Talk:Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Body doubles

Putin has several body doubles [1]. One can find many sources with various claims and counterclaims about it, which defines this subject as a controversy, not disinformation. My very best wishes (talk) 23:16, 11 January 2024 (UTC)

The text I removed might be used on other page(s), not sure where exactly:

There were numerous speculations that Russian president Vladimir Putin's has several body doubles.

In March 2023, Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to Ukraine's interior minister, and Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's GUR press service, claimed that there were attempts to find evidence of Russian presidential doubles. They published three photographs of Putin's chin and questioned whether they showed the same person. They also alleged that Putin didn't visit Mariupol and sent a double there, citing a different chin in the photos as evidence. However, fact-checking organizations such as Reuters, Snopes, and Italian openFactChecking found that the first image offered for comparison was actually published in 2020, not 2023. They also noted that the second photo was taken in Mariupol, not Sevastopol. As a result, Snopes concluded that the claims were false.

In October 2023, Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov has said that Putin used three body doubles who had plastic surgery to look like him. He noted: "We know specifically about three people that keep appearing, but how many there are, we don't know". He also said: "Each person's ear picture is unique. It cannot be repeated".

No. Most reliable sources claim that this is a conspiracy theory. Such nonsense is spread either by the Ukrainian media and officials, or by British tabloids, which are considered as not reliable sources. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 12:13, 12 January 2024 (UTC)

The allegation or conspiracy theory predates the war and is not unique to its context, e.g. [2]. It does not belong to this article. -- Mindaur (talk) 12:36, 12 January 2024 (UTC)

I'm aware, I edited a whole article about it on the Russian Wikipedia. Initially, it appeared in the Russian space as meme and was promoted by a Russian opposition journalist, but subsequently, from 2022, it was picked up by the Ukrainian side and began to be actively used by Ukrainian officials who deliberately pushed all sorts of nonsense like "strange" chin in the photos which Snopes exposed. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 12:44, 12 January 2024 (UTC)

Yes, indeed. It is not about the war and definitely predates the war. My very best wishes (talk) 15:32, 12 January 2024 (UTC)

Nope, the theory was actively popularized already DURING the war. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 19:23, 12 January 2024 (UTC)

People like him having body doubles is nothing unusual ("Stalin had at least a couple; Panamanian strongman Manual Noriega apparently had no fewer than four. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un was once photographed chatting with two of his identically-dressed doubles." [3]). A person who recently came to the city of Derbent did look and behave very differently from Putin [4]. One can consider this a "speculation", something unproven, even rumors (which may or may not be true), but definitely not an outright disinformation. What he died was indeed apparently a disinformation, but it came from Russia. The story about the doubles is notable [5] and perhaps deserves a separate page, just as on ruwiki. My very best wishes (talk) 22:39, 12 January 2024 (UTC)

"A person who recently came to the city of Derbent did look and behave very differently from Putin" - This statement is marginal and most likely false, because it is not reliably substantiated in any way, but is only based on guesses and thoughts. But still, I'm not talking about how old this theory is, but about who is using it now during the war (basically it's Ukrainian side). False claims about Putin's death firstly was forced by Western media. And only recently, the Russian conspiracy Telegram channel "General SVR" began to actively force it; its words, by the way, were picked up by some dubious Western tabloids. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 09:23, 13 January 2024 (UTC)

You are conflating three unrelated claims:

Claim that Putin is dead (this is WP:FRINGE, it comes from Valery Solovei)

Claim that he is sick (we do not really know, but there are reliably published claims and counterclaims)

Claim that he has body doubles (we do not really know, but there are reliably published claims and counterclaims)

Does any of these claims directly related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and do they qualify as an outright disinformation? Maybe only #1. My very best wishes (talk) 21:15, 13 January 2024 (UTC)

No, it's all comprehensively interconnected, and it's documented in reliable sources. It's significant that in the case of his alleged double bodies and the disease, you say that "everything is not so clear" (a reference to a popular meme in Russia and Ukraine that tells that "all sides lie [equally]"), referring to the allegedly "reliably" published statements of some pseudo-experts who invent some kind of justification for promoting conspiracy theories. The problem is that such excuses are not properly exposed by other media. But the fact remains that reliable evidence has not yet been found.

Moreover, you did not mention the previously mentioned Ukrainian media and officials who deliberately promoted conspiracy claims about Putin's double bodies. Their goals are unknown, but I suppose they wanted to make fun of him in some black way. It is strange why, even in a situation where they are wrong, some editors try to silence it in some way. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 11:23, 16 January 2024 (UTC)

P. S. It's done. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 17:47, 17 January 2024 (UTC)

I see. Of course there are body doubles, but Valeri Solovei has transformed this story to a conspiracy theory [6], obviously on purpose. My very best wishes (talk) 15:58, 19 January 2024 (UTC)

United News telethon — should it be included or excluded?

Should this section be included in the article? It reads more like patriotic news, and less like a disinformation campaign with alernate reality events.--3E1I5S8B9RF7 (talk) 16:17, 8 February 2024 (UTC)

Depends on what the sources are and what they say. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:20, 8 February 2024 (UTC)

Feel free to read them. I already expressed my opinion that it doesn't refer to disinformation, but rather patriotic news.--3E1I5S8B9RF7 (talk) 15:10, 9 February 2024 (UTC)

One needs a consensus to include. Sources clearly describe this as propaganda (biased information), not disinformation (intentionally false information). Hence, this content does not belong to this page. Some other pages - yes, maybe. My very best wishes (talk) 14:22, 28 February 2024 (UTC)

Both sides moment

@Manyareasexpert, no reason for deletion. Reliable sources, such as NYT, Deutsche Welle, NBC, VoA listed here. There is a consensus among them that propaganda and disinformation comes obviously from both/all sides. But this doesn't mean that it's equally, this is what it says that most of the news is devoted to the Russian side, and two large paragraphs have been written about it. So I don't see a reason to cancel my edit. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 12:33, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

The fact that disinformation comes from both sides doesn't mean the effort is equal or has the same degree of systematic effort at the state level. There is a significant difference between the Russian ambassador to the United Nations spreading blatant, widely refuted, lies and some provincial Ukrainian politician or official making dubious or deliberately misleading claims. That should be reflected per WP:DUE. It also doesn't mean that every single case of disinformation should be listed here, as per WP:INDISCRIMINATE. If we are going to include all delusions made by such figures like Dmitry Medvedev and other RU officials, then this article would be never ending. It should meet the WP:N criteria. -- Mindaur (talk) 12:55, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

disinformation comes from both sides doesn't mean the effort is equal or has the same degree of systematic effort at the state level - That's exactly what I wrote about in the original message. I don't deny that Russia is much more covered in this regard. Earlier I also added that "Much of the news about military propaganda during Russia's invasion of Ukraine focused on Russian disinformation." But I don't understand why "both sides" should be rejected. It doesn't equalize the sides, since the second and third paragraphs describe in detail Russian actions, much more than Ukraine. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 13:03, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

Speaking about the Ukrainian side, there was some military disinformation related to their first and possibly the latest offensives. The rest of it is presenting the events in a more favorable light than they really are; the "ghost of Kyiv" was one of them. Some sources define some of this as propaganda (biased information) rather than disinformation (providing an intentionally false information). the situation is very different on the Russian side, where MoD provides entirely invented numbers, for example. Hence, "the both sides" is incorrect summary, and I agree with removal. Also, remember that inclusion any new materials/changes require WP:CONSENSUS. There is no one. My very best wishes (talk) 15:38, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

It's also worth noting that military deception is a distinct form of disinformation. Allies also used deception, e.g. see Operation Fortitude. Ultimately, any major military campaign generally involves deception. -- Mindaur (talk) 16:09, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

No, Ukraine is spreading disinformation and propaganda to a much greater extent than you think. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine does not "too", but "even as", provides fake casualites.

Policy of the Ukrainian government has been characterized by researchers as a “propaganda campaign”[358] and a “misinformation campaign". The New York Times notes that “Few military analysts, on the other hand, believe the Ukrainian military’s optimistic daily account of Russian casualties running into the hundreds that is nonetheless reported widely in Ukrainian media.”

A content analysis of the 15 most popular Ukrainian websites made by Ukrainian scientists showed that none of the national media reported either statistics or individual cases of mass deaths of Ukrainian military personnel in battle; instead, regional media, without observing state censorship, report the death of specific participants, indicating in most cases their personal information. Ukrainian scientists note that the state has to report losses using the media so as not to cause mass panic, depression or other negative psychological consequences. Thus, government authorities or their representatives use indirect or inaccurate reports of military losses, which require additional clarification. Ukraine has repeatedly cited figures that are “overtly speculative in nature”. At the same time, the losses of the Russian side are regularly reported in reports and communiqués with exact figures. In July 2022, representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense explained the hushing up of losses by the need to disorient the Russians.

The "Ghost of Kyiv", "murdered" "Guards of Snake Island", Russian "orcs"-"rashists" everywhere stealing toilets, glorification of the Patron and the creation of the cult of "bayraktarism", the excitement from the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Truha and UNIAN (the last is one of the major Ukrainian news agencies) are Ukrainian dubious Telegram channel, that doesn't comply with journalistic standards and incites interethnic hatred and enmity. On YouTube, many Ukrainian news publishers release clickable headlines in the "blogger" style, predicting the collapse of Russia. Some Ukrainian sources also produce fakes about Russian mobilization (for example, fake orders), which are covered in this article. They say on TV about Putin's double bodies and that Putin is very ill. They write "Russia" and "Putin" with a small letter. And, of course, United News (telethon).

Tbh, tired of watching cleaning stuff about Ukrainian side, I mean, some editors trying to clean up the material of the Ukrainian side only because "this is propaganda, not disinformation, and this too". Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 16:23, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

@Roman Kubanskiy: You sound surprised that Ukraine, its society and media do not have the neutral (let alone positive) view of Russia -- a country which started an unprovoked war against them, in an attempt to conquer a sovereign state, committed war crimes and atrocities, and has been doing so for the last two years. Well.. what did you expect?

As for the article: I don't quite see a coherent argument from you. Your concern (in the context of disinformation) about the "glorification of the Patron [the dog]" is particularly interesting and rather unusual one. Care to elaborate? :)

-- Mindaur (talk) 23:20, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

Good points. For example, dog Patron does exist. Detection dogs are great. And yes, Russian soldiers steal a lot of hardware. The guys from Tuva are very poor. It is no secret that Ukrainians hate Russians right now and call them this (or at least that is what I heard on YouTube records of actual fighting). None of that is disinformation. My very best wishes (talk) 23:52, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

I understand your solidarity with Ukraine, but it doesn't mean that it is necessary to suppress objective criticism of it and, thus, whitewash it.

I will allow myself to quote a participant from the Russian Wikipedia Грустный кофеин ("Sad Caffeine"), who has discussed Patron's topic. As for the Patron, in Ukrainian society he had a big splash of attention at the highest state level, but then he became a meme and his image took on a life of its own. Famous songs have appeared about him. According to this: "On the rise of patriotism, mass culture began to exploit the same images that became symbols of a new stage of the war - for example, the Turkish drone "Bayraktar" or the Patron mine-sweeping dog. Havryshenko says that these images have become banal due to excessive and often unjustified repetition. It is characteristic that this banality turns into kitsch." Thus, the dog Patron became a character of the specific pop culture of Ukraine during the Great War, which its critics call "bayraktarshchyna".

The Ukrainian authorities even wanted to limit it: "According to my observations, this kind of "bairaktarshchina" is usually played by small enterprises that deal with marketing communication independently. They use these symbols mindlessly. Someone does it to increase sales, someone to emphasize their own patriotism, and in the first and second cases, it is moral looting, if these words are not supported by actions. At the same time, "Almost a quarter of those surveyed (23%) noted that they are annoyed by the use of national symbols, disregard of military realities or the inappropriateness of advertising, speculation or PR on the topic of war. Respondents name the pizza "Bayraktar" or "Glory to Ukraine". At the same time, the majority (57%) have a positive attitude to military images, such as Patron the dog, "Russian ship" or "Bayraktar". Almost three-quarters (72%) believe that the use of a patriotic theme is appropriate in times of war. 71% noted that they have a positive attitude to humor in brand advertising, especially memes on military and non-military topics, Russian military casualties and "bavovna".

And in this article you can find the following: "In our society, the Patron dog, Javelins, Bayraktars were cultivated, with which clothes, candies, jewelry are made, Bayraktar news shows, songs, etc. are created. And this, unfortunately, has a negative impact more than a positive one. As a result of this, the stereotyping of war occurs, it gives rise to the well-known "bairaktarshchyna" and belittles the merits of the military. Viktor Rozovyi, a soldier of the 3rd OShBr, made a sharp statement about Patron the Dog in September: "My dream is for Patron the dog to die and with him the entire Bayraktar region." The military officer is outraged that a service dog has been made a national hero, although he is no different from all other service dogs. What's more, Patron the dog received an award from President Volodymyr Zelensky - the medal "For devoted service". But for some reason it is not indicated anywhere that this is the merit of the State Emergency Service and the people who work there. Rozovoy's brother in the same video says that Patron has a much higher reward for his service than he, a man who is always on the front lines. At most, the award was sent to him by mail, while Patron was awarded by the President himself. In this way, injustice can be traced in the truly heroic deeds and recognition of the military: the sergeant of the 3rd OShBr was awarded such a medal as Patron the dog, only when he went against the tank and single-handedly destroyed it, taking the Russians prisoner." Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 12:22, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

@Roman Kubanskiy: You are sharing some personal as well as public sources with some random discussions. This may as well be about Larry (cat), Maru (cat) or [insert a random celebrity here]. In your message I almost feel a resentment about some dog's popularity, which is quite amusing. However, I still don't see a coherent argument.

What's your point? -- Mindaur (talk) 16:04, 16 March 2024 (UTC)

No resentment, just the facts. If Ukrainian sources describe it in this way, are they also "resentment" by him? I'm familiar with the Ukrainian internal society, since I'm neighour and from a region where the vast majority were Ukrainians a century ago.

But the problem of the Patron and the cult of "bayraktarischina", which misinforms the Ukrainian people, exists. And I think that much less objective attention is paid to Ukrainian propaganda and disinformation. Since the Western media are focused on combating Russia's information influence, they are not up to thorough coverage of criticism of the Ukrainian side. As a result, we have a false picture that Ukrainian cases were allegedly recorded only a few times, like the same "Ghost of Kyiv" and Snake Island (as if there was nothing else besides propaganda in the early days of invasion). And the obvious cases of a "United Mrathon", dehumanization of Russians and the Russian military, propaganda Ukrainian Telegram channels, the activities of Ukrainian scam call centers (which operated before invasion and were aimed not only at the Russian, but also at the European audience), conspiracy theories about Putin's body doubles, fakes about Russian mobilization, and so on. Note that I don't write about cases like Bucha, because I write about objective things. And even what can be considered such is constantly edited by some members here: "this is A, not B", "fakes" are replaced by "rumors", and "disinformation" by "misinformation". Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 17:40, 16 March 2024 (UTC)

The included text says: both sides waged an information war,[1] used propaganda,[2][3][4] actively spread misleading claims,[5] misinformation[6][7] and disinformation. But propaganda and misinformation, for example do not belong to this page, even though the difference between misinformation and disinformation is blurred. My very best wishes (talk) 15:42, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

In fact, I would consider renaming the article "Information war during Russian invasion of Ukraine", so it would cover all aspects of information warfare: misinformation, disinformation and propaganda.

@My very best wishes, as for the Unified Telephon: Anton Filatov, a former film critic and later a soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, believes that disinformation about Russia is the hidden purpose of this telethon. He expressed indignation at promises to recapture key facilities in a matter of weeks, excess of modern weapons, generalizations about Russians as "hand-assed jerks" and their commanders as "morons"; stories in the news are generally perceived as "cloying sedative for peaceful [people]." [7] It was already in the article. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 16:28, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

Information war would be a distinct/different subject, and we already have such page, Russian information war against Ukraine. Who is Anton Filatov? Yes, he criticizes this "Telephon" saying it is ridiculous and failed to disinform anyone if it was the purpose [irony]. My very best wishes (talk) 20:53, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

I am not sure if this is really supported by sources. Which source says that it "has become a key tool of information warfare"? A quote? My very best wishes (talk) 21:12, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

Per NYT: The show, Telemarathon United News, has been a major tool of Ukraine’s information war. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 14:42, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

• This and other sources say about various exaggerations (the Patron dog, Javelins, Bayraktars, and many others) which helped to rise the spirits of Ukrainian people during the war. Such narrative was promoted by a number of commenters, such as Arestovich. This has been described as a propaganda, at least in some sources (including this NYT article, if one actually reads it starting from the title), rather than an outright disinformation. The situation is very different on the Russian side, where a massive brainwashing campaign with monstrous lies was conducted by the state to justify the aggression to their own population and the world. This is reflected in the body of the page. Therefore, making the "both sides" narrative in the lead would be wrong. My very best wishes (talk) 15:44, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

I still don't understand why you think this is wrong. No one claims that they do it equally. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 16:06, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

No, as framed in your edit [8], it does imply they did everything equally, even though you do not use word "equally". My very best wishes (talk) 16:18, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

Because that needs a reliable source. Many reliable sources for "both sides" were here. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 17:02, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

The lead should properly summarize content in the body of the page. That version does not. My very best wishes (talk) 17:52, 9 March 2024 (UTC)

It's already summarizing. Significant advantage towards the Russian side. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 08:11, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Not in your version. In fact, 1st para in your version contradicts to content in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th para of the lead. Hence, it was correctly reverted by two users.My very best wishes (talk) 14:10, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

The claim that both sides are not doing that stuff is obviously untrue. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 14:17, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

This is not a proper summary of content on the page and even of the remainder of the lead. My very best wishes (talk) 15:01, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Reliable sources don't directly write "to varying degrees", they only generalize as "both sides". Of course, we can try to come to a consensus. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 19:05, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

The phrase "both sides", as applied to the first sentence in Special:Diff/1212549636, is a clear violation of the WP:FALSEBALANCE policy in the context of this article. Additionally, adding the reverted phrase back into the first sentence 22 minutes later against consensus, as was done in Special:Diff/1212552026, is a violation the policy against edit warring. — Newslinger talk 18:52, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Again, we can work on the wording. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 19:06, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

It looks like you previously attempted to change the first sentence to substantially similar language in Special:Diff/1189217990 on 10 December 2023, which was reverted and disputed at "Disputing edit per BRD". This makes your recent set of edits a violation of this article's WP:1RR page restriction. There is consensus against using language in the first paragraph that would imply a false balance, and any proposed changes to the wording would need to respect the WP:FALSEBALANCE policy. — Newslinger talk 19:39, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Clarification: I am referring to the entirety of the WP:BALANCE policy, and the part that applies to false balance in the context of the edits under discussion is WP:PROPORTION. — Newslinger talk 20:34, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Chemical weapons

@My very best wishes, even per your source it claims: Russia has denied allegations of using chemical weapons in Ukraine and has accused Ukrainian forces of their use, which Kyiv denies. Neither side has produced evidence and Reuters has not been able to verify any use by either side. No independent verification. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 06:43, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

Did Russian forces use chemical weapons? Institute for the Study of War say "yes", and the Russian military command actually acknowledged that they did [9],[10]. Royal United Services Institute says the same: [11]. This is either a fact or a controversy, not disinformation. Hence, it does not belong to this page. My very best wishes (talk) 16:39, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

According to some commenters, the use of "riot" chemical compounds at war is forbidden by UN conventions because, unlike civilians, soldiers sitting in trenches have nowhere to run, just leave the trench and be killed. My very best wishes (talk) 16:47, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

It's all interesting, but it's not that Russia potentially didn't use chemical weapons, but that US intelligence agencies reported this in April 2022 without providing evidence to manipulate the audience. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 16:53, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

Even if the "intel was not rock solid" in April 2022 (as the cited reference say), there is a plenty of published evidence now. This is not misinformation. My very best wishes (talk) 17:09, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

I don't know what it is. If they didn't intentionally promote these statements, then it is "misinformation", if intentionally, then "disinformation". It would great if article was called "Information war during Russian invasion of Ukraine", because the article says that "It’s one of a string of examples of the Biden administration’s breaking with recent precedent by deploying declassified intelligence as part of an information war against Russia". Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 17:29, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

I think that at the Ukrainian side this would be best described as propaganda, the page you just created, rather than an "information war". On the USA side, a new feature is openly publishing their intelligence data, with the purpose to influence other sides (which they apparently failed). They did it just before the war, warning that the war will start (incredibly, Zelensky and USA itself did almost nothing to prepare), and later, when they had some info, but not so solid, as these sources say. My very best wishes (talk) 21:20, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

Speaking on WMD, this page is missing a description of Nuclear threats during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a disinformation/nuclear blackmail strategy that was applied by Putin administration with enormous success. Otherwise, that war could end up as another Gulf War with Russia beaten like Iraq at the Ukrainian territory. The threats were bluff, but such is the power of fear. My very best wishes (talk) 21:36, 15 March 2024 (UTC)

This cannot be attributed to Ukrainian propaganda, since it doesn't originate from Ukraine and its citizens, it is called PRO-Ukrainian propaganda when statements are thrown in that are favorable to the Ukrainian side. And no, this directly relates to the information war, it is written in the above source. In any case, it should be in the article about the information war. The only question is whether this should be considered disinformation, since this is not directly stated in the sources, just an "unproven statement." And if we write about the infowar, like in Ru Wiki, then you can find a lot of interesting things about the United States there [12] [13], [14]. Roman Kubanskiy (talk) 11:32, 16 March 2024 (UTC)

Two points:

1. We suppose to make a summary per multiple sources on the subject, and according the the most recent sources, the use of chemical weapons by Russian forces is essentially a fact (see above), not disinformation.
2. A part of the "information war" is actually telling the truth (per your linked sources above). Therefore, this is a different subject. My very best wishes (talk) 16:11, 16 March 2024 (UTC)

NATO aggression section is a mess.

I'm gonna start off by saying I'm not some apologist for Russia or Putin but the "Allegations of NATO aggression" section is mostly an argumentative essay that has nothing to do with disinformation. Keep in mind, disinformation means "false information deliberately spread to deceive people." Whereas misinformation refers to "incorrect or misleading information." In other words, not all incorrect information is disinformation, you actually have to show some level of intent and knowledge the claim is deceitful. Almost everything in this category would probably be misinformation and not disinformation as irrational and wrong claims are not automatically disinformation.

The first paragraph about Ukraine stationing NATO troops in their territory would obviously count as disinformation because it seems that Russia knew that this wasn't happening. The next section is about Russia claiming Ukraine is a proxy of NATO and the West, while I'd agree Russia is dead wrong on this, calling Ukraine a proxy is not disinformation. Even the person that is quoted in this section doesn't call it disinformation and he merely says the claim has misleading implications. For this to be considered disinformation, Russia would have to know that the claim is wrong and yet still purposefully spread that to deceive people. Even if Russia knew this claim was wrong, none of the sources cited in this paragraph call these claims "disinformation" other than the citation from NATO themselves. I don't have anything against NATO but of course they're gonna say "Ukraine is a proxy."

The next paragraph about how NATO never actually promised to not expand East, while it may be true this promise was never actually made, Russia being irrational and wrong about this is not disinformation. Again the only source that implies its disinformation is NATO themselves. Russia being wrong on this does not automatically count as disinformation.

The next paragraph talks about Finland joining NATO in response to Russia's invasion. Not really sure how this is relevant to "Russia Disinformation."

The next paragraph quotes an expert on the subject who said the real reason Russia oppose NATO expansion is because they want to bully their neighbors. Russia having malevolent intentions is not disinformation and the source quoted never calls Russia's narrative disinformation.

Finally, the last paragraph is fine because it claims Russia is lying about this supposed NATO aggression. That belongs in the article because it implies Russia is actually spreading disinformation. This is what disinformation actually means.

I know this is gonna stir some debate but essentially almost everything in this "Allegations of NATO aggression" section aside from the first and last paragraph can be deleted or heavily changed in my opinion. JasonOhioHistory (talk) 16:34, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

I find your logic flawed. Several points:

• "Ukraine is a proxy of NATO": can you demonstrate that most WP:RS consider this a proxy war? There are a few reasons why is it RU disinformation: 1) RU claims deny Ukraine's sovereignty; 2) how can they claim it's a proxy war, if they initiate it in the first place?; 3) it's contradictory to the RU strategic war objectives which demonstrate that it was supposed to be a war of conquest (but went horribly wrong, hence the new narratives).
• Regarding the NATO "expansion to the east": there was not a single treaty or signed document giving such promise and RU could not have been "unaware" of that; moreover, the view that some European states cannot join military alliances denies their sovereign right; in fact, the right to collective self-defense is included in the Charter of the United Nations. It's absurd to suggest that RU diplomats are not aware of the international law.
• Regarding Finland: it might not be directly related, but it illustrates the contradiction (or rather plain hypocrisy) from RU: why Finland (with its 1340 km border with RU) joining NATO was apparently not a problem, while the hypothetical Ukraine's membership is a big deal?

-- Mindaur (talk) 18:26, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

I'm inclined to agree. I ended up here after a line in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine article caught my eye. Focusing specifically on the promise from Baker that "NATO will not move one inch further east", NATO's own website, which is cited here as a source, is very misleading in how it selectively quotes this interview with Mikhail Gorbachev.

Full question and answer from the interview (cited by NATO), bold added by me:

RBTH: One of the key issues that has arisen in connection with the events in Ukraine is NATO expansion into the East. Do you get the feeling that your Western partners lied to you when they were developing their future plans in Eastern Europe? Why didn’t you insist that the promises made to you – particularly U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that NATO would not expand into the East – be legally encoded? I will quote Baker: “NATO will not move one inch further east.”

M.G.: The topic of “NATO expansion” was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a singe Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either. Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces from the alliance would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement, mentioned in your question, was made in that context. Kohl and [German Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich] Genscher talked about it. Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled. The agreement on a final settlement with Germany said that no new military structures would be created in the eastern part of the country; no additional troops would be deployed; no weapons of mass destruction would be placed there. It has been observed all these years. So don’t portray Gorbachev and the then-Soviet authorities as naïve people who were wrapped around the West’s finger. If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object. The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed.

The Wikipedia article presently states, "Another claim is that NATO broke a promise not to let any Eastern European countries join. This unwritten promise was allegedly made to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, but both NATO and Gorbachev denied it."

To say Gorbachev denied that an assurance was made to him that NATO would not expand to the east is simply false. The NATO website even strawmans this point a bit by stating "Myth: NATO promised Russia it would not expand after the Cold War." That's not the claim, as is plain from the interview cited on their own website. It's an entirely different thing to promise not to expand at all versus not to expand toward the border of an adversary.

The current lines in the article misrepresent the sources for those lines, and one of those, NATO's website, should absolutely not be used to make such statements in Wiki voice. NATO's website can be used to say what NATO says about an issue, but not to make such assertions. entropyandvodka | talk 05:29, 12 May 2024 (UTC)

Here is a more comprehensive account of the 1990 discussions. entropyandvodka | talk 16:59, 12 May 2024 (UTC)

Greetings, I checked one of your edits [15] where you changed
Mikhail Gorbachev clarified that there was never any promise to not enlarge the NATO alliance
to
Mikhail Gorbachev said that promises not to expand NATO eastward were made in the context of negotiating German reunification
, which is not what the source Ukraine: the history behind Russia’s claim that Nato promised not to expand to the east (theconversation.com) says: There was, he said, no promise not to enlarge the alliance.

Regarding your addition to this article, the source you provided do not cover the "Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine" topic. I'm undoing your contributions to this and other articles regarding NATO promises, please reach the consensus on talk pages first. Thanks! ManyAreasExpert (talk) 18:58, 12 May 2024 (UTC)

This is a selective, misleading, if not outright dishonest reading of Gorbachev's answer. Scroll up to the entire answer, and the sections I've highlighted in bold. Gorbachev explicitly confirms Baker's statement about "not one inch east" being made in the context of German reunification, and a little later in the answer states that the decision to expand NATO eastward was a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to them in 1990. To quote the more comprehensive source I provided, which I would encourage you to read:

"The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.

This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did."

To quote only one line from the beginning part of Gorbachev's interview answer, while ignoring the rest, is a dishonest use of that source. This applies to other sources electing to do the same thing. I would request that you self-revert your edits/reversions to mine, or address these problems here so we can come to a consensus. Wikipedia must not be used to obscure critical details about what is obviously a controversial issue. entropyandvodka | talk 00:10, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

User talk:Entropyandvodka#May 2024 - personal attacks . It's you who misquoted the source, not previous authors. See the message above, which arguments you haven't addressed, so they stay. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:02, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

I haven't attacked another editor, and you haven't addressed my arguments. Please justify your reverts and address the arguments. The previous uses of that source selectively quoted it, ignoring the portions of Gorbachev's answer explicitly acknowledging Baker's statement, its context, and that the Russian leadership carried away from the 1990 talks an understanding that NATO had assured them they would not expand eastward. This is borne out not only in his interview answer in 2010, but in the documents and other sources I've linked. Please justify your revert. entropyandvodka | talk 08:11, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

NATO had assured them they would not expand eastward
This is your interpretation, and it is a misinterpretation, contradicting the sources currently in the article saying the opposite. Gorbachov only said "making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces from the alliance would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification". ManyAreasExpert (talk) 08:20, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

You're failing to address both the sources and the argument. Gorbachev says, in the same answer:

"The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990."

Your reading of his answer, as well as that particular source, conveniently leaves this out. Moreover, the documentary record, which you still have not addressed and I've linked twice, does indeed show:

"that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels."

In both Gorbachev's answer, which I believe is often selectively misquoted, as well as the historical record, which is quite easy to look up, it is clear that Western leaders at minimum led Gorbachev to believe that Russia, then the Soviet Union, had assurances from the West that NATO would not expand eastward.

Any discussion of this issue that does not cover these facts but asserts NATO made no such promises in a written treaty is itself engaging in misinformation. That paragraph should either be expanded to cover this in a neutral manner, or be stricken entirely. entropyandvodka | talk 16:23, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

Entropyandvodka: I think you are confused how is this supposed to work. You are citing a primary source, which you analyze and interpret, which is precisely what you should not do per WP:PRIMARY policy. It's one of the reasons why WP should primarily be written using the WP:SECONDARY sources, since it's easy to jump to misleading conclusions.

Sure, Gorbachev or the other participants might have felt one way or another. However, look at the bigger picture: a lot of things may be said during any diplomatic negotiations or forums, but, ultimately, policies and decisions are formalized in documents and treaties. There is not a single document where NATO gave a promise to not accept new members. As I pointed out above, the right to collective self-defense is actually included in the Charter of the United Nations. These two facts dwarf any personal feelings or impressions of the diplomats involvement.

You may certainly write down how the other side viewed certain decisions, but it has to be presented as such, without creating an imperssion that it's more controversial than it actually is (per WP:FALSEBALANCE).

-- Mindaur (talk) 16:49, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

Are you referring to the interview as the primary source, or the documents? The article I cited that supplied the documents was a secondary source. I can show you other secondary sources more fully citing the interview answer, if you're arguing that to be a primary source. The personal feelings of diplomats aren't the same thing as the words and assurances of Western leaders, or their diplomats, to Gorbachev. Your point about collective self defense and the UN Charter is irrelevant to this discussion. Answer this simple question: did Western leaders and diplomats offer assurances or lead Soviet leadership to believe that NATO would not expand eastward? entropyandvodka | talk 17:36, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

For "Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine" article we should concentrate on sources which talk about Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 17:41, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

I agree. The article states: "Another claim is that NATO broke a promise not to let any Eastern European countries join. This unwritten promise was allegedly made to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, but both NATO and Gorbachev denied it."

The article fails to establish this as disinformation, as RS has shown. In addition, it doesn't offer a neutral, encyclopedic presentation of the issue. Has Russia made a claim that NATO violated a written promise, assurance, or treaty not to expand eastward/let Eastern European countries join? That would qualify as disinformation. Do you have any RS to establish that?

Additionally, saying the unwritten promise was "allegedly" made is quite POV, especially while failing to discuss anything else. We have RS providing multiple, documented assurances. The article seems to be attempting to combat perceived disinformation with misinformation and misdirection, and citing biased sources to do so, at that. NATO's website? Really? entropyandvodka | talk 18:53, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

"Russian Disinformation on NATO Expansion and the War in Ukraine" by Cody Schuette (usf.edu)
... Putin’s central argument: NATO broke its pledge not to expand one inch East, and therefore, justifies Russian coercion. A careful review, however, invalidates his argument and the Russian disinformation narrative.
...
the director of Harvard University’s Cold War Studies Project, Mark Kramer, reviewed the Russian and American declassified transcripts and other related documents in totality and ultimately concluded, “at no point in the discussion did either Baker or Gorbachev bring up the question of the possible extension of NATO membership to other Warsaw Pact countries beyond Germany.”33 More convincingly, Gorbachev essentially validated this version of events in 2014 when he clarified the specifics of the conversation and the context to the Russian media. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:51, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

Quite amusingly, the author of that paper also leaves out parts of Gorbachev's quote that are damning to views opposed to the one of the author, specifically: "The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990." See page 40-41. He ellipses out that portion of the quote. I wonder why.

It's easy to find sources pushing a cherrypicked narrative. This is precisely what NATO's website does on this issue. The reliable sources I've already provided, along with Gorbachev's own words, call this narrative into serious doubt, if not refute it altogether, and you've thus far refused to engage with those points.

1. Can you acknowledge Gorbachev said: "The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990."

2. Can you acknowledge the source I provided, which states that "Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels."

I can provide additional sources that go further in discussing this, some of which are currently cited in related articles on Wikipedia. This article in particular is presenting the topic in a way that violates Wikipedia's NPOV standards. entropyandvodka | talk 21:40, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

The source above do attends your concerns, and it also talks about the subject of the article we are discussing. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 21:48, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

You're still avoiding the questions. entropyandvodka | talk 23:14, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

This from another source that more properly addresses the issue. A key takeaway, if you won't read it, is that the Soviet view that they were offered assurances is not meritless or baseless:

"A fuller reading of the diplomatic record shows that the Soviet Union repeatedly received assurances against NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. These promises were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet negotiations throughout 1990, as diplomatic bargaining evolved from a U.S. and West German effort to engage the Soviet Union on German reunification to shaping the substance of the deal and ultimately the formal terms that the Soviet leadership accepted in September 1990. That said, there is also strong evidence showing that the United States misled the Soviet Union in the 1990 talks. As Sarotte first noted, a growing body of evidence indicates that U.S. policymakers suggested limits on NATO’s post–Cold War presence to the Soviet Union, while privately planning for an American-dominated post–Cold War system and taking steps that would attain this objective."

In my view, the best course of action here would be to present this as the contentious issue that it is, not to simply take a side in Wiki voice and fail to present anything else about it, or to wholly brand one view of a debated issue as disinformation. That kind of writing undermines the credibility of the article. entropyandvodka | talk 00:18, 14 May 2024 (UTC)

There is a recent work edited by Shifrinson Evaluating NATO Enlargement - Google Books which I encourage everybody to take conclusions from. It also touches the "disinformation" subject. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 07:50, 14 May 2024 (UTC)

Do you have a specific section you'd like to refer to or quote? Wikipedia has a separate article about NATO enlargement, which covers the issue we are debating here in a much more encyclopedic manner. entropyandvodka | talk 16:54, 14 May 2024 (UTC)

The expansion of NATO and the alleged aggression by NATO are two different issues. The expansion of NATO is only relevant here with regard to Ukraine potentially joining NATO. In that regard, Putin and Russian government were well aware before the invasion that Ukraine had absolutely no chance to be accepted to NATO in any near future, but they still attacked. Now, it may have such chance, but this is only due to the Russian invasion. And of course the involvement of many NATO countries (rather than NATO as an organization) to the war is significant right now, but again this is a defensive reaction to the Russian invasion, not the aggression by NATO. My very best wishes (talk) 17:19, 14 May 2024 (UTC)

In other words, it well could be that Baker had misled Gorbachev [16], but this is irrelevant to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Claim that something they have talked about in 1990s can justify the invasion is an example of propaganda/misinformation. My very best wishes (talk) 17:31, 14 May 2024 (UTC)

Propaganda can be true. Disinformation can't. There's no debate about whether or not the claim that NATO assured the Soviet leadership in 1990 that it wouldn't expand eastward is a point of Russian propaganda. It very clearly is used as propaganda. But if the claim is true, that propaganda point isn't disinformation. If the claim is debatable, it can't be asserted in Wiki voice to be disinformation. entropyandvodka | talk 19:12, 15 May 2024 (UTC)

I understand that Western leaders could not promise this to Gorbachev because it would contradict article 10 of NATO founding treaty [17], and I assume everyone including Gorbachev knew about it. Propaganda or disinformation - it depends on the exact claim. When Putin is saying that "we attacked Ukraine to prevent the inclusion of Ukraine to NATO, which would inevitably lead to NATO militarily attacking Russia", while knowing there was no any possibility to invite Ukraine to NATO before the invasion, this is actually a disinformation, even two pieces of disinformation. Unfortunately, a lot of Russians believe this and more. Hell, one man (who is a very nice person, I liked him a lot) said: "we have killed already a million of Ukrainian Nazi, and this is great!". My very best wishes (talk) 21:19, 15 May 2024 (UTC)

How would such an agreement contradict article 10? It requires unanimous consent among member states for another European state to accede. If the member states in 1990 agreed not to admit Eastern European states, ie by not consenting if/when the day comes, such an assurance to Gorbachev would be entirely within that scope, would it not?

I think we agree on the propaganda/disinformation distinction. The point I was trying to drill down on here specifically was the 1990 assurances issue and the way the article presents it.

With regards to the other issues you raised, I'm not sure those could be flatly presented as disinformation either, depending exactly what the claims are. I agree that Ukraine's odds of joining NATO were in reality slim, but not for lack of desire. You might recall there was also a failed push to get Georgia into NATO, excluding the region where it lacked territorial sovereignty. It could well be the case that NATO membership was a driving factor in the events of 2014 and 2022, at least in the minds of Russian leaders, even if the likelihood of accession was small in reality. I'd be happy to discuss those too, but maybe on a separate thread under this same section topic? entropyandvodka | talk 16:54, 16 May 2024 (UTC)

You keep interpreting things the way you want, ignoring the very nature how the negotiations are conducted (it involves offers, counter-offers, disagreements, concessions, usually many amendments and so on and so forth). It is not clear whether the West made an offer to the Soviets or merely discussed it (and if the offer was indeed made, then why the Soviets didn't accept it?). If you can find multiple secondary WP:RS which claim that the offer was made, then it can be mentioned. However, the main point being here is that it needs to be put in an appropriate context and have a due weight (per WP:DUE). The fact is that the legal agreement never materialized. Just talks, discussions or verbal offers don't have enough significance. Trump offered to buy Greenland [18]; so what? It doesn't mean that it has legal implications or that it is meaningful.

What matters here is that Russia is trying to make it significant as a way to justify its war (decades later, despite other countries joining NATO; despite inconsistent/contradicting positions; despite breaking many legally binding treaties). Hence the main aspect here is the propaganda element of Russia trying to make those events significant, rather than the events themselves. Attempts to present this in controversial light is WP:FALSEBALANCE.

Also: the UN Charter and international treaties are absolutely relevant in this case, because they determine the legal status quo (both now and then) and because the events in question were about the potential legal changes to the status quo. It is also relevant in the propaganda context, as Russia is trying to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and rights under the international law, including its legal right to join NATO or any other military alliance.

-- Mindaur (talk) 23:46, 16 May 2024 (UTC)

As I was discussing above, we have to distinguish here between propaganda and disinformation. Disinformation is false by definition, while propaganda may or may not be false. In fact, the most effective propaganda contains a lot of truth. I'm not disputing that the 1990 assurances issue is a point of Russian propaganda. But the article can't state in Wiki voice or give an impression that it's purely made up, which it does in its current form.

It's very much WP:DUE to be explicit about what the disinformation aspect here actually is. If Putin, for example, claimed there was a written agreement, that's obviously disinformation. If Putin claims there was an understanding in the Russian leadership that NATO wouldn't expand eastward based on assurances from 1990 talks, sorry, that's just not disinformation, as multiple RS show.

Let's take a look at the disputed part:

"Another claim is that NATO broke a promise not to let any Eastern European countries join. This unwritten promise was allegedly made to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, but both NATO and Gorbachev denied it."

The first sentence is more or less accurate, but might be better phrased as "not to expand eastward". No major issue. The article then engages in its own misinformation in the next sentence, by calling the promise alleged (rather than explaining the basis of the claim), and then by mentioning both parties denied it. This fails to mention that Gorbachev also affirmed it on multiple occasions, and later faced significant criticism as being naive or incompetent to have not secured these assurances in writing. It fails to mention that the historical record shows multiple instances of Western leaders making such assurances, generally as bargaining chips to secure German reunification. It fails to mention that the Russians were apoplectic about eastward expansion when it occurred, and felt it violated an agreement they'd reached with the West. It fails to mention that Russian leadership took from those 1990 discussions an understanding that they had such an agreement with the West, regardless if it was legally binding or not.

Instead, the article gives the impression this entire issue is just something Russia made up (as is implied by it being a claim in an article about disinformation, and the term 'alleged' without further detail), and even their own relevant party to the 'alleged' assurance/s, Gorbachev, says so, so it must be made up. To write it that way is to use propaganda or misinformation to discuss disinformation, a violation of Wikipedia's editing standards.

Sources:

[19]https://web.archive.org/web/20210126134122/http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/1990.pdf

"...it is clear from the historical record that the assurances about NATO non-expansion that both Baker and Genscher gave the Soviets in February 1990 related not just to eastern Germany but to Eastern Europe in general. Genscher was quite explicit in this regard, Baker less so, but the evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that he, too, had the Warsaw Pact area in general in mind. Those assurances amounted to promises—perhaps not “legally binding” promises but promises nonetheless—and Russian allegations to that effect were by no means baseless."

[20]https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/003-ISEC_a_00236-Shifrinson.pdf

"A fuller reading of the diplomatic record shows that the Soviet Union repeatedly received assurances against NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. These promises were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet negotiations throughout 1990, as diplomatic bargaining evolved from a U.S. and West German effort to engage the Soviet Union on German reunification to shaping the substance of the deal and ultimately the formal terms that the Soviet leadership accepted in September 1990. That said, there is also strong evidence showing that the United States misled the Soviet Union in the 1990 talks. As Sarotte first noted, a growing body of evidence indicates that U.S. policymakers suggested limits on NATO’s post–Cold War presence to the Soviet Union, while privately planning for an American-dominated post–Cold War system and taking steps that would attain this objective."

[21]https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early

"U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels." entropyandvodka | talk 18:48, 17 May 2024 (UTC)

Well, NATO did not broke any promise because there was no any written agreement with the USSR about it, and such agreement could not be signed because it would contradict the article 10 of NATO, as I said above. That was nothing like Budapest memorandum. What they talked about had no significance because every new Western administration can say or do something completely different (and sure, Gorbachev knew about it). But what do you suggest to change on the page, exactly? Yes, maybe this should be rephrased. The actual issue here is not that "NATO broke a promise not to let any Eastern European countries join" but that Putin used such nonsense to justify his aggression. My very best wishes (talk) 21:36, 17 May 2024 (UTC)

@Entropyandvodka: I mostly agree with your first two paragraphs, but then it gets very problematic when you go into the details. Specifically:

• On "promises" being "allegedly" made and denial: there were indeed serious diplomatic discussions ongoing at that time (and this is what your sources reveal, but just that) and the wording should be improved; Gorbachev's position can be clarified (but it keep it mind that it's a primary source; more sources need to be checked - perhaps he was inconsistent about it over the time); also, Baker's statements and the US view on this issue is no less noteworthy, e.g. [22].
• However, there are multiple, potentially misleading aspects in your points. The article uses the word "promise", but even that is problematic in the context of international relations, as the reader might understand it the way you just generalized - as an "agreement with the West", but that's totally misleading and I'd say plain wrong:

1. There was no agreement, because any "assurances" or "promises" possibly made were neither legally binding nor even finalized;
2. Your sources only mention Baker and Genscher, but they are only two diplomats; they are not "the West" or even the "Western leaders"; any proposed agreement would have had to be endorsed by the heads of the involved states;
3. In fact, per [23] summary: Were these promises ever written down in a treaty? No, largely because Bush felt Baker and Kohl had gone too far, or in Baker’s words he had “got a little forward on his skis”. So, the ideas or proposals didn't even pass the US president. It should also be kept in mind that while Americans have the main voice, they do not speak on behalf of the whole NATO, since the decisions in the organization are made collectively.

• Regarding the impression that this entire issue is just something Russia made up: you are right that it's not entirely made up and that there were serious diplomatic discussions ongoing at that time, but:

• In no way there was ever a legal agreement or even high-level declaration or memorandum between the head of states; it is disinformation (rather than mere propaganda) from Russia to present these events, the "promises" or "assurances", as something equal to an agreement which was somehow in effect and something what could be "broken" or "violated".
• In no way this justifies Russia's claims, actions and the war of conquest against Ukraine. The attempts to falesly add some legitimacy to such "promises" (regardless how serious those diplomatic discussions were) and present them as a valid justification is disinformation. Just because Putin feels resentment that the Western diplomats outplayed the Soviets, that doesn't add any legitimacy to his claims or actions.
• Russian propaganda uses tiny bits of truth to make things look more credible or way more controversial than they actually are, mixed with fundamental distortions. Even if the false claims are identified, covering such narratives more extensively than they merit leads to WP:FALSEBALANCE.

• Again, you focus a lot on the details about how some verbal assurances or promises were been made by a few officials, but you completely ignore my previously mentioned points about the legal status quo and international law. As if verbal promises by two diplomats have greater weight than what was actually agreed and signed by the states. It is relevant, because the international law and treaties (which Russia blatantly violated) clearly and directly refute the Russian attempts to justify the war against Ukraine; this has also been covered in various WP:RS.

Fur the purposes of this article, all the aspects I just mentioned are much more relevant and carry greater weight than the peculiarities of the diplomatic talks in 1989-1990 (these details could go into Enlargement of NATO, though).

-- Mindaur (talk) 00:15, 18 May 2024 (UTC)

• No, this is not a mess. The section is titled "Allegations of NATO aggression". Indeed, there were such allegations by Putin and others in Russia, and they are notable. Do they qualify as an outright disinformation? There are multiple RS that directly say it [24],[25], and for a good reason. "Aggression" means that NATO would first attack Russia. Did it happen? No, it did not, as a matter of fact. Something different had happen, and that is Russia attacking Ukraine. My very best wishes (talk) 16:04, 14 May 2024 (UTC)

Unsupported claim in lede

"However, the Russian state has had more success spreading its views in many developing countries."

The relevant section of the article does not offer any sources to establish that the views of Russia, the United States, and the West, are a product of Russian disinformation. The sources provided even offer other reasons, such as United States foreign policy subsequent to 9/11. This statement in the lede is synth or altogether dubious.entropyandvodka | talk 08:07, 13 May 2024 (UTC)

Agreed, no source is given for this claim. It should be deleted.--3E1I5S8B9RF7 (talk) 14:24, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

@Piotrus: looks like you added this in 2022. Firefangledfeathers (talk / contribs) 14:34, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

@Firefangledfeathers Plenty of sources for this, ex. [26], [27], [28], [29]... _{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 14:42, 28 June 2024 (UTC)

@Firefangledfeathers If those are sufficient, can you add them to the article? My time for wiki editing right now is limited due to travelling. _{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here} 09:43, 29 June 2024 (UTC)

I do think more/better sources would be helpful. Of yours, the first is an opinion piece, I can't access the second, and the last is an audio piece. Nothing wrong with paywalls or audio, but it does add a bit of work that I don't have time for right now. Firefangledfeathers (talk / contribs) 01:54, 30 June 2024 (UTC)

The third source provided says: "The Central African Republic is largely already a Russian vassal state. (The UN Security Council in fact approved Russian military “training” to stabilize CAR in 2017, not quite imagining what it would turn into.) Now Russian operatives work openly in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and have established physical disinformation infrastructures in South Africa". Maybe the sentence should be amended from "the Russian state has had more success spreading its views in many developing countries" to "the Russian state has had more success spreading its views in some African/Sahel countries"?--3E1I5S8B9RF7 (talk) 17:56, 1 July 2024 (UTC)

I added a quite long paragraph, it could probably be trimmed down a bit, but I feel like its missing context to not include the Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger coups which were all influenced by Russia. MarkiPoli (talk) 10:12, 21 August 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 20 May 2024

Change in grammar tense in first sentence of third paragraph under “Denial of Russian war crimes” heading : change “The Russian Defence Ministry's Telegram channel said Russian forces did not targeted civilians during the battle” to “The Russian Defence Ministry's Telegram channel said Russian forces had not targeted civilians during the battle”. Curious-mess (talk) 19:14, 20 May 2024 (UTC)

 Done M.Bitton (talk) 19:20, 20 May 2024 (UTC)