Talk:Falaise pocket/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

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This was an anonymous contribution, obviously not by a native speaker. I've tried to edit as well as I could, also left some notes in comment marks to hopefully help someone who knows the topic (which I don't) see what still needs to be done. -- Jmabel 01:49, 19 May 2004 (UTC)

I believe this is also the action more commonly known as the 'Falaise pocket'. A little more info is needed to integrate into the story of the second world war. DJ Clayworth 15:24, 26 May 2004 (UTC)

Gulf War Highway of Death (1991)??

Anybody has got an idea why this link is included in See also section? --Edcolins 13:50, Jun 6, 2004 (UTC)

I don't necessarily think it should be there. The historical parallel might be reasonable, but if so, someone should overtly make the case with appropriate citations, rather than just throw in a "see also." -- Jmabel 05:51, Jun 8, 2004 (UTC)

I'm taking it out, it looks very odd. I'm not sure I see the point of the "See Also" section, surely that's what the categories are for? The comparison to Dunkirk looks a little strained as well. Forgot to sign this Leithp 11:08, 1 May 2005 (UTC)

I think I'll just take out the "see also" section, as I don't see that it serves any purpose. Leithp 07:48, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC)

The Poles had lost 325 dead, with 1,002 wounded and 114 missing when they were reinforced by the 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment in the early morning of August 21. The Germans lost around 2,000 dead, with 5,000 taken prisoner, and 359 vehicles destroyed. Those is alleate propaganda. Francesco

Also montgomery due to much heavier fighting than the americans was notably more cautious because of this.

The aftermath

I can't make heads or tails of the last phrase in this section

Although it must be noted Montgomery's approach had significantly more troops than those of Patton and Bradley.

Any clue what it's trying to say? It looks to be a defense of Monty's cautiousness but I don't know what, really, that defense is. — Lomn | Talk / RfC 21:37, 20 September 2005 (UTC) This only makes sense to me if considered to be a comment on the broader situation: the British and Canadians were still attacking through the enemy, whilst US soldiers were, by then, moving through more open ground. Not sure of the relevance of this and in any case, Monty was still overall field commander, with Dempsey and Bradley reporting to him at this stage, wasn't he?

categ

would it be appropriate to categorise this under world war ii or would that have been subsumed under operation overlord already? Chensiyuan 16:27, 2 December 2006 (UTC)

Allied victory?

Objective of the operation - to encircle and destroy German armies - was not fully reached. That's hardly definition of victory. Pavel Vozenilek 14:17, 15 December 2006 (UTC)

I concur, if up to "100,000 German troops succeeded in escaping the allies due to the delay in closing the gap" that´s rather a huge screw-up that a lost opportunity and sure as hell no victory. I guess I change it to limited allied victory.Markus Becker02 17:14, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

That's not a serious point of view. The campaign in Normandy was a major disaster for the german army. That a few got away at Falaise is hardly cause to call it "no victory". DMorpheus 18:36, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

First, we are not talking about the whole campaign, just about the pocket. Second, saying 100,000 troops are "a few" is not serious. Especially when the remnants of two SS-Division that would late make THE key contribution in the defeat of Operation Marker-Garden were among the escapees. They had the Germans by the balls and the blew it. Markus Becker02 21:07, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

British forces were succesfully evacuated from Dunkirk, but german forces are considered to escape always, This sound Biased. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.62.146.244 (talk) 21:56, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

An excerpt from Max Hasting's Overlord helps construe this idea that eventhough the Allies were able to encircle 5th Panzer Army and Panzer Group Eberbach, which in itself is proof of victory, they were not, however, able to prevent the most determined Germans from fleeing: "...the pocket at Falaise was being closed too late to prevent the escape of a formidable cadre of the German army, including some of its most skilled and dedicated officers who lived to lead men through many more battles. It was only the most determined who still possessed the will to try the gap." While one can see this as detrimental towards future Allied aims, it cannot be rationally considered a defeat. More happened prior to and during the assault to close the gap that definantly are of more importance to history than those who escaped the gap: Operation GOODWOOD, Operation COBRA, Operation TOTALIZE, and Operation TRACTABLE. These all should be analyzed in order to truely understand the events of the gap.

Dr. Owenby (talk) 21:22, 28 April 2008 (UTC) Dr. Phillip Owenby, Professor of History (UTK)

The wieght of victory is not measured in how many escaped, one should look at the ammount of material that the Germany Army was unable to pull out of Normandy, how they were unable to make a decent stand in France following this battle - the original allied plan called for the desivie battle to be fought to the east of the Seine iirc. The German army essentially collsaped and within a short time the allied forces had reached the frontier. It was only at this point when they were once again capable of succesful defensive operations agaisnt the allied forces. It can hardly be called anything other then a victory.--86.4.87.16 (talk) 22:22, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

Infobox

I wasn't sure if N/A under the Strength1 and French and American Casualties meant that there weren't any, or that the number is unknown. Since I've seen photos of American dead at Falaise, I'm sure that the N/A represents that the # of casualties isn't known. I've simply replaced that with unkown, since it makes a bit more sense that way. Climie.ca 18:48, 17 April 2007 (UTC) Cam

Added Citations

I tried adding a few citations to this article, but I haven't figured out how to attribute mulitpul things to one source. Thus the Reference area became jumbled because several things are cited with the same book. If I figure this out I will fix it later, but if anyone else can I'd appreciate it. --KobaVanDerLubbe 22:56, 30 August 2007 (UTC)

Watch out, someone is keen on posting fantasy German losses

2x total Normandy KIAs in Falaise only, oh lawd. --HanzoHattori 14:51, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Thanks for keeping wacth on this. But also keep looking at the Aftermath section. --HanzoHattori 18:19, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

Limited Victory

I for one do not believe that Falaise Pocket is a limited victory. It was a decisive victory for the Allies and a disaster for the Wehrmacht; while the allied victory was not 'complete' there is no doubt that the Wehrmacht lost its ablest units and had nothing to show away from it. Losing one third of its personel and all heavy equipment and weapons should not be viewed as anything other than unmitigated disaster. Chin, Cheng-chuan —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.239.202.30 (talk) 21:00, 8 October 2007 (UTC)

I agree. I've done some research in the last few days, and I can tell you that all sources say that Falaiase was a crushing defeat for the Germans, and the worst since Stalingrad, as well as a decisive victory for the allies. Ok, Market Garden was a complete balls up, but the Falaise Gap is most certainly an allied victory, and a disaster for the Wehrmach. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.154.110.177 (talk) 23:20, 7 November 2007 (UTC)

image removed

here is the image i removed from the info box and the caption in case its of use further within the article:

|image= |caption=U.S. soldiers celebrate with a captured German flag in front of a destroyed Panther tank.
The group of infantrymen were left behind to "mop-up" in Chambois, last German stronghold in the Falaise Gap area.

Contradictions about movement of the army boundary on August 15th

In the "Battle/South" section it says:

"they were ordered to halt by Bradley since he needed Montgomery's permission to cross army boundary lines (a decision supported by Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower) and for fear of running into the Canadians to the north—the rapid changes in troop locations were causing confusion in the Allied communication lines. The halt in the northward advance is thought to have enabled several thousand German troops to escape. Montgomery modified the northern boundary on August 15 after Bradley had waited for a crucial 24 hrs..."

This implies that it was procrastination by Montgomery which delayed Bradley's advance northwards. In the "Aftermath" section, however, it says:

"The U.S. forces pushing northward were halted by an inter-Army boundary line. Bradley did not request that the boundary be moved (not an uncommon procedure) nor did Montgomery suggest it."

These are clearly contradictory. I do not profess to be an expert about the events, but it would seem that some editing is needed here to reconcile these statements.

Incidentally, "Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower" should be "commander Dwight D. Eisenhower" or possibly "Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower": "commander" is the generic noun for his position, not either his rank or his official title.

Incidentally also, the implication that Bradley had to wait whilst Montgomery dithered reminds me of similar assertions made regarding how long it took to take Caen. The clearly-stated aim of the operations around Caen was to draw off the German forces to allow Bradley to break out in the West, not to capture Caen as quickly as possible, and the campaign achieved this objective successfully. I'm wondering if someone has modified the Battle/South section to indulge in some historically-dubious "we Americans woulda had the whole thing licked if it weren't for the plodding British" inanity? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 144.32.35.99 (talk) 12:42, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

In Bradley's memoirs he takes full responsibility for not requesting a boundary adjustment. Aside from that, inter-unit boundaries, even at the Army level, were routinely violated when the situation called for it, with permission granted afterwards.

I suggest the clearly-stated aim of operations around Caen were indeed intended to take the city itself on D-Day, and the nearby flat, open land to the east of Caen was needed for allied airfields and staging areas. The failure to do so constrained allied operations throughout the Normandy campaign. This is not just an American myth of some kind. Tedder had quite a lot to say about it too.

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 13:23, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

I suspect that Tedder's demands for action around Caen 'for airfields' was treated as a querulous bleat by Monty once the human cost of a swift capture of ground south of Caen became known. I suspect that Tedder was playing politics and got outmanoeuvred by Monty, something which would have stung considering Monty's somewhat undiplomatic personality. I think that Bradly never spoke truer than when he talked about preferring a hard shoulder to a broken neck at Falaise and that all three commanders were content for the Germans to run the gauntlet of Allied firepower given that they were also preparing another one at the Seine. Keith-264 (talk) 13:59, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

Tedder's "demands" were part of the original Overlord plan. He was also deputy supreme commander. And yes, he had it in for Montgomery. It could be argued, and has been, that the human cost was at least partially the fault of Montgomery's decisions and the poor leadership of many of the units in 2nd Army (to be fair, Montgomery sought the removal of some of the weak ones before D-day, but not all). Surely when the deputy supreme commander demands that the mission be accomplished, that is no mere 'bleat'.

Bradley's 'hard shoulder' remark has been completely discredited by his immediate orders to move westward before the pocket was closed, *weaking* the supposed hard shoulder position he said he was seeking. DMorpheus (talk) 15:06, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

Tedder began to bleat about failure soon after D-Day (14th June), placing himself (as the most senior British commander who was also a 'Monty sceptic', 23rd July) so as to be elsewhere when the recriminations began. A few days later his defeatism blew up in his face. Would someone without Monty's contempt for detractors of whatever rank have wthstood self-serving pressure from the likes of Tedder? Fortunately Monty also had the example of the earlier Desert Generals to reflect on when it came to being prodded by people who didn't have his responsibilities.

It's good insurance to express scepticism about (some) close subordinates so as to have the fact that some were wished on him recorded beforehand. The stellenbosching of XXX Corps and 7th Armd Div officers looks like a sacrifice Monty was willing to make, rather like Haig dumping Gough in 1918. I don't know of any sources which say that 7th Armd changed much after the long knives were wielded.

'Move westward'? Towards Mortain?? Do you mean stopping XV Corps south of Argentan then sending the remainder of XV; XX and XII towards the Seine? If the Germans had pushed XV Corps back south from the Argentan area they'd have been putting their heads in another noose.Keith-264 (talk) 17:09, 21 November 2008 (UTC)