective leadership continued to act as such, and indeed it might be argued that, despite the undoubted consolidation of power by Brezhnev himself as 'primus inter pares' , in terms of leadership style the Soviet Union was ruled by a collective leadership throughout the Brezhnev era. Certainly, through the end of the 1960s, the consensus view was that collective leadership prevailed. The economic reforms of 1965 were clearly identified with the prime minister, and referred to as the 'Kosygin reforms.'..."

•"...[I]n a palace coup on 14 October 1964, Khrushchev was ousted as first secretary of the CPSU and replaced by Brezhnev, his protege. Alexei Kosygin became chairman of the Council of Ministers and Anastas Mikoyan, head of state. In December 1966 Mikoyan was replaced by Podgorny, who had been unable or unwilling to prevent Khrushchev's overthrow...[¶] Brezhnev was elected in order to bring a measure of stability to the Soviet system. His eighteen-year rule was marked by a corporate and faceless style that contrasted with his predecessor's brash unpredictability. It has been said that after Stalin's terror Khrushchev gave Soviet officials personal security and Brezhnev gave them job security. He put a premium on compromise and consensus, so that no single group or individual dominated...[¶] This new collegial style of management obscured the actual extent of Brezhnev's role and influence in the Soviet leadership. During his first years in power, he apparently concentrated his efforts on party affairs and the world communist movement, while Kosygin, came to be identified with economic planning and relations with the noncommunist world. But by 29 March 1966, when he adopted Stalin's old title of general secretary at the 23rd Party Congress, Brezhnev had emerged as primus inter pares within the ruling triumvirate. Even so, he spent more than a decade consolidating his power: it was only with the forced retirement of Podgorny in May 1977 that Brezhnev had finally eliminated his last rival."

•"Behind the facade of collective leadership a hidden struggle for power had been going on from the time Khrushchev was overthrown and pensioned off. Its first stage was marked by the purge of the supporters of the ousted first secretary from the Party apparatus. The country was then actually ruled by three men: Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny. Brezhnev did not control a majority in the Politburo: of eleven members chosen at the 23[r]d Party Congress only four—Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pelshe, Suslov, and Polyansky—were on his side. Furthermore, one of them, Suslov, was an 'errant' ally who always endeavored to preserve the balance of forces in the Politburo. When the balance swung in favor of Brezhnev, he went over to the side of Kosygin: when Kosygin was in the ascendant, he did the opposite. As for Shelepin, he was a sort of Brezhnev 'fellow traveler.' He allowed Brezhnev to use him against Podgorny, but when a clash occurred between the general secretary and Kosygin, Shelepin remained on the sidelines, letting the two big boys fight it out between them and, he hoped, exhaust themselves. [¶] Nor was there any harmony between the Kosygin and Podgorny factions. The two men were permanently at odds in their rivalry for the second spot. Voronov and Shelest were close to Podgorny, and Kirill Mazurov leaned toward the side of Kosygin. But when Kosygin and Podgorny agreed on some issue, Brezhnev would find himself in the minority in the Politburo, especially because the ambitious and ever-wavering Shelepin could never be relied on. This is why Brezhnev's main concern at this time was to sow discord between Kosygin and Podgorny."

•"The variations in the real distribution of power between 1964 and 1973 reflect the response by Brezhnev and his senior colleagues (during this period, Kirilenko apparently functioned more as Brezhnev's lieutenant than as an independent member of the troika) to the inherent problems of the succession cycle. These problems were compounded by the collective-leadership pact of 1964 which placed explicit limitations upon the new general secretary's expansion of personal control. The understandings of 1964 had specified 'stability of cadres' in contrast to the instability of the Khrushchev years. Brezhnev, therefore, could not augment his personal power by widespread appointment of clients to regional secretaryships. But a new general secretary's consolidation of authority depends upon the forging of cohesion of the party's elite, so that other elements in the political system can be more or less firmly controlled. Since the middle level was largely off limits, the new general secretary had to concentrate on the top of the party pyramid...[¶] The years from 1965 to 1968 were marked by the installation of 'safe' apparatchiks or of clients of Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kirilenko in key posts in the Central Committee apparatus. Podgorny lost his party secretaryship in 1965 when he was kicked upstairs to the presidency..."

•"October 1964 to December 1969: The post-Khrushchev collective leadership was at first led by a triumvirate of Leonid Brezhnev (general secretary), Aleksei Kosygin (premier), and Nikolai Pogornyi (Party secretary), with Aleksandr Shelepin (chair of the Party-State Control Committee) and Mikhail Suslov (Party secretary) playing active roles in the succession conflict."

•"The removal of Khrushchev brought a new division of posts with Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary, Aleksei Kosygin as premier (chairman of the Council of Ministers), Nikolai Podgornyi, Aleksandr Shelepin, and Mikhail Suslov as central Party secretaries. Khrushchev's removal also brought a new opportunity to build more effective guarantees of collective leadership. The team reached an agreement on powersharing and, with the experience of Khrushchev's breakout, established stronger checks on the consolidation of autocratic power. These included more thorough balancing of the posts and powers among members of the collective leadership to facilitate mutual checking, higher obstacles to defection and disqualification, and more vigilant enforcement of the norms that would serve as early warning of threats to balance. [¶] Predicated on the presumption...that 'two heads are better than one' the post-Khrushchev balancing agreement led to what Rigby has called an 'implicit compact'. As before, its provisions (1) divided the posts of premier (chairman of the Council of Ministers) and general secretary between two leaders, (2) distributed seats in the Politburo, Secretariat, and Presidium of the Council of Ministers so 'as to avoid dangerous patterns of overlap,' and (3) established 'countervailing power between top-most leaders.' It went beyond the previous agreements, however, in that it (4) significantly reduced opportunities for patronage in the second tier, particularly by limiting the general secretary's personnel powers... [¶]The division of posts was done with fine attention to reestablishing balance and blocking the concentration of excessive power in the hands of any one person. To prevent a new consolidation, the day after Khrushchev's ouster the Central Committee Plenum adopted a resolution to keep the posts of general secretary and premier (chairman of the Council of Ministers) in separate hands. An essential structural foundation for the balance between general secretary and premier was reestablishment of the ministries that had been dismantled under Khrushchev. Beginning in March 1965 a growing number of state committees were transformed into ministries—first in the area of defense production. In September 1965 the regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) that Khrushchev had used to assume ministerial responsibilities were abolished. By 1967, twenty-five all-union and twenty-seven union-republic ministries had been reestablished. These would be balanced against the Party apparatus."

•"...For several years after Khrushchev's demise [in 1964], power within the [Soviet]m collective leadership remained both dispersed and balanced: Nikolai Podgorny, the hard-line head of state, dominated relations with Third World countries; Prime Minister Kosygin handled the economy and urged detente with the West; Brezhnev, the party secretary, looked after Eastern Europe, harping on the threat from Germany and the United States. Gradually, in the late 1960s, Brezhnev maneuvered his way into preeminence . Partly, like Stalin and Khrushchev before him, he used his control of the party apparatus to promote allies and topple enemies. But he also raised his profile by moving into the foreign-policy arena, stealing some of Kosygin's ideas while retaining his own reputation as a hard-liner on security. It was Brezhnev who put the new 'peace program' to the twenty-fourth party congress in April 1971. During the summer, Gromyko indicated that in future Nixon should write to Brezhnev, and not Kosygin, about foreign policy. Even after 1971, the Soviet leadership remained collective: Brezhnev was first among equals and never achieved the dominance of Khrushchev, let alone Stalin."

•"Key to the success of the balance after 1964, where previously it had failed, were limits on the general secretary's control over personnel. Beginning with the very first succession in the 1920s, the greatest threat of breakout had come from the general secretary's control of the Party apparatus. In 1922 and in 1953 the collective leadership established inadequate safeguards against patronage within the Party apparatus. Thus, by consolidating control within the apparatus, a general secretary could confront other leaders with a fait accompli in a Central Committee showdown. Indeed between 1953 and the 1956 Party Congress, Khrushchev had replaced seven of the fourteen union-republic secretaries and thirty-nine of the sixty-nine Russian Republic provincial first secretaries. He replaced them with a dependent clientele: Three of the new-union-republic secretaries and six of the new Russian provincial secretaries had previously served with Khrushchev in the Ukraine. By the 1961 Party Congress in October, all but two of the Russian Republic's provincial secretaries had been replaced. [¶] The post-Khrushchev leadership limited the general secretary's patronage power by separating and balancing control over the apparatus. Initially Brezhnev shared control over the patronage machine with Podgornyi. Thus, at the critical moment (November—December 1964) when the provincial party organizations were being reorganized in order to undo a reform previously introduced by Khrushchev, no one leader was in a position to use this to break out from collective leadership by appointing a clientele among the first secretaries. Reflecting the balance within the Secretariat, the leadership relied on the solution of bringing back previous incumbents to fill the first secretary posts in the reunified organizations—or where one was no longer available, promoting the ranking party official in the provincial organization..."

•"Limitations on the general secretary's patronage powers reduced opportunities for consolidation within the [party apparatus]. According to a provincial first secretary speaking to the 1966 Party Congress, between late 1964 and April 1966, 'the Central Committee has made a most important turnabout in its work with personnel and has ended mass transfers.' The 1966 Party Congress removed the provision in the 1961 Party Statutes mandating turnover of one-third of the membership of Party committees at each election, a provision Khrushchev had used to justify removal of disloyal Party personnel. As a consequence, the rate of annual turnover among union-republic and Russian Republic provincial first secretaries was significantly lower in the Brezhnev years...[¶] The general secretary's ability to translate a constituency within the Party apparatus into control over the Central Committee was also limited. Outside political intervention in personnel matters decreased as leaders of key bureaucracies asserted greater professional control over their subordinates...For example, commanding officers at the highest levels of the Soviet armed forces gained greater professional and institutional autonomy, limited Party meddling, and established a more traditional chain of command. In civilian bureaucracies, one concomitant of this trend was growing specialization of career tracks and professionalization of the criteria for appointment and promotion within the respective hierarchies."

•"Norms against defection and disqualification were reinforced in the compact of 1964-1965. Sanctions against defection limited most airing of differences outside the Politburo and blocked most appeals to enlarge the arena of conflict...[¶] Norms against disqualification were reinforced by limiting piecemeal disqualification that could dislodge first-tier actors from their second-tier bases. Balance in the first tier depended on the balancing of coalitions that stretched across tiers. A key to Khrushchev's success had been to break the institutional ties of first-tier actors to second-tier constituencies in preparation for a showdown in the Central Committee...[¶] After Khrushchev the balance survived because the leadership blocked this type of piecemeal disqualification. While a few leaders, such as Shelepin, whose accumulation of power threatened the balance, were dislodged from their second-tier constituencies and ultimately from the Politburo, those leaders such as Suslov and Kosygin who were essential to maintaining the balance retained their critical roles atop their constituencies until virtually the end of the Brezhnev administration."

Nikolai Podgorny

•"...[A]fter October 1964 Podgorny was the highest generalist in the Secretariat next to Brezhnev himself, while the other members specialized in ideology, industry , etc. Thus there were only two attitudes that Podgorny could take toward Brezhnev: to be his second-in-command or his principal rival. Apparently, it was mainly the rival that Brezhnev saw in him. In December 1965, after consolidating his own position, Brezhnev applied the treatment he had experienced from Kozlov five years before and moved Podgorny from the Secretariat to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet."

•"...Right after the anti-Khrushchev coup that brought Brezhnev to power, it became obvious that not only the Politburo but also the Central Committee Secretariat blocked his aspirations. The fall of Khrushchev led to the appointment of Podgorny as second secretary. In this capacity, the latter directed the work of the Organizational Division, which he could easily transform into his own independent power base."

•"...Leonid Brezhnev had succeeded Khrushchev as general secretary, but initially shared control of the Party apparatus with Nikolai Podgornyi, who sat as the 'second secretary' in the Secretariat. With his associate atop the department responsible for local party organizations, Podgornyi was in a strategic position to build a following in the party apparatus. Brezhnev moved quickly to exclude Podgornyi from the Secretariat and to purge Central Committee departments of his followers. Podgornyi was transferred to the more honorific post of chief of state (chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet)"

•"As the rift between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union widened in spring 1968, the CPSU Politburo authorized Soviet defense minister Andrei Grechko to begin preparing Soviet forces in Eastern Europe for a large-scale military contingency. This decision marked the initial step in planning for Operation Danube, the eventual code name of the August 1968 invasion. With the Soviet politburo, however, there was not yet full agreement about the best course to pursue. Brezhnev initially was unwilling to embrace a clear-cut position, and he permitted and indeed encouraged other members of the politburo to express their own opinions about particular matters. The transcripts of Soviet politburo meetings from 1968 reveal that some members, such as Yuri Andropov, Nikolai Podgorny and Petro Shelest, were consistent proponents of military intervention, whereas others, particularly Mikhail Suslov, were far more circumspect. Several politburo members, notably Aleksei Kosygin, fluctuated during the crisis, at times favoring 'extreme measures' (i.e. military action) and at other times seeking a political solution."

Alexei Kosygin

•"On October 14, 1964, a special session of the Central Committee suddenly removed Khrushchev from power. Kosygin was named to replace him as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, or prime minister. Brezhnev assumed Khrushchev's position as first secretary of the Communist party. ¶ Initially, Kosygin was responsible for government affairs, including economic matters and foreign relations with nonsocialist countries, while Brezhnev was to handle party affairs and Soviet relations within the international communist movement. The division of labor seemed to work at first. While Brezhnev was busy consolidating his power withi the party, Kosygin tackled the Soviet Union's economic problems...."

•"...In October 1964, Khrushchev was removed from power...Kosygin took over the [Soviet Union's] economic policies and assumed leadership of the government as chairman of the Council of Ministers."

•"At the Twenty-third Party Congress, convened in March 1966, Brezhnev and Kosygin demonstrated that they were the leading policy makers in the regime. Nikolai Podgornyi's power was diluted when the congress replaced him on the Secretariat with Andrei Kirilenko. As head of the party, Brezhnev was responsible for party matters and relations with other communist countries and parties. He delivered the opening speech at the congress on March 29. Kosygin oversaw economic planning and relations with the noncommunist world."

•"[Brezhnev] was not a man of bold initiatives and innovative thinking – one of the reasons why his comrades had chosen him to follow the quixotic Khrushchev [as First Secretary] – and left the running of the economy to Kosygin."

•"...It was only when Khrushchev was removed from all his offices that in October 1964 Kosygin finally became Chairman of the Council of Ministers and was seen as one of the top two Soviet leaders, along with Brezhnev who became party chief. [¶] Throughout the remainder of the 1960s Kosygin acted like a Prime Minister in the full sense of the term and it was he who engaged in highest-level talks on behalf of the Soviet Union with President Lyndon Johnson, with President Charles de Gaulle and with the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. It was only from the beginning of the 1970s that Brezhnev took over these functions and made increasingly clear that he was the senior partner in the party-government duo."

•"Kosygin...had an importance initially which was at least comparable to Suslov's. And like Suslov he did not aspire to be general secretary. He was content to head the governmental rather than the party machine, although less happy at the way Brezhnev's gradual accretion of power reduced his own authority in the 1970s as compared with the mid-1960s. Kosygin was so prominent in the earlier post-Khrushchev years that as late as 1970 Henry Kissinger mistakenly thought that he was ‘the dominant figure in foreign policy in the Politburo’ and that summit talks with the recently elected President Nixon would mean meeting with Kosygin. In fact, Brezhnev was busy demonstrating once again that the leader of the Communist Party would emerge as number one in Soviet politics and that discussions at the highest level must involve him. Kosygin continued, however, to be in charge of detailed economic administration in his role as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. [¶] He introduced an economic reform of modest proportions in 1965. It aimed to increase material incentives and to reward factories and their managers for sales rather than simply for gross output. But in the absence of market prices, even the sales success indicator was of dubious value as a measure of economic efficiency. The Soviet economy, in fact, enjoyed stronger growth in the second half of the 1960s than it ever did thereafter, but the link between that and the ‘Kosygin reforms’ is tenuous. Kosygin, although an able administrator, was too much a product of the Soviet ministerial system, as it evolved under Stalin, to become a radical economic reformer. However, even his modest proposals for change became linked in arguments behind the scenes with the developments in Czechoslovakia. It seems likely that the harshness of Kosygin’s criticism of Czech and Slovak reformers owed something to his realization that they had made his own attempt to achieve greater rationality within the Soviet economic system harder to realize. The fact that economic reform in Czechoslovakia had in 1968 been accompanied by dangerous political reform helped to discredit the very word ‘reform’ in the Soviet Union. Those, especially within the Communist Party apparatus, who viewed any attempt to make the economy more self-regulating as a threat to their political and administrative powers were happy to assist in the task of elevating Brezhnev to a position of significantly higher authority than Kosygin."

•"The third stage in Brezhnev's consolidation of power was the early 1970s which saw the 'retirement' of Gennadi Voronov...and the demotion of Dmitrii Polyansky to become Minister of Agriculture, having previously been first deputy to the prime minister, Aleksei Kosygin. Both Polyansky and Voronov were considered part of the Kosygin 'faction', which was thus weakened by these moves."'

•"...At the December 1969 CC Plenum, as John Dornberg reports, Brezhnev 'delivered a secret speech which was violently critical of the state of the economy and called for draconian, orthodox measures to deal with it.' Brezhnev blamed Kosygin's methods and the ministries for economic problems and pressed for greater reliance on the methods of the Party including 'moral stimulants,' discipline, and mobilization. The issue came to a head in early 1970, when Brezhnev apparently sought to unseat Kosygin and secure his own appointment or that of a proxy as premier, but a majority of the Politburo blocked this. The following year this issue again surfaced along with rumors that an organizational compromise was in the works to create a new state council on the model of Romania and the German Democratic Republic, whereby the general secretary could become president with direct control over the premier and council of ministers. In this Brezhnev clearly failed; he had to be content with a set of lesser appointments that hemmed in, but did not dislodge Kosygin. In 1970 changes in the seconds-in-command in both the State Planning Committee and State Committee for Science and Technology increased Brezhnev's 'presence' within Kosygin's state economic bureaucracy, leading once again to mixed control through alternating layers of protégés. Replacement of government heads by party apparatchiki in four union-republics — Kazakhstan, Moldavia, Azerbaidjan, and Latvia — further expanded Brezhnev's presence at lower levels of the state apparatus. Yet, by preventing the dislodgment of Kosygin, the leadership maintained a cornerstone of collective rule."

•"...Aleksei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgornyi were the most outspoken proponents of policy innovations that would shift priorities from the iron triangle to either consumer-goods industry (Kosygin) or social programs (Podgornyi)...Podgornyi spoke in Baku in May 1965 for expansion of the 'social funds of consumption,' including 'housing construction, urban amenities, health care, and services for the daily needs of the people.' He argued that restrictions on consumer welfare and national sacrifices by the population to allow for priority development of heavy industry and strengthening of defense were things of the past. Kosygin was not so bold in his proposals for development of light and food industry and satisfaction of the population's demand for a varied assortment of goods. Yet, speaking in Minsk in February 1968 he called for accelerated growth in light industry in order to reduce the imbalance in growth rates with heavy industry. Brezhnev chose to build a constituency within the iron triangle, and in reaching out to this constituency he resisted reforms that would impinge on its priorities. Thus, his speeches pressed for strengthening defense, while he remained virtually silent on the need for investment in light industry. He attacked Kosygin's reforms for their emphasis on material incentives to increase productivity rather than Party apparatus leadership: 'It would be wrong to reduce everything to material incentives; this would impoverish the inner world of Soviet man.'"

Aleksandr Shelepin

•"...Shelepin, who was made Presidium member after helping to organize Khrushchev's dismissal, made a bid for the supreme leadership in February 1965 by calling for a restoration of obedience and order. He disliked the concept of the 'all-people's state'; he wanted to resume an ideologi al offensive against Yugoslavia; and he showed a fondness for the good old days in his confidential support for the rehabilitation of Stalin's reputation. 'Iron Shurik', as he was nicknamed, got nowhere in the Presidium. He did not help himself by parading his contempt for his older colleagues and by proposing to cut back the perks enjoyed by party office-holders. Brezhnev was not yet strong enough to remove him from the Presidium; but in 1967 he directed him out of harm's way by moving him from the Committee of Party-State Control to the USSR Central Council of Trade Unions."

•"The prime directive of security and stability determined the nature of leadership in the Soviet Union [after Khrushchev's removal]. During 1965 and 1966 Brezhnev prevailed in a struggle for power over two serious rivals — Podgorny and Alexander Shelepin — and emerged as the leading figure on the Presidium. Shelepin's fate was particularly instructive. Although more than a decade younger than his colleagues, Shelepin, nicknamed 'Iron Shurik,' had played a major role in the plot against Khrushchev and in November 1964 became a full member of the Presidium without having to pass through the normally obligatory candidate stage. He had headed the secret police for two years under Khrushchev and was a tough law-and-order advocate and hard-liner regarding foreign policy who had disapproved of Khrushchev's attempts to ease tension with the United States. Shelepin's unbridled authoritarianism and apparent ambition to accumulate more power than his colleagues thought safe, as well as his close ties both with the old-line Stalinists Khrushchev had pushed aside and with the secret police, evoked uncomfortable memories among the Presidium membership. His political eclipse thus reinforced the principle that the new party leadership, while prepared to restore certain practices from the Stalin era that Khrushchev had ended, was determined to chart a course between the Scylla of a dangerous new Stalin and the Charybdis of another destabilizing Khrushchev."

•"Shelepin initially was the main threat to Brezhnev. He was young and ambitious and had a foothold in both the Council of Ministers (as deputy premier) and the Secretariat. Shelepin was chairman of the Party-State Control Commission, and he had well-placed personal associates below him."

•"The fall of Shelepin proceeded gradually through several stages. His career began to decline as early as 1965. During this period his power base dissipated first in the Komsomol, then in the KGB, the Party bureaucracy, and finally in the trade unions. [¶] Not a single star in the Kremlin political firmament rose so brilliantly or waned so pitiably as Shelepin's. He became a member of the Central Committee under Stalin. Khrushchev made him head of the security services. Then, several years later, in reward for his help in denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev made him a CC Secretary and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, as well as the watchdog over the government and Party by appointing him chairman of the Party-Government Control Committee...[¶] The year 1965 marked the apogee of Shelepin's career and the beginning of its end. First he lost the Control Committee when the office was liquidated. Then he was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Yet he still had too much authority and had played too important a role in the plot against Khrushchev to be pushed into oblivion. So in 1966 Brezhnev awarded him the gold star of the Hero of Socialist Labor in honor of his fiftieth birthday and then promptly removed him from Party work by making him head of the trade unions. Thus, Shelepin lost power in spite of continuing to be a Politburo member. He attempted to use his Politburo membership to regain a power base, and in the process switched from one side to the other. Supporting the opponents of the general secretary, at one moment he endeavored to be a flaming liberal, courting Kosygin's favor by criticizing Brezhnev for his conduct of domestic policy. Then just as suddenly, he became an ardent Brezhnevite when Brezhnev sought support for detente. But it was too late; Brezhnev could not forgive his double-dealing. In 1975 Shelepin was dispatched as head of a labor-union delegation to England. This turned out to be his journey into political oblivion. Using the wave of protests in Europe (perhaps even stirred up by Moscow)against Shelepin as a pretext, at the CC Plenum in April 1975 Brezhnev succeeded in having him dismissed 'on his own request'. The thus-phrased resolution was his political coup de grâce..."

•"If Brezhnev kept a wary eye on Kosygin, he turned a more baleful gaze on one member of the top leadership team who was a real potential rival, Alexander Shelepin. There is every reason to suppose that Shelepin, who was not alone in regarding Brezhnev as a temporary leader aspired to the top job. Known as 'Iron Shurik', he had accumulated some important allies on his way to membership in the Politburo. He had been head of Komsomol (the Communist youth organization), then head of the KGB, and from 1961 a secretary of the Central Committee. When in 1966 he became a full member of the Politburo, he was one of the handful of senior secretaries — those with a foothold in both the Politburo and the Secretariat— who, as a result, carried special authority. Brezhnev handled Shelepin with care. In May 1967 he removed Vladimir Semichastny, an important ally of Shelepin, from the chairmanship of the KGB, replacing him with Yury Andropov. In September of the same year he eased Shelepin out of the Secretariat, making him head of Soviet trade unions. This was a dead-end job, given that the main function of Soviet-style unions was to keep workers docile and obedient rather than have them become an autonomous force defending workers' interests. Yet such was Brezhnev's caution that there was a gap of almost eight years between his moving Shelepin out of the secretariat and dropping him from the Politburo. That was engineered in 1975 while Shelepin was on a visit to Britain. As we have seen, it was common practice in the post-Stalin Soviet Union for politicians to be dismissed when they were far from Moscow and thus unable to mobilize support from potential allies..."

•"...Shelepin used his post as head of the Party-State Control Committee, responsible for party discipline and bureaucratic monitoring, to challenge the supremacy of the Party apparatus. Shelepin extended his coalition by alliances with complementary organizations in the areas of mobilization and control, using his long-time associates in the Komsomol (Sergei Pavlov), the militia or MOOP (Vadim Tikunov), and the KGB (Vladimir Semichastnyi). Shelepin apparently encouraged rumors that his rapid rise would soon culminate in his ascendancy over his peers in the [post-Khrushchev] collective leadership."

•"...The most significant threat to [Soviet] collective leadership in the post-Khrushchev succession came from Aleksandr Shelepin, who emerged from the 1964 succession as chair of the Party-State Control Committee, deputy chair of the Council of Ministers, all-union Party Secretary, as well as member of the Politburo. Shelepin held a unique position at the juncture of party and state He supervised the Administrative Organs Department, the Party apparatus department monitoring the police, and his hand-picked successor atop the KGB gave him a base in the police. In the first half of 1965 Shelepin's supporters circulated rumors that Brezhnev would soon be replaced 'by a man with a little more dynamism and natural authority.' His obvious ambition, his control of the police, and his attempt to use the Party-State Control Committee to gain laverage over the Party apparatus threatened to upset the balance in the [Soviet] leadership and spurred balancing behavior into action. To contain Shelepin, Brezhnev brought together an overwhelming majority that included even Brezhnev's other significant competitor for control of the Party apparatus—Nikolai Podgornyi. The leadership rapidly moved to expel Shelepin from the Party-State Control Committee (1965) and then more slowly from the Secretariat (1967). To prevent anyone else attempting to repeat his strategy from the Party-State Committee, the Party dissolved the Committee on 6 December 1965, with the admonition that 'the organs of peoples' control do not control the work of party organs.' "

Post-Brezhnev Interregnum

•"An important step forward in the institutionalization of collective leadership was increasingly precise definition of the role of the general secretary, so as to establish both lower and upper bounds to its powers. On the one hand, institutionalizations of the role guaranteed it certain powers. By 1982 actors in both tiers shared an expectation that the general secretary would serve as the 'head of the Politburo' rather than just one member in a collectivity. The label 'head of the Politburo' had not been used to describe Brezhnev until 1969; but people used it to describe the role of Andropov and Chernenko immediately upon election, and a Central Committee resolution used it within eight months of Andropov's election. On the other hand, institutionalization of collective leadership placed upper bounds on those powers and created further obstacles to consolidating directive leadership."

•"The Brezhnev administration set the pattern whereby the general secretary served as chairman of the Defense Council and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ('president'). The former was granted to general secretaries almost automatically or with only slight delay in all three of the next successions. Confirmation that the general secretary served as defense chair came within six months of Andropov's succession, one month of Chernenko's, and five months of Gorbachev's...¶Yet, the post of chief of state–that is, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium–was not the automatic prerogative for all general secretaries. Andropov was apparently at first blocked from adding the post; reportedly this had been promised to Chernenko in the leadership settlement of October 1982. A month later Andropov had reneged, deciding to block Chernenko's election; thus, the November Supreme Soviet session left the post vacant. Within six months, however, the general secretary was able to win election for himself. In 1984 Chernenko was elected to the post almost automatically–within two months of his succession. At the April 1984 parliament (Supreme Soviet) session that formally elected Chernenko, Gorbachev created the expectation that combined party and state posts would be normal in the future:'Simultaneous performance by the general secretary...of the functions of the chairman...is of great importance for pursuing the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.' Yet just a year later general secretary Gorbachev was denied the chief of state post, and at the 2 July 1984 Supreme Soviet session that elected Andrei Gromyko instead, Gorbachev seemed to contradict his earlier logic. While defending the previous decision to combine posts as 'justified under the conditions of the time,' he argued that the tasks of domestic restructuring would 'demand greater intensity in the work of the CPSU and its Political Bureau.' 'Under these concrete conditions and with due account taken of the present state, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee found it advisable that the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee should concentrate to the maximum on organizing the work of party central organs.' The demands of mutual checking in 1985 led the collective leadership to contain Gorbachev's power by denying him the office of chief of state."

•"Mutual checking also led the leadership to enforce the 1964 Central Committee resolution that separated the general secretary and chair of the Council of Ministers. The leadership continued to balance control of the police despite Andropov's long association with the KGB. When Andropov removed Brezhnev's client as minister of internal affairs and appointed his own associate from the KGB to succeed him, the KGB chair was then given to Viktor Chebrikov, a longtime associate of Brezhnev and Chernenko. In January 1986, the collective leadership replaced the minister of internal affairs but left Chebrikov in his post as chairman of the KGB."

"Most important, this elaborate balancing took the next step necessary to block consolidation of directive leadership by a general secretary–by balancing control within the Party apparatus itself. The balancing acts of 1982-1985 gave special attention to this through cohabitation within the Secretariat and through layering of control in the personnel machine. After Andropov's election, Chernenko remained within the Secretariat and retained his lose associations with the Brezhnevite cadres. After Andropov's death Chernenko's control of the apparatus was balanced by appointment of Gorbachev as his second in command within the Secretariat, a position charged with oversight of personnel matters. After June 1983, they cohabited the Secretariat with Romanov. After Gorbachev assumed the general secretaryship, operational control of the Secretariat was taken from3 him and placed in the hands of Egor Ligachev. In an interview published on 4 December 1987 with Le Monde writers Michel Tatu and Daniel Vernet, Ligachev explained, 'I chair the Central Committee Secretariat's meetings and, at the request of the Central Committee Politburo, I organize its work.' He suggested that he kept the general secretary, who did not attend, informed of Secretariat meetings. In particular, Ligachev retained a significant role in cadres policy. In April 1985 appointment of Gorbachev's associate Georgii Razumovskii to head the Organization Party Work Department (OPW), which was responsible for work with local Party organizations, gave Gorbachev some leverage in personnel matters to check Ligachev's control over cadres. The presence of Ligachev's appointee Evegenii Razumov as first deputy chair of the same department, however, meant that control over personnel remained balanced among Politburo members with their partisans at alternating layers of authority in the personnel machine."

Post-Andropov Collective Leadership

In General

•"...General Secretary Andropov had been ailing even at the moment of his appointment, and on 9 February 1984 he died after his kidneys entirely gave out. Next day the Politburo endorsed Gromyko's proposal for Konstantin Chernenko to become the new General Secretary. Ustinov declared his support — Gorbachev had asked him to put himself forward, but he declined. He had an understanding with the ascendant group inside the Politburo and did not wish to disturb it. The Soviet leaders knew that Chernenko was in poor health and had never shown an imaginative understanding of the USSR's problems. For decades he had operated on the sidelines as Brezhnev's personal assistant. Indeed, it was his weaknesses that that recommended him to most of the Politburo. The Politburo veterans had run affairs with little hindrance in Brezhnev's last years. They wanted to do the same again. They also aimed to put an end to the disturbances that Andropov had started to create. Chernenko fitted this requirement."

•"Chernenko chaired meetings in a limp fashion. He let people talk for as long as they liked at the Politburo, rarely venturing a comment of his own. When he sensed that the discussion was complete, he mumbled: 'Does it mean we're going to stop at this point? Ponomarev informed his Party International Department officials that a weekly regime agreed for Chernenko gave him three full days off work and limited him to just a few hours of activity on the others. No sooner had it elected him than the Politburo was treating him as a medical casualty. Each of its members got on with his duties liberated from the stresses that Andropov and introduced. The campaign against corrupt or inefficient officials ceased...Urgency disappeared from governance. The leadership had thrown away its opportunity to set about the overdue reforms."

•"The decisive factor in Chernenko's selection...was the position of the old guard. Unlike the Chinese Communist Party, the Politburo does not have a formal standing committee, a small group of the most experienced members who decide the agenda and the resolutions. Yet, in fact, the Politburo did have a leadership core composed of the old guard that carried influence and importance beyond its numerical strength. It seemed to include Ustinov, Gromyko, Tikhonov, the head of the Party's Central Control Commission, Mikhail Solomentsev, Grishin, and, of course, Chernenko. In the final analysis, it was they who carried the day. Their decision was not difficult to understand. To pick Gorbachev in February 1984 would have involved a major risk. Instead, Chernenko would be a temporary, transitional leader who was more popular than Gorbachev with the venerable generation of the party apparatus. His attitude toward his old comrades would be safe and predictable, and in foreign and security policies, he would rely on Gromyko and Ustinov. The Politburo opted for caution in a time of danger on the international scene and major unresolved problems at home. The selection of Chernenko was the 'last hurrah' of the old generation."

•"The fluidity and precarious balance of forces in the leadership, the separation of power centers within it, and the division of responsibilities under Chernenko were unprecedented in postwar history, though in some ways the situation resembled the three-year period following Stalin's death. There were two centers of power within the leadership; all the major figures gravitated toward one or the other. [¶] The two centers also coincided with a new division of labor responsibilities within the leadership. The first was composed of the most influential and visible members of the old leadership core, Andrei Gromyko and Dimitrii Ustinov. It was they who had played the role of kingmakers in the selection of Chernenko. They formed a power center not because they competed with Chernenko for overall leadership but because they monopolized to an unprecedented degree the decision-making in two areas of central concern to the leadership — foreign policy and national security."

Weaknesses of Chernenko's Claim to Leadership

•"Chernenko's successful pursuit to become general secretary depended both on the endorsement of Brezhnev and on his ability to allay the concerns that he was merely a colorless staff member with misplaced aspirations to top office. On the positive side, it became clear in the months before the aging leader's death that Chernenko was being groomed as the heir apparent; while Brezhnev endorsement had been long in coming, it presumably brought with it the support of the General Secretary's closes associates within higher party echelons and the symbolic mantle of continuity and stability...[¶] On the negative side, however, Chernenko's status as an aide and staff director carried with it strong liabilities, not the least of which was his lack of a separate political identity or constituency outside the Brezhnev entourage. Even though he had served in top-level posts since Brezhnev's rise to power, Chernenko had never emerged as an independent figure. He had no natural constituency other than the general secretary himself, and he had been unable to use his high office to create either a regional or institutional following."

•"...Whatever his positive qualities as an aide to the General Secretary, Chernenko lacked high level executive experience as a decision maker; he had never been tested by the responsibilities of direct leadership. Moreover, he was alleged to be devoid of the qualities of firm leadership valued in the Soviet setting; he lacked both the force and discipline needed for the top post and the personal style and sophistication to deal with important leaders both at home and abroad. He was, as his detractors argued in the rumors that swept Moscow in the last months of the Brezhnev regime, merely a man of peasant stock brought to high office by his mentor."

•"[As leader of the Soviet Union,] Chernenko delegated increasing amounts of responsibility and decision-making to his inner circle because of his health. Gorbachev, for example, chaired politburo meetings in Chernenko's (frequent) absence. In public, inspired by his initials K.U.Ch., Soviet citizens had taken to calling him kucher, or 'coachman,' to evoke the image of an old man struggling to control his team of horses."

•"To everyone inside the Kremlin, it was clear that Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was seriously ill; his shortness of breath, a result of emphysema, was impossible to disguise. He had barely got his feet under the table as new general secretary when the jockeying began as to who would succeed him. Those who favoured a return to the stable, good old days of Brezhnev tried to pressure Chernenko into halting Andropov's reforms. Those who favoured reform lost heart; the new leader was spiritless and wavered between faction. Often he was too ill to attend Politburo meetings, and at fifteen minutes' notice the head of the secretariat would be asked to take the chair."

•"On 14 February 1984 the Central Committee assembled in the Kremlin's Sverdlov Hall to hear what the Politburo had decided. Everyone watched the door on the left of the platform to see who came through it first. Whoever it was would be the endorsed choice to become General Secretary. When Chernenko appeared leading the rest of the Politburo, the sense of collective disappointment was almost palpable. No one stood to clap. This was the nearest thing to lèse-majesté that anyone could remember. Short of booing Chernenko, Central Committee members as a body could not have made it plainer that they deplored his appointment. Now that sat quietly and got ready to vote in his favour. Chernenko spoke in a shaky voice, holding his head low over his prepared text as he gave a brief eulogy of Brezhnev...Then Tikhonov announced the 'candidature' of Chernenko as General Secretary. A silence lasting several painful seconds followed before a perfunctory applause rippled forth as Chernenko was unanimously elected. Gorbachev closed the plenum expressing satisfaction that continuity of leadership had been assured. Most of his listeners had been yearning for some kind of discontinuity; many had wanted him to become the Politburo's choice."

•"While in office Chernenko labored under major constraints. He was supposed to lead a Politburo that only fifteen months before had rejected him in favor of Andropov. The new members of the Politburo and the score of high officials who joined the central Party apparatus after Brezhnev's death were all Andropov loyalists. They shared their patron's position on the issues. Almost all belonged to the younger generation. Many had replaced Brezhnev loyalists who were close to Chernenko. Moreover, Chernenko did not enjoy the respect of the older generation, all of whom had had more illustrious careers and more independent positions than he. They controlled major bloc of bureaucratic support from the hierarchies they supervised. Nor was Chernenko personally respected by the younger generation. For them he represented the past, and particularly the years of paralysis at the end of Brezhnev's rule. It was in the interest of all the Politburo members to praise Chernenko and support his prestige within the population at large as a front man for the key Soviet institutions of power. However, it was also in their interest, in order to maintain their independence on policy and organizational questions, to keep him on a short leash. [¶] Most important, however, Chernenko's power and his independence were sharply circumscribed by the widely recognized fact that he was a transitional leader who was keeping the seat of the general secretary warm for the real successor to come. The lame-duck nature of Chernenko's leadership meant that officials were not likely to become preoccupied with an effort to please him, or to identify themselves with him."

•"The power represented by Gromyko and Ustinov was counterposed in the Politburo, although not opposed, by the allianced formed by Chernenko and Gorbachev. The division of responsibilities for all practical purposes left to Chernenko control over domestic policies and the leadership of the most important bureaucracy, the Party apparatus. At almost any time in the past, and with a more forceful man than Chernenko, ultimate control of domestic political-economic matters, and particularly leadership of the Party, would constitute a firm enough base for taking full charge of the Politburo's activities and decision-making agenda. However, the situation in 1984 defied the traditional logic of Soviet politics. An accumulation of power resources by the general secretary did not occur. Chernenko was never more than a caretaker leader. The situation potentially profited Mikhail Gorbachev."

•"Even if one of Andropov's close associates had occupied the general secretary's chair, a respite in personnel turnover would not haveen surprising following the widespread replacements of December and January. With much of Chernenko's support hinging on an impllied promise to halt the 'purge,' a virtually total stoppage of cadre renewal under the new leader was not unexpected. It is noetworthy that the major thrust of personnel turnover under Andropov had occurred after Chernenko had been rather clearly recognized as heir apparent, indicating that a general secretary in full control of the cadres department may exercise wide discretion on midlevel replacements even when the constellation of forces in the Politburo may not be entirely favorable; Khrushchev's record between 1954 and 1957 also tends to support this observation. But Chernenko did not have control of the cadres department. The best that he could hope for was to prevent further accretions of power by the partocrats who had rallied around Andropov."

Andrei Gromyko

•"To the extent Chernenko had any views on foreign affairs, they seemed to emerge from the Brezhnev era. He signaled soon after becoming General Secretary that he sought to return to the early 1970s period of Soviet-American détente if he could do so without shifting established Soviet positions. In this sense he was less confrontational than Andropov and less inclined to portray the international situation in dire terms. For the most part, though, Chernenko as General Secretary ceded foreign policy leadership to Gromyko. 'He was a very sick man, so probably it would be more correct to speak of a Gromyko foreign policy,' according to Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, who continued as national security assistant in the General Secretary's office under Chernenko. Gromyko's relationship with Chernenko was suggested by an incident during the Andropov funeral. AS the Politburo stood at attention during the ceremony, Gromyko turned to Chernenko and instructed him in a whisper — loudly enough for a microphone to pick up— 'Don't take off your hat.' U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, who accompanied Vice President Bush to a meeting with Chernenko following the funeral, noticed that Gromyko seemed to go out of his way to interrupt the leader and dominate the discussion, in contrast to the great deference show by Gromyko and everyone else to Andropov a year earlier. 'It was quite clear that this guy was not a world class leader,' said Hartmann."

•"[Under Chernenko's leadership,] Gromyko and others exercised authority over policy making which at times eclipsed even the general secretary's. The worse Chernenko's health became, the more Gromyko dominated foreign policy. Often, Gromyko pursued his own priorities, believing Chernenko lacked the background required of a general secretary. He never tired of reminding his colleagues how long he had managed to remain in the uppermost echelon of Soviet officialdom and how much experience he had in dealing with the United States. As Anatolii Cherniaev, a senior Central Committee foreign policy official, remarked, at this point Gromyko was implementing a foreign policy better suited to the 1930s or 1950s than to the realities of a weakened Soviet Union, especially as compared to the United States."

•"After Chernenko's selection,...Gromyko became the most influential voice in foreign-policymaking. Indeed, he seemed to hold virtual veto power in such matters. Andropov's effort to build a parallel foreign policy apparatus within the Party to circumvent Gromyko's state bureaucracy (and at the same time to kick Gromyko upstairs by furnishing him with the title first deputy prime minister) was nullified. The influence of the international departments of the Party declined or were forced to concentrate more narrowly on international labor and communist movements. The advisory role to the Party leadership of the think-tanks of the Soviet Academy of Sciences — such as the Institute of the Study of the United States and Canada under Central Committee member Georgii Arbatov, or the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, under Alexander Yakovlev — were diminished. [¶] To what extent Gromyko bore responsibility for the extremely hard line of foreign policy in 1984 is difficult to establish. The line was adopted under Andropov, especially after October 1983, when the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe became a foregone conclusion. Moreover, the entire Politburo, other leadership institutions and their aides and experts probably gravitated to this position even without Gromyko's prodding. However, one has the impression that Gromyko actually enjoyed the anti-Americanism. He may have felt a sense of personal betrayal, which other members of the Politburo probably did not, at what the Soviets saw as the Reagan Administration's attempts to deny them equality with the United States and the status of a respected global power, a status that the Soviets felt had been conceded to them in the 1970s."

Dmitry Ustinov

•"Dmitrii Ustinov's function in directing and deciding national security policies was also unique in Soviet history. What was exceptional about it was the fact that he as defense minister, and not the general secretary or the collective Politburo, played the decisive role in formulating national security policies. His status was extraordinary in the degree of authority and respect he enjoyed in the high command of the armed force. Ustinov, who had no professional military education and never commanded troops, was nevertheless a leading military hero of World War II. From 1940 when he was thirty-two years old, until his appointment to the post of minister of defense in 1976, he was in charge of the military-industrial complex. During the war, as people's commissar for munitions and afterward as deputy prime minister and secretary of the Central Committee, he directed the development and production of arms and weapons systems. He was the only person still active of the dozen people who, working under Stalin, were primarily responsible for the Soviet victory in World War II. With the exception of the chief of the navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who commanded a fleet, all members of the present high command were either junior officers during the war or had entered the service afterwards....The resulting prestige of Ustinov, both among his political colleagues and in the military establishment, was enormous. Finally, his position was further strengthened by the fact that in the reigning mood of hostility and threat in Moscow, any demand of the Soviet high command accepted by Ustinov was assured of passing in the Politburo. As one official expressed it: 'No member of the Politburo or of the Government will dare in the present situation to deny the military any request which the military and Ustinov deem necessary for the defense of the fatherland.'"

Makino Nobuaki

•"Shortly after Tanaka's resignation [as Prime Minister], on the day prior to selecting his successor, Makino enacted his plan for removing the emperor from direct participation in political policy discussions...For the sake of constitutional monarchy–and, more important, the preservation of the imperial house–the emperor must not appear to be responsible for political policy. He must be entirely dissociated from government actions and any personal liability for them. Makino brought up this pressing issue with the emperor...Imperial thoughts could be transmitted by telephone, Makino suggested, or perhaps the grand chamberlain could be dispatched to transmit imperial inquiries...The emperor thought this a very welcome solution, Makino noted. This procedure, as it turned out, was to have an ominous effect. Makino could prevent direct communication between the emperor and Japan's civil leaders, but he could not do the same with the military."

•"The emperor was to be protected from involvement in the daily affairs of government that might lower him, a 'living god,' in the eyes of the Japanese people. Likewise such involvement would undermine his claims to being a constitutional monarch and make him responsible for these affairs. Not to be overlooked is that fact that this policy also increased the power of the court officials surrounding the emperor, including Makino. These bureaucrats maintained that they enunciated the 'imperial will'. But because Makino and his colleagues at court could not prevent the emperor from actively discussing military affairs, high military officers claimed in a like manner to represent the 'imperial will.'...¶For many years after the war, the lines of influence and responsibility between Japan's prewar leaders and the emperor remain obscure. Therefore one could say Makino was successful: he restrained the emperor from being, or appearing to be, responsible for specific political policies. But the cost was high. Decision making was increasingly privatized, and behind the scenes the military , relieved of civilian pressure through the emperor, was able to expand its power. As the military gained the upper hand it was deemed necessary to make career officers prime ministers in order to bridge the gap between civil and military officials. Shielding the emperor from political responsibility, as suggested by Saionji and implemented by Makino, was partly responsible, then, for the rise of the military in prewar Japan."

Ōkubo Toshimichi

•"It was Okubo the manipulator who contrived Saigo's downfall. During his travels in Europe with the Iwakura mission, Okubo had been impressed by Prussia's strongman, Otto von Bismarck, who manipulated the kaiser like a hand-puppet. Okubo now saw himself as Japan's Iron Chancellor. Taking advantage of a Cabinet reshuffle following Saigo's resignation, he moved to gain personal control of the entire government bureaucracy. He switched portfolios from finance minister to home minister, which put him in charge of the national police and secret police. The army might control the secret police, but the secret police controlled the army. Okubo clearly was no longer interested in sharing power. His ruthlessness offended even the urbane Kido, who also resigned in disgust from the State Council but hung around at court making himself a thorn in Okubo's side."

•"The new [Meiji] government consisted of three parts: a provisional administration, a senior council, and a junior council. Ōkubo was appointed a junior councilor. Satsuma men predominated in the new regime and Ōkubo was in a position of real power. As had been true in the domains, the actual governing was done largely by the middle bureaucrats, and Ōkubo was one of three who had crucial influence, along with his friends Saigo and Kido. In order to establish firm central control over the many prefectures that had replaced the multiple traditional domains, 'Ōkubo and his colleagues were to adhere to a harsh and dictatorial policy.' With his unusual fixity of determination, 'Ōkubo was to nurture the young Meiji government just as carefully as he had helped to plan and execute the detailed operations of the Restorationist movement. Almost singlehandedly, during the critical period from the spring of 1868 to 1871, he held the government together, coaxing and flattering jealous colleagues...Because of his untiring efforts the Meiji government displayed sufficient unity to cope with the myriad problems, both internal and external, that beset it.' "

•"Ōkubo was far from being democratic and had no trust in popular government. When an elective national assembly was proposed, Ōkubo prevented its establishment, arguing that 'many unnecessary matters are raised in the course of a debate. It [the assembly] is not suited to our present national policy so the decision has been made to abolish it.' He insisted that the government pursue a steadfast policy of developing national wealth and strength, without being influenced by popular opinion, and to ensure this he stressed that policymaking should be secretive..."

Phipps Family Network

Associates

• Andrew Carnegie
• Henry Clay Frick
• Grace family
• Freddie Guest
• Arthur B. Hancock Jr.
• Stuart Symington Janney Jr
• George Lauder Jr.
• David T. Layman Jr.
• Bradley Martin Jr.
• Ogden L. Mills
• Addison Mizner
• Ian Snow

Businesses

• Ayavalla Land Company
• Bessemer Investors
• Bessemer Properties
• Bessemer Trust
• Bessemer Venture Partners
• Carnegie Steel Company
• Denver Broncos
• International Hydro-Electric System
• The Fauquier Democrat
• International Paper
• Palm Beach Company
• Phipps Land Company
• Phipps Plaza
• Snow Phipps Group, LLC
• WCTV
• Wheatley Stable

Philanthropy & miscellaneous non-profits

• El Cid Historic District
• Elinor Klapp-Phipps Park
• Gulf Stream Golf Club
• Gulfstream Polo Club
• Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic
• Howard Phipps Foundation
• John S. Phipps Family Foundation
• Phipps Conservatory and Botanical Gardens
• Phipps-Florida Foundation
• Phipps Houses
• Phipps Institute for the Study, Treatment and Prevention of Tuberculosis

CEOs of J.P. Morgan & Co.

• George Whitney (1942-1950)
• Henry C. Alexander (1950-1965)
• Thomas S. Gates Jr. (1965-1969)
• John M. Meyer Jr. (1969-1971)
• Ellmore C. Patterson(1971-1977)
• Walter H. Page (1977-1979)

Fumimaro Konoe

Fumimaro Konoe was born on October 12, 1891 to a distinguished noble family in Tokyo. He was admitted to Kyoto Imperial University where he studied socialism and courted the support of the influential genrō, Saionji Kinmochi. While still at the university, he assumed his father's seat at the House of Peers in 1916. Following his graduation, Konoe worked as a civil servant in Japan's home ministry before accompanying the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. There, he pushed to have a Racial Equality Clause incorporated in the Covenant for the League of Nations. After the clause was rejected by the United States, he became an outspoken detractor against what he saw as pervasive anti-Japanese sentiment in the West.

On 4 June 1937, Konoe was appointed Prime Minister of Japan by Emperor Hirohito. Upon taking office, he presided over the Japanese invasion of China following a series of skirmishes with the Chinese Kuomintang. During the course of the ensuing conflict which came to be known as the Second Sino-Japanese War,......

Peacetime Leadership of the German Army

After becoming Chief of the German General Staff, Moltke devoted much of his time reviewing and fine-tuning the war plans set in place by his predecessor, Count Schlieffen. What came to be known as the "Schlieffen Plan" was based on the likelihood that Germany would be forced to fight both France and Russia in a two-front war. Therefore, in the event of conflict with Russia, it simultaneously called for a decisive offensive against France. In order to outflank French defenses, the offensive would entail an invasion of the Low Countries, thereby theoretically enabling German forces to swing behind Paris and decisively defeat the whole of France's armies in a battle of encirclement. In 1913, Moltke discarded the Germany's sole alternative to the Schlieffen Plan, the Eastern Deployment Plan, which confined hostilities to Russia alone in the event of a Russo-German conflict. Thus, by the time of the July Crisis, there was no way for Germany to go to war to with Russia without simultaneously opening hostilities against the West.

Despite agreeing with the strategic aims of the plan, Moltke made several significant modifications to its implementation.

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• Zemtsov, Ilya (1989). Chernenko: The Last Bolshevik. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0-88738-222-3.

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