Talk:Universal pragmatics

Formal pragmatics

JA: Formal pragmatics is a term that was already in use in the 1960's, at least. If the UP crowd wants to crowd under that umbrella, then they will have to learn to share it with those who are already there. Hence my slightly contorted rephrasing of the first sentence. Jon Awbrey 06:54, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

I too was very surprised to find that 'formal pragmatics' consisted entirely of the work of Habermas. Especially since some of his core ideas are clearly taken from Grice. The Formal Pragmatics and Universal Pragmatics pages should be separated (no redirect) and new content created for Formal Pragmatics. I suppose that means we are looking for a volunteer to do this?? Anaphalis (talk) 02:16, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

Ifs's plan does allude to this issue, proposing a section on Speech Act Theory vs Universal Pragmatics. Anaphalis (talk) 02:20, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

I would also have thought that Formal Pragmatics belongs as much to linguistics as to philosophy. Anaphalis (talk) 02:30, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

ifs's plan

I have a proposal for a rather radical re-edit of the entire 'universal progmatics' entry, but would like to do so in conjunction with the previous contributors to this topic. (I hasten to say that I'm very aware of the advantages of doing such a thing consensually, that I'm very grateful to the previous editors for having started the topic, that I look forward to a debate on the substance of this, and that I'm much too old to approach a project as difficult as this with an 'I'm-the-king-of-the-castle' attitude.) But I'm a specialist on this topic, I'm busy writing a book on it, and I do have some interest in putting down an entry which would be as appealing to the general reader as it would be to the professional philosopher. Also, I should say, I'm new to this wikipedia, and don't have much idea about procedure and so on... (ifs-ffm)

Go wild, my friend. If you have insights that can make the topic clearer, and extend it beyond what I've carved out here, then that would be a wonderful service. But I hope that I haven't screwed up anywhere to such an extent that it would require an actual replacement of materials already put down. Lucidish 21:33, 25 Jun 2005 (UTC)

The main problem with the UP entry, as it stands, is that it is too concretistic. You guys make it sound like a do-it-yourself guide: "How do I/we communicate more successfully?". (As if you're explaining to a 16-year-old. In the vein of: "When you're trying to 'come accross' - e.g. in a job interview, whatever - make sure you're sincere, that you've got your facts straight, that you're confident without seeming brash, that you're polite, that you're correctly dressed, that you've cleaned your nails and had a bath, that you don't pick your nose, that you answer the questions without evading..") I don’t mean this to sound carping – I know how difficult it is to write, for a general audience, on philosophical matters... Will present something substantial within the next few days... (did I see that there was a 'sand-pit' feature somewhere? where one can present the entire article and then discuss it?) regards ifs-ffm

I'm afraid I don't know what you mean by "concretistic". If you mean it sounds too formal: we have to keep in mind that, since this is an encyclopedia, it cannot be informal or vague in essential places. Sure, if you have a stylistic manner that keeps within that general guideline, and have the knowledge to share in a way you think is better, then by all means do it.

Re, the self-help comment: I suppose that's a matter of how you interpret the post.

For testing out the Wiki format, you can test things out on your user page (http://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/User:ifs-ffm), or you can try out the sandbox. Also, if you want to add your full name at the end of a post with a link back to your user page, use four ~'s, ala ~~~~. Lucidish 28 June 2005 16:52 (UTC)

Thank you. By 'concretistic' I meant what it says in the dictionary about the word: "of or relating to concrete representations of abstractions". i.e. that this is a thoroughly theoretic-abstract topic, and that in trying to 'make it intelligible to a wide audience', one does the topic an injustice. I suppose the danger of 'dumbing down' would be another way of putting it. One is always trying to ward off the mantra: 'that's much too abstract for me. Can't you put it in words an ordinary person can understand? Which does'nt sound so elitist?' What I mean is: you can try to explain astronomy or brain surgery to an 'ordinary person', but in the end, if you want to do the topic justice, you have to go into details which the layman is not going to understand. Universal pragmatics is such a topic. i.e. as it stands the article isn't formal *enough*.

In Habermas' Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, (1984) the paper "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?" (UP) is in a context which makes it obvious that there's a relationship between UP and Analytic Philosophy in general, to the post-Wittgensteinian 'linguistic turn' in epistemology specifically; that in addition to this UP is the basis for the two-volume Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, as well as excursions into the logic of the social sciences, psychology, discourse theory, ethics and social evolution. (That's all evident just from looking at the table of contents.) That should be enough to make anyone despair, but it also puts paid to the notion that UP is about 'communication' or language use in any conventional sense of the term. That's what I was trying to get at. UP is, in effect, both a critique of Analytic Philosophy, as well as part of a program - on which there are hundreds of titles now - which recasts the relationship of philosophy to the individual sciences. This is no less than a reformulation of what once went under the heading of dialectics, even if this term is still likely to raise some hackles. (c.f. Matustik's Jürgen Habermas - A philosophical-political Profile, 2001 for details of the political background.) Regards.. ifs-ffm

By all means, if you think the "concrete" wording put here has failed to live up to the meaning of the original, do some replacements. I am happy to learn more about this subject, and admit having quite a bit of difficulty decoding the latter part of the article you mention ("What is Universal Pragmatics?"). But the things you mention here seem to be contextual issues which demand more treatment (which is worthwhile and valuable to expand on), but not criticisms of what has actually been written. So if I have failed in regards to interpretation, then by all means that kind of thing needs to be edited and / or removed; but otherwise I'd prefer seeing things added, context elaborated on, etc, as opposed to seeing things taken away. Lucidish 1 July 2005 00:12 (UTC)

O.K. I start with a couple of general considerations. Bearing in mind what the Wikipedia philosophy group is saying about philosophical entries, perhaps one should take a systematic approach. (i.e. these are some of the points one needs to bear in mind)

1) Definition. What are the connotations that the term 'UP' invokes?

2) When and by whom, in which context was the term 'UP' first introduced? (+ a word about its history and cognates.)

3) What are the problems and issues to which the introduction of the term 'UP' seeks to provide a solution? What *alternative* approaches are there?

4) What is the relationship of UP, communicative action, communicative pathology, 'systematically distorted' communication, reconstructive versus empirical science, discourse theory, social evolution? To politics?

5) [Since this is a philosophical topic:] How does UP stand to the philosophical mainstream, i.e. Analytic Philosophy? (Both systematically and historically)

6) What are some of the research implications of this approach for the social sciences? (Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, History, Linguistics, Psychoanalysis?)

7) How has this approach been received in the literature?

8) [Procedural point: this should be written so that it can readily be translated into German.]

Bearing all of the above in mind, here then a first attempt at a *definition*:

i) Definition Universal Pragmatics(UP) is the name of a position within contemporary philosophy which seeks to overcome three venerable dichotomies: body/mind, theory/practice, analytic/continenal. Coined by Jürgen Habermas in his 1976 article "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?" it is part of a larger project, going back to Max Horkheimer's founding of the program of Critical Theory in the 1930s, to rethink - at a time of social crisis - the relationship between philosophy and the individual sciences. The term itself is already indicative of the two great traditions it seeks to reconcile: on the one hand the Platonic/Aristotelian and Kantian tradition in which words (concepts) are regarded as universally valid idealisations whose truth content a speaker gleans through a reflexive examination of the collectively shared meanings and connotations which he/she shares with most other speakers; on the other hand the American Pragmatist tradition (Mead, Peirce, Morris) for which words are arbitrary signs devoid of intrinsic meaning, whose function it is to denote the things and processes in the objective world that surrounds us.

Though to speak of the reconciliation of these two traditions - the analytic and the continental - is ambiguous. Whereas UP shares - with Speech Act Theory, Semiotics and Linguistics an interest in the details of language use, it insists (one could almost say: in the 'Continental' manner) on a categoric difference between the linguistic data that we observe in the 'analytic' mode, and the rational reconstruction of the rules of symbol systems that each one of us posesses intuitively if he/she can read these lines. "So unterscheidet sich die Daten, wenn man will, nach ihrer ontologischen Stufe: das aktuelle Sprachverhalten ist Teil der wahrnehmbaren Realität, das Regelbewußtsein verweist auf die Erzeugung symbolischer Gebilde, in denen etwas über die Realität geäußert wird. " (ref...) In this sense UP is as much a study of the 'apriori' conditions for successful 'communicative action' as it is a formalisation of something that has long been acknowledged in the fields in question (Speech Act Theory, Linguistics, Semiotics) namely the ambiguity between language use as an object of scientific investigation, and language use as a 'rational reconstruction' of intuitive 'know-how' that we all have access to by virtue of being speakers and actors in an existing life-world.

And here a couple of additional headings:

ii) Methodology: reconstructive versus empirical-analytic science (not yet done)

iii) UP versus 'generative grammar' in the sense of Chomsky (not yet done)

iv) UP versus transcendental hermeneutics (not yet done)

v) UP versus Speech Act Theory and Analytic Philosophy (not yet done)

vi) UP as a research program (not yet done)

please let me have your thoughts on this..

ifs-ffm 4 July 2005

Interesting insights, and I'm glad to get someone on board with this who's an expert!

Three things that jump out at me in the writeup so far.

a) I noticed that you've provided the intellectual and historical context for the theory without providing the theory itself first. It seems to me that it's vital to give people at least a minimal understanding of the theory itself first, especially in the introduction, and then provide the context afterwards, or else the reader gets confused about the significance of the information they're getting.

b) The other thing is that the last sentence in the first paragraph is a run-on, so it should be chopped into smaller ones. Right now it reads:

"The term itself is already indicative of the two great traditions it seeks to reconcile: on the one hand the Platonic/Aristotelian and Kantian tradition in which words (concepts) are regarded as universally valid idealisations whose truth content a speaker gleans through a reflexive examination of the collectively shared meanings and connotations which he/she shares with most other speakers; on the other hand the American Pragmatist tradition (Mead, Peirce, Morris) for which words are arbitrary signs devoid of intrinsic meaning, whose function it is to denote the things and processes in the objective world that surrounds us."

Instead, one might write: The term itself is already indicative of the two great traditions it seeks to reconcile. On the one hand, ideas are drawn from the tradition of Plato, Aristotle and Kant, wherein words (and their corresponding concepts) are regarded as universally valid idealisations (whose truth content is gleaned by a reflexive examination of the collectively shared meanings which he/she shares with most other speakers). And on the other hand, theory is drawn out of the American Pragmatist tradition (Mead, Peirce, Morris) for whom words are arbitrary signs devoid of intrinsic meaning, and whose function is to denote the things and processes in the objective world that surrounds the speakers.

c) In an English article, it's good to translate the quotes into English too. I've got a copy of the essay on hand, so if you give me some idea of what that paragraph says and where it is in the essay, I can post the quasi-official translation. Cheers, Lucidish

Zak's plan

Hey, what is the status of this collaborative project. I'd like to join. First I'd say that Habermas officially regretted using the term "universal" pragmatics, and in a foot-note to the 1979 English translation of the essay "what is universal pragmatics" stated a preference for the term "formal pragmatics." I suggest we change the title of this page to that.

Offerings:

I agree that there should be a large section on the methodology of rational reconstruction, here are my thoughts, if you like them feel free to cut and paste them int the article:

rational reconstruction

First some Habermas:

"Once it has renounced its claim to be a first science or an encyclopedia, philosophy can maintain its status within the scientific system neither by assimilating itself to particular exemplary sciences nor by the exclusive distancing of itself from science in general. Philosophy has to implicate itself in the fallibilistic self-understanding and procedural rationality of the empirical sciences; it may not lay claim to a privileged access to truth, or to a method, an object realm, or even just a style of intuition that is specifically its own. Only thus can philosophy contribute its best to a nonexclusive division of labor, namely, its persistent tenacity in posing questions universalistically, and its procedure of rationally reconstructing the intuitive pre-theoretical knowledge of competently speaking, acting and judging subjects….This dowry recommends philosophy as an indispensable partner in the collaboration of those who are concerned with [the progress of reason, knowledge and truth]. (Habermas, 1992)"

What is especially useful and interesting about Habermas’s rendering of this issue is that he specifically names the task that he sees as appropriate for philosophy. This is a type of formal analysis he calls rational reconstruction. This mode of philosophical reflection can be compared to procedures traditionally taken up in philosophy and is concerned with the questions traditionally posed. That is, rational reconstruction involves making explicit and theoretically systematizing the universal and inescapable conditions for the possibility of certain types of phenomena. Put more specifically, it can be said that rational reconstruction is a manner of explicating the deep generative structures that give rise to and allow for particular performances, behaviors, and other symbolically pre-structured realities (Habermas, 1998a).

Rational reconstruction is limited to the analysis of symbolically pre-structured realities because it is a procedure that is intimately tied to the interpretation of reality as opposed to its description. So, while the natural sciences generate theoretical knowledge about the general structures of an observable reality, rational reconstructions (sometimes called the reconstructive sciences) generate a theoretical knowledge of the deep structures of a reality accessible only through interpretation (Habermas, 1998a). Some questions cannot be dealt with through the process of rational reconstruction, but an extremely broad range of questions can be. It is hard to point out a phenomenon that is not in some way symbolically pre-structured, that is without some meaning to someone.

While the meaning of any phenomenon must in some way be generated, and the interpretation of symbols is dependent upon intelligence, the bestowal of meaning is not arbitrary. Rational reconstruction attempts to make clear the underlying processes that generate particular meanings. It is concerned with the deep structures of intelligence that generate the knowledge, judgments and actions of subjects as well as the meaning, import and validity of objects. Because of this, those sciences that systematically explicate the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects by reconstructing the pre-theoretical know-how of certain human capabilities can be seen as representative of this procedure of rational reconstruction (Habermas, 1998a).

Habermas suggests along these lines that “we can distinguish between know-how, the ability of a competent subject who understands how to produce or accomplish something, and know-that, the explicit knowledge of how it is that he is able to do so” (1998a). This should be understood in the context of rational reconstruction as two levels of the explication of meaning, two ways of understanding a symbolically pre-structured reality. The difference between the two levels is, in Habermas’s terms, the content and the intuitively master rule-consciousness that allows for it, or in other terms, surface structures and deep structures. It is worth quoting Habermas at length to clarify this. Here he is discussing these two levels of analysis as applied to the interpretation of a text:

"…the understanding of content pursues the connections that link the surface structures of an incomprehensible [symbolic] formation with surface structures, of other, familiar formations. Thus, linguistic expressions can be explicated through paraphrase in the same language [etc.]…. If she cannot attain her end in this way, the interpreter may find it necessary to alter her attitude. She then exchanges the attitude of understanding content (directed towards surface structures)…for an attitude in which she focuses on the generative structures of the expressions themselves. The interpreter then attempts to explicate the meaning of a symbolic formation with the help of the rules according to which the author must have produced it….The attitude changes as soon as the interpreter tries not only to apply the intuitive knowledge of speakers but to reconstruct it. She then turns away from the surface structure of the symbolic formation….She attempts instead to peer into the symbolic formation- penetrating through the surface as it were- in order to discover the rules according to which this symbolic formation was produced….The object of understanding is no longer the content…but the intuitive rule consciousness….(Habermas, 1998a)."

Furthermore, following this distinction between surface and deep structures, Habermas views the task of the reconstructive sciences as moving in two directions, horizontal and vertical. The “horizontal” direction seeks to reconstruct fundamental and important competencies, while the “vertical” direction seeks to reconstruct the (genetic) logic of the development of these competencies. So there are surface structures and deep structures related to competencies and sub-competencies, and these are teased apart and reconstructed by engaging two distinct modes of understanding symbolically pre-structured realities.

This should clarify what it is that rational reconstructions seek to accomplish. It should also be said that the results of systematized reconstructions claim to explicate “universal capabilities and not merely the particular competencies of individual groups” (Habermas, 1998a). The theoretical claims of such rational reconstructions have the status of general theories of human competencies and behavior. “When the pre-theoretical knowledge to be reconstructed expresses a universal capability, a general cognitive, linguistic, or interactive competence (or sub-competence), then what begins as an explication of meaning aims at the reconstruction of species competencies” (Habermas, 1998a).

These kinds of rational reconstructions are notably different than the purely philosophical but comparable solutions and methods offered up as definitive answers to such issues in the past. Kant’s transcendental analysis sought to deduce the categorical framework that structured and determined experience. Hegel’s dialectic sought to systematize the process of knowing, fitting each stage of insight as a defined moment to be subsumed in the development of Absolute Knowledge. These great systems were conceived as being a-priori, inescapably generative of all experience and knowledge, and they were understood to be factual, to be the truth. Habermas sees rational reconstruction as a similar, but less grandiose, undertaking:

"Marked down in price the transcendental and dialectical modes of justification may still come in handy. All they can fairly be expected to furnish, however, is reconstructive hypotheses for use in empirical settings….[Rational reconstructions are] fallibilistic in orientation, they reject the dubious faith in philosophy’s ability to do things single handedly, hoping instead that the success that has for so long eluded it might come from an auspicious matching of different theoretical fragments (Habermas, 1990a)."

Furthermore:

"….[In rational reconstruction] the distinction between drawing on a-priori knowledge and drawing on a-posteriori knowledge becomes blurred. On the one hand, the rule consciousness [i.e. intuitive know-how] of competent subjects is for them an a-priori knowledge; on the other hand, the reconstruction of this calls for inquiries undertaken with empirical [methods] (Habermas, 1998a)."

In this respect Habermas sees those theorists whose projects represented a blend of philosophy and scientific methods as important exemplars. He identifies Freud, Durkhiem, Mead, Weber, Piaget, Chomsky and Kohlberg as those who “inserted a genuinely philosophical idea like a detonator into a particular context of research…[initiating] paradigms in which a philosophical idea is present in embryo while at the same time empirical, yet universal, questions are being posed” (1990b). These theorists approximated the ideal division of labor between philosophy and science that Habermas understands as crucial for progress to be achieved across disciplines; the human sciences in particular represent fertile ground for such cooperation.

And on other things:

Formal Pragmatics of Communication

There are a number of ways to approach Habermas’s project of developing a formal pragmatic analysis of communication. Because Habermas developed it in order to have a normative and philosophical foundation for his critical social theory most of the inroads into formal pragmatics start from sociology, specifically with what is called action theory. This concerns the nature of human action, especially the manner in which collective actions are coordinated in the functioning of societies. The coordination and integration of social action has been explained in many ways by many theories. Rational choice theory and game theory are two examples, which describe the integration of individuals into social groups by detailing the complex manner in which individuals motivated only by self-interest will form mutually beneficial and cooperative social arrangements. In contrast to these Habermas has formulated a theory of communicative action (1984; 1987). This theory and the project of developing a formal pragmatic analysis of communication are inseparable.

Habermas makes a series of complex conceptual incisions in the service of dissecting the phenomenon of social action. I’m going to cover these quickly in order to get to the details of his rational reconstruction of the deep structures of communication. The first major conceptual incision differentiates two social realms, the system and the lifeworld. These designate two distinct modes of social integration. The kind of social integration accomplished in the system is accomplished through the functional integration of action consequences. It bypasses the consciousness of individuals and does not depend upon their being oriented towards acting collectively. Economic and industrial systems are great examples, often producing complex forms of social integration and interdependence despite the openly competitive orientations of individuals. The social integration accomplished in the lifeworld, by contrast, depends upon the coordination of action plans and the conscious action-orientations of individuals. It relies on processes of human interaction involving symbolic and cultural forms of meaning. More specifically, as Habermas maintains, the coordination of the lifeworld is accomplished through communicative action.

Thus, communicative action is an indispensable facet of society. It is at the heart of the lifeworld and is, Habermas claims, responsible for accomplishing several fundamental social functions: reaching understating, cultural reproduction, coordinating action-plans and socializing individuals. However, Habermas is quick to note, different modes of interaction can (in some ways) facilitate these social functions and achieve integration within the lifeworld. This points towards the second key conceptual incision Habermas makes, which differentiates communicative action from strategic action; the coordination of action plans, which constitutes the social integration of the lifeworld, can be accomplished either through consensus or influence.

Strategic action is action oriented towards success, while communicative action is action oriented towards understanding. Both involve the symbolic resources of the lifeworld and occur primarily by way of linguistic interaction. On the one hand, actors employing communicative actions draw on the uniquely impelling force of mutual understanding to align the orientation of their action plans. It is this subtle but insistent binding force of communicative interactions that opens the door to an understanding of their deep structures. On the other hand, actors employing strategic actions do not exploit the potential of communication that resides in the mutual recognition of a shared action-orientating understanding. Instead strategic actors relate to others with no intention of reaching consensus or mutual understanding, but only the intention of accomplishing pre-determined ends. Strategic action often involves the use of communicative actions to achieve the isolated intentions of individuals, manipulating shared understanding in the service of private interests. Thus, Habermas claims, strategic action is parasitic on communicative action, which means communicative action is the primary mode of linguistic interaction. Reaching a reciprocally defined understanding is communication’s basic function.

Keeping in mind this oversimplified (on my part, not Habermas’s) delineation of the object domain the formal pragmatics of communication can be more readily laid out. The essential insight has already been mentioned, which is that communication is responsible for irreplaceable modes of social integration (among other things) and this is accomplished through the unique binding force of a shared understanding. This is, in a sense, the pragmatic piece of formal pragmatics: communication does something in the world. What needs to be explained are the conditions for the possibility of what communication already does. This is, in a sense, the formal piece of formal pragmatics: a rational reconstruction of the deep generative structures that are the universal conditions for the possibility of a binding and compelling mutual understanding.

This is where it becomes complex, because Habermas heads the analysis in two directions (1998). In one direction is a kind of linguistic (speech act) analysis, which can be placed under the heading of the validity dimensions of communication. The other direction entails an intriguing categorization of the idealized presuppositions of communication. I will take these one at a time. I’m going to simply explain Habermas’s position and not even attempt to make reference to the thinkers that inspired his project. Furthermore, this should be understood as a cursory explanation of a very complex system of thought. I am trying only to divulge the general direction of Habermas’s project, not attempting to defend it or give a definitive rendering of it.

The Validity Dimensions of Communication

Habermas claims that communication rests upon a de-centered understanding of the world, which is an idea he borrowed from Piaget. A subject capable of a de-centered understanding can take up three fundamentally different attitudes to the world. As Cooke (who has provided the only book length treatment of Habermas' communication theory) explains: “when we adopt an objectifying attitude we relate, in the first instance to the objective world of facts and existing states of affairs [IT]; when we adopt a norm-conformative attitude we relate, in the first instance, to the social world of normatively regulated interactions [WE]; when we adopt an expressive attitude we relate, in the first instance to the subjective world of inner experience [ I ]” (Cooke, 1994).

Another way Habermas states the same notion is by making reference to the idea of validity dimensions. The basic idea is that individuals have the ability to differentiate between at least three dimensions of validity. Specifically, this means individuals can recognize that the validation of an empirical truth claim requires different methods and procedures then the validation of subjective truthfulness, and that both of those require different methods and procedures of validation than claims to normative rightness. These dimensions of validity can be summarized as claims to truth (IT), truthfulness (I), and rightness (WE). So the ability to differentiate between the attitudes (and their respective “worlds”) mentioned above should be understood as an ability to distinguish between types of validity claims.

This is fundamental to Habermas’s analysis of communication. He maintains that the performance of any speech act necessarily makes reference to these dimensions of validity, by raising at least three validity claims. One way to grasp this idea is to take an inventory of the ways in which an attempt at communication can misfire, the ways a speech act can fail. A hearer may reject the offering of a speech act on the grounds that it is invalid because it: 1) presupposes or explicates states of affairs which are not the case (IT); 2) does not conform to accepted normative expectations (WE); 3) raises doubts about the intensions or sincerity of the speaker (I). Of course from this it follows that if a hearer accepts the offering of a speech act they do so on the grounds that it is valid because it: 1) presupposes or explicates states of affairs that are true (IT); 2) conforms to accepted normative expectations (WE); (3) raises no doubts concerning the intensions or sincerity of the speaker (I). This means that when engaging in communication the speaker and hearer are inescapably oriented to the validity of what is said. A speech act can be understood as an offering, the success or failure of which depends upon the hearer’s response of either accepting or rejecting the validity claims it raises. The three dimensions of validity pointed out above are implicated in any attempt at communication.

Thus, communication relies on its being embedded within relations to various dimensions of validity. Any and every speech act is infused with intersubjectively recognized claims to be valid. This implicitly ties communication to argumentation and various discursive procedures for the redemption of validity claims. Because to raise a validity claim in communication is to undertake to show, if challenged, that this claim is justified. Communication is possible because a speaker is accountable for the validity of what they say. This assumption of responsibility on the part of the speaker is described by Habermas as a “warranty”. It is described as a warranty because in most cases the validity claims raised during communication are taken as justified, and communication proceeds unproblematically on that basis. Similarly, the hearer is accountable for the stance they take up in relation to the validity claims raised by the speaker. Both speaker and hearer are bound to the validity claims raised by the utterances they share during communication. They are bond by the weak obligations inherent in pursing actions oriented towards reaching an understanding. Habermas would claim that this obligation is a rational one:

"With every speech act, by virtue of the validity claims it raises, the speaker enters into an interpersonal relationship of mutual obligation with the hearer: The speaker is obliged to support her claims with reasons, if challenged, and the hearer is obliged to accept a claim unless he has good reason not to do so. The obligation in question is, in the first instance, not a moral one but a rational one- the penalty of failure to fulfill it is the charge not of immorality but of irrationality- although clearly the two will often overlap (Cooke, 1994)."

This begins to point towards the idea of communicative rationality, which is the potential for rationality that is implicit in the validity basis of everyday communication, the shape of reason that can be extracted from Habermas’s formal-pragmatic analyses.

"The modern- decentered- understanding of the world has opened up different dimensions of validity; to the extent that each dimension of validity has its own standards of truth and falsity and its own modes of justification for determining these, one may say that what has been opened up are dimensions of rationality (Cooke, 1994)."

However, before the idea of communicative rationality can be described the other direction of Habermas’s formal pragmatic analyses of communication needs to be explained. This direction looks towards the idealized presuppositions of communication.

The Idealized Presuppositions of Communication

I have explained that when individuals pursue actions oriented towards reaching an understating the speech acts they exchange take on the weight of a mutually recognized validity. This means each actor involved in communication takes the other as accountable for what they have said, which implies that good reasons could be given by all to justify the validity of the understanding that is being achieved. Again, in most situations the redemption of validity claims is not an explicit undertaking (except in discourses, see below). Instead, each actor issues a “warranty” of accountability to the other, which only needs to be redeemed if certain validity claims are thrown into question. This suggests that the validity claims raised in every communicative interaction implicitly tie communication to argumentation.

It is here that the idealized presuppositions of communication arise. Habermas claims that all forms of argumentation, even implicit and rudimentary ones, rest upon certain “idealizing suppositions,” which are rooted in the very structures of action oriented towards understanding. These “strong idealizations” are always understood as at least approximately satisfied by participants in situations where argumentation (and communication) is thought to be taking place. Thus, when during communication it is discovered that the belief that these presuppositions are satisfied is not justified it is always taken as problematic. As a result, steps are usually taken to reestablish and maintain the belief that they are approximately satisfied, or communication is simply called off.

The most basic of these idealized presuppositions is the presupposition that participants in communicative exchange are using the same linguistic expressions in the same way. This is an obvious but interesting point, which clearly illustrates what an idealized presupposition is. It’s a presupposition because communication would not proceed if those involved did not think it was at least approximately satisfied (in this case that a shared language was being used). It’s idealized because no matter how closely it is approximated it is always counterfactual (because, in this case, the fact is that all meanings are to some degree personally defined). Another, basic idealized presupposition of argumentation is the presupposition that no relevant argument is suppressed or excluded by the participants; another is the presupposition that no persuasive force except that of the better argument is exerted. There is also the presupposition that all the participants are motivated only by a concern for the better argument, and the presupposition of attributing a context-transcending significance to validity claims. This last one is controversial but important (and becomes expanded and clarified in the presuppositions of discourse, see below). The idea is that participants in communication instill their claims with a validity that is understood to have significance beyond the specific context of their agreement. In sum, all these presuppositions must be assumed to be approximately satisfied in any situation of communication, despite their being necessarily counterfactual. Habermas refers to the positing of these idealized presuppositions as the “simultaneously unavoidable and trivial accomplishments that sustain communicative action and argumentation.”

Habermas calls discourses those forms of communication that come sufficiently close to actually satisfying these presuppositions. Discourses often occur within institutionalized forms of argumentation that self-reflectively refine their procedures of communication, and as a result have a more rigorous set of presuppositions in addition to the ones listed above. A striking feature of discourse is that validity claims tend to be explicitly thematized and there is the presupposition that all possible interlocutors would agree to the universal validity of the conclusions reached. Habermas especially highlights this in what he calls theoretical discourses and practical discourses. These are tied directly to two of the three dimensions of validity discussed above: theoretical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized regarding objective states of affairs (IT); practical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized concerning the rightness of norms governing social interactions (WE).

Habermas understands the presupposition just mentioned to be responsible for generating the self-understanding and continuation of theoretical and practical discourses. It involves an implicit connection with universality in two senses(Cooke, 1994). It points out that the validity of an understanding reached in theoretical or practical discourse, concerning some factual knowledge or normative principle, is always expanded beyond the immediate context in which it is achieved. The idea is that participants in discourses such as these presuppose that any understanding reached could attain universal agreement concerning its universal validity if these discourses could be relieved of the constraints of time and space. This idealized presupposition directs discourses concerning truth and normative certainty beyond the contingencies of specific communicative situations and towards the idealized achievements of universal consensus and universal validity. It is a rational reconstruction of the conditions for the possibility of earnest discourses concerning facts and norms. Recall that rational reconstructions aim at offering the most acceptable account of what allows for the competencies already mastered by a wide range of subjects. In order for discourse to proceed the existence of facts and norms must be presupposed, while the certainty of an absolute knowledge of them must be, in a sense, postponed. Striking a Piagetian and Peircian chord Habermas understands the deep structures of collective inquiry as developmental. Thus, the presupposition shared by individuals involved in discourse is taken to reflect this. The idealized mathematical notion of an infinite approximation is transplanted into the realm of intersubjectivity, as the communicative pursuit of truth and normative certainty is taken to be motivated and grounded not in the givenness of an objective or social world, but in a learning process.

There are other presuppositions of discourse, including the presupposition that no validity claim is exempt in principle from critical evaluation in argumentation and the presupposition that everyone capable of speech and action is entitled to participate, and everyone is equally entitled to introduce new topics or express attitudes needs or desires. However, these do not need to be elaborated here. Because what I want to emphasize is the importance of the analytical project Habermas has laid out by trying to explicate the presuppositions of argumentation and communication. Even if the specifics of the presuppositions he has formulated could be refined, I think the general intuition that motivates their being rationally reconstructed is correct. In fact Habermas himself is always careful to formulate his work as a research project.

In any case, reconstructing the presuppositions and validity dimensions inherent to communication is valuable because it brings into relief the inescapable foundations of our everyday practices. Communicative action and the rudimentary forms of argumentation that orient the greater part of human interaction cannot be left behind. By reconstructing the deep structures of these Habermas has discovered a seed of rationality planted in the very heart of the lifeworld. Everyday practices, which are common enough to be trivial, such as reaching an understanding with another or contesting the reasons for pursuing a course of action, contain an implicit and idealized rationality. We would not communicate if we thought that the speech acts we exchanged did not carry the weight of a validity for which those participating could be held accountable. Nor would we feel that a conclusion was justified if it was achieved by any other means than the unforced force of the better argument. Nor could the specialized discourses of law, science and morality continue if the progress of knowledge and insight was denied in favor of relativism. The fact that these (and other or similar) idealizations are necessarily counterfactual is in some ways the point. The rationality Habermas alludes to by way of his analyses of communication serves as the foundation of a critical theory. It is meant to disclose the possibilities for a just and reasonable life that are already developing in the womb of today's distress and to hold them up in the hope of recruiting midwives.

Cooke, M. (1994). Language and reason: A study in Habermas's pragmatics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action: Lifeworld and system, a critique of functionalist reason (T. McCarthy, Trans. Vol. 2). Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action (C. L. a. S. Nicholsen, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1990a). Philosophy as stand-in interpreter (C. L. a. S. Nicholsen, Trans.). In Moral consciousness and communicative action (pp. 1-21). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1990b). Reconstruction and interpretation in the social sciences (C. L. a. S. Nicholsen, Trans.). In Moral consciousness and communicative action (pp. 21-43). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1992). Themes in post-metaphysical thinking (W. Hohengarten, Trans.). In Post-metaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays (pp. 28-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. --Zakademic 14:09, 12 August 2005 (UTC)

Zak

Holy crap, nice work. I think that given the length of the above entry on rational recon., it might be better to put it up as a separate article. A short summary of his metaphilosophy here would do, and then a link to the larger article. Lucidish 15:10, 12 August 2005 (UTC)

Thanks

Thanks for doing some leg work for me and cutting and pasting that stuff in. Here are some more thoughts taht pick up where the otehr s leave off, unpaking the idea of communicative rationality:

Overview ideas

Let me start by saying I'm new to this, whcih is why I'm dunping all this stuff here in the discussion page. I think that on the Habermas main page there should be a link to universal pragmatics and a link to communicative rationality and a link to Habermas's discourse ethics. Thsi last one could start out as follows:

Communicative Rationality

The general outlines of Habermas's formal pragmatic analyses of communication have been explained. What these imply is the potential for rationality that is inherent in communication itself. Of course, this has led Habermas to formulate a notion of communicative rationality, which takes up this implicit potential and formalizes it into an explicit knowledge. Again the form of rational reconstruction arises, where implicit know-how is transformed into explicit know-that. In this case it is the intuitively mastered rules for reaching an understanding and conducting argumentation possessed by subjects capable of speech and action that have been explicated. The result is a complex conception of reason that Habermas sees as doing justice to the most important trends in twentieth century philosophy, while escaping relativism and providing standards for critical evaluation (Habermas, 1992).

There are number of specific trends that Habermas identifies as important to twentieth century philosophy and to which he thinks his conception of communicative rationality contributes. Looking at these will give a clear outline of what Habermas understands communicative rationality to be. He labels all these trends as being post-metaphysical. They can be listed as such (Cooke, 1994). These post-metaphysical philosophical movements have 1) called into question the substantive conceptions of rationality (e.g. “a rational person thinks this”) and put forward procedural or formal conceptions instead (e.g. “a rational person thinks like this”); 2) with regard to valid knowledge and how it may be achieved, they have replaced foundationalism with fallibilism; 3) they have cast doubt on the idea that reason should be conceived abstractly beyond history and the complexities of social life, and have contextualized or situated reason in actual historical practices; 4) as part of this contextualization of reason they have replaced a focus on individual structures of consciousness with a concern for pragmatic structures of language and action; and 5) as part of this orientation toward practice and away from theory they have given up philosophy's traditional fixation on theoretical truth and the representational functions of language to the extent that they also recognize the moral and expressive functions of language.

Needless to say I will not cover all of these points in detail. But I would like to point out at least some of the ways that Habermas's conception of communicative rationality moves along with these contemporary currents of philosophy. Concerning 1) it can be said that

"[Communicative] rationality refers primarily to the use of knowledge in language and action rather than to a property of knowledge. One might say that it refers primarily to a mode of dealing with validity claims and that it is, in general, not a property of these claims themselves. Furthermore…this perspective suggests no more than formal specifications of possible forms of life… it does not extend to the concrete form of life…(Cooke, 1994)."

Concerning 2) Habermas clearly and explicitly understands communicative rationality according to the terms of a reconstructive science. This means that the conception of communicative rationality is not a definitive and final rendering of what reason is, but rather a fallible but rigorously substantiated claim or hypothesis. It also means that communicative rationality itself is a procedural and falliblistic ideal of rationality. It can prescribe only formal specifications concerning what qualifies as reasonable (not concrete exemplars to be emulated) and even those formal specifications are taken as fallible, being open to revision in light of experience and learning.

Concerning 3) and 4) it should be noted that Habermas's entire conceptual framework is focused around social interaction and communication. He ties rationality to the validity basis of everyday speech, which contextualizes reason in the everyday practices of modern individuals. This is opposed to those philosophies (e.g. Plato, Kant etc.) that sought to ground reason in an intelligible and non-temporal realm, understanding this reason as being able to judge the realm of time and contingency because it was outside it. However, it should also be noted that while Habermas's notion of communicative rationality is contextualized and historicized, it is not relativistic. Many philosophical contextiualists take reason to be entirely context dependent and relative. Habermas holds reason to be relatively context specific and sensitive. The difference is that Habermas explicates the deep structures of reason by examining the presuppositions and validity dimensions of everyday communication, while the relativists focus only on the content displayed in various concrete standards of rationality. Thus, Habermas can compare and contrast the rationality of various forms of society with an eye to the deeper and more universal processes at work, which enables him to justify the critique of certain forms (Nazism=irrational=bad) and lend support to the championing of others (democracy=rational=good). The relativists on the other hand, can compare and contrast the rationality of various forms of society but are unable to take up a critical stance, because they can posit no standard of rationality outside the relative and variable content of the societies in question (Nazism=a kind of society with standards that constitute what is right and true=democracy).

Concerning 5) Habermas's communicative rationality emphasizes the equal importance of the three validity dimensions, which means it sees the potential for rationality in normative rightness (WE), theoretical truth (IT) and expressive or subjective truthfulness (I). The differentiation of these three “worlds” is understood as a valuable heuristic. This leaves each to its specific forms of argumentation and justification. However, these validity dimensions should be related to one another and understood as complementary pieces in a broader conception of rationality. This points towards a productive interpenetration of the validity dimensions, for example the use of moral insights by the sciences without their having to sacrifice theoretical rigor, or the inclusion of psychological data into resources of moral philosophy.

These last points concerning the breadth of communicative rationality have by far the most important implications. By differentiating the three validity dimensions and holding them as equally valuable and rational a broader and multifaceted conception of rationality is opened. What this means is that Habermas has, through the formal pragmatic analysis of communication, revealed that rationality should not be limited to the consideration and resolution of objective concerns. He claims that the structure of communication itself demonstrates that normative and evaluative concerns can (and ought to) be resolved through rational procedures.

The clearest way to see this is to recognize that the validity dimensions implicit in communication signify that a speaker is open to the charge of being irrational if they place normative validity claims outside of rational discourse. Following Habermas the argument relies that the following are given: (a) that communication can proceed between two individuals only on the basis of a consensus (usually implicit) regarding the validity claims raised by the speech acts they exchange; (b) that these validity claims concern at least three dimension of validity (I, truthfulness; WE, rightness; IT, truth); and (c) that a mutual understanding is maintained on the basis of the shared presupposition that any validity claim agreed upon could be justified, if necessary, by making recourse to good reasons. From these premises it is concluded that any individual engaging in communication is accountable for the normative validity of the claims they raise. By earnestly offering a speech act to another in communication a speaker claims not only that what they say is true (IT) but also that it is normatively right (WE) and honest (I). Moreover, the speaker implicitly offers to justify these claims if challenged and justify them with reasons. Thus, if a speaker, when challenged, can offer no acceptable reasons for the normative framework they implied through the offering of a given speech act, that speech act would be unacceptable because it is irrational.

In its essence the idea of communicative rationality draws upon the implicit validity claims that are inescapably bound to the everyday practices of individuals capable of speech and action. A mutual understanding can be achieved through communication only by fusing the perspectives of individuals, which requires they reach an agreement (even if it is only assumed) on the validity of the speech acts being shared. Moreover, the speech acts shared between individuals in communication are laden with three different types of validity claims, all of which quietly but insistently demand to be justified with good reasons. Communicative rationality appears in the intuitive competencies of communicative actors who would not feel that a mutual understanding had been achieved if the validity claims raised were unjustifiable. Thus, the simple process of reaching an understanding with others impels individuals to be accountable for what they say and to be able to justify the validity claims they raise concerning normative (WE), evaluative (I) and objective matters (IT).

Of course a very important issue arises from this, which is that what constitutes a good or acceptable justification varies from context to context. Even if it is accepted that rationality must be expanded to include normative and evaluative dimensions it is not clear what it is that makes a speech act justified, because it is unclear what constitutes a good reason. Before tackling what constitutes a good reason it must be understood that there are different kinds of reasons in relation to the different validity dimensions. This should have been becoming apparent, because what defines a validity dimension are the procedures of justification that are unique to it. For example, if I claim or imply with my speech act that it is raining outside, a good reason for claiming this is that I saw it out the window. If you don’t believe me I could ask you to go look. This is a very simple way of describing the procedures of justification unique to objective validity claims. However, if I claim or imply with my speech act that abortion is acceptable in certain cases my reasons for claiming this must be of a different nature. I would have to direct your attention to certain features of the social world that are infused with meaning and significance. I would have to draw on insights into the vulnerability of individuals under the weight of life's circumstances and the kinds of rights that humans deserve. These types of considerations make up the resources available for the justification of normative validity claims.

What constitutes a good reason is a more complex problem. Accepting the distinction between the different kinds of reasons that accompany the differentiation of the validly dimensions does not give any insight into what a good reason in a particular validity dimension would be. In fact, it complexifies the issue because it makes it clear that there are different procedures unique to each validity dimension and that these dimensions cannot be reduced to one another. Habermas does suggest some general guidelines concerning the rationality of communicative processes that lead to conclusions; the presuppositions of discourses have already been discussed. But his explanations regarding the specific procedures that are unique to each validity dimension are much more elaborate. --Zakademic 15:26, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

Habermas's discourse ethics

Habermas's moral theory (1990), which has been given the name discourse ethics, is essentially his attempt to formulate the implications of communicative rationality in the sphere of moral insight and normative validity. It is a complex theoretical effort to reformulate the fundamental insights of Kantian deontological ethics in terms of the analysis of communicative structures. This means that it is an attempt to explain the universal and obligatory nature of morality by evoking the universal obligations of communicative rationality. It is also a cognitivist moral theory, which means it holds that justifying the validity of moral norms can be done in a manner analogous to the justification of facts. However, the entire project is undertaken as a rational reconstruction of moral insight. It claims only to reconstruct the implicit normative orientations that guide individuals and it claims to access these through an analysis of communication.

Simply put, Habmeras maintains that normative validity cannot be understood as separate from the argumentative procedures used in everyday practice, such as those used to resolve issues concerning the legitimacy of actions and the validity of the norms governing interactions. He makes this claim by making reference to the validity dimensions attached to speech acts in communication and the implicit forms of argumentation they imply, which is a facet of his theory I will not get into. The basic idea is that the validity of a moral norm cannot be justified in the mind of an isolated individual reflecting on the world. The validity of a norm is justified only intersubjectivly in processes of argumentation between individuals. Thus, the validity of a claim to normative rightness depends upon the mutual understanding achieved by individuals in argumentation. From this it follows that the deep structures of argumentation would become important. Kant extracted moral principles from the necessities forced upon a rational subject reflecting on the world. Habermas extracts moral principles from the necessities forced upon individuals engaged in the discursive justification of validity claims, from the inescapable presuppositions of communication and argumentation.

Recall the idealized presuppositions of communication discussed above. These were the kinds of idealization that individuals had to make in order for communication and argumentation to even begin. To list them quickly:

• The presupposition that participants in communicative exchange are using the same linguistic expressions in the same way
• The presupposition that no relevant argument is suppressed or excluded by the participants
• The presupposition that no force except that of the better argument is exerted
• The presupposition that all the participants are motivated only by a concern for the better argument

There were also presuppositions unique to discourse:

• The presupposition that everyone would agree to the universal validity of the claim thematized
• The presupposition that everyone capable of speech and action is entitled to participate, and everyone is equally entitled to introduce new topics or express attitudes needs or desires
• The presupposition that no validity claim is exempt in principle from critical evaluation in argumentation

These are at the center of Habermas's moral theory. Basically, discourse ethics attempts to distill the idealized moral point of view that accompanies a perfectly rational process of argumentation (also idealized), which would be the moral principle implied by the presuppositions listed above. The key point is that the presuppositions of argumentation and communication that have been rationally reconstructed by Habermas are both factual and normative. This can be said about his entire project because it is explicitly attempting to bridge the gap between the is and the ought. Habermas speaks of the mutual recognition and exchanging of roles and perspectives that are demanded by the very structural condition of rational argumentation. He maintains that what is implied in these factual presuppositions of communication is the deep structure of moral norms, the conditions that every valid norm must fulfill. The presuppositions of communication express a universal obligation to maintain impartial judgment in discourse, which constrains all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the exchange of reasons. From this Habermas extracts the following principle of universalization (U), which is the condition every valid norm has to fulfill:

"(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its [the norm's] general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and the consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas, 1990)."

This can be understood as the deep structure of all acceptable moral norms, and should not be confused with the principle of discourse ethics (D), which presupposes that norms exist that satisfy the conditions specified by (U).

"(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse (Habermas, 1990)."

The implications of (U) and (D) are quite profound. (U) claims to be a rational reconstruction of the impartial moral point of view at the heart of all cognitivist moral theories. According to moral cognitivists (e.g. Kant, Rawls etc.), it is only from such a moral point of view that insight into the actual (quasi-factual) impersonal obligations of a general will can be gained, because this perspective relieves decisions from the inaccuracies of personal interests. Of course, Habermas's reconstruction is different because it is intersubjective. That is, Habermas (unlike Kant or Rawls) formulates the moral point of view as it arises out of the multiple perspectives of those affected by a norm under consideration. The moral point of view explicated in (U) is not the property of an individual subject but the property of a community of interlocutors, the results of a complex dialogical process of role taking and perspective exchanging. Furthermore, (U) is deduced from a rational reconstruction of the presupposition of communication, which downgrades the strong transcendentalism of Kantian ethics by establishing a foundation in inner-worldly processes of communication.

(D) on the other hand, is a principle concerning the manner in which norms conforming to (U) must be justified though discourse. Again, Habermas takes the task of moral reflection out of the isolated individual's head and gives it to intersubjective processes of communication. What (D) proposes is that moral principles must be validated in actual discourse and that those to be affected by a norm must be able to participate in argumentation concerning its validity. No number of thought experiments can replace a communicative exchange with others regarding moral norms that will affect them. Moreover, this general prescription concerning the type of discourse necessary for the justification of moral norms opens the process of moral deliberation to the kind of learning that accompanies a fallibilistic orientation. (U) and (D) are catalysts for a moral learning process, which although fallible is not relative. The flesh and blood insights of participants in communicative exchange are refracted through the universal guidelines explicated from the deep structures of communication and argumentation. This spawns discourses with a rational trajectory, which are grounded in the particular circumstances of those involved but aimed at a universal moral validity.

---

Needless to say, I have moved far to quickly into the heat of Habermas's moral theory. But this is unavoidable. Because space does not allow for a full elaboration and justification of his position I have attempted to simply lay it out. I hope I have at least established that the general outline of Habermas's thought is acceptable, if not correct.

The citations here are the same as above.

Sorry to keep dumping all this stuff here. But I've written it and want to get it out there. I deeply apprecoiate all feed back and comments and help. The more people who understand Habermas the better. This may be a good start. The major headings of formal pragmatics, communicative rationality, and discourse ethics need to be supplimented with one's reguraidng system and lifeworld, socio-cultural evolution, law, etc. But that is my ambition—mabye some share it. --Zakademic 19:17, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

Because of certain Wikipedia stardards, spelling, etc. it will take a bit of editing, but I can have it up soon. Habermas's page now links to the articles you wanted, though. Lucidish 21:16, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

Vague footnote references?

There are several places that seem to have ill-formed footnotes whose reference is not clear. E.g., the introductory section has

For Habermas, the goal of coming to an understanding is "intersubjective mutuality... shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another" (3).

What is the (3) referring to? A page number in the essay mentioned in the first paragraph, or what? This and other similar footnote numbers or page numbers throughout the article need to be made more specific. --Jim Henry | Talk 18:46, 19 August 2005 (UTC)

Convention has it that, if a page is referenced, then it refers to whatever source has been cited earlier in the paragraph. In this case, the essay "Universal Pragmatics". Lucidish

This is rather confusing and not in line with Wikipedia:Manual of Style. Proper Wikipedia:Inline citations should be used.--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 21:15, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

IIRC this is a convention from the Chicago Manual of Style which is part of the Harvard system, and hence, endorsed by Wikipedia. When I get home I'll check again; if I'm mistaken, I'll change it myself. In the meantime, if it bothers you, you can change it and nobody will mind. Lucidish 22:14, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

I would change it if I was sure I understand it. This is why I prefer inline, hypertexted footnotes - they are much more difficult to 'break'. (Habermas 1979) is an obvious reference, but the number 3 mentioned above is still a mystery to me, for example.--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 01:10, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

Sorry then; fixed Lucidish 03:20, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

Tnx! This looks like a pretty good article. Have you thought about PR for it?--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 05:57, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

I hadn't thought of it, but peer review might not be a bad idea. Zak's done a good job on the article. Lucidish 20:53, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

And you. I think that with a little more work this can be a FA. PR would be a good start towards that path (and is a formal requirement anyway).--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 23:27, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

$Insertformulahere$

Peer review: fine tooth combery

What does "modal confusions" mean in the intro? The word "modal" has different meanings, and can be used in many different contexts. Lucidish 21:03, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

Also needed are images. Any ideas on what would make a good image here?Lucidish 02:50, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

Cover of Habermas article, perhaps?--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 21:43, 13 March 2006 (UTC)

Disambiguation

There is a link to [[Development]] on this page that is linking to a disambiguation page. I'm not sure which (if any) of the more specific pages on types of development would be a better link in this context. Could someone please review the choices available and either re-direct the link or delete it? Thanks.—Chidom ^talk  08:43, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

Where's the link in the article? Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 20:00, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: It looked like a purely generic use of the word, so I delinked it. Jon Awbrey 20:24, 8 August 2006 (UTC)