Talk:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact/Archive 7

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RFE/RL article on this article

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published an article comparing the English and Russian-language Wikipedia articles about the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact here. Otebig (talk) 11:44, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

• The comparison is superficial. For instance, the author didn't notice that whereas the English article tells nothing about attempted early Nazi-German contacts (Kandelaki mission etc), Russian WP discusses them in the details. Another example is the story of 17 April Merekalov-Wiezacker meeting: Russian WP reproduces the old Cold war version (that this meeting marked a start of full scale rapprochement), whereas the English article takes into account more recent sources. In that sense, the English WP is much less an anti-Soviet.
• I generally agree with the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article's statement that the role of Britain and France has been "soft-pedaled". Definitely, it should be fixed.
• However, the most interesting thing is that the role of East European states is much more passive according to English WP than according to the Russian one. For instance, both articles cite a Shirer's book, however, only the Russian article reproduces his words about a suicidal Polish policy. The Russian article present a quote from Churchill who openly stated that the problem of warranties for Poland, Romania, the Baltic states and Finland "paralyzed the policy of Britain and France".
  Interestingly, the Russian article tells in details about the role of the Baltic states. According to the source (Aivars Stranga. Latvijas un Igaunijas attiecības: 1918 — 1940. Grām.: Sarunas V: lekcijas un diskusijas sabiedriskā izglītības fonda “Jaunā akadēmija” vasaras nometnē Mazsalacā 2003. gada vasarā. — R.: Jaunā akadēmija, 2004. ) the Baltic states proclaimed that any warranty given without their request would be considered as an act of aggression. In addition, the same source states that Franz Halder and Wilhelm Canaris visited Estonia in late June, 1939. That looked like these states tried to use any possibility to support Soviet fears. (BTW, I looked at the Stranga's name in journal databases, and I found that he has been mentioned among "well-established experts", thus, Nils Petter Gleditsch in his review on the book "Global Dangers. Changing Dimensions of International Security. An International Security Reader" (Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, Special Issue on Environmental Conflict) writes:

"Daina Bleiere and Aivars Stranga are now well-established experts who have tested their analyses in dozens of conferences and workshops examining the political developments in the Baltic region.",

so I believe, we can trust a Stranga's opinion.)

• The most striking difference between the Russian and English articles is the difference in concepts. The Russian article is a story of the pact itself, whereas the English article is mostly focused on the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the period of the pact's operation. I believe, the latter approach is incorrect. I propose to move a part of material to German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation and other daughter articles, and to put the story of MRP signing back into the article from the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations. The more I look at the latter article the more I understand that it is a WP:CFORK.
  --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:06, 24 August 2009 (UTC)
• We are not bound by Russian WP views of how to present accounts of history. Do not split up the negotiations from the background or the history of the pact. The only separate article should be the copy of the pact itself plus the additional protocols. The M-R pact is meaningless in a context lacking the pact's origins, implementation and operation. The only thing you will accomplish is to gut the story of the pact and its effect—I trust that is not your intention here. VЄСRUМВА  ♪  19:08, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

I didn't propose to split anything: all these daughter articles already exist. However, the emphases must be shifted. The article about the pact must tell mostly about the pact itself, not about the subsequent treaties, and unilateral steps of each parties (Jews persecution, Katyn massacre, Winter war etc). Of course, all of that should be mentioned here briefly, and appropriate links should be given, however, that belongs to the "Aftermath" section, whereas the main body of the article should be devoted to the events between April 1939 and September 1939. The situation when the material directly relating to the pact has been moved out of the article into a separate WP:CFORK article, and that the material related to the daughter article is overrepresented here is ridiculous. BTW, it partially explains an accusation here in "soft-pedaling" the role of Western powers in MPR: all criticism has been removed to a separate, non notable article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:39, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

I agree with Vecrumba, we don't need to slavishly reflect the viewpoint of Russian Wikipedia. The RFE/RL article made no criticism of the scope of this article, only that it soft-pedaled on the role of Britain and France, which you have already fixed. --Martintg (talk) 21:14, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

I didn't propose to follow Russian WP, I just proposed to follow the common sense rules. The article about the pact must tell mostly about the pact: about the preceding events, about the position of all parties (Germany, the USSR, the Western powers and the East European states), about the circumstances of the pact's signing, and about its consequences. However, if you look at this article, you will see that the section devoted to the consequences is huge whereas the section about the April-August event has been artificially shrunk and moved to another article. It is not correct, in my opinion. The RFE/RL article's observation on soft-peadling is a direct consequence of that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:53, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

To Otebig: Interesting article. As an aside, I've been clicking around to other language Wikipedias on a number of historical topics recently from Roman history to the Iran-Iraq war. The non-English language articles seem far more flushed out than they did a couple of years ago now (most were barely stubs then on many topics). They still obviously usually lack the sourcing and detail the English Wikipedia articles contain, a natural byproduct of the project starting in the U.S. and the number of English readers with broadband internet access, but the progress over the last few years has been pretty remarkable.

RegardingPaul Siebert's latest antics, including seriously and openly suggesting changing this article to comport with most unsourced Russian Wikipedia version re "soft pedaling" in an article, and actually -- no kidding -- edting this article with a miscite of Kershaw citing this "soft pedaling" concern word-for-word, I'm not even sure what to say. Mosedschurte (talk) 00:44, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

A typical straw man fallacy. I wrote clearly: "I didn't propose to follow Russian WP, I just proposed to follow the common sense rules." In addition, I propose to follow WP policy that prohibits content forking.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:56, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

I and the other editors see what your wrote after the fact. It is not particularly relevant. Nor is a reliance upon comporting with the mostly unsourced Russian WP version based on the assertion that this would "follow common sense rules."

In more than one regard, this Talk Page section has been rather illuminating. I thank the original poster for starting it.Mosedschurte (talk) 01:43, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

"I just proposed to follow the common sense rules.". I like that, let the facts and common sense speak for themselves instead of adding a number of speculations and theories to the article why the Soviet Union and Germany had to sign the treaty that caused the outbreak of WWII.--Termer (talk) 02:01, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, but that sounds a little bit odd. Presenting facts mean working with primary sources, i.e. OR. We can only work with different interpretations of the facts made by different historians. And the question is what works sould be included and what do not. Just telling that the USSR and Germany signed a pact and carved up Europe is also only a part of truth. And an attempt to conceal the third parties' role in the pact looks like a not completely honest trick. --Paul Siebert (talk) 02:10, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Presenting facts mean working with primary sources, i.e. OR. ? Who says so? facts are all written down to any secondary source that speaks about the subject. Different interpretations can be added to any facts pr WP:YESPOV. what works sould be included and what do not is the simplest question-> Any notable interpretation as an opinion can be added as long as it's beyond WP:UNDUE, meaning if someones works are cited by a third party, it can go in. If someone goes around and makes crazy claims, that no secondary source pays any attention to, it says out. Not completely honest trick? I'm sorry I might have misunderstood you but did you happen to accuse anybody here in dishonesty?--Termer (talk) 02:51, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "Any notable interpretation as an opinion can be added as long as it's beyond WP:UNDUE" Yes, but the balance is determined not by the relative amout of the VP editors on a talk page, and even not by numerical amount of the sources, but by notability and reliability of the sources. I had presented a number of notable sources that support my edits, and these sources meet all criteria applied to reliable sources. I looked for the sources expressing the opposite point of view, but I found not many.

Re: "If someone goes around and makes crazy claims, that no secondary source pays any attention to, it says out." Of course. But what relation does it have to the subject of our discussion?

Re: "did you happen to accuse anybody here in dishonesty?" No. I just wrote that some your claims create an impression (I believe, completely wrong) of a dishonest tricks. And this trick consists in following. If we limit ourselves with facts only, who can tell which facts should be in the article and which shouldn't? Obviously, we will add the facts according to some theory, and this theory will be present in the article implicitly. In other words by saying "let's exclude theories" you implicitly propose to exclude theories you don't like. I fully realize that you probably meant something else, but that is how your proposal looks like. I apologize in advance if I was wrong.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:53, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Please, I hope there is no need to explain the difference between a fact vs an opinion or an interpretation. An opinion can be a fact if it says who says so. It can't get simpler than that. On the rest, you have failed to present secondary sources that cite the the opinions of your preferred authors. Please, I can't put it better myself than JW on WP:UNDUE: If a viewpoint is held by a significant minority, then it should be easy to name prominent adherents --Termer (talk) 04:16, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "you have failed to present secondary sources that cite the the opinions of your preferred authors" If I present these secondary sources, someone may request for the validation of these new secondary sources, etc, etc. No, that doesn't work like that. The very name of journal warrants the validity of the author's statements. Poor articles of non-notable scholars simply do not pass the peer reviewing procedure. For the details of this procedure, see the last section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:18, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Joint Soviet-German military parades

Is there reliable information whether, where and when did these parades take place? Original footage apparently exists only on the parade in Brest. However, this article, for example, states: A joint German–Soviet parade was held in L'vov and Brest-Litovsk, while the countries commanders met in the latter location.. The article Invasion of Poland, on the other hand, has the following: Just three days earlier, however, the parties had a more hostile encounter near Lwow (Lviv, Lemberg), when the German 137th Gebirgsjägerregimenter (mountain infantry regiment) attacked a reconnaissance detachment of the Soviet 24th Tank Brigade; after a few casualties on both sides, the parties turned to negotiations. The German troops left the area, and the Red Army troops entered Lviv on 22 September. Looks pretty mutually exclusive. --Illythr (talk) 12:25, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

The article in general seems to de-emphasize the extent of Nazi-Soviet opposition (even during the time of the Pact's operation).--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:18, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

I am not aware of any reliable sources that say the joint parades actually occur. The original German title of the photo does not have any word resembling "joint". Few Russian historians state that the Soviet officers were simply observers at German parades. Does anyone have a reliable source to the contrary? 173.129.80.30 (talk) 23:01, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

There are plenty of history books that state it was a joint parade[1]. Here are some interesting images from the joint victory parade[2]. --Martintg (talk) 23:21, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Dear Martintg, the parade in Brest-Litovsk is well known fact. However, by typing "joint nazi soviet "victory parade"" in the books.google.com you get all books that contain the words "joint", "nazi", "soviet", and the phrase "victory parade" (not necesserily in the each other context, and not even on the same page. For instance, one of these books tells about Soviet victory parade in Moscow in 1945). That doesn't mean that these books tell about joint nazi-soviet military parade in Lvov. Answering the Illythr's question requires a little more work. You didn't answer this question.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:48, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

PS The search ""joint Nazi-Soviet" AND victory AND parade ANDNOT Brest" [3] gives two books authored by Davis. The search "joint AND "Nazi-Soviet" AND victory AND parade ANDNOT Brest" [4] gives 10 results (including Davis). Except Davis' books, none of these books tells about joint Nazi-Soviet victory parades. One more search [5] ("nazi-soviet" joint victory parade -"parade in Brest") excluded the word "Brest" only if it was in a context of parade. This search gave 16 results, three of them are Davis' books, some others tell about the parade in Brest-Litovsk, majority other results are irrelevant. This search ("nazi-soviet" joint victory "parade in lvov" -"parade in Brest") gave no results. Your claims are little bit unsubstantiated...--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:06, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Again, and this could be stated in most sections, I'm not sure what you're arguing about with regard to this article. The sources discuss the parade in Brest which answers the original poster's question, regardless of whether or not this is discussed in another Wikipedia article. I haven't looked at Lviv specifically, but I'm not sure anyone is disputing that either.Mosedschurte (talk) 01:18, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

I believe it is simple. Whereas almost noone questions the fact that the joint parade took place in Brest, the sources about the parade in Lvov are scarce (if exist at all). From other hand, the fact that some hostilities took place between German and Soviet troops is missing in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:25, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

I don't think Google searches with ANDNOT will accomplish anything here: if someone will write about these parades, they will definitely mention the Brest one. Anyhow, my problem is this: there's a ruwiki article about these parades, which uses just one source, Semiryaga, M. I. Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy 1939-1941 (available in Russian here). The source mentions a number of joint parades in Grodno, Brest, Pinsk and "a number of other cities", adding that the Grodno parade was received by Chuikov and the Brest one - by Krivoshein and Guderian. Unfortunately, the author provides no references for these events in his book and I was unable to find anything on parades other than the widely publicized one in Brest. As numerous enwiki articles casually mention these parades in plural, I was wondering if any good English-language sources are available around here. --Illythr (talk) 01:28, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

(joint nazi-soviet parade brest) 9 results, (joint nazi-soviet parade grodno) 0 results, (joint nazi-soviet parade Pinsk) 0 results, (joint German-soviet parade Pinsk) 1 result, but the book appeared to talk about somethinh else. I'll try to look in journal databases tomorrow.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:41, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

An odd edit

On the page 194, Kershaw writes: "Within the Soviet leadership the entrenched belief that the West wanted to encourage German aggression in the East (that is, against the USSR), the recognition that following Munich collective security was dead"

I wrote: "This policy (appeasement) affirmed the Soviet concerns that the West may want to encourage German aggression in the east..."

Mosedschurte claimed that my wording is an odd interpretation of the Kershaw's words. However, the Kershaw's sentence gives a direct link between Munich and Soviet fears. According to the wording proposed by him, ("which is seen as part of an appeasement of Germany conducted by Chamberlain's and Daladier's cabinets.[27] The Soviet leadership believed that the West may want to encourage German aggression in the east[28] and that France and Britain might stay neutral in a war initiated by Germany, ") the Soviet fears appeared from nothing, just like paranoja. The wording proposed by Mosedschurte attempts to "soft-pedal" the connection between the Soviet fears and Munich, exactly what RFE/RL article tells about.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:53, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Oh, it was an odd edit alright:

---

Kershaw's actual words:
"Within the Soviet leadership, the entrenched belief that the West anted to encourage German aggression in the East (that is, against the USSR) . . . "

Paul Siebert's edit citing that text actually claiming an affirmation of Soviet concerns of the West wanting to encourage such an attack
"This policy affirmed the Soviet concerns that the West may want to encourage German aggression in the east"

---

If you miscite another author like that again in this article, I'll consider moving for a topic ban. I wasn't even going to raise this as an issue on the Talk page, which you have seemingly turned into an incredibly meandering vortex of arguments re details far too tiny for discussion in this article, such as this latest one on a letter by William Strang".Mosedschurte (talk) 01:00, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Re topic ban. If you want to play in this game, feel free to start right now. Just keep in mind that I am able to present much more examples of your violations of WP policy.

Re "miscite another author". (Which one was the first, btw?) The full quote form Kershaw (on the top) demonstrated that he connected Munich and Soviet concerns, although did that not so explicitly as I did. However, another source (Max Beloff, already in the article) is even more categorical than Kershaw is. He says:

"Thus, just as the Munich episode can only be understood in the light of a long-standing divergence between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, its conclusion immediately raised the question of whether the Soviet Union could avoid being next on Hitler's list, and whether the way to do this did not lie in becoming an active partner in re-shaping the map of Europe as created by the treaties of Versailles and Riga."

I believe you can compare this quote with the text I've just introduced, and you will see that I cited him absolutely precisely.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:00, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

PS I appreciate your last interference that helped me to express what the sources say more clearly...--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:01, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

"just as the Munich episode can only be understood..."? Is it just me or is someone actually claiming here that there is a only way the Munich episode can be understood? As far as I can tell, this is a political commentary. Does political commentary belong to an encyclopedia? Sure, why not as long as it's loud and clear who says so? So who is Kershaw/Beloff and why are their opinions notable?--Termer (talk) 02:09, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "Does political commentary belong to an encyclopedia?" Any statements containing the words "because", "thus", "therefore" etc. are someone's comclusions. All conclusions are commentaries. In other words, your question must be understood like any historical articles cannot contain conclusions or commentaries. Did I understood you correct?

Re: "who says so?" If you read some article (not a WP article but normal scientific article) the answer is obvious. Every statement there is attributed to some source. For instance "Cain killed Abel¹". If you want to know who says that you just have to go by the ref 1. I believe, the same is valid for WP, at least policy states that...--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:22, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

If you have any doubts about reliability of Beloff or Kershaw (btw, I am not 100% sure, but the latter source seems to be added not by me. I just read it and added more facts from it), feel free to go to the RS noticeboard.

BTW, to show you that Beloff was neither Marxist nor leftist, let me quote another fragment of the same article: "One of the many poisons with which the Marxist virus has infected our intellectual life is the idea that the pursuit of the truth for its own sake is inherently absurd."...--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:31, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

There is no answer to the question, who are Kershaw/Beloff and why are their opinions notable? Please refer to a published secondary source that cite the the authors and their opinions. That's is needed to determine the notability of the authors you speak of pr. WP:UNDUE. Thanks!--Termer (talk) 03:36, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

(edit conflict):::::Sorry but this your comment is completely obscure for me. Beloff is notable because it meets the most stringent criteria applied to reliable secondary sources. (Unfortunately I cannot tell the same about majority of books and articles published by the Baltic authors, however, I rise no questions about their notability) Since it was not me who introduced Kershaw, I didn't check his notability, but taking in account that this reference is in the article for a long time, I beliewe WP community recognizes it as RS. BTW, this source is redundant because it just repeats what Beloff says. Feel free to remove it if you want.
In addition, I always refer to published secondary source that cite the the authors and their opinions. I even used to present quotes from these works to demonstrate that I cited the authors correctly....--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:57, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

You're citing somebody called Kershaw from a book he is the author of [6]. This is not a secondary source about Kershaw work but Kershaw's own work, OK. So who are Kershaw/Beloff and why are their opinions notable? Please see Wikipedia:Notability (academics) FFI. Thanks!--Termer (talk) 04:06, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

(od)WP policy (that takes precedence over guidelines) outlines concrete criteria reliable secondary sources must meet. All works cited by me meet all these criteria. That is quite sufficient. Beloff's works are notable because they passed a peer reviewing procedure (that is very strict in top journals). In addition, let me explain you one thing. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:14, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Beloff's works are notable because they passed a peer reviewing procedure. That's exactly what I'm talking about, please cite a peer review, that would be a secondary source that speaks about Beloff's works. Thanks!--Termer (talk) 04:18, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Dear Termer, I probably unterstand the reason of confusion. You, probably are unaware of the details of the peer reviewing procedure. When you send a manuscript to some journal your work is reviewed by two or three anonymous scientists (as a rule, very reputable scientists). You don't know who they are, only the editor knows that. If these reviews are positive, the journal's editor accepts the manuscript for publications. The reviews are internal documents, and they are available for the author and the editor only. However, we don't need to read them: the very fact that the article has been published implies that these reviews were highly positive.
That is how the peer-reviewing procedure works, and it warrants that all the articles published in first class journals can be trusted.
By contrast to the articles, not all books pass through such a procedure, that is why majority books, media articles etc are less reliable.
I believe I answered your questions, and I beg your pardon if I looked rude.
Cheers, :)
--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:11, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

PS Re: "a secondary source that speaks about Beloff's works" I believe, you understand now that Beloff is a secondary source by itself, and a very reliable source...--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:30, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "I believe you can compare this quote with the text I've just introduced, and you will see that I cited him absolutely precisely." (Paul Siebert)

This is such a laughable inaccuracy -- see above blockquote for your edit where you inserted that the act "affirmed" the Soviets leadership belief the west wanted Germany to attack the East (seriously) -- that there is not much more to say on the topic. Simply unbelievable that you would do so, then claim "you will see that I cited him absolutely precisely". You would have looked much better had you just stated that the first edit was an error made while not closely examining the inserted text.Mosedschurte (talk) 09:54, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Are you seriously think that every BRD is an edit war? In actuality, what happened was just a pure example of how WP works: I made an edit - you changed it (and pointed at some inaccuracy, although this inaccuracy was just formal one) - and I made a final change that absolutely correctly reflects the source.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:26, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

It seems Paul has not been able to come up with any secondary published sources that cite the authors Beloff/Kershaw and their work? Unfortunately such claims than have no place in Wikipedia pr WP:UNDUE.--Termer (talk) 13:57, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

I am sorry, the reference was wrong. In actuality, I took the Beloff's words from his another work (Soviet Foreign Policy, 1929-41: Some Notes Author(s): Max Beloff Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Oct., 1950), pp. 123-137). I've just fixed that. Thank you for pointing my attention to that reference.
In the case if you are still not satisfied, please keep in mind that I posted a question on the Reliable Sources Noticeboard [7] where I described a situation and asked for comments on if additional proof is required for reliable secondary sources.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:52, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

PS With regards to Kershaw, since it was not me who introduced this reference, your question should be addressed to those who did that. If you have any doubts about Kershaw, I personally do not mind you to remove this reference completely: it is redundant, and all the article's statements can be supported by other sources that are already in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:57, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

← For the record, as an uninvolved editor who saw this at WP:RS/N, I think this is a relatively minor dispute as far as the content issue goes (though it's become a bit acrimonious on a personal level). I think the objection to Kershaw has to do with how his words are paraphrased. Kershaw says that Munich encouraged "an entrenched belief" among Soviet leaders. Paul's proposed wording is a bit more declarative than the source, saying that Munich "affirmed" the fears of the Soviet leadership. I think the latter wording implies that the fears were reasonable and valid, which is not an implication I see in the cited source from Kershaw.

I'd suggest you just use Kershaw, and paraphrase him a bit differently, along the lines of: Chamberlain's policy of appeasement amplified the Soviet belief that the Western powers were tacitly encouraging Germany to turn eastward... (with a cite to Kershaw). Just a suggestion. Carry on. MastCell ^Talk 17:42, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Thank you MastCell for your intervention. However, now we have to resolve another question. We have two sources, Kershaw and Beloff. I know nothing about Kershaw, but Beloff was introduced by me more than a year ago. His article was published in reputable peer-reviewed journal. In addition, although I don't think I am obliged to do that, I checked his notability in google.scholar.com,[8] and I found that the author is very notable. Since someone was not satisfied with my wording, I took Beloff's words (see above), and made corresponding changes in the article's text ("This policy immediately raised the question of whether the Soviet Union could avoid being next on Hitler's list.").
In connection to that, my question is do you think if there is any reason to remove the notable historian's words from the article and to replace them with something else?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:11, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Beloff seems like a reasonable source. I don't think anyone seriously denies that that Soviets were concerned by appeasement, and after the fate of Czechoslovakia, that they believed that Germany would continue to expand eastward. That seems to be what Beloff is saying. The wording probably needs to be hashed out a little. I guess what I'm saying is that the sources and material seem reasonable; I think you guys are just a little bit off on the specific wording, but I think you can work that out. MastCell ^Talk 20:32, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "I don't think anyone seriously denies that that Soviets were concerned by appeasement" I would say that the above discussion is a direct attempt to soft-pedal that fact under any pretext, for instance, by disputing reliability of highly reliable sources...--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:22, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Sorry to see that you Paul still are missing what I'm talking about. In case Beloff is a notable figure, his opinion is worthy of having included in Wikipeida. In fact the easiest to determine this , make an article about him, and that's an end of the story. If he is notable enough to have an artcle on Wikipeida, his opinions are notable enough for related articlesetc. Now, anything that Beloff says is still his opinion or commentary or a theory in the context. And that's what the text needs to say in case its an interpretation of events: "beloff this and that says so". And again, "soviet fear" is a speculation, an interpretation. Unless the Soviet Union has made a declaration of the fear any time anywhere, then this declaration would be a fact. Anything else is "according to..." OK?--Termer (talk) 02:32, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

In other words, you decided to demonstrate my point, namely, that some people "seriously denies that that Soviets were concerned by appeasement", and, according to them, the Beloff's POV is just Beloff's speculations, not the majority POV...
In actuality, I read many articles like the Beloff's one, and most of them express the same POV. Among the authors who share this vision are Roberts, Gorodetsky, Carr, Harley, Watson, Kershaw(I mention only those who was cited in that article). All of them are reputable scholars.
I would say the opposite is true, namely that the number of serious scholars who believe that appeasement was not a reason of the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement is relatively small. Among them, I would name Nekrich, Raak and some others.
And, finally, do you seriously propose me to start a new WP article about every person whose works I am intended to use as a source for WP? Please, present your POV at the [WP:RS/N]] and let's see what WP community says...--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:50, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

PS. Frankly, I would prefer our discussion to proceed in a less aggressive manner, so I apologize if I was not polite and propose to pass to a more constructive dialogue.
Termer, my major objections to your proposal ("Anything else is "according to...OK?") consists in the following.
Firstly, WP policy does not require that.
Secondly, it is not always clear what is a pure fact and what is just a majority POV.
Thirdly, had we accepted your proposal, WP would become unreadable: 50% of the text would consist in "According to Smith¹, Miller², Watanabe³ and Chou⁴.....whereas according to Popov⁵ and Schwartz⁶ .... etc etc. Remember, almost all staff the Baltic peoples consider to be the facts can be represented as the opinions of some scholars (btw, non-notable scholars, according to the western scientific community's criteria)...
Again, although I fully realise that your and my personal sympathies are quite different, I believe we can come to some consensus about key things. I am sincerely intended to reach this consensus, because basic logic rules are common for all peoples belonging to the western civilization.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:09, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Well I'm still missing the point of all of this, including the list of names you have listed here all the way up to "Soviets were concerned by appeasement" etc. how is all this related to Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact? Os it something like the Soviets were afraid that Germany might want to expand eastwards, and by using this fear to their advantage proposed a deal to Germany to divide the east between themselves? So that both were happy and not afraid any more, and Germany was able to expand eastwards and Soviet Union westwards?--Termer (talk) 05:20, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "how is all this related to Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact?" That is obvious. It is quite necessary to explain how two deadly enemies decided to sign a political deal and became (for a short period) almost the allies. Noone both in the East and in the West was able to predict that.

Re: "Os it something like the Soviets were afraid that Germany might want to expand eastwards, and by using this fear to their advantage proposed a deal to Germany" You rather accurately summarised what Carr, Beloff, Churchill, Roberts, Carley, Gorodetsky, Watson, partially Kershaw, Overy etc think on that account.
Interestingly, I found 3 peer-reviewed articles, two of them were written by the Finnish authors, that confirm that before the Winter war Stalin needed only to move a border from Leningrad and to lease some islands in the Gulf of Finland. According to these sources (that have nothing in common with the Soviet propaganda) the decition to conquer Finland and to communize it was taken later, only because a peaceful solution had not been achieved...--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:33, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

So the way I'm getting this you want to explain more clearly the political interest of the parties? And mostly the interest of the Soviets? Well, I guess the reason I've missed what you're after here by listing names etc. has been that such things I've taken as self explanatory, or another way to put it, deadly enemies can always make a deal if they both can gain something out of it. So as long as those interest are cited appropriately: "according to this and that the Soviet interests were following", there shouldn't be any problems.--Termer (talk) 05:54, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

No. I propose to tell about the political interest of all the parties, including the political interests of small Baltic states that wanted only one thing, namely, to remain neutral and independent, that eventually had quite opposite effect, and this effect was much more global than anyone could imagine. According to a Carley's definition, that decade was really "dishonest", and all the party, each of which pursued their own, as a rule, egoistic goals, eventually got something they absolutely didn't expect to get.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:25, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

An interesting add to, perhaps, some other article detailing early 20th Century Baltic international relations and the like. As others have pointed out to you, this is an article on a Soviet-German 1939 non-aggression pact dividing Eastern Europe. In such a summary article, a sentence or two is spent on the motivations of others, and that's about it.Mosedschurte (talk) 08:41, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Not Baltic. The pact had a global effect, and most world powers except the USA were involved in the story connected with its signing. If you thin so locally why do you even dare to start working with international WP?--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:34, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Termer: not that I want to get dragged into this discussion on yet another mostly off-topic issue (I feel for you), but as a heads up, there is already a section in the article on Post-war commentary regarding the motives of Stalin and Hitler detailing various authors' theories on what they might have been thinking.Mosedschurte (talk) 08:49, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Yeah, I'm going to quit this discussion since I'm completely lost in it what is that Paul wants and what is this that keeps coming up: "locally thinking" and "dare to start working with international WP" all about? international WP? I thought it was English WP.--Termer (talk) 05:27, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

English is the international language, so the English WP's audience the majority of nations. If you Estonian write something here, people from India, Australia, Canada or Nigeria can read that. Therefore, by contrast to other WP's English WP must reflect a global POV.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:11, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Rewrite of the "Background" section

The background section should be rewrite. 1) Need of balance both Germany AND Soviet Union background. Now there is only background of German motives. 2) Role/mention of the small Eastern European countries politics 3) Overall, the section could be shrink/compact easily to half size, as subarticles should be enough. Peltimikko (talk) 07:31, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Best of luck attempting to shrink the Background section. I agree that it could be half the size. Another editor of this article has made edits increasing that section size and resisting cutting efforts.Mosedschurte (talk) 08:32, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

I see no reason to shrink the section considerably because it doesn't look not overextended. However, I agree that both that and other sections related to the pact's signing need no additional extension, provided that the most important facts are moved there, and all marginally information is removed.
Dear Peltimikko, please, tell more about what would you like to see in that section and what should be removed? This would allow us to discuss the issue more concretely. I would prefer if we discuss the major points on the talk page, then write the draft here, and, when all editors will express their opinion about the draft, we will put it into the article. This scheme works nicely, for instance in the World War II article and allows to avoid unneeded and devastating edit wars.
Regards,
--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:12, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Actually, this was not first in my mind, but the section is useless. I read it several times, and it did not give any information value or background to the pact. The article truly started from the next section: "Negotiations". We could do two things: 1) Delete whole background section (as its information value is zero) 2) rename the title of section "Negotiations" to "Background". This way we achieve much simpler structure and a reader would tap into business right away. I bet 100 euros nobody would not even noticed "old background", nor miss it. Peltimikko (talk) 19:51, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Congratulations, you lost your 100 Euros! (please, spent them for saving rainforests on behalf of me) The material from the present Background section was the only article's piece of text that has been discussed in the RFE/RL article (See the previous section on this talk page).--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:27, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Speaking seriously, it seems quite necessary to explain why Hitler and Stalin decided to sign the pact, isn't it? If we discuss their motives, then we automatically come to the story of German anti-Communism/anti-Semitism, German economic isolation, Munich/appeasement, Franco-Anglo-Soviet triple talks, Polish position, Baltic fears etc, and major part of the Background section would come back. However, I don't mind to clean the Background from some marginally relevant staff, to merge it with the triple talks story and to start the Negotiation section from early August events.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:45, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

(edit conflict) While the section may be overextended and somewhat awkward, there are several key pieces of information that must be presented in one way or another: 1) Prior German-Soviet relations were cool, with the two participating in a proxy war in Spain against each other. This is important so that the reader may understand the surprise the Pact has caused. 2) The Munich Agreement and the role of the Western Allies in it. The "down-pedaled" part, as it were. 3) The "why" of it - the reasons behind the parties' signing - probably the most interesting question in the whole thing, at least for those who can see beyond the "they were evil so they did their evil thing" line of reasoning. --Illythr (talk) 20:49, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

Correct. In addition, I have to concede Mosedschurte was partially right when he devoted some space to economy. Some reasonable people in Germany realized that the German ambitions had to be supported by economical capabilities, and put a pressure on Hitler to improve relations with the USSR as a potential economical partner. Although it would be quite incorrect to make a stress on that fact (too much attention is paid in the article to that) few words on that account are needed in the Background.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:38, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

I would also add 1) the rise of Russian nationalism in the Stalin's Soviet Union in the 1930s. Stalin wanted to recover the territories of Tsarist Russia lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War. So, for example assault against Finland (Winter War) was a mix of Russian nationalism and ideology to fight against the "fascism". Before 1935, fascism was used widely against Western Social democrats (Social fascism), as they were not willing to revolt instead parlamentarism - the western social democrats "betrayed the revolution". Only after 1935, the German threat became real. 2) Stalin did not respected smaller nations such as Poland, Finland, Estonia etc., instead it was easier to negotiate only with "big guys"; Germany, Great Britain, France etc. In Stalin eyes, no country could not be "neutral". For some reasons Stalin-era theory that the Soviet Union needed "buffer" against mother-Russia is popular still even today, but the theory is selfish and against a will of smaller countries. Peltimikko (talk) 07:46, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: 1. It is incorrect. The rise of Russian nationalism started after WWII (the Stalin speech about "the great Russian nation", fight against cosmopolitism etc). Before the war, despite most "old Bolsheviks" had already been either arrested or executed, the orthodox Bolshevik ideology (internationalism and world revolution) still dominated. With regards to Finland, I believe, I was able to demonstrate that a number of reliable sources argue that the primary motive was security, whereas some other sources consider both motives (expansionism and security). I have an impression that Finland was a separate case (btw. in 1944 Stalin decided not to conquer Finland, and he didn't try to communize it, although he theoretically could do that. I understand that it is partially can be explained by brave Finnish resistance, however, the Finns wouldn't withstand against Red Army, had Stalin decided to conquer Finland at all cost.)

Re: "was a mix of Russian nationalism and ideology to fight against the "fascism"." Incorrect. The standard cliche the Soviet propaganda used to name the Finns during the Winter war was "belofinny", "White Finns", so the Soviet authority tried to draw a parallelism between Finland and the Civil war's time White movement. It was a very common cliche, and I am unaware of an attempt to build a direct connection between the "belofinns" and fascism.

Re: " Stalin did not respected smaller nations such as Poland ..." Poland was not a small nation. Poland won the Polish-Soviet war, Poland was a major strategic partner of Britain in Eastern Europe, some British officials regarded Polish military capabilities very highly (and underestimaded the Soviet capabilities). Poland is believed to consider a possibility of the pre-emptive attack of Germany in 1933. Some scholars believe Polish contribution into the war against Germany was greater than that of France. In addition, by European standards, pre-war Poland was rather big country.

Re: "Stalin-era theory that the Soviet Union needed "buffer" against mother-Russia". Please, keep in mind that Wilson supported formation of many Eastern European states as a buffer against Soviet Russia, so the term buffer state was common in post WWI world.

Re: "In Stalin eyes, no country could not be "neutral"" That was not only Stalin's vision. Although contemporary Baltic historians say the reverse, many western sources I read tell that the Baltic states were pro-German, and vehemently anti-Soviet. I agree that in actuality it could be not the case, however, the external observer's impression was that they were.

Finally, I think it is a good time for you to write a preliminary draft of the section. I think it is you who has to do it because you initiated the discussion and placed the tag. After looking at your draft it would be easier for all of us to understand each other's positions and to continue our work.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:02, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Due to these researches are basic material of ANY historian, in any country, I quote Donald Rayfield's "Stalin and His Hangmen" (2004): "From 1933 Stalin encouraged Russian chauvinism, implying the Russians were politically and culturally superior – elder brothers to other people of the USSR and the Slavs, just as the Germans were a superior race among the Aryans." (pp. 253-254) and also "The countries [Germany and the USSR] had shared political goals: the crushing of Poland, for both Hitler and Stalin an upstart and a usurper of national territory." (p. 254). I have also read reviews of Soviet, and unfortunatelly some recent Russian, books were small Eastern European countries and Finland are accused for "pro-German" and that received "casus belli" to justify occupations. If you make just a scratch to these controversial theories, they do not have ANY scientific basic. For example in multipile parliamental elections in Finland, ultranationalist received only 14 (top peak) seats of 200 seats (and later less and less), and still Stalin accused Finland for fasiscm. As I wrote, these are basic stuff. Peltimikko (talk) 20:34, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

(od)Re: "ANY historian, in any country". Although Stalin personally was not an internationalist, he initially attacked chauvinism, and even utilized the fight against chauvinism to achieve his own aims. For instance, he used that as a pretext for his attacks of NEP:

"Stalin charged that the two-year-old policy "exposed [the party] to the corrupting influence of NEP elements." Worse yet, it nurtured the growth of nationalistic and reactionary thinking, which has "acquired many supporters among Soviet officials" and "has penetrated even into some of our party institutions." Indeed, Stalin alleged that at a recent Central Committee plenum "speeches were heard which were incompatible with communism." This was a dangerous "epidemic," he warned, and it was caused by the NEP.
Stalin's most extensive criticism of the NEP at the congress came in his speech on nationality affairs. It was "as a result of" the NEP, he claimed, that "Great Russian nationalism has begun to grow and become more pronounced." "But the NEP fosters not only Great Russian chauvinism - it also fosters local chauvinism," Stalin declared." (Robert Himmer. "The Transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy: An Analysis of Stalin's Views" Russian Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 515-529)

Again, chauvinism was absolutely inconsistent with pre-war Soviet ideology. The works you quote are probably a result of projection of the post-WWII situation on the past.
Re: "If you make just a scratch to these controversial theories, they do not have ANY scientific basic." Again, I do not discuss the real state of things inside the Baltic countries or Poland, I tell how they were seen from outside. For instance, Carley, a reputable scholar, writes:

"Meanwhile, the Baltic states looked on nervously. They preferred a year of Nazi occupation to a day of Soviet-which was what worried the Soviet government. The Baltic ambassadors made regular inquiries at the Foreign Office; British ambassadors reported Baltic anxiety and anti-Soviet hostility. In early June Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany; German officers supervised the building of their fortifications."(Michael Jabara Carley. "End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341)

I can provide additional references upon request, however, I propose you to come back to the discussion about the Background section. You claimed it is unsatisfactory, you placed the template into the article, so I expect you to present a draft of the new "Background" section here to understand what do you propose concretely.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:10, 27 August 2009 (UTC) PS. I can write a new section as I see it, however, I would like to look at your version first...--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:19, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

We should be very careful when using book sources before the Moscow Archives became public in 1992. After that history researches have discussed issues, and build new theories during 1990s. Due to size of archives, investigations take time. For example the Secret Protocol of the Mutual Assistance Agreement between the puppet regime of "Finnish Democratic Republic" and Molotov was discovered not until 1998. And another example to understand the effect of these Moscow Archives comes from Finland: Before 1987 the Finnish academic world kept solely the Continuation War as a separate war against the Soviet Union. The Moscow Archives have changed the view, and nowadays, especially younger researches, set Finland as an ally with Nazi Germany during the WWII. Anyway, I look the "Background" section within week as I have collected proper sources (written in the 2000s). Peltimikko (talk) 07:43, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "We should be very careful when using book sources before the Moscow Archives became public in 1992." Almost totally agreed. With one exception, namely, that the release of the documents started earlier, in late USSR. And almost immediately the articles started to appear that use newly released documents extensivelly (and that explicitly tell about that). Therefore, the sources written since 1990 may be considered "proper".--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:51, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

An odd para in Background.

The first para is nonsence.

"After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Bolshevist Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceding sovereignty and influence over parts of several eastern European countries. The treaty lasted only eight and a half months, and the countries subsequently entered the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, pursuant to which, they renounced territorial and financial claims against each other. They pledged neutrality in the event of an attack against one another with the 1926 Treaty of Berlin."

What does "Bolshevist Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceding sovereignty and influence over parts of several eastern European countries." mean? With whom Russia signed a treaty and to whom it ceded "sovereignty and influence"? What "eastern European countries" the para is talking about? What are "the countries" that "subsequently entered the Treaty of Rapallo".

In my opinion, the para was written by someone who is too focused on the USSR, and who simply forgot to mention Germany. Anyway, the para is terrible and must be rewritten.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:23, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

A new version of that paragraph is hardly an improvement. It starts with the odd statement: "The outcome of the First World War was disastrous for both Germany and the Soviet Russia." Soviet Russia as the state emerged only a year before WWI ended (and due to this war, btw), and it's outcome, that made a treaty of Brest-Litovsk void, was per se not a disaster for the Soviets (the real disaster was a Civil war). The last sentence ("After the collapse of Germany, British, French and Japanese troops intervened the Russian Civil War.") is equally odd: it is unclear for the reader what is the concrete linkage between intervention and MRP.
In my opinion, it is necessary to say in the first paragraph that both Germany and the USSR were European outsiders. Germany (and a German nation as whole), as a defeated country, was stripped of a part of its territory, humilated and military weakened. The Soviet Union, was devastated as a result of bloody Civil war. Soviet leadersip of international Communist movement, as well as its support of the idea of World revolution lead to the political isolation of the USSR. That, as well as participation of most world powers in Russian civil war on the Soviet opponent's side amplified Sovit mistrust and hostility towards "capitalist encirclement". --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:37, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

... while Polish officials refused to allow Soviet troop to be stationed on Polish territory.

The source (Shirer) doesn't say that. Like Watson, Shires tells about the "passage of Soviet troops through Poland if Germans attacked" (p.537). On the page 536 he wrote that the Poles "reacted with unbelievable stupidity". Changed accordingly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:59, 16 July 2009 (UTC)
If someone wants to extend this part to tell a story how the Poles opposed to passage or stationing of the Soviet troops, then the neutrality will require to add some scholars' opinions about "Polish stupidity" and about their role in the WWII outbreak. I have no desire to open this Pandora box here.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:52, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Only Soviet historians see the Soviet demands as reasonable. Here's a reliable ref explaining Polish motivations: [9]: "The Polish government and high command refused, saying they did not believe the USSR would fight Germany, and that once Soviet troops entered Poland - they were unlikely to leave.". --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 22:56, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

Note, I never used Soviet/Russian sources here. Shirer was not a Soviet historian, however, he called the Polish position a "stupidity". Watson is not a Soviet historian, however he said noting about invasion. The direct quote from Shirer demonstrates that he used the word "passage", and it is unclear for me why someone changed the wording.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:32, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Not only Soviet historians, but even the French foreign minister saw Soviet demands reasonabe. Michael Jabara Carley (a western, not pro-Soviet historian) described how French pressed the Poles to accept the Soviet terms(End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341)

"Mistrust was exacerbated by Polish policy during the Munich crisis, when the Polish army had seized Teschen. 'The Germans were not the only vultures upon the carcass', wrote Churchill. Others drew analogies with jackals and hyenas."

"Naggiar worried less about the Baltic states than about the question of Poland and Romania. He reminded Paris repeatedly in July that their cooperation was vital to the success of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance. Naggiar raised the issue of Red Army passage across Poland, as did the French military attache Palasse. If the Polish government did not agree to it there could be no effective eastern front. Poland and Romania could not hold out without Soviet support. And if the eastern front were broken, Germany and Italy could turn all their force against the West. This was not a question of Polish or Romanian security but of French security, quite apart from that of the USSR. The Soviet government understood this point only too well and would not compromise itself against Germany without 'precise and concrete military guarantees', as Coulondre had warned after Munich. New Anglo-French proposals for agreement risked provoking new Soviet counter proposals. If we do not conclude, the USSR could remain neutral or come to terms with Germany based on a partition of Poland and the Baltic states."

"Naggiar correctly identified the problem: neither the French nor British govern- ments were prepared to make the necessary commitments. Bonnet wanted a political, not a military agreement which would require Polish cooperation. Poland did not want to give it, minuted Naggiar, and we did not want to press for it. 'We want a gesture', scribbled Naggiar, 'the Russians want a concrete agreement involving the assent of Poland and Romania'. The Soviet leaders having been duped in the past, would accept nothing less than an ironclad military alliance. If the Anglo-French did not like Soviet proposals, said Molotov, he was prepared to consider a straight triple alliance guaranteeing the security of the contracting parties against direct aggression."

"On 15 August Bonnet summoned the Polish ambassador in Paris, Lukasziewicz, who said Beck would certainly reject out of hand a Soviet demand for passage. Bonnet sent instructions to Noel to see Beck, and the French military attache, General Musse, was ordered back to Warsaw. In the midst of a full-blown crisis, commented Naggiar, 'the military attache was on holiday in Biarritz'. It was worse than that; neither Noel nor Musse was prepared to apply the full rigour of their instructions. Noel feared to compromise his personal position in Warsaw. Musse was vulnerable to Polish influence and questioned Soviet good faith as much as did the Poles"

Once again, all these quotes are from Western and very reputable historical journals.
I fully understand that every country has their own myths, and every country has something it would like to forget. The story of the Poles and the outbreak of WWII is something the Poles would prefer not to remember. I also am not inclined to open this Pandora box. However, to do that, let's stop to represent the Poles solely as innocent victims.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:53, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, I can't stand this. It is actually quite contrary, we remember very well that Beck has refused admittance of Soviet troops into Poland, and IMHO it was the only reasonable decision, as only an idiot could trust Soviet intentions. What actually happened, i.e. how the Red Army behaved having Poland entered, that became clear after 17th September 1939. Of course, *France* wouldn't loose anything in this deal, as this wouldn't be French security endangered, not its goods looted, not its citizens murdered. Anyone who wanted Poland to admit Soviet troops into its borders, simply *had* to *guarantee* that they will leave having Germany defeated - or face refusal. Beck was not an idiot, he knew that Soviets were more interested in spreading "spontaneous" revolution and communism, than defeating Germany, and yet even if Germany had been defeated, who on earth could guarantee that Soviets would get back home? 83.7.13.185 (talk) 22:43, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

From one hand, you are right, it was a great danger of Soviet occupation of Poland. However, from other hand, we all know what Polish position had lead to: the failure of the triple talks resulted in the outbreak of WWII. The latter caused much greater losses of Polish and Jewish population than 50 years of Soviet occupation did.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:39, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

You are now casting our knowledge of then-future into past. First of all, the future wasn't known to Beck: he could reasonably hope that the war would be after all avoided without exposing Poland to such a risky treaty (one German provocation would most probably have triggered Soviet invasion), and another solution could be found. And it has been found: the alliance of Poland with France and UK against Germany *without* involvement of Soviets and admitting them into the country. Now, this _at_the_time_ looked like a perfect solution: Hitler either wouldn't attack, or, if he did, he could have been quickly defeated. Even after RMP, this solution was still attractive, as one could reasonably guess that Soviets would not have attacked, if France/UK moved their fat asses, as they had promised - and that guess would have been correct, as Stalin waited until 17 Sept. to be sure that the West wouldn't move (now, *this* was stupid, France decided to sacrifice the ally - and all its citizens, including all Jews, for that matter - but it turned over to be a disaster anyway; so who is to blame for stupidity now, eh?). Second: knowing what happened later, I am sure that even if Beck accepted the unacceptable (i.e. the Soviet "passage"), the result would have been exactly the same, i.e. Soviets would make a secret deal with Germany (even a non-secret deal, as we know now, wasn't a problem for them), and do what they did 17 Sept. Third: this is not a question of admittance of foreign troops per se, I am sure that Beck would agree on the passage, if it was French army to be admitted, as he could reasonably hope, that any damages done by them would be minor. With Soviets no such hope was possible, and the Polish state was to protect all of its citizens, and not only Jews (which of course could suffer minor damage from Soviets than they have sufferred from Germans - but none is better than minor, and, besides, that's casting future into past again). Fourth: ironically, the states that made pressure on Poland to admit Soviet troops, risked nothing, it was Poland that had to risk everything (short: existence, in both short and long terms) as a price for defeating Germany, whereas Germany didn't yet begin to do anything critically bad (like open war), and, at the other hand, anyone could reasonably guess that Soviet proposition is only a pretext to begin invasion of Poland (and the rest of Europe, of course). Fifth: I am sure that anyone being at Becks position that time would have dismissed such an idea (Soviet passage, that is) out of hand, including yourself and your very reputable historian you cite. Just see how they (Soviets, that is) behave now, do you think that it is reasonable to admit their army into anyone's borders? And at Stalin time they were much worse. Summary: the opinion, that the Becks decision was "Polish stupidity" is not only nationalistic and insulting, but much worse, it is completely mindless. I highly appreciate your tendency to use Western historic journals as secondary sources, but I'd like to point out, that being a "Western historian" does not automagically make anyone a fountain of pure wisdom, and that *even* (irony intended) Western sources should be at least roughly selected regarding their reliability and possible bias. As an example, I can mention an 18th encyclopedia, just about everything it contains is properly sourced, yet the it doesn't prevent the book from being a pile of silly crap - not because all sources contained crap, but because the author wasn't able to estimate what sources are reasonable and what contain pure fantasies. Well, just don't make the wikipedia another instance of such a phenomenon. 83.7.7.234 (talk) 14:29, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

This isn't the place for a detailed historian analysis of the various parties' intentions. The facts were rather straight forward and agreed to by all: the issue was over Soviet demands for their troops having the right to enter Poland if Germany invaded, and the UK/France attempted to pressure Poland to accept the Soviets' terms.Mosedschurte (talk) 03:03, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Correct.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:24, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Geography

...the treaty included a secret protocol dividing Eastern and Central Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence - Isn't Finland part of northern Europe? --Illythr (talk) 13:10, 26 August 2009 (UTC)

My understanding is that back in the 1930's Finland was considered to be one of the Baltic states. The notion that Finland is a Nordic state was a post-war public relations initiative of the Finnish government. --Martintg (talk) 03:55, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Finland is part of Northern Europe exactly like the Baltic states are, among which Finland is also listed in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The text itself is available in multiple sources including wikisource, and that is also conveniently liked into the infobox of this article. What the Secret Additional Protocol Article I says is that In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) etc. Also there is a difference between geographical and political meaning of "Northern". Please see Northern Europe vs. Nordic Countries FFI.--Termer (talk) 05:18, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

So, shouldn't that sentence be modified accordingly? --Illythr (talk) 10:53, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

I guess it would be more accurate if it said North-East and East-Central Europe or something similar by referring to geographical terms instead of political. Like the meaning of "Eastern Europe" in political sense since the end of the WWII refers to anything that was on the other side of the Iron curtain once, but Finland, even though geographically located in the North-East managed to stay out of "Eastern Europe" in political sense...--Termer (talk) 13:39, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Well, yeah, this is kinda the problem: the Baltic states and Finland are in Northern Europe, so, common sense would suggest "Eastern and Northern Europe" or "Eastern Europe and the Baltic states". However, the text of the protocol only mentions "Eastern Europe", and all the sources I read usually say "Eastern" or "Eastern and Central Europe". Meh. --Illythr (talk) 19:07, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Division of Europe on Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, etc., does not imply the Central Europe category (see map [10]). If we speak about Central Europe we mean not a strictly defined region, but "something in the middle of Europe". So we either can say "Central Europe" (this would be sufficient), or to say "Northern Europe, Eastern Europe" (more accurate, but, probably, redundant).--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:29, 27 August 2009 (UTC)

Please see what does Central Europe mean instead of offering opinions Paul! Thanks! Also, please stop referring to what other editors possible nationalities might be on wikipedia in your opinion like you did it again [11] after this comment [12] where I chose to ignore your ethnic remarks. FYI, such personal comments have been grounds for indefinite block in the past, and is definitely a violation of "don't comment on contributors but content". I'd appreciate your compliance with such matters. Thanks again.--Termer (talk) 03:15, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Dear Termer, the map [13] my "opinion" is based on is a United Nations geoscheme. You can easily see that there is no Central Europe on this scheme. By contrast, the Central Europe you refer to is not a strict geographic category, but somewhat elusive.

Re: "instead of offering opinions Paul" I don't think your habit to dub anything you don't like an opinion (regardless of how reliable the sources are) is a good way to conduct a discussion.

Re: "FYI, such personal comments have been grounds for indefinite block in the past". Incorrect. Based on your personal page I concluded that you don't try to conceal your national identity: obviously, you are the Estonian patriot. Had you try to conceal it, and had I found it by doing a special efforts, and had I throw some accusations in nationalistic edits based on my findings, you would have a ground to request to block me indefinitely. However, I did nothing of that. I just propose you to look at the history of the Baltic countries in more global context, and by no mean it can be considered an accusation in nationalism. Again, I want you to know my point of view on that account. I agree that the Baltic people suffered during WWII and after, their sufferings were considerable and, as a rule, undeserved. However, many European nations' sufferings were evenn greater, so the attempt to give a distorted picture of common European (or even world) history to overemphasize the Batlic sufferings (and everything associated with that) may be considered POV pushing. Note, even your compatriot Erikupoeg (who is, in my opinion, absolutely neutral and perfectly honest editor) was dubbed Estonian POV pusher on WWII talk page [14] (to what I opposed, btw).
Again, I respect your national feelings, but the balance between patriotism (the latter is not necesserily nationalism, btw) and a danger of national POV pushing must be observed.
With respect,
--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:16, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

PS. When I encountered the Baltic Wikipedians, it was a big shock for me to learn some facts about their countries' history. As a result, my vision of that part of the world history changed considerably, and now I support something I vehemently regected a year ago. But you Baltic people are not a carriers of ultimate truth, you sometimes are not right too. And, if you want to edit international Wikipedia, you have to be open to the (justified) opinions of others, especially if it is supported by reliable sources.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:01, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Umm, I think this discussion is best continued on someone's user talk page, if at all. --Illythr (talk) 10:08, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

I definitely prefer the second option.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:58, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Once again Paul Siebert please stop commenting on someone's presumed nationality on wikipedia talk pages. This is your last warning! Thanks!--Termer (talk) 02:51, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

Redundant para in background

Taking into account that pre-MRP German economic issues described in the end of the section, the para starting with the words: "Before World War I, Germany and Russia had a long trading relationship" is redundant and can be removed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:03, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

How could that possibly be redundant? Pre-WWI Russian-German trading issues were never addressed at all in any paragraph. Now were any of the other trading relationship statistics.Mosedschurte (talk) 07:02, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Do you really think that "Pre-WWI Russian-German trading issues" should be addressed in the article? What is the reason to discuss economical relations between two empires (that disappeared more than twenty years before the events we are talking about took place) in the article devoted to the political treaty? --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:35, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

In that form this sentence feels indeed pointless, although article definitely should make it clear that Germany had very critical economic reasons for making pact with Soviets due lack of raw materials.--Staberinde (talk) 17:36, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Such a sentence is already in the article: "For Germany, because an autarkic economic approach or an alliance with Britain were impossible, closer relations with the Soviet Union became necessary, if not just for economic reasons alone."--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:23, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Putin's statement

There has been some new facts available lately on the subject that is like a good conclusion to the long but mostly off track discussion above. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has condemned the Nazi-Soviet pact. According to Putin: "any form of agreement with the Nazi regime was "unacceptable from the moral point of view and had no chance of being realised", "It is possible to condemn - and with good reason - the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact concluded in August 1939," and, "Our duty is to remove the burden of distrust and prejudice left from the past in Polish-Russian relations," . On the the Munich agreement he argued though that it wrecked efforts to build an anti-Nazi alliance. It seems this needs to go into the article as an historical statement that made a difference I think.--Termer (talk) 05:45, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

"Only 6 percent of Russians in the Levada poll in July condemned the pact outright." [15] Peltimikko (talk) 14:02, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

Essentially, Putin is a defender of the Soviet Russian propaganda on Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. By the way, many Wikipedia users (probably Anglosaxons and Russians) have the same point of view. See for example, a lack of the most important political decisions - Stalin's speeches on March 10 and August 19, 1939, and a wide discussion on relatively unimportant Tripartite (Soviet-British-French) negotiations. Especially an ominous role of Stalin is hidden. See for example, a lack of the most important political decisions - Stalin's speeches on March 10 and August 19, 1939, and a wide discussion on relatively unimportant Tripartite (Soviet-British-French) negotiations. -- Mibelz (talk) 15:22, 2

September 2009 (UTC)

Let me remind you that Putin's words are the primary source. They reflect this politician's point of view on those time events, however, they shed no additional light on what happened in reality in August 1939. The only thing we can do is to quote his words. BTW, after looking at Russian WP I found some interesting section that is composed exclusively of opinions of various politicians on MRP. It contains quotes from Churchill, Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini etc. I think it is a good idea. If we make such a section here we can include there quotes from Putin, Baltic leaders etc.
Re:"By the way, many Wikipedia users (probably Anglosaxons and Russians) have the same point of view." This point of view is based on the reliable sources. Majority English sources available for me tell not much about "an ominous role of Stalin". By contrast, many sources state that the Soviets were in political isolation, their army was relatively weak, the economic modernisation was not finished, they lost a proxy war in Spain, and, as a result, their security was among major Soviet goals. As a result, the Soviet policy was more passive and opportunistic rather than active and aggressive. In addition, majority of British historiand are extremely critical of Chamberlain's policy during that time, and, according to them, it was him to be blamed in the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement. However, if you have really reliable sources that state something quite opposite, please, tell us what these sources are and what are they telling. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:49, 2 September 2009 (UTC) Re: "See for example, a lack of the most important political decisions - Stalin's speeches on March 10 and August 19, 1939, and a wide discussion on relatively unimportant Tripartite (Soviet-British-French) negotiations." The sources available for me (that are quite reliable according to WP:V criteria) tell almost nothing about the Stalin's speeches, whereas the triple talks are being discussed in details there. Your opinion about relative importance of the Stalin speeches and the triple talks should be supported by reliable sources.
Re: "By the way, many Wikipedia users (probably Anglosaxons and Russians) have the same point of view." WP is not a democracy. Not majority of user's opinions but majority of reliable sources matters. Again, please, show the sources your conclusion is based on.
And, finally, your reference to the alleged nationality of the editors is not acceptable. By writing "probably Anglosaxons and Russians" you are trying to make conclusion from the information some users may want not to disclose. Although I don't think it is a major violation of the policy, however, some people may request for your ban.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:00, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Well, please let me remind you that Putin's words are not coming from the primary source, lets say Putin's web page on Twitter but the story has been published by a secondary source. It only takes a click on the link above to see this. For the rest I have nothing much to add. The facts in the article speak for themselves exactly like Putin's comments...that should be after all the official position of Russia. --Termer (talk) 03:47, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure that Putin's statements should be considered the official position of Russia, since he is now the Prime Minister, not the President. I admit that I personally do not believe much of Putin's political power has been lost, but if we are going to call something the official position of Russia, it should be the words of the President, Medvedev. On Sunday August 30, 2009, Medvedev had an interview [16] on the Soviet role in WWII, saying that "anyone who lays equal blame on the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is telling a `cynical lie'" and that "nobody can question "`who started the war, who killed people and who saved millions of lives — who, in the final analysis, saved Europe.'" He doesn't come close to calling the Non-Aggression Pact "immoral", like Putin did--in fact, he defends it as a natural outcome from other countries' politics. Say nothing about Soviet actions in Poland during and after the invasion (e.g. Katyń massacre) and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

My point is that while Putin's message is big news, it shouldn't be considered the official position of Russia, when on the same day as his article was published in Gazeta Wyborcza, the Russian President comes out saying essentially the opposite. The messages coming out of Russia are (perhaps intentionally) mixed. -Krasnoludek (talk) 09:44, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

What issues are relevant for the background section?

The background section turned out to be problematic. The main question is, what issues are relevant for the section? I picked some views from different books, as no source did offered ultimate answer:

1. The pact was an agreement between two equal superpowers.
2. Stalin made a choice between Hitler and the Western Allies.
3. Stalin did not have to make a choise, Hitler did not affort two fronts.
4. Rise of the Russian nationalism in the 1930s. Soviet politics was a mix of the world revolution of communism and nationalism, which included acquiring the old Imperial Russian borders.
5. For Hitler and Stalin, a "neutrality" did not exist for small nations.
6. Realpolitik overrode smaller issues such as Hitler's concept of "Untermenschen" or the Spanish civil war.
7. Nonaggression pacts with small nations were just a piece of paper, as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact overrode every previous paper.

So, I suggest the background should include following headings: "Relations after the First World War", "Decace of the nonaggression pact" and "Realpolitik overrides differences between Hitler and Stalin". Every treaties or state visits do not have to mention anymore, as we have the separate timeline article. Peltimikko (talk) 19:54, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

• Main problem is this. The pact is called "non-aggression". But in fact, that was a pact about joint aggression: two sides agreed to attack Poland and other countries, as explained here. Unfortunately, that's a Russian source.Biophys (talk) 01:07, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Grani.ru are hardly too reliable source. By contrast, many western scholars believe the attack of Poland was not a joint aggression. At least, we know that (i) Hitler ordered to prepare for the attack of Poland before any agreement with Stalin was signed, and (ii) even after WWII started Hitler didn't know when the USSR plan to invade Eatsern Poland (if they plan to do that at all).--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:32, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

I took a look at this "background section". Reads like someone has posted an essay, and pretty messy one. "the Bolsheviks struggled for survival...", "Lenin had no option except recognize...", "Lenin and Trotsky were forced to enter..."...very dramatic indeed. In case there is a need for such a chapter, it needs to be rewritten indeed.--Termer (talk) 05:12, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Instead of placing a tag into the whole section why didn't you edit the para you are not satisfied with? BTW, your criticism of this para is quite justified.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:34, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Again, to avoid a mess in the main article I propose to refrain from making any changes in introduction until the consensus about it's structure is achieved. Remember, many people read the text you edit so frivolously.

Re: 1. "The pact was an agreement between two equal superpowers." Incorrect. Neither the USSR nor Nazi Germany were superpowers by that moment.

Re: 2. "Stalin made a choice between Hitler and the Western Allies." Incorrect. The Background section tells about the pre-August events, and during that time no choice had been made by Stalin.

Re: 3. "Stalin did not have to make a choise, Hitler did not affort two fronts." Didn't understand. Do you mean that Hitler would never dared to attack Poland without MRP? Not necesserily. Many sources state that even after signing MRP the Hitler's attack of Poland was suicidal, because Germany's western borders were extermely vulnerable for the French assault. This your conclusion seems to be derived from the Raak's works. Although this Californian professor is a rather reputable historian, his views do not represent a majority views on that account.

Re: 4. Incorrect. The rise of Russian nationalism took place later, after WWII. Before the war, Russian nationalism was considered a highly negative phenomenon by the Party.

Re: 5. Probably, however I would see what concretely do you propose to tell.

Re: 6. "Realpolitik overrode smaller issues such as Hitler's concept of "Untermenschen" or the Spanish civil war." Quite reverse. Both for Hitler and Stalin, the pact was just a tactical retreat. By no mean the Hitler's concept of "Untermenschen" can be considered a smaller issue.

Re: 7. Irrelevant.

In summary, the proposed plan is not acceptable for several reasons. Firstly, the Background section has to describe a situation before the main events the article tells about took place. In actuality, the proposed background section looks more like a summary of the article. Secondly, the section makes unneeded stress on the USSR's policy, whereas, obviously, it was Germany that played the most active role in MRP. Thirdly, the proposed section ignores the fact that the USSR and Germany were natural enemies, and nobody believed any pact was possible between them. In my opinion, it is a critical omission. Fourthly, no connection is shown in the proposed summary between the failure of the collective security system in Europe and MRP. Fifthly, the policy of other major players, Brithain, France and Poland, is left beyond the scope.
My conclusion is that the proposed plan is premature and that it does not reflect what majority reliable sources tell on that account.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:29, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Re:Re 1: Odd denial. Nazi Germany had just conquered Austria and Czechoslovakia, and you argue that Germany was not superpower? Or only months after the pact the Soviets occupied large parts of the Eastern Europe.

Re:Re 2&3: Than who made a choice? Why Stalin did not stayed neutral? Or, do we use "buffer states" theory? Maybe "buy time" theory? Further available "Western Allies forced Stalin to ally with Hitler" ("they did it, not we") theory? Before Moscow Archieves opened 1990s, these were widely used casually without any history science background.

Re:Re 4: Example from Donald Rayfield: "Stalin and his hangmen" (2004,2005) p. 253-254

From 1933 Stalin encouraged Russian chauvinism, implying that Russians were politically and culturally superior - elder brothers to the other peoples of the USSR and the Slavs, just as the German were a superior race among the Aryans.

Re:Re 6: Tactical retreat meant assault? Again "buffer states" theory? "War is Peace"?

Re:Re 5&7: Correct! Opinions and/or actions of smaller European countries were irrelevant for these two superpowers.

I challenge you to present your sources. Name a book, paper or dissertation, after the late 1990s published (in English and somehow available), that support theories of "Germany played the most active role in MRP", "there is no connection of the failure of the collective security system in Europe and MRP", "the pact was just a tactical retreat" and "neither the USSR nor Nazi Germany were superpowers by that moment". Peltimikko (talk) 20:08, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Re "Odd denial" It is just your speculations. I recall one article I read mentions that Germany started WWII to obtain a status of the world superpower, therefore it had no such a status before the war. Anyway, I am unaware of reliable sources that call pre-war USSR and Germany superpowers. If you have some, please, present the quotes to discuss the issue concretely.

Re: "Than who made a choice?" What are you saying is correct, however, it belongs to the background section only if the talk section starts form the mid-August events. Try to write something more concrete, otherwise it is a little bit hard to understand what do you mean.

Re: Rayfield. Other sources state a directly reverse, namely, that the word "Soviet" replaced the word "Russian", and the superiority of the "Soviets" is not racial, but it was a superiority of the political system. See, for instance, Geoffrey Hosking "THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND RUSSIAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS*", PAST AND PRESENT, No 175, p. 162-187:

"During the 1920s and for much of the 1930s most educated Russians accepted this outlook, believing that the universalist and messianic goals of the Soviet state justified the downplaying, even suppression, of Russian identity. This was the pure internationalist phase of Soviet consciousness."

Re: "Tactical retreat meant assault" Of course, not. Under "tactical retreat" I meant the Hitler's decision to stop for a while his anti-Soviet rhetoric and to sign a pact with Stalin. Similarly, for Stalin signing a pact with openly anti-Communist Nazis was the tactical retreat too.

Re: "Opinions and/or actions of smaller European countries were irrelevant for these two superpowers." No irony. What I mean was that this text seems not to belong to the background section.

In summary, let me point out one more time that if you present a real text instead of brief claims it would be probably easier to discuss it. Maybe, the major reason of our dispute is just poor understanding of each other's points.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:37, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Re: "I challenge you to present your sources." As a rule, you don't present your sources. However, I am ready to present any source on demand. However, since it is rather laborious task, could you please tell me what concrete facts seem doubtful to you, and what concrete my statements are needed to be supported? BTW, I don't think late 1990s is an adequate threshold, because most documents became available in late 1980s, and the articles written based on them started to appear almost immediately after that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:43, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Re: "Name a book, paper or dissertation, after the late 1990s published (in English and somehow available), that support theories of "Germany played the most active role in MRP", "there is no connection of the failure of the collective security system in Europe and MRP", "the pact was just a tactical retreat" and "neither the USSR nor Nazi Germany were superpowers by that moment"." Frankly, your request is quite reasonable and correct, much more reasonable than something I used to face on WP talk pages. It is a pleasure for me to answer these concret questions.

1. "after the late 1990s " As I already explained, the threshold you have chosen seems redundantly stringent. "Early 1990s" would be more correct.

2. "Germany played the most active role in MRP" see, e.g., Ian Kershaw. (Hitler, 1936-45: nemesis, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, ISBN 0393322521, 9780393322521, p. 205):

"...A flurry diplomatic activity - Rubbentrop pressing with maximal urgency for the earliest possible agreement, Molotov cannily prevaricating until it was evident that Soviet interests in the Anglo-French mission was dead..."

Another source is a Michael Jabara Carley's review on the Pon's book (the latter worked extensivelly with de-classified Soviet archives, so he fits your criterion). In his review Carley reiterates the Pon's point (which he supports completely) that:

"If the Soviet government was isolated during the inter-war years, it was not by choice except perhaps in making a virtue out of necessity. Whether it was peaceful coexistence in the 1920s or collective security in the 1930s, the Soviet government wanted correct political and economic relations in the West and later a defensive alliance against Nazi Germany. The high point—more apparent than real—of Soviet foreign policy during the 1930s was the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935." (see. Review: Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936-1941: A Review Article Author(s): Michael Jabara Carley Reviewed work(s): "Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941" by Silvio Pons, and "Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941" by Albert L. Weeks Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7 (Nov., 2004), pp. 1081-1093). Other sources are the articles and books of Derek Watson, Geoffrey Roberts, Gabriel Gorodetsky, etc.

3. Re: "there is no connection of the failure of the collective security system in Europe and MRP" Frankly, I didn't understand your question. Maybe you meant "there was a direct connection" (that was my point)? If yes, then all sources quoted above, fully support this statement, for instance Geoffrey Roberts, another scholar that worked exstensivelly with Soviet archives (and even was criticized for that by Haslam), wrote:

"My own interpretation of the Soviet documents is well known: that Moscow neither responded to nor made any overtures to the Germans until the end of July 1939 at the earliest. The reason for this was that until summer 1939 Moscow was intent on a triple alliance with Britain and France. I have also described Soviet foreign policy in 1939 as passive, reactive, ad hoc, incompetent even." (Review: On Soviet-German Relations: The Debate continues. A Review Article. Author(s): Geoffrey Roberts. Reviewed work(s): Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941 by Aleksandr M. Nekrich Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8 (Dec., 1998), pp. 1471-1475)

4. Re: "the pact was just a tactical retreat".WEINBERG, GL (THE NAZI-SOVIET PACTS: A HALF-CENTURY LATER Source: FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume: 68 Issue: 4 Pages: 175-189, 1989) wrote:

"Since Hitler believed that the attack on the west was the difficult but necessary prelude for the subsequent simple and fast attack on the Soviet Union, concessions could easily be made to Moscow.... For a short time, Berlin was willing to sign an agreement with Moscow.

On the Soviet side, a different ideology by a different route led to the same result."

5. Re: "neither the USSR nor Nazi Germany were superpowers by that moment" David Reynolds ("The Origins of the Two 'World Wars': Historical Discourse and International Politics" Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 1, Redesigning the Past (Jan., 2003), pp. 29-44) writes:

"Wilson saw the League of Nations as nothing less than an instrument of world peace. This implied that the preceding conflict was nothing less than a world war. In America as in Germany, therefore, the terminology grew out of the war aims. For the Kaiserreich this was a world war because the root issue was world power; for Wilsonians the conflict was defined as a world war because the goal was world peace. Germany and the USA were both second- rank players seeking international influence, albeit in very different forms. In both cases ideology, as much as geography, shaped their vocabulary. The story would be similar a quarter-century later.

Hitler, a war veteran, shared the German propensity to describe 1914-18 as a world war. In Mein Kampf, published in two volumes in 1925-6, the fifth chapter of volume one is entitled 'Der Weltkrieg'. In the foreign policy chap- ters at the end of volume two, Hitler asserted that 'Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany'."

In other words, Germany started WWI and WWII to become a world power, that means that it was not a world power by the moment WWI or WWII started. With regards to the USSR, both Britain and France simply didn't trust in Soviet military capabilities (ref 43 in the article). That means that the USSR was not a world power by that moment.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:46, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

4. "Russian nationalism before WWII" is now verified! The full story is now in the article Korenizatsiya. Stalin began to rehabilate the Great Russian and to glorify many of the heroes of Russian history from 1937. The Soviet/Russian patriotism was born again to fight for the socialist fatherland. Now, six more issues to go. I'll be back. Peltimikko (talk) 17:19, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Dear Peltimikko, I never stated that Stalin didn't promote Russian nationalism. You are right, in 1937, when he essentally exterminated all classical Communists, Stalin began rehabilitation of Russian nationalism, however, he did that gradually, avoiding sharp changes in official ideology. Therefore, it is not clear for me what was the connection between this newly emerging tendency, that had not affected official propaganda by that moment, with MRP? And why that is relevant to the Background?--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:15, 8 September 2009 (UTC)