Talk:Battle of Waterloo/Archive 9
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Archive 5 | ← | Archive 7 | Archive 8 | Archive 9 | Archive 10 | Archive 11 | → | Archive 15 |
Archive 8
Please note I have moved older arguments to archive 8 Tirronan (talk) 23:33, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
Featured Article
I've thought about this and have finally come to the ocnclusion that we probably should apply for FA status. It is a really good work and perhaps that time has come.
Your opinions my fellow editors? Tirronan (talk) 00:37, 16 March 2008 (UTC)
- Why not, in for a penny...
- Done. :) Watch Wikipedia:Featured_article_candidates#Nominations for comments. -Kieran (talk) 16:18, 1 May 2008 (UTC)
Peterloo
I had my addition of the Battle of Peterloo reverted from the see also section. Surely one of Britain's greatest social upheavals which takes its name from this battle deserves this link? Some of those at Waterloo were present at Peterloo. --Jza84 | Talk 21:51, 29 March 2008 (UTC)
The connection seems rather tenuous, the use of the name of a famous recent battle for a political protest which was repressed heavy handedly. The argument for the reverse, for the Peterloo page referencing the Battle of Waterloo as the origin of its name is more cogent.
Urselius (talk) 15:18, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
Numbers
The troop numbers in the infobox do not agree with those in the text. A new, fully referenced, set of numbers including the numbers of Prussians engaged (broken down into troop type if possible) need to be found.
Urselius (talk) 15:13, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
I've no idea where the numbers in the info box came from. The numbers I have put in on the Prussian's were from PH's book and include references, of course that assumes no one has changed anything since I did... and that is a large assumption. Tirronan (talk) 15:59, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
I tried to get the numbers in the infobox to agree with the ones that were referenced in the box, but I wasn't favourably impressed with them anyway, then I noticed they were substantially different from those in the text.
Perhaps we could just take the ones in from the text and express them as overall numbers in the box? I don't think, on reflection, that they need to be broken down into different "arms" within the box. Round figures of combatants would be fine.
Urselius (talk) 19:24, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
- They were already in the article when I clean them up with this edit "(Not the most reliable of sources, but the site was already cited even if two of the pages were cut and past and incorrect. We could do with a more authoritative source.)" --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 19:54, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
- I have PH, Chesney, and Barbero, close to hand let me check the numbers and yes I agree we need them to be round numbers all inclusive, all 3 armies had been in recent fights with the desertions and casualities and returning stragglers to make thing even more muddy than normal. Tirronan (talk) 21:44, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
- Please do that. I think that will probably satisfy the FA reviewers better. It looks bad right now, when the first reference in the article are to a website. -Kieran (talk) 23:29, 4 May 2008 (UTC)
- PH gives the numbers at 48,000 Prussians, Chesney 50,000 Prussians on the battlefield. Everyone seems to agree on the round number of 68,000 for the Brits and allied states, 72000 French. 17,500 Prussians, 33,000 French at Wavre Tirronan (talk) 03:17, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
All numbers updated and correcte with good citations. Tirronan (talk) 04:20, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
Verify misspelling
Would someone with access to the Hofschröer Wellington's Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of Waterloo reference verify, or not, that it misspells equipment as epuipment used in the article quote ...leaving large masses of artillery, epuipment and ammunition waggons.... Thanks. -- Michael Devore (talk) 18:58, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
- Actually I wrote that and it was from PH's 2nd book in the Waterloo pair he put out. I am assuming that I simply mistyped as I am given to do and therefor use the Queen's English as it should be used. Tirronan (talk) 19:12, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
Waterloo in popular culture
I've started this section, as per suggestions in the FA review. It's late, though, so it needs a read-through and some expansion. (It's currently very anglo-centric, with a tiny bit of mention of the French POV, and none of the German/Germanic). Unfortunately, I'm not at a university, so can't get access to some of the better articles in historical journals about the commemoration or the cultural effect of the battle. Perhaps someone with access could write a bit more? -Kieran (talk) 23:59, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
- I think it is a mistake. There is an article Waterloo in popular culture. All that is needed in this article, if anything is one small paragraph to introduce the article Waterloo in popular culture, otherwise why not put back all that is in Waterloo in popular culture, because who judges what is important to add in this section? I think it is better off as a line in the "See also" section. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 08:27, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- Because what (I think) the several reviewers who have raised similar points are after is not a list of computer games featuring Waterloo but an attempt at a brief encyclopedic treatment of the enormous impact of the battle on the rest of the 19th century outside the sphere of pure military history. Johnbod (talk) 13:30, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- And I think it opens up a can of worms, better to add any such points to aftermath. Because thinks like "The fact that Waterloo Station was, from 1994 until 2008, the landing point for French visitors to the country arriving on the Eurostar, was found insulting by some French even in modern times." and "with references in modern literature, including Asterix," is not the sort of think we need in this article. But I suggest we discuss this further on the talk page of the article. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 14:05, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- I never saw a thing in that section that really made me very happy by its inclusion and I seem to remember a lot of complaints about not having triva sections or popular culture sections so that really confuses me. While we are on the subject one fellow seems to want us to discuss the socio/economic background of the French Empire and its effect on the battle. While I agree that it is a subject well worth exploring it would seem to be so vast as to overwhelm the battle article altogether. The 3rd issue is that this again seems to be a few editors wanting any FA article to be a acedemic research paper and held accountable to standards that I can't see or conform to. Tirronan (talk) 15:50, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- Do please stop whining, and blowing up these requests. When you get similar comments from 3 reviewers, perhaps you might consider they could be on to something. As it is an FAC matter, I shall continue the discussion, if necessary, there. Johnbod (talk) 16:00, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- I would consider them to be onto something if they would take time to to justify the criteria is for the section of the trivia to be included in this article instead of unconstructive comments like "Do please stop whining" which do little to bring harmony to the project and make it hard to build a consensus. For example why include "with references in modern literature, including Asterix," but exclude trivia such as Waterloo in popular culture#Battle of Waterloo simulators. Or why in this sentence should the US be included "Numerous places in Britain, the United States and other countries are named after the battle, with Waterloo Station in London being one of the most famous." while excluding all but one of the the principle combatants? That would seem to me to be a clear case of WP:BIAS --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 16:24, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- If you are saying the latest attempt is not (yet) adequate, I certainly agree. No one has asked for trivia to be added! Johnbod (talk) 16:31, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- I'm not saying I won't do it I am saying this is confusing. Perhaps a background section giving a brief rise and fall of the French Empire, setting this up as against the Congress of Vienna, and the start of the Rise of both the Kingdom of Prussia and of Russia in the balance of power and limit that to a few paragraphs might suffice. What I still don't understand is the pidgeons and rothschild thing or what a train station has to do with an aftermath so I am asking what do you want? Tirronan (talk) 16:46, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- If you are saying the latest attempt is not (yet) adequate, I certainly agree. No one has asked for trivia to be added! Johnbod (talk) 16:31, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- I would consider them to be onto something if they would take time to to justify the criteria is for the section of the trivia to be included in this article instead of unconstructive comments like "Do please stop whining" which do little to bring harmony to the project and make it hard to build a consensus. For example why include "with references in modern literature, including Asterix," but exclude trivia such as Waterloo in popular culture#Battle of Waterloo simulators. Or why in this sentence should the US be included "Numerous places in Britain, the United States and other countries are named after the battle, with Waterloo Station in London being one of the most famous." while excluding all but one of the the principle combatants? That would seem to me to be a clear case of WP:BIAS --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 16:24, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
- Any economist or information scientist have it as a standard part of their undergraduate course, legend has it that Nathan Mayer Rothschild made a killing financial out of the killing at Waterloo. He reputedly did this by having a better communications system than his peers.[1][2] According to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography "Contrary to stories emanating from an article about the family in a late nineteenth-century magazine with decidedly antisemitic undertones, Rothschild's first concern on this occasion was not the potential financial advantage on the market which the knowledge would have given him; he and his courier immediately took the news to the government." Here is another similar story (see the paragraph that starts "The vicissitudes of the Stock Exchange are like those of the gambling-table. ..."--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 17:45, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
I was an Engineering major with minors in math (incidental) and history (not incidental). Tirronan (talk) 20:38, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
Napoleonic Wars
When we get done with the FAC stuff we really really need to bail in on this one and clean it up. Tirronan (talk) 20:36, 7 May 2008 (UTC)
The Battle of Salamanca is another candidate for overhaul! Urselius (talk) 10:31, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
Lets get a list together then Phillip and I had to get together on the 100 days to fix that up after a bunch of guys helped us out. There was a encycolpedia entry on it that really caught my attention... Napoleon and his Henchmen... There are some Russians that refuse to admit Borodino was a defeat... what the French really won is highly debateable but... and so forth. The French invasion of Russia section has most of the casulites taking place in winter, a sure sign that someone just wrote something on what they thought happened. So probably a good idea to look at articles around this one and fix them back up. Tirronan (talk) 17:54, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
POTD notification
![](http://up.wiki.x.io/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Waterloo_Campaign_map-alt3.svg/100px-Waterloo_Campaign_map-alt3.svg.png)
Hello,
Just to let you know that the Featured Picture Image:Waterloo Campaign map-alt3.svg is due to make an appearance as Picture of the Day on June 15, 2008. If you get a chance, you can check and improve the caption at Template:POTD/2008-06-15. howcheng {chat} 22:46, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
Quis Custodet Custodes?
I was hanging fire on writing a piece on the "history of the history" of the battle but it seems that the reviewers have dropped any attempt at dialogue.
Surely they cannot be surprised that the people who have put a great deal of effort into writing on a subject, and I think that the page on Waterloo is probably the finest treatment for its length anywhere, show decided opinions about relevance/non relevance issues.
I merely note that the Battle of Albuera, which I have also contributed to, is of FA status and appears to have relatively little "flummery" added to its narrative.
Urselius (talk) 06:43, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- I had a look at Battle of Midway article (and had to fix some things when I did!). I also looked at couple of other I worked on in the past Battle of Dien Bien Phu and Battle of the Bulge. There is no popular culture section in Dien Bien Phu and although there is large on in the Bulge it has in total 15 citations 4 of which are to web sites. It seems to me that this article easily to the standard of any of those.
- Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Battle of Waterloo/archive1
- Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Battle of Albuera
- Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Battle of Midway
- Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Battle of Dien Bien Phu
- Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Battle of the Bulge/archive1
- It is not clear to me why the FA process was so abruptly terminated. Who arranged for the bot to terminated it and why? And as only one person had proposed the that it be promoted and none opposed, why was it not promoted? --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 12:25, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- I don't know. Looks good at a quick glance. I wonder whether Napoleon's quote at the top could be integrated more smoothly into the text; at the moment, it comes out as a bit ?journalistic. TONY (talk) 13:51, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- I rather suspect that we didn't agree to a historgraphy... and I still don't have a clear idea what that would look like, was rather the rub. However I just don't see anything like that in other battle articles and there are tags all over saying not to put popular culture sections in wiki articles, and we hived off the one here for just that reason. If we go into a historgraphy on Waterloo I am not sure if the reviewers understand that we would be lighting off the nationalistic candles from hell. There are still "histories" coming from the UK press that attempt to minimalise any role other than Britain's to this day and I am sure I am not aware of recent German histories doing their damming only because I don't read German. The Belgium/Netherland/Nassu issues aside (and they won't be aside). Tirronan (talk) 23:50, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- I was also surprised it ended so soon, although i suspect the numbers of noms at FAC are rising, and the article had not I think attracted any support votes as such after 10 days. Waterloo is not just any battle, & appeals citing more obscure encounters miss the point. No doubt when the aspects reviewers felt were missing are added, it should be ok for a second nom, although none of the specialist copy-editors have been over it yet. Johnbod (talk) 18:10, 11 May 2008 (UTC)
- I rather suspect that we didn't agree to a historgraphy... and I still don't have a clear idea what that would look like, was rather the rub. However I just don't see anything like that in other battle articles and there are tags all over saying not to put popular culture sections in wiki articles, and we hived off the one here for just that reason. If we go into a historgraphy on Waterloo I am not sure if the reviewers understand that we would be lighting off the nationalistic candles from hell. There are still "histories" coming from the UK press that attempt to minimalise any role other than Britain's to this day and I am sure I am not aware of recent German histories doing their damming only because I don't read German. The Belgium/Netherland/Nassu issues aside (and they won't be aside). Tirronan (talk) 23:50, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
seems to be a fluke; comment for FAC
- The closing of the FAC seems to be a fluke of some sort. I wouldn't get too anxious about it by any means. Meanwhile, I would've put this comment/request on the FAC page: Would it be possible to add an "Analysis" section immediately above the Aftermath? See Battle of Red Cliffs for an example. This article is kinda longish, and all this talk of square formations and cavalry advances and north-retreating Prussians and "nearest thing you ever saw" has me wondering: what were the crucial factors in Napoleon's defeat?? Thanks Ling.Nut (talk) 14:47, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- A fuller quote is: 'Upon recognising me [Thomas Creevey], he immediately beckoned to me with his finger to come up. . . . The first thing I did was to put my hand out and congratulate him upon his victory. He made a variety of observations in his short, natural, blunt way, but with the greatest gravity all the time, and without the least approach to anything like triumph or joy. "It has been a damned serious business," he said, "Blucher and I have lost 30,000 men. It has been a damned nice thing - the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. Blucher lost 14,000 on Friday night, and got so damnably licked I could not find him on Saturday morning; so I was obliged to fall back to keep up communications with him." Then, as he walked about, he praised greatly those Guards who kept the farm (meaning Hougoumont) against the repeated attacks of the French; and then he praised all our troops, uttering repeated expressions of astonishment at our men's courage. He repeated so often it's being "so nice a thing – so nearly run a thing", that I asked him if the French had fought better than he had ever seen them do before. "No," he said, they have always fought the same since I first saw them at Vimiero." Then he said, "By God! I don't think it would have done if I had not been there."'[3] Sir Arthur Bryant, The Great Duke; or, The invincible general, London: Collins, 1971, p. 453, after Creevey, The Creevey Papers, ed. cit., I, 23-67. -- So there you have one opinion: Wellington thought Wellington was crucial :-) --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:19, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- Which closely mirrors the fact that I, of course, am indispensable to Wikipedia ;-). But seriously– if an "Analysis" section could be added, it would greatly improve the article, in my opinion. Basically it requires little more than pulling out crucial bits from earlier sections, though one or two new observations/bits of info may be germane. 15:24, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- A fuller quote is: 'Upon recognising me [Thomas Creevey], he immediately beckoned to me with his finger to come up. . . . The first thing I did was to put my hand out and congratulate him upon his victory. He made a variety of observations in his short, natural, blunt way, but with the greatest gravity all the time, and without the least approach to anything like triumph or joy. "It has been a damned serious business," he said, "Blucher and I have lost 30,000 men. It has been a damned nice thing - the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. Blucher lost 14,000 on Friday night, and got so damnably licked I could not find him on Saturday morning; so I was obliged to fall back to keep up communications with him." Then, as he walked about, he praised greatly those Guards who kept the farm (meaning Hougoumont) against the repeated attacks of the French; and then he praised all our troops, uttering repeated expressions of astonishment at our men's courage. He repeated so often it's being "so nice a thing – so nearly run a thing", that I asked him if the French had fought better than he had ever seen them do before. "No," he said, they have always fought the same since I first saw them at Vimiero." Then he said, "By God! I don't think it would have done if I had not been there."'[3] Sir Arthur Bryant, The Great Duke; or, The invincible general, London: Collins, 1971, p. 453, after Creevey, The Creevey Papers, ed. cit., I, 23-67. -- So there you have one opinion: Wellington thought Wellington was crucial :-) --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:19, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- Boiled down to its simplist elements the battle was lost due to the fact that:
- The forward positions of Wellington's Armies blunted most of what should have been a devastating attack and absorbed far more resources than they should have from the French.
- That the one attack that was succeeding was torn assunder by the Uxbridge attack.
- That Artillery and Infantry support followed the Cav attacks far too late
- That much of what should have been available to Napoleon to complete his attack on Wellington was siphoned off to fend off the Prussians
- That much of Napy's attention was all directed upon his new right flank leaving Ney to work the other side
- Finally when you look at the failure of the French line with a cold hard eye, Wellington's genius at this defense, 48,000 pissed off Prussians Nappy never accounted for, and 3 complete failures on his line within 10 minutes of one another points to being completely overwhelmed by superior numbers of well motivated troops. Tirronan (talk) 16:28, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
Analysis: Wellington beat Marshals Soult 7 times. Neither was the French army in Spain "secondary"; it included many absolutely first line French regiments and divisions including units of the Garde Imperiale; there were no better regiments at Waterloo. Generalship is the ability to deliver victory; nothing else matters. The consistent pattern is that Wellington "delivered" victory:- a. In Peninsular with weak Portuguese and suspect Spanish allies. b. At Waterloo with mostly untested British units, unsteady Bavarians and with most Nassau troops having been under Napoleon's command (and still wearing his uniform!) these comprising over 60% of his coalition forces. And he was 7% outnumbered by the French (all veteran regiments) and 60% outnumbered by French artillery under the command of the ultimate "massed battery" artillery general, Napoleon himself, aided by Soult and Ney etc etc. This was as good an army as Napoleon ever had. Napoleon had been kicked up the ass for three years since 1812; hardly had a single success before his abdication in 1814. Napoleon's use of speed of maneuver and the massed column paid off well in his early campaigns against more staid armies, but then smart generals like Wellington developed tactics to defeat him and Napoleon NEVER adapted. Everyone knew he tried to split opposing forces. Everyone knew he tried to "blitkrieg" a defensive line with massed columns. Wellington had the anti-dote for Napoleon's "dinosaur" which worked every single time. "THEY CAME ON IN THE SAME OLD WAY, AND WE BEAT THEM IN THE SAME OLD WAY." Give Wellington almost any body of raw recruits from any nation and he would "deliver victory —Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.109.81.247 (talk) 15:45, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- Well its a bit too British centric for this American but large parts of what you say are valid, understand that Napoleon was still winning a lot of battles after 1812 but what was not happening was that they were no longer battles of annihilation, ie he might force the opposing army out of position but he couldn't destroy it any more. The Russian campaign was the most graphic example, where Napoleon tried over and over to rip the Russian armies to shreds only to see said army march away covered by superior light cav. He could beat the Austrians but just barely and even then it took an incompetent Arch-Duke John to help accomplish the Victory at Wargram. The Prussians of 1813 didn't look anything like the Prussians of 1807 with flexible all arms brigades doing what it took a French Corps to do. They added additional interesting twists in that they could march as fast as the French, and if you pursued them they could and would turn the tables on the over aggressive pursuer by counter-attacking without much warning and turn a retreat into a victory. Even more interesting and to the point of Waterloo you could defeat them but they could and would reorganise faster than was believe possible and return to the fight. Military colleges still teach that that 48 hour turn around of the Prussian Army was one of the great feats of modern warfare and this was a gift of the General Staff. A comparable feat was Patton's turn to the north in 48 hours in the Battle of the Bulge. Tirronan (talk) 16:15, 10 May 2008 (UTC)
- Agreed. Napoleon won a load of battles after 1812, his campaign in France 1814 was possibly his finest. His enemies targetted his marshals - who frequently lost - and avoided Napoleon. He couldn't hope to win a war of attrition. At Waterloo, the Guard was still a magnificent corps, but the army was a shadow of the immaculately trained and organised one on campaigns from 1805 to 1809. In fact, most of the French regulars at Waterloo were only averagely trained and completely inexperienced. Although the French were still probably of better quality than the Anglo-allied or Prussians, it was not a particularly good army. It's not that Napoleon never adapted either. It's more that in 1805 everyone had a obsolete military system except France, and over 10 years they'd learnt from the French development and caught up. I think the key to the victory was Wellington's impeccable defence to gain time, and the Prussian restoration and determination after Ligny to get back to the fight. Napoleon could never defeat both armies together.Agema (talk) 10:57, 29 May 2008 (UTC)
- Zeithen saw so many streaming away from La Hay that he at 1st thought the Allied army was defeated. British regulars were running before Uxbridge's attack. The Prussian's had 2 monumental retreats in Placinoit. If it is true (and folks there is enough disinformation to choke a horse about Waterloo) then they were in excellent company. Tirronan (talk) 21:04, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
Outstanding issues from FAC candidacy
I've attempted to summarise the outstanding issues, from the discussion of the FAC nomination. Once these seem to be addressed, we can re-apply. I'll also be asking the reviewers themselves to come and clarify points if they can. -Kieran (talk) 20:09, 11 May 2008 (UTC)
Item | Current state |
---|---|
refs 1, 2, 3 link to a website | done - ref to books now |
Same for ref 6 | done? Urselius, can you confirm? |
Concern over reliability of http://www.napoleon-series.org/index.html | Urselius has justified. Do we even use this as a source now? Prefer not, Tirronan (talk) 20:14, 12 May 2008 (UTC) |
Item | Current state |
---|---|
Adkin, Barbero, Roberts and Weller may not be reliable sources | Adkin has been defended; Others need to be defended or changed for more reliable sources. |
Lead needs rewriting, too choppy and not eloquent enough. | Part done, more needed |
Copy edit by Roger Davies | Not done |
Background and aftermath need expanding | Not done - is this necessary? |
Add an overview section | Not done - do we have a template? |
Quotations are call-out quotes | Done - all blockquotes now |
Quotations are too long and not explained | Some quotations are there for flavour, the rest are explained/integrated. |
Item | Current state |
---|---|
"Wellington's misapprehension" needs explaining. | done |
Clarify "In the centre about the road south of the inn La Belle Alliance..." | change to "on either side of" or similar |
"Twelve hours later Grouchy, still following his orders, defeated ..." Later than what? | done |
More commons images could be added | not done |
The battle map could be screen-width (see French article) | For whose screen? What does MOS say about this? |
Needs "a brief encyclopedic treatment of the enormous impact of the battle on the rest of the 19th century outside the sphere of pure military history". | Not done |
Item | Current state |
---|---|
The article needs a historiography section | Needs debate. Concerns about WP:POV and WP:BIAS. |
The article needs a "part about the paintings depicting the battle" and references in pop culture section | Needs debate. Concerns about WP:POV, WP:BIAS and WP:TRIVIA. |
Item | Current state |
---|---|
Web references need to be formatted consistently and fleshed out | not done |
- Ref 6 wasn't one of mine, however, it originally comes from: Creevey, T. "The Creevey Papers: A Selection from the Correspondence and Diaries of the Late Thomas Creevey, MP" (Ed. Sir Herbert Maxwell, 3rd edn, 1905 pp. 236-237. The original wording was: "It has been a damned nice thing - the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life." No doubt the use of the word "damned" ensured it being bowdlerised for public consumption.
- Ref 9 (was Chandler is now Siborne, W) is fine, I changed the wording in the text to reflect the slight shift of emphasis in the Siborne passage, but it is now quite kosher.
- Barbero is a paid up professional academic, I don't think he needs defending from him being labelled "not academic enough" - or - God-forbid - an interested amateur. Also he does not have a nationalistic axe to grind - a positive attribute.
- Weller's work is slightly dated, but none the worse for that. He was an ardent admirer of Wellington but being an ardent Bonapartist (Bonapartisan? - such as Chandler) never stopped anyone having their work treated seriously, so I don't think that this can be a reasonable objection. Also Weller was an American, Anglophile admittedly, but also someone without an overt nationalist axe to grind.
Urselius (talk) 21:03, 11 May 2008 (UTC)
- On the so-called "popular culture" issue, please read again what the reviewers actually said. For the full-width map (just a thought), see the French article. Johnbod (talk) 00:15, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- That table was written at around midnight after trawling through the 3-4 page discussion that the FA review turned into. I created it with every intention that the reviewers edit it to clarify or correct the points where I got them wrong. It's a wiki - please feel free to alter it to better reflect your points. (And I'm sorry if I came across strongly in places.) -[[Kieran (talk)]] (talk) 19:22, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- On the so-called "popular culture" issue, please read again what the reviewers actually said. For the full-width map (just a thought), see the French article. Johnbod (talk) 00:15, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
I think I understand the "In the centre about the road south of the inn La Belle Alliance" problem. This is an English usage issue, the word 'about' is used in a slightly archaic, though completely legitimate, way here. In this context 'about' means 'surrounding' with the inference of being 'equally-disposed on either side.' In the context used the word 'about' does not mean "approximately." In the same way 'without' in the Easter hymn "There is a green hill far away, without a city wall" means "outside of" not "lacking" - no one would build a city wall around a bare hill.
IMHO this does not warrant change, just a general improvement in English language education - its a very subtle language let's use it to the full. :)
Urselius (talk) 20:55, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- Ah, finally - it should be changed to "on either side of". A passage like this is not the place to try effects of style. Johnbod (talk) 21:40, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- Linguistic kill-joy ;) - I revelled in using the word 'involute' in a paper I wrote recently! Urselius (talk) 07:46, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
It is used quite commonly in mathematics and numerate sciences e.g. "Centred about the X-axis" so most educated people ought to be familiar with this use of "about". A similar usage is also found in the common expressions like "out and about" (see b below). The OED says
about, adv. and prep.
- A. (without obj. expressed) adv. I. Position.
- 1. a. Around the outside, around; on every side.
- b. Towards every side, in every or any direction from a point, all round; fig. in cast about, look about.
- 2. Less definitely: on any side; near, in the neighbourhood, without defining the exact direction.
- 3. Nearly, approximately; not many more or less;—used with numbers or quantities. (Almost prepositional: about a hundred men were there = men, about a hundred in number, were there. See B9.)
- 4. Hence, in familiar language, of degrees of quality: nearly, almost, all but. much about: very nearly.
- II. Motion. ...
- B. (with object expressed) prep. I. Position. ...
- II. Motion. ...
There are lots of different meanings all derive from the first one, so I see no harm in keeping the phrase as it is in common use and a primary meaning of the word "about". --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 09:23, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Let's see what Roger thinks, shall we? 11:20, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- For what it's worth, my view is that we should be using language that communicates clearly and unambiguously to a massive global audience. This article was viewed 77,401 times in April 2008. --ROGER DAVIES talk 19:00, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- I agree let it be so. Tirronan (talk) 00:40, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
Where to next? Featured Article work
Right, so it seems that, in part due to lack of interest, the FA discussion got archived. I think mainly we got a bit distracted by Awadewit's comments, and missed quite a few important smaller ones, which are tabulated above.
So, what we need are to fix the minor and fixable items, debate some of the larger and more controversial ones, and try to advertise the FA nomination on MILHIST next time to attract more reviewers. I'll get started over the next few days, but need to get on with other work for now. -Kieran (talk) 20:13, 11 May 2008 (UTC)
- What we really need is at least one reviewer who has a military history background, I just got the impression that the last group of reviewers were rather economic and social history orientated, possibly not a useful direction to come from when reviewing military articles.
Urselius (talk) 21:19, 11 May 2008 (UTC)
- Oh, dear, missing the point again. Apart from the sources and historiography points, the main concerns were about an exclusively military historical approach; personally I was perfectly happy with that side of things, but Waterloo cannot be restricted to that. I don't know who you thought was "economic and social history orientated". Johnbod (talk) 00:19, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- Well the following gave me a certain impression: ""tended to shift the emphasis more towards the underlying structure of the Napoleonic regime....it is now fashionable to view the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 'experience' not so much as a succession of ruptures which ended in military dictatorship, but more as an evolving process with important themes of continuity across the whole period". This change in historiography was so important that it was taught in my undergraduate class." This backed up with the pigeon post-stuff suggested "Ec Soc Hist" to me. Exactly how 'evolutionary' a 'revolution' can be perplexes my mind, I must admit.
- I am certain that the historiography of the treatment of the battle cannot be fitted in with recent trends in Napoleonic history as a whole, the two things are just too different. The historiography of the battle is intimately tied up with nationalistic bias and agendas, and reactions against them. For example it is now fashionable to maximise the Dutch-Belgian contribution to the battle, even British authors are subscribing to this view. This is a reaction against earlier British histories where the D/Bs were roundly damned as being an encumbrance to the British and German elements of the Allied forces. This doesn't fit with an "evolving process" it is a volte-face.Urselius (talk) 11:00, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- In the ==Aftermath== section we have a paragraph:
:::Waterloo was a decisive battle in more than one sense. It definitively ended the series of wars that had convulsed Europe, and involved many other regions of the world, since the French Revolution of the early 1790s. It also ended the political and military career of Napoleon Bonaparte, one of the greatest commanders and statesmen in history. Finally, it ushered in almost half a century of international peace in Europe; no major conflict was to occur until the wars resulting from the unifications of Germany and Italy in the latter half of the 19th century.
- Perhaps we could add a paragraph to that. But this is a battle article that is already bigger than the recommended size and it is one of several other articles an overview Hundred Days/Waterloo Campaign and more detailed articles:
- Perhaps as Urselius would like to write his article about the historiography of the battle. Good luck to him because it will need to be a very big article and difficult to construct because of the NPOV! Perhaps we should move Waterloo in popular culture to Cultural impact of the Battle of Waterloo and add the Pigeons, Waterloo Day, Lord Uxbridge's leg, the relative peace in Europe until the War of 1870, etc to that article and then put a brief summary into this article --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:47, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- Add to that Napoleonic War which does go into the entire arc (with regretable laspes) and the Battle of Wavre. Perhaps the answer is to give them a Historiography of the battle but its going to be ugly as hell, with the prejudice of the various nations really coming out in full. There isn't a German alive that doesn't think that Wellington betrayed them in the worst fashion for perhaps 100 years and that still goes on somewhat to this day. I read a history called the cousin's war and the brief treatment of Waterloo and the utter dismissal of the Prussians let me know that trend is still alive and well also. I'd suggest that we write it and put it up in draft form and let the chips fall where they may but its going to be a 40k article in its own right at best. Tirronan (talk) 16:48, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
Two comments from Awadewit
I was asked to continue the discussion from FAC here. Here are my two major concerns about the article:
- Sourcing: I haven't had time to do my line-by-line analysis of the article yet (due to the family issues that called me away from the FAC), but I am still concerned about the sourcing in the article. It seems light for a topic as significant as Waterloo. I am concerned that the article is sourced to so few books, many of which may be of questionable reliability (I haven't had time yet to see how the 19th-century sources are being used - another concern). That is why I was trying to figure out what the best scholarly works on Waterloo were and how the editors went about their research. If, for example, the editors had said: "I went to Borders and bought the books they had on Waterloo and used those" I would have opposed right then and there. That is not real research. However, from their comments, it is clear that the editors seem to have done some research. Yet, I am quite concerned, for example, that the editors are trying to defend a source that was described as a "coffee table book" in an academic review. We are supposed to be using the best sources for FA articles (ideally, for all articles).
- Comprehensiveness: Lack of information on the war leading up to Waterloo and lack of information on the political and social significance of the battle. I looked at other battle FAs and most of them have such information, particularly for wars and battles that most people are unfamiliar with. I can assure you, for example, that undergraduates are unfamiliar with the Napoleonic Wars and when we teach literature from this period we have to give them a little mini-history lesson. Such sections are a courtesy to the reader and only make sense. Battles do not happen in isolation and their surrounding events must be explained.
I hope that these comments clarify my concerns. Awadewit (talk) 17:43, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- Thank you, I really do understand where you are coming from but in most of your concerns I think that I always did. Which coffee table book do you refer to? I think most of us have enough sourcing to be able to recite without referring to a single source or at the least back it up with another better regarded source. I think we really can put together a brief 3 paragraph background and probably should do the same with an aftermath, it was the end of the game of thrones and the begining of the balance of power in Europe and that alone warrents an aftermath section. My concerns are around the popular culture and historgraphic sections remain in as much that I am concerned that the tone remain serious and that an article that rose above national bias remain so. Tirronan (talk) 18:27, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- The Adkin book I imagine is the "coffee tabler," I can see that there are two reviews in academic journals, unfortunately I'm at home so I don't have access to them at present; tomorrow, time permitting, I'll have a look at them from my work computer which will give me automatic access as I'm - Oh God! - an academic researcher myself. I'll just say that Adkin's book is insanely detailed and not composed in the fashion of a narrative history (deliberately); does it have lots of nice pictures and maps? - yes - does this make it a worthless book? - no. Have I found any factual mistakes in it? - no. Have I found factual mistakes in Longford, Chandler, Howarth, Barbero? - yes. Urselius (talk) 20:32, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- Couldn't get the 'History Today' review but the Journal of Military History (Vol 66 no.3 p. 846) review says "coffee table" and, to paraphrase, 'not suited to the academic researcher' - because it doesn't follow the "paper-trail" format of academic volumes, but the review also says "... book is a great success" and "... is a formidable accomplishment." A French review - http://www.critiqueslibres.com/i.php/vcrit/13552 - says it is "Le "must" absolu" - a nice bit of Franglais! Modern historians, Hofschroer not the least, lean quite heavily on Siborne's work of the 1840s and that doesn't even have an index, much less a bibliography. I think it would be a great disservice to the reader of the wiki article not to include well researched and written works merely because they do not follow slavishly the format of academic writing, after all only a tiny minority of potential readers will be academics and, frankly, they will want independant verification for anything said here anyway. A very small proportion of books written on military history are intended purely for academic audiences (they would not sell), even books like Hofschroer's, which have an academic format, also have a populist agenda. Urselius (talk) 08:22, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
- My original comment was this: "I question the use of Adkin, which according to a review I read by Clifford Harmon from VMI in the Journal of Military History, is a coffee table book without references and an unhelpful bibliography. According to the review, the bibliography also reveals "an almost total lack of French sources" which handicaps Adkins analysis. While the reviewer says that the book has its good points - bringing history alive - I'm not sure that this is the type of source we want to be using.". - I am not only concerned about the book's lack of academic apparatus, such as footnotes, but the fact that the author doesn't seem to have consulted French works. Awadewit (talk) 14:16, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
- Chandler more than a few, Barbero 5 by count, never read Longford, Gave up on Howarth as hopeless, Hamilton-Williams about 12 and 2 of them serious. Tirronan (talk) 20:56, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
- There are only seven modern books on Waterloo in the bibliography (only half of which I have been able to track down reviews for so far). Considering this is such a major topic, I am concerned that the article may reflect only a narrow band of research. For example, are we sure that the article reflects the major theories regarding Napoleon (in the bibliographic essay I read, it indicated there were several theories regarding his generalship and pointed to at least to different books on this)? Also, the "wider, political, social, and economic repercussions" of the battle across Europe, central to Esdaile's study, is left out of this article. I must say that I find it hard to believe that a comprehensive article, representing the major scholarly viewpoints, can be written from so few books. That one of my concerns regarding comprehensiveness - political and social effects of the battle - is actually listed as one of the strengths of a book not included in the bibliography reassures me that I am not entirely offbase here. Awadewit (talk) 14:16, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
- I have some difficulties in understanding the need for a very large number of modern works, this is history not particle physics, there has been no "Quantum Theory" to revolutionise history, just trends and fads. Most modern works merely retread older ones, sometimes with a novel thesis, often without. If I saw an article about an event of two centuries ago which didn't cite contemporary, or nearly contemporary sources I would be much more worried.Urselius (talk) 18:53, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
- I have finished my quick search for reviews on Barbero, Roberts, and Weller. I found a reference to Weller here. The article indicates that Weller's work is widely accepted among "enthusiasts" but is considered "worshipful of Wellington" and "antiquarian". There is a New York Times review of Roberts, but it does not analyze the scholarship of the book in any depth. It says: "Both [referring to a comparison book] are admirably researched and stylishly written. But "Waterloo" demands, at most, a couple of hours of reading time. It delivers the maximum amount of information, and pleasure, in the minimum number of minutes - an unbeatable deal." - Apparently the book is short and informative. It would be nice to have more information on these books - these analyses are too short on which to form a judgment. Also, I still haven't found anything on Barbero. Awadewit (talk) 14:32, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
- Here is a review on Chesney [[4]] perhaps that will be of a help
- Indeed Hero worship is one of the things we have had to work against here as well as some attempts by two of the Commanding Generals to cover up mistakes in reports later in life so please also be aware that there are attempts at deliberate misinformation as well in the sourcing. Tirronan (talk) 15:47, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
- The use of multiple source become less on an issue if all we are doing is relating what happened when, as much of the narrative is agreed by most sources (with exceptions like when the battle started, merde, where and when Blucher and Wellington met etc, where we have mentioned alternative views). The use of modern sources becomes more relevant for a historiography of the article, scholarly analysis of why such and such happened and analysis of the faults and failings of the commanders, the impact of this specific battle on history and other POV issues. To date we have shied away from this because the history of the battle's details is a very large topic in its own right, and as this article is as large as it is historiography probably should go into a sub article with a brief summary in this article to note that these interpretations are myriad and often nationalistic. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:07, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
- I do not think the article is complete without an explanation of "why such and such happened and analysis of the faults and failings of the commanders, the impact of this specific battle on history". Yes, there are going to various theories regarding these questions. That is why quite a bit of research is required. "Just the facts" is not enough. We must present readers with explanations of those facts, otherwise the facts will not make any sense. Awadewit (talk) 17:56, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- I was going to say more or less exactly that. We only really need to be pedantic where we are citing analysis from books. Where straight facts are cited (which unit was where and when), this is of less concern. I also agree on historiography warranting a separate article - it seems to me that the historiography is a topic much broader than the battle itself, and could fall under an article titled "Historiography of the Napoleonic Wars", or some such, but I'm not sure that it falls within the scope of the article on the battle. This does merit further discussion, though, as it seems that the main contributors to the article feel this way, whereas many of the FA reviewers felt otherwise. -Kieran (talk) 20:18, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
- I agree that entire articles could be written regarding these theories (probably one on Napoleon's generalship alone!), but that does not mean a summary of such material should not be in this article. There are many aspects to a battle and the explanation of why the battle happened in the first place, the effect of the battle, the poor/excellent strategies of commanders, etc. are all a part of that. One way to figure out what should be in the article is to figure out what the experts say about it and they discuss the Battle of Waterloo from all of these other viewpoints. We must as well, if we want to provide good information to our readers. Awadewit (talk) 17:56, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
I've looked through Hofschröer's two volumes and cannot find a single reference to Siborne, but we are told here he leaned hevily on it. Is there any evidence for this, or is the claim the usual BS?
Roger Davies is on board
Roger Davies has agreed to take on copy editing the article as a prelude to the FA re-nomination. Since he seems to be fairly widely considered an excellent copy editor, especially of military history articles, this is an excellent thing. He's somewhat familiar with the material, but has asked that we keep an eye to that nothing important gets taken out. Urselius, Tirronan and Philip, can you guys be on the alert? He reckons it will happen over the course of the next two weeks, in stages. -Kieran (talk) 21:08, 12 May 2008 (UTC)
Jomini
Have added a small section on Jomini's ideas about the principal reasons behind Boney's defeat. It also ups our French sources quota. Hope all find it cogent. Urselius (talk) 19:20, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
Images
I've been looking around a little, and have dug up a few that might be worth adding.
![](http://up.wiki.x.io/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e9/Marechal_Ney.jpg/305px-Marechal_Ney.jpg)
The German article also has a portrait of von Gneisenau, but the copyright is uncertain on that one, so we probably can't use it for now. -Kieran (talk) 20:36, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
- The re-enaction is terrible, and brings the history channel to mind; don't go there. Byt the way does Ziethen have a first name. Ceoil (talk) 21:57, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
![](http://up.wiki.x.io/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f2/Grognard1813.jpg/150px-Grognard1813.jpg)
- Yes, General Zeithen had a 1st name, I'll look it up tonight for you. Hans Ernst Karl, Graf von Zieten. Ney controlled most of the battle from 4pm on the left flank as the Prussians were on the field and started to make a real problem on a new right flank from that time on and required quick reinforcement over and over throughout the afternoon. Problem here being that had the Prussians broke through at Placenoit then it was as short straight march right into the rear of the flank fighting Wellington and instant game over. Tirronan (talk) 23:27, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
- Often (usually?) spelt Zieten :) --ROGER DAVIES talk 07:15, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Of course the "th" spelling is a fossil in German of the time when German speakers pronounced the sound (like English, Greek, Castillian and Icelandic speakers still do - to some extent). The spelling Zeithen entered English usage when German still tended to use 'th', on that count I would stick with it. Subsequent changes in German spelling conventions should not affect previously established English usage. Urselius (talk) 07:51, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Indeed, though the article on en:Wiki has him as Zieten (as does de:Wiki). Incidentally, Zieten gets 82,000 ghits, as against Ziethen's 176. --ROGER DAVIES talk 07:59, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Of course the "th" spelling is a fossil in German of the time when German speakers pronounced the sound (like English, Greek, Castillian and Icelandic speakers still do - to some extent). The spelling Zeithen entered English usage when German still tended to use 'th', on that count I would stick with it. Subsequent changes in German spelling conventions should not affect previously established English usage. Urselius (talk) 07:51, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Often (usually?) spelt Zieten :) --ROGER DAVIES talk 07:15, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
![](http://up.wiki.x.io/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/Napoleon-imperial-guard.png/250px-Napoleon-imperial-guard.png)
I've wondering about the merits of this:
- Hofschröer, Peter. The Prussians and Wellington at Waterloo (Questions to Peter Hofschröer supplied by our visitors)
and what the "our vistors" refers to. --ROGER DAVIES talk 08:55, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Since his books are cited by me about 50 times, next to none. Tirronan (talk) 10:18, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- It is a quote from the first line of the online article. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:38, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Since his books are cited by me about 50 times, next to none. Tirronan (talk) 10:18, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- Thanks both of you. Expunged. --ROGER DAVIES talk 10:50, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
There's a 180° panorama of the field today on the French article. image here. It's annotated in French, so would need some interaction with the author to acquire the original photo. Is this worthwhile? The Panorama gives some sense of the dimensions of the field, even though the topology has all changed. If it seems worth following up, I'm happy to do the legwork. -Kieran (talk) 16:43, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
- There are a couple of general images in Battle of Ligny article that could be used. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 17:22, 15 May 2008 (UTC)
The infantry regiment depicted in the photo on the left is the 16th (Dutch) Chasseur battalion, commanded by Hulstein. Tirailleur (talk) 22:42, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
Which variety of British English?
As you know, Britain has two spelling systems. One is Oxford spellings (-iz- instead of -is-, ie realize, organize, organization) and the other is Cambridge (-is- instead of -iz-, ie realise, organise, organisation). My preferred route, which Awadewit and I have used extensively, is Oxford (-iz-), largely because Brits are used to it and it doesn't look too jarring to American eyes. Does anyone object to this? --ROGER DAVIES talk 11:28, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
- I don't like it, but that is just a personal preference - just don't get me started on 'which' and 'that'! :) The quotes should be left unaltered if they use the alternate though - I would opine. Urselius (talk) 12:56, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
- Prefer Oxford myself just because so many American's use a version of it over here. Tirronan (talk) 14:36, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
- "ise" "largely because Brits are used to it" and they are not used to "ize" which looks American, as does soccer, although neither are American. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:00, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
- Besides Oxford gives Harvard something to hate and since most Texas types hate Havard... Sorry had to throw a joke in there somewhere. Tirronan (talk) 18:06, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
- "ise" "largely because Brits are used to it" and they are not used to "ize" which looks American, as does soccer, although neither are American. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:00, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
- Prefer Oxford myself just because so many American's use a version of it over here. Tirronan (talk) 14:36, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
(od) The bulk are "ise" so I suppose (grudgingly) that's the existing default variety :) Will fix. --ROGER DAVIES talk 08:48, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- The OED's failure to reverse its first and second spellings of "iz" and "is" to reflect longstanding practice in BrEng is gobsmacking. What are they doing? Use the es, please. The zed jars with me. TONY (talk) 09:00, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- As a former OED reader, I'm used to it. What does the OUP style guide mandate these days? --ROGER DAVIES talk 09:40, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- Regrettably, OUP goes with first spellings on the OED. It simply discredits OED that it hasn't changed with the times; on that topic, The Times is holding out as the only major Br newspaper that zeds everything. TONY (talk) 10:08, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- Not even The Times ... From their style guide: "-ise, -isation avoid the z construction in almost all cases, eg, apologise, organise, emphasise, televise. But note capsize, synthesizer". The occasional "connexion" still sneaks in though. Bless 'em :) --ROGER DAVIES talk 10:23, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- That is welcome news; must have been in the past few years. The disadvantage of the American maximised-zed system is that there's a huge page of "s" exceptions; maximising the use of "s" involves a relatively tiny list of exceptions. TONY (talk) 11:17, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- Not even The Times ... From their style guide: "-ise, -isation avoid the z construction in almost all cases, eg, apologise, organise, emphasise, televise. But note capsize, synthesizer". The occasional "connexion" still sneaks in though. Bless 'em :) --ROGER DAVIES talk 10:23, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- Regrettably, OUP goes with first spellings on the OED. It simply discredits OED that it hasn't changed with the times; on that topic, The Times is holding out as the only major Br newspaper that zeds everything. TONY (talk) 10:08, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- As a former OED reader, I'm used to it. What does the OUP style guide mandate these days? --ROGER DAVIES talk 09:40, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
Hofschroer notes
The notes seem to refer to several sources. The likeliest are:
- Hofschröer, Peter (1998). 1815: The Waterloo Campaign. Vol. 1: Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1853673047
- Hofschröer, Peter (1999). 1815: The Waterloo Campaign. Vol. 2: The German Victory. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1853673689
- Hofschröer, Peter (2005). Waterloo 1815: Quatre Bras and Ligny. London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 978-1844151684
so I've listed all three in references. Could someone (Tirronan perhaps?) familiar with the material, please tie the notes - Hofshroer (1998) pp 23-24; Hofschroer (2005) pp 45-46 etc - into the refs? Any "unused" books could go into Further Reading.
Many thanks, --ROGER DAVIES talk 08:54, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- PS:I've created a stub for Peter Hofschröer. It's very skimpy (hint). --ROGER DAVIES talk 10:43, 18 May 2008 (UTC)
- I'll start on that but last I recall about 97% of it came from book 2 ISBN 978-1853673689 Tirronan (talk) 03:22, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
- I've know Peter for about 15 years now though not by my username LOL. Pretty nice guy actually. Tirronan (talk) 00:14, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
Historiography
There's great merit in a short section (perhaps two paragraphs?) on this. It's a kind of critical reception of the battle, which is I suppose why it was clamoured for at FAC. It really could be a brief roundup, tracing the first flush of publishing (survivors/commanders memoires/apologias) to dispassionate analysis, in chronological order. While I accept it could run to thousands of words, there's no real need to, as its purpose is simply to chart in broad strokes the main trends. Thoughts? --ROGER DAVIES talk
- I guess the main points of such a historiography would be
- - the Waterloo dispatch;
- - the 19th century Prussian view (Clausewitz's, basically);
- - mythmaking on St Helena;
- - Chesney and the re-emphasis of the Prussians;
- - Pflugk-Harttung and the Zieten's letter controversy;
- - the position today;
- - the protagonists' reputations today.
- what did I miss? Tirailleur (talk) 13:23, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
In the English speaking world there are the "popular accounts" by eyewitnesses, such as Cotton, written fairly soon after the battle. The synthesis by W Siborne in the 1840's which gives the Prussians due respect but is scathing on the Dutch-Belgians, and the collection of eyewitness accounts he made which was published in part by his son and then finally the rest by Glover a few years ago.
The other approach is the various viewpoints adopted by writers - Wellington won it, Napoleon lost it, Ney lost it, Grouchy lost it, Blucher won it, Germans of various origins won it etc.
Urselius (talk) 15:39, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- You also have Muffling's account (and many ommissions covering his screw ups), French Historians have to be brought up Chesney outlines the most important, Chesney outlines the most important works on Waterloo by German, Austrian, Netherland, and Belgium, authors as well as of Mid 1860's anyway. Interestingly, he doesn't spare much of anyone for shoddy or overly nationalist work including British authors and while not as scathing as PH on Prussian General's mistakes it does give a refreshing air of truth in a time when no one would look beyond a flag.
- He outlines Siborns work
- Fairly blasts various British works out there dismissing Prussian contribution
- Takes on French Historians for taking Napoleon at his word without a bit of checking
- Notes Mufflings good work, PH calls him out later
- Clausewitz is talked about
This is probably the place to go for evaluations of trends in historgraphy trends up to this point. However if we are going to do this then it has to be consistent and fair, there are still awful histories coming out to this day on Waterloo or in part of Waterloo, the History Channel and The Cousins war come to mind fairly quickly. Tirronan (talk) 16:32, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- I have just come across this book An Annotated Bibliography of the Napoleonic Era: Recent Publications, 1945-1985 by Jack A. Meyer, described on the web at www.amazon.ca
- Meyer, a historian of US regional and European history, has compiled a bibliography on the Napoleonic era, a topic closely related to his master's thesis and dissertation.... The 1,754 monographic entries, mainly in English and Western European languages with some Slavic language entries, are accessible by braod categories ... Nearly two hundred thousand scholarly books and monographs have been published about the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era during the last two hundred years. ...
- So it might take a rather long time to compile a balanced historiography based on a wide cross section of sources! --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:27, 28 May 2008 (UTC)
At the risk of opening a can of OR worms....
I've just noticed we repeat the story about how a French attack around Wellington's right would have pushed his army closer to Blucher's. Of course, it might not have done - it might have caused him to retreat headlong to "run around the hook" and thereby put him further away from Blucher.
This seems obvious to me but I can't recall a cite for it. What is it, OR? Should we leave the text in as it stands? Tirailleur (talk) 22:50, 22 May 2008 (UTC)
- PH's 1st book does call that out and its not the only one. The Duke was very concerned about being flanked about his right and driven off his supplying ports its often stated that he had left the 17,000 troops in Hal for just such an event though I don't know who has a source on that. Tirronan (talk) 00:10, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- If I was given the option of falling back on 60,000+ allies or running the gauntlet, with an unavoidably open left flank, in order to fall back on my lines of communication I know which one I'd pick. :) Urselius (talk) 09:17, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- I don't have Waterloo Lectures: A Study Of The Campaign Of 1815 to hand (long story), but Charles Chesney says that Wellington mentioned after the battle that if his position had been forced at Waterloo he would not have retreated north towards Brussels (through the woods with no bottom) but intended to retreat east towards the Prussians. If that was his intention at Waterloo then it is reasonable to assume that had Boney gone for the flank attack towards Mons, then Wellington would have gone to his left with his full army. Next week I should have the book in hand and can look up the page number. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 09:21, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- Thanks, that would be useful. I can't remember where I first read this, but Wellington was, IIRC, always very conscious of the fact that he led - and had to preserve - Britain's only field army. Therefore, a threat to his right might have induced him to do a Corunna and run for the coast, knowing he could preserve his army and perhaps inflict a few checks on the French en route. As I recall, Napoleon's strategy against Moore was to achieve just this - to frighten the "leopards" back into their ships - and it pretty much worked. Tirailleur (talk) 13:17, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- The British army in Belgium 1793-95 retreated to the north German coast, they were a wreck by the time they embarked though it must be said. Urselius (talk) 15:42, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- For a lot of reasons I would think retreating along the Namur line along with the Prussians would have made more sense but Hal seems a long way from that if that was what he intended. However I confess of all the things about Waterloo that confound me that position of 17k troops he was going to horribly need makes the least sense to me and I have never had a good explaination for it. Tirronan (talk) 16:39, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- I think they were there as a precaution for a flank attack. Napoleon loved enveloping attacks. Just a couple of divisions into the rear of the army, cutting supply lines, and so on, would be a disaster. I wonder if Wellington was also concerned about losing Brussels (which he was ordered to defend). If he were pushed back in battle, he could reasonably abandon it. If the French managed to just marched straight in or outmanoeuvered him, it would have been humiliating.Agema (talk) 11:46, 29 May 2008 (UTC)
wellington intended to abandon Brussels if it meant saving his British contingent of his army by re-embarking them at a port. He had covering forces on his flanks BUT he did get caught out at the campaign start when Napoleon struck at not the coast flank Wellington worried about, but at the very juncture where his flank met Blucher's Prussian army right flank. In the battle, it was only Wellington's heavy cavalry brigades that stopped D'erlon's Corps from breaking through unopposed to Brussels -if they'd chosen to plunge ahead that far-this is contrary to the myths that D'Erlon was stopped in his tracks by Picton's 4 brigades of British and Hanoverians. --Joey123xz (talk) 15:08, 4 September 2008 (UTC)
I now have Waterloo Lectures: A Study Of The Campaign Of 1815 to hand (long story), Charles Chesney wrote in the Preface to the Third Edition (march 13 1847) page xii in my edition (Greenhill books 1997):
The other point relates to the question of Wellington's supposed line of retreat in case of his position at Waterloo having been forced before the Prussians came up. It has been usually taken for granted that this would have lain direct to his rear through the wood of Soignies, and much controversy has arisen on the probable advantage or disadvantage or such a course. But if Wellington's own statement, deliberately made not many years after to a Dutch officer of high rank, may be taken literally, he looked to no such movement as advisable at the crises of the battle, but rather to retiring with the bulk of his force directly towards the expected army of Blücher. As in this view his right wing must have been left to effect a separate retreat westward, a fair solution is at once offered of that obstinate retention to the last detachment at Hal, on which so much criticism has been spent. I have not hesitated to adopt this view, since the fact of his having contemplated thus retiring rests upon good evidence, due to the research of Professor Büdinger of Zürich...
--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:22, 20 June 2008 (UTC)
- I'm inclined to believe that had the battle started at 6am with 'ground-dry' conditions, Napoleon would've opted for a Nivelle roadway flanking attack. His grand battery would have had a field day blasting the Allied positions without any blocking terrain protecting the Allied right rear positions all the way to the Brussels road - indeed all the ground behind Mont St.Jean was utterly flat and valley-like. Wellington would surely have retreated to Brussels if the pressure just on his right flank alone had become unbearable and his line of retreat been threatened with being cut. He undoubtedly would have left Blucher to his own fate to save his own army in my opinion in such a situation.--Joey123xz (talk) 00:52, 3 November 2008 (UTC)
No Middle Guard in 1815
We currently have the description of the Guard's attack in line with most writing, which is to say it is described as an attack by the Middle Guard.
I understand that in fact, the Middle Guard was not reactivated in 1815, and that the Grenadiers and Chasseurs were all characterised by the War Ministry as "Old" Guard.
Hitherto, the two senior Grenadier and Chasseur regiments, and the officers and NCOs of the 2nd Grenadier and Chasseur regiments, had been considered "Old Guard". The rank and file of the 2nd regiments were deemed Middle Guard, as were all members of the Fusilier-Grenadier and the Fusilier-Chasseur regiments. The latter were not reconstituted at all for 1815; the 3rd and 4th regiments were new. There had previously been a Dutch 3rd Grenadiers, but they were annihilated to the last man in Russia.
This came to my attention when a published author on Napoleonic artillery alluded to this matter on a message board elsewhere. There are at least two available cites for this; Lachouque / Brown in Anatomy of Glory; Esposito and Elting in A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars; and Elting again in Swords Around A Throne. I have only the latter, in which he says "...it was a hasty mustering, never completed. The Old Guard infantry comprised four regiments each of grenadiers and chasseurs..." (p202). So he labels them Old Guard but does not labour the point about the absence / nonactivation of the Middle Guard.
I don't have copies of the other two. Does anyone else? Can we check? It's at Map 158 in the Atlas. I ask because Houssaye, whom we have used as - for example - our source for the Guard heavy cavalry division's losses - says that the two junior formations were considered to at the time to be Middle Guard though officially / technically of the Old Guard; i.e. he is either on the fence or aligned with the orthodoxy depending on how one wants to take that.
I think the account we have of the Guard's attack is, quite frankly, one of the clearest I've read, online or elsewhere. It would be a pity to slip up on a checkable technicality. Tirailleur (talk) 13:38, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- I think that there were two levels of organisation operating here. Officially there were three divisions in the Guard infantry, the Young Guard Division, the Grenadier Division and the Chasseur Division, each of which had its own commander. However, this administative system was demonstrably not applied in practice on the field of battle. The Young Guard did function as a unit, but the grenadiers and chasseurs were combined into mixed "functional divisions" allocated by order of seniority. Therefore there were de facto, 'Old Guard' and 'Middle Guard' divisions operating on the battlefield because that is how they were deployed. Besides there is the Ney quote - and he calls the attacking formation "Middle Guard" - I would say that Ney was a definitive "horse's mouth." Urselius (talk) 15:23, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- I agree in offical demarkation there was never a "Middle Guard" though it was there as a operational unit and acting as such. There was both in the Young Guard. Tirronan (talk) 16:43, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
- Yes, officially the War Ministry had only two bodies determined for the Imperial Guard infantry in the Waterloo campaign -Old and Young Guard.
- Though the War Ministry did not term 3rd+4th Gr/Ch Regiments as Middle Guard [which in the 1813-14 campaigns consisted of the Fusilier-Grenadiers and Fusilier-Chausseurs regiments [with shako headwear]; apparently though the Army -[1] -Infantry of the Imperial Guard, and Napoleon himself still referred to the 3rd/4th Gr/Chaus regiments as the Middle Guard in the Waterloo campaign. see below for source.
- The Middle Guard and Old Guard were not divided in separate divisions as in previous campaigns;
- In reality they existed as motley Divisions;
- One Division of Grenadiers under Gen.Friant- with 2 brigades;
- one being Old Guard [1st and 2nd Regiments]
- the next being Middle Guard [ 3rd and 4th Regiments]
- One Division of Chausseurs under Gen.Morand and Michel- with 2 brigades;
- one being Old Guard [1st and 2nd Regiments]
- the next being Middle Guard [ 3rd and 4th Regiments]
- One Division of Young Guard under Gen. Duhesme and Barrois -with 2 bigades;
- one being Tirailleurs [1st and 3rd regiments]
- the next being Voltigeurs [1st and 3rd regiments]
- These Middle and Young Gd regiments in the Waterloo campaign were not the hard core veterans of the Guard that existed throughout the Napoleonic Wars. The Old Guard units were of that legendary calibre however which 8 and more years of service for eligibility in those seasoned ranks.
- The Middle Guard alone were the units that were launched across the width of the ridge in between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte against Wellington's positions. The Old Guard - the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard and the Chausseurs of the Imperial Guard [ less the 2 battalions deployed at Plancenoit ] advanced with the Middle Guard but they were halted by Napoleon south-west of La Haye Sainte -waiting as a tactical reserve pending the outcome of the Middle Guard's attack.
- Napoleon himself in his memoirs of Waterloo referred to the 'Middle Guard'.
I ordered General Friant to go with these four battalions of the Middle Guard....
- Napoleon on Napoleon[2], by Somerset de Chair.
- Friant apparently led the Middle Guard brigade of his Grenadier Division [Napoleon was with the Old Guard components of the Grenadiers + Chausseur Divisions in tactical reserve] when he was wounded just as he led the attack which at that point caused chaos in the Allied lines to the north-west of La Haye Sainte - just before one of Chasse's Dutch brigades in the Allied reserve line launched a spectacular counter attack that utterly routed these Middle Guard grenadiers. Of course, it was the Chausseurs Middle Guard brigade to the north-east of Hougoumont that confronted Maitland and Adam and were crushed in their turn. --Joey123xz (talk) 22:16, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- I agree in offical demarkation there was never a "Middle Guard" though it was there as a operational unit and acting as such. There was both in the Young Guard. Tirronan (talk) 16:43, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
List of Commanders
User:Red4tribe has twice added William of Orange to the commanders list. It seems to me that he was entirely subordinate to Wellington, and had no influence on the strategy of the battle, so should not be listed as a commander. Red argues that the same applies to Ney, but he did at least have a degree of independent command in the clashes prior to Waterloo itself, though there may well be a case for taking him out too. David Underdown (talk) 09:59, 10 June 2008 (UTC)
- William of Orange had the same substantive rank and functiion as Rowland Hill (command of a corps), neither were given any great lattitude in deciding how the battle was fought by Wellington, and Uxbridge would have succeeded Wellington in command if the latter had been killed/incapacitated. Better not to have any of these people in the box, if any are included then all must be, and all the French corps commanders, it would become ridiculous.
- Ney is in a different league, he was given authority by Napoleon over the French corps commanders during the battle (with the possible exception of the Imperial Guard) and demonstrably exercised this power to make substatial decisions on deployment during the battle. Personally I think there are sufficient grounds for his name remaining. Urselius (talk) 09:36, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
- Ney in fact did NOT have total authority over Corps commanders. Ney and Grouchy had command of their Corps commanders in their Army wings as long as Napoleon was not present for Corps commanders to get orders directly from Napoleon himself. Technically Ney did have authority -particularly in his row with Gen.Delort at Waterloo as to who he took orders from. [3]--Joey123xz (talk) 00:39, 3 November 2008 (UTC)
- I had missed that about Ney - I'm not sure that's clearly explained in the article as it stands-should it be? David Underdown (talk) 09:41, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
Well, Ney is credited with ordering the grand attack of the massed French cavalry and the combined arms attack immediately after it within the text, so Ney's prominence as a decision-maker during the battle should be fairly evident. The division of responsibility between Napoleon and Ney for decisions made during the battle is rather obscure. Napoleon seems to have been rather sluggish on the day. I guess that once it was decided to use frontal assaults to knock Wellington off his ridge Napoleon considered that Ney was as able as himself, and much more expendable (Ney had horses killed under him and epaulettes shot off so he was considerably exposed), to carry these assaults out. Napoleon seems to have given more thought to the action on his right wing against the Prussians than to micro-managing the assaults against Wellington's troops. Perhaps a paragraph on this issue might make a useful addition. Urselius (talk) 10:57, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
- Geoffrey Wootten in Waterloo 1815: Birth of Modern Europe on page 15 sums up why we should not include anyone in the Wellington's army apart from Wellington. "My plans Sir, are to beat the French" Wellington's explanation of his battle plan to Uxbridge his second in command! --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 13:58, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
- Attacking Wellington's centre with massed cavalry without all arms support, only makes sense if the commander who ordered the attack thought that Wellington's army was in flight (as was to happen to the French later that day). It was a monumental blunder and as we know Napoleon never blundered, Ney must have ordered it without consulting his commander ;-) --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 14:05, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
- That particular user has had various run ins with Admins, and other editors for making changes with little or no citaion whatsoever. He and another user have had serveral run in's with yours truely on the War of 1812 and the American Revolutionary war articles, and some of their clashes have been volcanic to say the least. Given past history I tend to give a close look to anything either of them touches. I'm not at all sure that Ney ordered the Cavalry charge, Chesney gives that to another general in charge of the cavalry but clearly states that but Ney and Napoleon watched the attackes without comment and I would have to assume approval since in fact either could have stopped it at any time. Ney had effective control of what became the French Left and Napoleon worked the right and didn't get that much involved until the ordering of the Guard's assault to my books. Tirronan (talk) 11:59, 18 June 2008 (UTC)
- My original belief was that Ney initially was going to pursue the supposedly retreating Allies with ONLY one cavalry brigade and was infuriated by one of Milhaud's IV Cavalry Corp's division commanders -Delort at only willing to go ahead with committing the brigade of his unit only by Milhaud's own orders. Ney then flew into a rage and committed the whole Corps instead. All this happening while Napoleon was unaware due to his being temporarily out of action with his infamous gut problems that day. That's what I believed. But the text of that episode of the battle by David Hamilton-Williams [4] claims the cavalry attack was actually ordered by Napoleon himself -who was apparently present on the field at 3:30pm. He is clearly stating Ney never orchestrated the cavalry attack but merely led the attack under Napoleon's own orders.--Joey123xz (talk) 22:45, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- In further reading, I see evidence that it was Napoleon who ordered Ney to attack with the cavalry. This needs to be a new topic of debate; Jerome -Napoleon's brother and a division commander at Waterloo wrote in a letter to his wife that "The Emperor ordered Marshal Ney to bear on the enemy's center with the bulk of his cavalry.[5]
- Also Gen. D'Erlon stated the same in his account of Waterloo to the French House of Peers [6]. Napoleon had a habit of ridiculously overlooking his errors and scapegoating where possible.Was Ney a scapegoat for this infamous decision? --Joey123xz (talk) 00:38, 3 November 2008 (UTC)
- Some deeper analysis since my last post. Did Jerome and D'Erlon actually mean in their statements that upon Ney's order to Gen.Delort to charge -who then initially refused to do so unless getting orders from his direct superior -as is well documented, that Napoleon gave orders to support Ney's request for cavalry of Gen.Milhaud's Cavalry Corps to attack Mont st.Jean? --Joey123xz (talk) 14:33, 21 January 2009 (UTC)
I am seeking help from any editors in improving the Duke of Wellingtons biography article. I have so far got up to his time in India. However the biggest section of the article without references (and largely consisting of unverified opinions) is the Waterloo section. I would appreciate any assistance anyone might give (especially those of you with access to the references in this article) to expand the waterloo section. This article is excellent and any help in transfering part of it to the Dukes page would be greatly honoured and appreciated. If you are willing to help please visit the Dukes article or drop me a message. Thank you! LordHarris 19:40, 17 June 2008 (UTC)
Friendly, French-speaking Brussels
A secondary, political, objective was for a Napoleonic victory parade through friendly, French-speaking Brussels.
This line is from the introduction. Is it accurate? If I'm not mistaken, Brussels was not predominantly French-speaking at that time. As for whether it was friendly to Napoleon, I don't know but I am skeptical. Funnyhat (talk) 22:52, 30 July 2008 (UTC)
- I have asked User:Norm mit on the his/her talk page to supply a reference for this recently added statement along with one for the other one added recently "(The bulk of the Peninsular army had been sent to North America to prosecute the War of 1812.)" --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 09:21, 31 July 2008 (UTC)
- Must have been a rather small army, 10,000 with Provost at The Battle of Lake Champlain, 10,000 with Packingham at New Orleans, both wrapped up before the 100 days began. Tirronan (talk) 19:54, 31 July 2008 (UTC)
Belgium
Belgium did not exist (as a state) at the time; was the name in use? The purist in me would prefer to mention the province, with "(now in Belgium)". —Tamfang (talk) 23:31, 7 August 2008 (UTC)
- The name was in use at the time, as shown by much contemporary literature about the area, before the country was incorporated in the Kingdom of the United Netherlands. The name Belgium was used for the governorate-general which was in place from February, 1814 until the de facto incorporation in the kingdom in March, 1815. It was already used during the short-lived attempt at independence in the United States of Belgium in 1790. So I do not see any objection in using "Belgium", as it was not an anachronism.--Ereunetes (talk) 00:45, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
- Thanks. We learn something every day. —Tamfang (talk) 02:02, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
Dutch-Belgian brigades
- This discussion was moved down from the section #Outstanding issues from FAC candidacy as it is now large and more recent than intermediate discussions. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:18, 15 August 2008 (UTC)
I am arriving late to this discussion, and I am not sure this is the right place to insert my remark, but I think a severe objection to the article as it now stands is that it perpetuates some of the howlers first perpetrated by Siborne. An example is placing Bylandt's brigade in an exposed position in front of the ridge, and then subsequently having them decimated by the opening French cannonade. This never happened. Bylandt, like the rest of Wellington's army, was safely behind the ridge. Neither Wellington, nor the capable Dutch officers would have made such a mistake, and they didn't, according to the Dutch after-battle reports (which also didn't mention the brigade being decimated).
- The casualties recorded for Bylandt / Bijlandt's brigade are certainly not consistent with the unit having been blown away by an artillery storm. They were actually very light; a couple of dozen IIRC. The event that does not seem in doubt is that they retreated precipately and took little to no further part in the battle - if they had, then being where they were, they'd have suffered a lot worse.Tirailleur (talk) 10:19, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
To avoid the suspicion that I am parroting Hamilton-Williams, here is a different article, well-documented with Dutch official sources, that describes the movements of the Van Bijlandt brigade in excruciating detail: Erwin Muilwijk,Bylandt's brigade during the morning (2008)I am not dignifying Siborne's aspersions about Dutch cowardice with a comment. Now I noted that the passage in question is justified with a citation of Barbero. But Barbero slavishly follows Siborne. I don't accuse him of a pro-British prejudice, but he is simply misinformed. Hamilton-Williams is not the only one repudiating Siborne (and those following him). In the 19th century the Dutch military historian Willem Jan Knoop (whose bio I am excerpting for wikipedia) already wrote a book repudiating Siborne immediately on many points, basing himself on archival material Siborne never bothered to consult. If the nonsense about the Bylandt-brigade must remain in, at least the controversy should be mentioned in the article. As it now stands it is not just British POV, it is simply factually wrong.--Ereunetes (talk) 20:10, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
Beside the problem with the disposition of Van Bijlandt's brigade, there is a similar problem with another passage that is solely based on Siborne: the anecdote where Lord Uxbridge tries to persuade a Dutch-Belgian brigade of cavalry to follow him in a charge, but they ignore his order. The text in the article gives no particulars, but by tracing the citation in Siborne I have discovered that it concerns an allegation made by Uxbridge against maj.-gen. Trip and his Belgian carabiniers. Now this allegation is made only in Siborne, 20 years after the fact. Other contemporaneous sources don't mention it. To show how implausible the allegation is: Trip was mentioned in dispatches by Wellington on June 19, 1815. His brigade had before this incident engaged the French cuirassiers next to Hougoumont, and sustained heavy casualties. Around the time this alleged incident took place the official Dutch history has the Prince of Orange personally leading the 2nd Reg. Carabiniers (part of the brigade) in a charge. Could they have been in two places at once? Or could it be Uxbridge was simply being ornerey? I think this gratuitous reference should be deleted. If one needs an example of cowardice around this time by cavalrymen, I nominate the Cumberlands. That is a well-documented case that ended in the court-martial and cashiering of their commander.--Ereunetes (talk) 23:23, 4 August 2008 (UTC)
- While David Hamilton-Williams isn't nearly as bad as he has been painted as a historian, I'd be loath to use him as a primary source. That said however the charges are thereby made and Siborne isn't above repute either, I'll dig out my copies of PH and see what he has to say, can anyone else confirm/refute this charge? I'm not at all convinced that Ereunetes might not have a point. Tirronan (talk) 01:28, 5 August 2008 (UTC)
- The Dutch general Knoop was not the only one frothing at the mouth about Siborne's allegations. The Belgian general and military historian Alexis-Michel Eenens also wrote a lengthy refutation, including the point of the alleged flight of the Trip-brigade, citing French sources, like Charras, in Eenens, A.M (1879) "Dissertation sur la participation des Pays-Bas a la campagne de 1815 en Belgique", in: Societé royale des beaux arts et de litérature de Gand, Messager des Sciences Historiques, pp. 131-198. Meanwhile, I think that many of the allegations made by Siborne may be explained by language problems (the British only speaking English, be it in a loud voice :-), and everybody else not understanding what they were going on about). However, "troops fleeing" of course cannot be explained away in this way. Someone must have been economical with the truth. Knoop and Eenens state in not uncertain terms that it must have been Siborne.--Ereunetes (talk) 01:03, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
- We will get this straight, we decided that there were Prussians on the field that day after all and that caused a hoot and holler I can tell you. Tirronan (talk) 02:07, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
- Footnote 55 needs to be changed regarding Bijlandt's brigade. The brigade was moved by General Perponcher on his own initiative from the forward slope onto the Ohain road crest -in front and to the left of Picton's division that was deployed in the road. This was done well before D'Erlon's attack. Furthermore the description of Bijlandt's officers getting slaughtered is inaccurate, Also while a few battalions retreated from D'Erlon's attack, many BRITISH soldiers saw Bijlandt's men mostly firefighting with D'Erlon's columns. Bijlandt retreated as did Picton due to the weight of the French columns surging forward. After D'Erlon was defeated, Bijlandt's brigade was battered and sent several hundred yards to the rear of Picton- THEY NEVER RAN OFF/ NOR LEFT THE BATTLEFIELD AS A UNIT. Many of Bijlandt's troops were used to escort to Brussels the 3,000 French prisoners taken after D'Erlon's failed attack. The current wiki-battle description used for Bijlandt's unit is based on inaccurate 100 year old British 'perceptions' of this phase in the battle- it's not accurate and is unfair to the memory of Bijlandt's soldiers which fought hard throughout the campaign.--96.22.108.10 (talk) 06:06, 2 March 2009 (UTC)
We seem to continually go round in circles on this one, with various people claiming that they know "The Truth". Clearly, sources form all countries should be included and given sensible weighting; however, it is not the job of the article to include or exclude schools of thought. There may be problems with Siborne, but he did do the work and collect eye-witness accounts. All accounts are inherently flaky: most people spent the day in small areas of the battlefield, gunpowder smoke obscured the field, it was very noisy, most had lots of other things on their mind at the time than recording history, the number of uniforms about will have been confusing. Eye witnesses all have their on agendas, whether prejudicial, political, or promotional: I doubt if there has ever been an official despatch or official despatch written which reads something like "We ran away". Furthermore, units disintegrated over the afternoon, especially the cavalry after repeated charging: it was easily possible for a unit to be in several places at once. It does not help that some people seem to be keen to insist that no one ever tries to run away from a battle: there is a big pile of evidence that troops of all nationalities ran away, refused to charge, had to be coerced &tc. Some of this will be because of fear or tiredness; some is very understandable, particularly from young, undertrained, or conscripted troops. There were reasons other than fear to leave the battle: some of the British officers seeing Belgium-Dutch troops go to the rear put it down to Bonapartist or republican sympathies. It is not possible to sort this all out to an unambiguous account, and it is not the purpose of the article to do so: it just should record what verifiable sources say, and distinguish narrative accounts from conjecture, as much as that is possible. What would be interesting would be a section of the historiography of the Battle of Waterloo, but that requires someone who really knows what they are talking about and will adhere to NPOV. MAG1 (talk) 09:18, 8 August 2008 (UTC)
- I completely agree that we need a section on historiography. That might put the whole discussion in the open. Siborne's assertions, even if they are purportedly based on eyewitness accounts, need *therefore* not be truthful; people have been known to lie and misremember, certainly after thirty years. Besides, if one reads Siborne in the original it is unbelievable that anyone could still take him seriously; the book is dripping with prejudice; try replacing "Dutch" in his text with "Jewish" or "black" and you easily see how despicable it is. I do not propose to "settle who is right" in this article. I just wish to point out that certain parts of the article are highly disputed *and have been from the moment that Siborne's book was published* (so it is not "just" Hamilton-Williams). If people or whole units have to be besmirched posthumously, let it be a British regiment like the Cumberland Hussars, about which there is no argument in this respect.--Ereunetes (talk) 23:31, 9 August 2008 (UTC)
- Nitpick: the Duke of Cumberland's Hussars were Hanoverian (or German as PH would say :-)Tirailleur (talk) 10:24, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
Quite. There were no black or jewish units on the field, though in the early 19th century no one in the western world would think twice about referring to them in racist terms without any thought about it being despicable. Siborne is not alone in letting his prejudices get in way of the facts: the Cumberland Hussars were Hanoverian, not British, pretty boys pretending to be soldiers. No British units did leave the field during the battle, though there are plenty examples of coercion being applied. This is not an example of national virtue, but probably because the army was experienced, had not suffered very heavy losses recently, professional, politically sound, and composed of volunteers (well, at least not conscripts). MAG1 (talk) 22:50, 10 August 2008
- There were a few black soldiers present in the Britisn contingent of Wellington's army at Waterloo;as documented by resources found at this site; http://napoleonic-literature.com/Articles/Black_Soldiers.htm. One being a black sergeant, George Rose -a recipient of the Waterloo medal and a veteran in the 42nd Highlanders. Napoleon had his former famous Mameluke squadron [of Arabs] incorporated into his Chausseurs a Cheval of the Guard.So while there were no black units -like Napoleon's 7th Neapolitan [African] Line infantry that took part in the retreat from Moscow and 1813-14 campaigns, there were a few veteran black soldiers fighting in Wellington's Waterloo army as they had done in the former Dutch and Peninsular campaigns. --Joey123xz (talk) 15:48, 4 September 2008 (UTC)
- Now we have got this off our chest, can we get back to business? My objection is to the following sentence in the article:" Uxbridge then tried to lead the Dutch-Belgian heavy cavalry forward, but they refused to charge.[Siborne, H.T., pp. 14–15; this corresponds with the citation I have given of the recent reprint of Siborne père, which is in one volume]. My contention is (and I repeat it in the bio of general Albert Dominicus Trip van Zoudtlandt) that this never happened. Just deleting the sentence is not sufficient, as far as I am concerned. I think it should be made an example of the way chauvinism sometimes gets the better of wikipedia also. Including a section (sidebar?) on historiography and the many disputes of "facts" about the battle, would still be a good idea in my opinion.--Ereunetes (talk) 23:18, 10 August 2008 (UTC)
No, you and I have no certainty whether it happened or not, and definitely no idea wf Siborne's motivation. The way forward is to say that someone (whoever it is) says that this did not happen, and back it up with reference to a verifiable, reliable source. MAG1 (talk) 08:09, 11 August 2008 (UTC)
- Zeithen saw so many streaming away from La Hay that he at 1st thought the Allied army was defeated. British regulars were running before Uxbridge's attack. The Prussian's had 2 monumental retreats in Placinoit. If it is true (and folks there is enough disinformation to choke a horse about Waterloo) then they were in excellent company. I have several accounts of British regular batteries running away and units breaking and running (though they later reformed) My issue here is that you will see this at various histories on this battle where if a unit ran it wasn't British it was allied (regardless of fact) and Sibone was under quite a bit of pressure on several fronts. PH treats him pretty kindly and others far less so. Be very careful about your sources albeit secondary, that they are working off the actual unit histories and not someone's recollections which often become "how it should have been". You see this to some extent in Wellington's writings right after the fact and compared to recollections many years later that were less giving to other national's contributions. I'd be inclined to use the version that used the actual unit's history and give counter-views a brief mention with a source. Tirronan (talk) 16:54, 11 August 2008 (UTC)
- MAG1 challenges me to name "someone" who says it did not happen. I thought I had already done that (see above), but to make it easy I'll give a link to google books (I hope you have an American IP address, or google may block access). This is Eenens, A.M (1879) "Dissertation sur la participation des troupes des Pays-Bas a la campagne de 1815 en Belgique", in: Societé royale des beaux arts et de litérature de Gand, Messager des Sciences Historiques, pp. 131-198. The part about the Uxbridge-Trip incident starts at page 135 and runs through page 140 [5]. He quotes another source for an independent view on page 137. This is apparently CHARRAS, (LIEUTNANT-COLONEL). Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Waterloo. Leipzig Alphonse Dürr 1857. I hope this is helpful. Incidentally, apparently general Eenens did not take aspersions lightly. I am afraid the Eenens in this 1834 duel was the same person :-)[6]--Ereunetes (talk) 20:52, 11 August 2008 (UTC)
- MAG1 is a darn fine editor in my eyes, when we challenge what we are requesting is what proof you have that this statement is back up with a verifiable citable source. Mssr Charras is one of the great historians and is listed by Chesney as one of his sources. Please dig a bit both of you and see what sources both used on this issue? Temporeal closeness is what I would strive for, ie a unit history writen within a few days of the battle being the most desirable, and both opinions can find a place if the other isn't disproven. Also be aware that any unit taking 25% casuaities isn't going to function all that well anymore and units alagamated (I know I mangled the spelling on that) with another unit will not perform very well at all. Tirronan (talk) 20:51, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
- I am getting a bit tired of this. After all, I must prove a negative here, and besides my sources seem to be discounted because of language difficulties. I already gave chapter and verse on Willem Jan Knoop (but he writes in Dutch) and Alexis-Michel Eenens (but he writes in French). Eenens quotes Charras to show that Charras places the brigade in a charge where they could not have been if Siborne were correct. Eenens next backs his argument up with a reference to the casualties sustained by the brigade, which they would not have, if they had run away (see also Order of battle of the Waterloo Campaign, though I wonder about the source there). Eenens also refers to an earlier Belgian attempt at refutation by general Renard, Bruno Jean Baptiste (1855) Reponse aux Allegations Anglaises sur la Conduite des Troupes Belges en 1815 (Bruxelles, 1855). There are official after-battle reports, but they are in Dutch and are referred to in Dutch scholarly works. Against this, we have a rather offhand remark by Siborne about two alleged events: the alleged refusal by Trip to obey an order from Uxbridge (but others have the brigade engaging the French cuirassiers about this time, so they seem to have done what Uxbridge wanted) and the alleged bolting of the brigade (disturbing other allied units) after Uxbridge had removed himself. In this case Siborne does not divulge his source (except, as he always does, by referring to "testimonies"). I think the onus of proof should be on Siborne and his followers, as he is the one impugning the honor of brave men, doing their duty.--Ereunetes (talk) 21:17, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
- I actually found a contemporary English-language source contradicting Siborne on the matter of the conduct of the Trip Brigade :-) It is Jones, G. (1852) The Battle of Waterloo: With Those of Ligny and Quatre Bras, Described by Eye-witnesses and by the Series of Official Accounts Published by Authority. To which are Added, Memoirs of F. M. the Duke of Wellington, F. M. Prince Blücher, the Emperor Napoleon, etc., p. cxlvii[7] It describes the well-known episode where Lord Somerset's brigade pushes the French cuirassiers into the ravine in a counterattack against Ney's attack on the British artillery. As far as I can infer from Siborne's account, this must be shortly after Uxbridge's encounter with Trip allegedly took place. In the same paragraph in which he describes Somerset's exploits, Jones writes: "The brig. of Dutch carabiniers, G. Trip at their head, bravely tried their strength at them [i.e. the French],and repulsed them twice into the bottom, U." But maybe Jones had not been fully briefed on what the official British account was to be? In any case, I think this is the source for Jones: Craan, W.B. (transl. by A. Gore) (1817) An historical account of the battle of Waterloo, p. 30 [8] because of the similar wording (plagiarism?). Craan is very close in time to the battle (1817)--Ereunetes (talk) 23:15, 14 August 2008 (UTC)
- I am getting a bit tired of this. After all, I must prove a negative here, and besides my sources seem to be discounted because of language difficulties. I already gave chapter and verse on Willem Jan Knoop (but he writes in Dutch) and Alexis-Michel Eenens (but he writes in French). Eenens quotes Charras to show that Charras places the brigade in a charge where they could not have been if Siborne were correct. Eenens next backs his argument up with a reference to the casualties sustained by the brigade, which they would not have, if they had run away (see also Order of battle of the Waterloo Campaign, though I wonder about the source there). Eenens also refers to an earlier Belgian attempt at refutation by general Renard, Bruno Jean Baptiste (1855) Reponse aux Allegations Anglaises sur la Conduite des Troupes Belges en 1815 (Bruxelles, 1855). There are official after-battle reports, but they are in Dutch and are referred to in Dutch scholarly works. Against this, we have a rather offhand remark by Siborne about two alleged events: the alleged refusal by Trip to obey an order from Uxbridge (but others have the brigade engaging the French cuirassiers about this time, so they seem to have done what Uxbridge wanted) and the alleged bolting of the brigade (disturbing other allied units) after Uxbridge had removed himself. In this case Siborne does not divulge his source (except, as he always does, by referring to "testimonies"). I think the onus of proof should be on Siborne and his followers, as he is the one impugning the honor of brave men, doing their duty.--Ereunetes (talk) 21:17, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
- MAG1 is a darn fine editor in my eyes, when we challenge what we are requesting is what proof you have that this statement is back up with a verifiable citable source. Mssr Charras is one of the great historians and is listed by Chesney as one of his sources. Please dig a bit both of you and see what sources both used on this issue? Temporeal closeness is what I would strive for, ie a unit history writen within a few days of the battle being the most desirable, and both opinions can find a place if the other isn't disproven. Also be aware that any unit taking 25% casuaities isn't going to function all that well anymore and units alagamated (I know I mangled the spelling on that) with another unit will not perform very well at all. Tirronan (talk) 20:51, 13 August 2008 (UTC)
- MAG1 challenges me to name "someone" who says it did not happen. I thought I had already done that (see above), but to make it easy I'll give a link to google books (I hope you have an American IP address, or google may block access). This is Eenens, A.M (1879) "Dissertation sur la participation des troupes des Pays-Bas a la campagne de 1815 en Belgique", in: Societé royale des beaux arts et de litérature de Gand, Messager des Sciences Historiques, pp. 131-198. The part about the Uxbridge-Trip incident starts at page 135 and runs through page 140 [5]. He quotes another source for an independent view on page 137. This is apparently CHARRAS, (LIEUTNANT-COLONEL). Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Waterloo. Leipzig Alphonse Dürr 1857. I hope this is helpful. Incidentally, apparently general Eenens did not take aspersions lightly. I am afraid the Eenens in this 1834 duel was the same person :-)[6]--Ereunetes (talk) 20:52, 11 August 2008 (UTC)
- "But maybe Jones had not been fully briefed on what the official British account was to be" shows a strong -- and I think unwarranted POV -- as that of which you are accusing Siborne. For example the opinions Wellington's expressed about Siborne were not exactly complementary. There was no official British account of the Battle, and many of the views expressed in different histories are contradictory. Personally I have always liked Wellington's view "The history of a battle, is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance." All we can do here is to find the best sources we can and try to reconstruct the ball but we will never resolve all the inconsistencies. BTW did you know that the 95th -- One of the best regiments of the era in anyone's army -- ran during the battle, but their overall reputation was not tarnished by that event. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:39, 15 August 2008 (UTC)
- I take it all back:-) But I notice that you are evading the main point. I was challenged to provide at least one English-language source contradicting Siborne, and I provided two (though one arguably echoes the other). My "main" source is W.B. Craan, who made the famous map of initial dispositions at Waterloo (you no doubt have heard of him; I didn't know an English translation existed, or I could have avoided a lot of the aggravation). Craan clearly has the Trip brigade charging the French cuirassiers at the same time Siborne has Trip running away. Craan wrote in 1817, using official after-battle reports. To put it differently, if you disparage Craan, you disparage his map also. And that could unravel a lot more than historians of the battle would care for:-) So why not stop this charade and admit that Siborne is wrong? The objectionable sentence in the article that now says: "Uxbridge then tried to lead the Dutch-Belgian heavy cavalry forward, but they refused to charge" could be changed to: "The Dutch-Belgian heavy cavalry brigade under general Trip joined in the attack on the cuirassiers", with a footnote giving a short account of the controversy, saying this version is based on Craan's 1817 account and that Siborne contradicted him in 1844 (and his son repeated that in his 1890s version, as the current footnote refers to Herbert Siborne, not William). Does this sound like an acceptable compromise?--Ereunetes (talk) 19:46, 15 August 2008 (UTC)
- "But maybe Jones had not been fully briefed on what the official British account was to be" shows a strong -- and I think unwarranted POV -- as that of which you are accusing Siborne. For example the opinions Wellington's expressed about Siborne were not exactly complementary. There was no official British account of the Battle, and many of the views expressed in different histories are contradictory. Personally I have always liked Wellington's view "The history of a battle, is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance." All we can do here is to find the best sources we can and try to reconstruct the ball but we will never resolve all the inconsistencies. BTW did you know that the 95th -- One of the best regiments of the era in anyone's army -- ran during the battle, but their overall reputation was not tarnished by that event. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 10:39, 15 August 2008 (UTC)
No it isn't as the attack was against an infantry column, supported by cavalry, the Dutch/Belgian heavy cavalry did charge French cuirassiers, with success, but this was, I think, earlier.
Uxbridge in his letter to Siborne, brackets the commander of the Dutch/Belgian heavy brigade with the colonel of the Hanoverian Cumberland Hussars (who fled the field), so I would imagine that Uxbridge was distinctly unhappy about the showing of the D/B heavies. He isn't the only one to mention the episode, in another letter in Siborne Uxbridge's ADC, says that he remembers Uxbridge trying to lead the D/B heavies into a charge and having to tell Uxbridge that he wasn't being followed. Either both men were lying or something happened indicative of the D/B heavies being reluctant to charge. Siborne senior, in his history is indeed scathing about the D/B army's performance but his informants were all British, or KGL, and he was accurately reflecting their views, whether or not these views were fair or accurate.
Personally I think you are trying to defend something that doesn't need defending. There is no indication that Uxbridge's actions were correct and no indication that the refusal of the D/B heavies to charge was not militarily the right thing to do. The D/B heavies didn't move at all, this suggests to me that their commander didn't order their advance, not that the troopers hung back of their own accord. The British Household Brigade had just been seen off, with losses, by the French infantry. The French infantry had just proven their ability to deal with cavalry, Uxbridge was wrong to attempt to attack again with cavalry. I suspect that Trip didn't want to see his command wasted and turned a blind eye to Uxbridge waving his sword around in front of his brigade. It's not magnificent but it is war.
I would be quite happy with the text being revised to cast doubt on Uxbridge's wisdom in trying to repeat a cavalry attack which had previously failed.
Something like: "Uxbridge then, perhaps unwisely, tried to lead the Dutch-Belgian heavy cavalry forward to charge the French infantry who had just exhibited their abilities to repulse cavalry. The Dutch-Belgian heavy brigade refused to follow him."
After all the text does remark on how the French unsupported cavalry attacks on formed infantry were repeated in a self-defeating manner, the same could be said for Uxbridge trying to do exactly the same thing.
I've just checked and the D/B heavies are twice mentioned earlier in the text as being in combat with French cavalry. I don't see that their contribution is being significantly under-played here. As mention of the single incident showing them refusing to charge is from an eyewitness (Uxbridge's ADC), and is described in considerable detail, I think it has sufficient primary source weight not to be dismissed entirely.
Urselius (talk) 13:19, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
The eyewitness accounts:
Sir Horace Seymour, Captain ADC to Uxbridge (HT Siborne letter 9)
"..., as to the conduct of the Dutch Brigade of Heavy Cavalry, the impression still on my mind is that they did show a lamentable want of spirit, and that Lord Anglesey [Uxbridge] tried all in his power to lead them on, and while he was advancing, I believe I called his attention to the fact of his not being followed. The Household brigade at this time were very much reduced."
Lord Anglesey (Uxbridge) C-in-C Allied Cavalry (letter 6)
"Seeing a Corps formed for attack and advancing, I brought forward a Brigade of Dutch Heavy Cavalry, and they promised to follow me. I led them beyond the ridge of the hill, a little left of Hougoumont. There they halted, and finding the impossibility of making them charge, I left them and retired."
Lord Greenock AQMG to the cavalry (letter 7)
"A short time before the Enemy's last advance, Lord Anglesey had made a very gallant but ineffectual charge against the French Cavalry at the head of the Lord Edward Somerset's Brigade, which he had wished to renew with the Belgian Cavalry; but abandoning this intention, after communicating personally with the Commanding Officer, in consequence of perceiving that the Belgians appeared to be too much dispirited by having just witnessed the failure of the Household Brigade, to afford any hope of a more favourable result, his lordship proceeded to that part of the field on which, by that time, Sir Hussey Vivian's Brigade had been formed,..."
I think that the last letter shows what happened, reading between the lines, Uxbridge received a negative response from Trip, who had seen what had happened to the Householders and that the French were still in good order, then tried to appeal to the troopers themselves (entirely in character) and they, unsurprisingly, did not budge without their own commanders' giving the order, Uxbrige then gave up and moved off.
Trip put the welfare of his men, being unwilling to make a charge with little prospect of success, above his own reputation which was bound to be affected by the refusal of a direct order on the field of battle. Trip made a quite admirable decision.
Urselius (talk) 18:27, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
- This may cover the altercation between Uxbridge and Trip, though I am not fully convinced that this is indeed what really happened (we only have the 1844 Siborne account, after all; Trip himself died in 1835 so he could not give his version of events). But quite apart from this altercation William Siborne goes on in the same paragraph with an accusation that (after Uxbridge rode away) the Trip brigade bolted and thereby almost caused other allied cavalry units to lose control also (horses being horses :-) I am sure there are supporting British letters for this also, but unlike the conversation between Uxbridge and Trip this event would certainly have been observed by others, if it occurred at all (if only by those inconvenienced allied cavalrymen). I find no mention of it in Craan (who wrote in 1816, so he did not know he should comment on this) and Eenens points out (specifically addressing this point in Siborne) that the Prince of Orange was personally involved in leading the 2nd Belgian carabiniers in a charge around this time. (Incidentally, it takes close reading of Siborne to see that actually two separate events may be described; superficial reading gives the impression that it was all one event). I appreciate your attempt to put a positive gloss on Trip's alleged disobedience, but the main point is whether it really happened. If so, I would have no problem with putting blame on him. If others (like Wellington and Orange) had made as big a deal of it as Uxbridge in his old age apparently did (which is a whole different kettle of fish). To give a counterfactual argument: the undisputed bolting of the Cumberland Hussars (which according to Siborne's narrative took place immediately following the alleged bolting of the D/B carabiniers), though causing less of a disturbance, was sufficient reason to court-martial its colonel after the battle (no doubt at Uxbridge's instigation). So why was Trip not also court-martialed then? I realize it is not proof positive, but that is the problem with trying to prove a negative, i.e. that the D/B brigade did not run away.--Ereunetes (talk) 20:46, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
- I think there are two considerations concerning relative levels of disciplining of the two commanding officers. First, Wellington commended Trip in his battle despatch and he was very, very unwilling to alter post-fact any public utterance he had made. Secondly, Hake of the Cumberland Hussars was an officer in King George's forces and not an allied force and therefore more available for censure. Also the D/B Heavy Brigade remained on the field, they didn't run all the way to Brussels like the Hussars.
- There is a German account by Captain Quintus Von Goeben of the 3rd Hussars KGL (Glover, G. Letters from the Battle of Waterloo: letter 68) which speaks of an incident around 3 o'clock, when the D/B Heavy Brigade advanced in front of the 3rd Hussars KGL but then returned en debandade and threw the right two squadrons of the hussars into confusion. Obviously, as they remained on the field, the Dutch-Belgian heavies were rallied and re-organised later, but it looks as though the brigade had a rather mixed time of it. Like all cavalry they were susceptable to being thrown into confusion and required rallying following such an incident. Urselius (talk) 21:42, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
- Wellington also commended the Prince of Orange too after the battle without criticizing the notable tactical disasters the Prince was responsible for during the campaign. The Duke certainly showed a bias personally to the Dutch officers. While it may seem proper to brand Tripp as cowardly who can blame him in avoiding a suicidal catastrophe. A squadron of 7th Hussars similarly disobeyed a direct attack order from Uxbridge at Genappe the previous day to go against an awaiting Phalanx of enemy lancers. Would we criticize Ompteda+ the 8th KGL line battalion for refusing to advance in line and avoid being destroyed by the Prince of Orange's specific order to do so similar to the slaughtering fate of the Hanoverian Luneberg battalion [Kielmansegge Brigade] with the same orders in the same area of La Haye Sainte earlier.
--Joey123xz (talk) 15:24, 4 September 2008 (UTC)
- This is all really good stuff- Wikipedia at its beat. As far as I can see these are the facts as far as we know them:
- the Siborne stuff is a canard: the refusal of the D/B carabiniers to follow Uxbridge is not his interpretation but comes from the letters of people who were there. They may all be lying through their teeth, but I doubt whether there is any direct evidence to support this. Ereuntes is right in that proving a negative is a fruitless labour; so, as far as we know (which is limited), the incident happened. Wellington and Orange were not there, and so will not have had an opinion.
- we do not know why they did not follow Uxbridge unless Trip gives an account of the incident. (Incidentally, the `positive gloss' is not positive: you were expected to follow the orders of a superior officer- and Uxbridge was in command of all the allied cavalry- even if they are suicidal otherwise you were shamed c.f the response of von Ompteda to Orange's orders to attack La Haye Sainte after its fall).
- no one is suggesting that the carbiniers left the field of battle or that they ran away. It was not unusual for cavalry to refuse to charge, just as it was not unusual for infantry formations to break, but running away from the battle was condemned as cowardly. This is the difference with the Cumberland Hussars, who ran off to Brussels. We have to get away from the idea that everyone was either suicidally brave or cowardly all the time.
- we haven't a clue whether Uxbridge was doing the right thing or not, and should not comment on it.
The text should perhaps read something like
"Uxbridge wrote that he tried to lead a charge by Dutch/Belgium Carabiniers under Trip, though they refused to follow him. There is no record of this incident in Dutch/Belgium sources."
if that is accurate. Trying to work out where Trip's brigade was is OR unless someone has done this with specific reference to this incident, in which case their work needs to be quoted. MAG1 (talk) 22:58, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
The British 23rd Light Dragoons refused to charge at Genappe the day before Waterloo, so the situation of the D/B heavies was hardly unique. After being met with less enthusiasm by the 23rd than he expected Uxbridge peremptorily ordered them to clear out of the way and said "the Lifeguards will have the honour." Urselius (talk) 15:20, 19 August 2008 (UTC)
I think we are getting somewhere with the suggestion by MAG1. All I wanted to achieve is show in this wikipedia article that things are not always as hard and fast as suggested. Uxbridge says that he reprimanded Trip. Unfortunately nobody was around anymore to contradict him in 1844 (two of Trip's regimental commanders, who might have been witnesses, died shortly after the battle from wounds sustained). So if this incident is important enough to be mentioned in the article, at least the phrasing by MAG1 is more satisfactory. I would amend the second sentence as: "This account is contradicted by Dutch/Belgian sources" (and we can cite Eenens, Renard, and Knoop, and mention Craan).--Ereunetes (talk) 22:36, 19 August 2008 (UTC)
I think that if citing is going to be extensive then it must be phrased "Uxbridge and other members of the British cavalry staff..." Urselius (talk) 08:26, 20 August 2008 (UTC)
- Why not? Agreed as far as I am concerned.--Ereunetes (talk) 19:43, 20 August 2008 (UTC)
- Darned if I am not proud of you guys and working it out. Tirronan (talk) 23:23, 20 August 2008 (UTC)
I have changed the account, but have toned down the proposed "contradicted" statement to a "no support" purely because I think the Dutch and Belgian primary sources do not mention the existence of the incident rather than present a clear case for an alternative scenario happening at precisely the same time. The proof of a negative is, as has been previously mentioned, a difficult proposition. The Dutch/Belgian sources could be usefully appended. Urselius (talk) 08:45, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
- I am glad we got to a resolution :-) If there is no objection I will put in a silent wikilink to Albert Dominicus Trip van Zoudtlandt behind "Trip" in Urselius' sentence. I can supply the references to Eenens and possibly Renard (if I can find him in google books). I don't think a reference to Knoop is useful as he writes in Dutch (expecting people to put credence in Francophone writers is probably already a stretch :-) Before I do that, I'd first like to explore De Bas and 'tSerclaes, which I only yesterday found in google books. This is really the mother lode, because they use excerpts from general de Constant Rebecque's journal. This already throws new light on the Quatre Bras imbroglio, for instance.--Ereunetes (talk) 20:03, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
- Darn it, the only volume of De Bas and 'tSerclaes, La campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas that is available in google books seems to be vol. I "Quatre Bras". We need vol. II, Waterloo, of course. The nearest library that has it from where I am is Brigham Young University. I doubt if they'll let it go in ILL. Any wikipedians in Utah:-)? Incidentally, I did find the memoirs of Karl Freiherr von Müffling, the Prussian liaison officer with Wellington, online. On p. 245 he has a very interesting anecdote where Vivian and Vandeleur watch Ponsonby's troopers being massacred without lifting a finger. When Muffling remonstrated with them, they said they were too afraid to go against Wellington's orders to stay put(Wellington later confirmed that he would have court-martialed them)Müffling, K.F. von (1853) Passages from My Life: Together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813 and 1814, p. 245 and fn * [9]. As it was so important to nail Trip, shouldn't we incorporate this little anecdote in the interest of historical completeness (and the reputation of Vivian, Vandeleur and Wellington for adhering to tactical inflexibility)?--Ereunetes (talk) 20:29, 22 August 2008 (UTC)
- Vandeleur and Vivian did, eventually, move; the 12th and 16th LD, supported by the 11th LD, of Vandeleurs's brigade charged the flank of Jaquinot's lancers (and some infantry). De Ghigny's Dutch-Belgian light cavalry brigade also moved forward to help bring the British heavies off. The real fault for the losses the British heavies suffered was Uxbridge's. He lead the charge when he should have been organising the supports. Had he personally brought De Ghigny and Vandeleur forward immediately, the British heavies would not have suffered greatly. Urselius (talk) 19:16, 24 August 2008 (UTC)
- I'm more inclined to believe the terrain in the center of the Allied positions was the true culprit for the ultimate disaster that befell the Union brigade. The Household brigade which Uxbridge led was able to retreat in orderly fashion. The Union brigade had no such luck. They themselves got carried away with their lust for unbridled attack. Their regimental commanders and Ponsonby were to blame -they alone decided to charge headlong into the French positions [ which in itself did considerable damage to two dozen guns in the French Grand Battery]. It was up to their commanders to rein in the bold troopers. Uxbridge was busy enough recalling the Household Brigade I would imagine, and the fact that the great farmhouse of La Haye Sainte and the deeply cut/ embanked roads -the Ohain+ Brussels highway intersection the the Allied center- separated the attacks of the Household and Union brigades, would clearly have an affect on Uxbridge's command and control capabilities.--Joey123xz (talk) 22:59, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
Finding Müffling's memoirs is great: there will be lots of interesting stuff there, especially about the interaction with the Prussians. The anecdote is a good one. Wellington despised the British cavalry for their habit of charging, and hang the consequences (the charge of the Household and Union Brigades is a good case in point), and I should think had made it very clear that there should be no one should charge without orders. The Scots Greys should not have been in the charge, but Ponsonby forgot to tell them to he may well have been right as well, stay in reserve (he died owing to his reluctance to risk his best horse in the battle and taking a hack instead), so Wellington will have been reluctant to send good cavalry after bad; he was probably right as well rather than inflexible: I am not sure that Hussars against lancers would have been a good match. MAG1 (talk) 22:52, 22 August 2008 (UTC)
Adkin
There is a book of letters by eyewitnesses to the battle, edited by Gareth Glover - Letters from the Battle of Waterloo, Greenhill Books (2004) - this book has impeccable academic qualifications. Amongst the books this author classes as "particularly invaluable" is Adkin's Waterloo Companion. Urselius (talk) 21:52, 18 August 2008 (UTC)
Glover - impeccible academic qualifications? Sorry, I disagree. He is a grocer by profession, which is not exactly an academic. His footnoting is about the level one would expect from a grocer that has read one or two collections of Brit fairy tales on Waterloo that are presented as history books. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.14.254.9 (talk) 18:15, 19 August 2008 (UTC)
- If you are going to make comments have the decency to identify yourself.
- I said the book has impeccable academic qualifications, read it and find out if I'm right. Glover did academic and amateur Waterloo studies a huge favour by editing and publishing the remainder of the letters collected by Siborne. As for academic snobbery, well Charles Darwin's only academic qualification was in Theology, I don't see many professional Biologists (and I'm one) saying the Origin of Species or The Descent of Man are un-academic. Urselius (talk) 08:22, 20 August 2008 (UTC)
- Hello 'unsigned'. For you to make the assertion that academic standing alone outstrips a history buff with a deep understanding of analyzing a historical event is an erroneous assumption on your part. As an enthusiastic history buff in certain military episodes I've debated 'academics and 'professional' historians who knew facts and how to research [ and sometimes I caught them not knowing ], but were at a loss in how to interpret and analyze facts to draw insightful conclusions. You may have opinions on others historical opinions, but you shouldn't blunder by assuming an academic standing is the be-all and end-all.....--Joey123xz (talk) 23:10, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
York? - hmmm? Urselius (talk) 12:35, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
Please give me a list of Glover's "impeccable academic qualifications".
Source needed
The last sentence of the French Cavalry attack section runs:
"The French cavalry was destroyed – but the English centre appeared on the verge of collapse. Desperate, Wellington rode through the smoke and carnage, refusing to order retreat. One officer heard him say: "Night or the Prussians must come.""
A direct quotation needs a source. I don't think the sentence, dramatic as it is, can stand without a source for the quote. Urselius (talk) 08:50, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
"Either night or the Prussians will come" (Joel Parker (1856). The True Issue, and the Duty of the Whigs: An Address Before the Citizens of Cambridge, p. 26 (see wikiquote:Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington) But the version I am more familiar with is "Give me night or give me Blucher" ("The Military Maxims of Napoleon" by Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon I, David G. Chandler, William E. Cairnes - History - 1995 - 256 pages, Page 143 "As it transpired, the battle was very much 'a near-run thing'. 'Give me night or give me Blucher' was the Duke's prayer at about 5.45 pm on 18 June").[10] There are half a dozen pages on the web that put the quote the other way round "Give me Blucher or give me night", but I think we should go with "The Military Maxims of Napoleon" as the best quote and source. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 13:01, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
The original quote is "I wish it were night or the Prussians came" and signified that up to that moment Wellington, who from the beginning took a very defensive stand in this battle, did not see any other way (e.g. by their own force) they could withstand the pressure. It is ironic that Waterloo is seen by the British as a great victory of their arms, whereas in German "Sein Waterloo erleben" signifies to suffer a crushing defeat. LutzBrux144.254.14.157 (talk) 11:52, 3 March 2009 (UTC) 12:45, 3 March 2009
Wellington's line stabilised
At the start of the Imperial Guard attack section there is the statement:
"Meanwhile, with Wellington's centre exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte, and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilised,..."
There is no mention about how Wellington sought to strengthen his centre. He moved Vivian's and Vandeleur's cavalry brigades from the left and called in the fresh Dutch-Belgian infantry division from Braine on his right. As it stands these troops just appear in the narrative in the right places to repel and then pursue the Imperial Guard. I think there needs to be some mention in the text of how and why these troops were moved. Urselius (talk) 09:03, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
- It should tie in with the Zeithen's arrival, as it allowed the shifting of troops and is mentioned in several histories. Speaking of which I need to revist that section as the number of troops involved around La Hay wasn't very large and the impact was out of all proportion. Tirronan (talk) 23:59, 21 August 2008 (UTC)
- Wellington was caught of guard for want of significant troops to stabilize his center after La Haye Sainte fell. Ideed great slaughter of the Allies took place there. The French had brought up 2 guns onto the crossroads and the other sections of its battery near La Haye Sainte. The canister fire of this battery were demolishing all existing Allied brigades in the crossroads section - particularly Lambert's brigade who had just been moved up to plug the center. Kruse's Nassauer brigade came up to plug the center also and made an effort to rescue Lambert by clearing the crossroads area but they were badly hurt in the process and 2 of its companies that chanced pressing their luck by continuing to counterattack alone were caught off guard by a French cuirassier attack and destroyed. Th episode is well told by David Hamilton[7]. It's an interesting curiosity why Napoleon did not decide to send his Middle Guard force straight up the Brussels road into the obviously weakened Allied center but instead chose to spread that attack across the Western ridge.--Joey123xz (talk) 00:00, 3 November 2008 (UTC)
Bijlandt's brigade
I noticed a revert today of an edit that may well address a legitimate concern. The revert may be defensible, but the current phrasing in the article is certainly objectionable. I am referring to "As the French advanced, Bijlandt's brigade withdrew to the sunken lane, and then, with nearly all their officers dead or wounded, left the battlefield, leaving just their Belgian battalion, the 7th." How so, "left the battlefield"? The 7th and 8th Militia batallions retreated to the position of the 5th Militia Batallion (standing in reserve) where they were rallied by Perponcher and De Constant Rebecque. They were later led in a counterattack. This is again one of those calumnious observations made thirty years after the fact by British officers who had "cowardly Belgians" on the brain. Let me count the way the sentence is erroneous:
- "Bijlandt's brigade withdrew to the sunken lane"; the brigade was already behind the sunken lane; this is the old bugaboo about the brigade being in an exposed position at the start of the battle.
- the officers were indeed mostly killed or wounded, but this was because they received several volleys point-blank from d'Erlon's divisions;
- "left the field"; see above.
- "leaving just their Belgian battalion, the 7th."; the 7th batallion was a Line batallion, unlike the two militia batallions to either side of it. This may have more to do with the fact that they moved to the side in an orderly fashion, than their being Belgian.
The next sentence offers a bogus explanation for these people "running away" (which they only did in the overheated imagination of some British witnesses), namely that they had Bonapartist sympathies. This just shows that these officers (and the people that perpetuate this myth) have no notion of the real political situation in the Netherlands and Belgium at the time. I do not deny that the British saw Belgian traitors behind every tree at the time (see the "Memorandum relative to the Dutch Army" of April 2, 1815 in Wellington, A. W. (1863) Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G., Vol. 10, pp. 15-17 [11]) but that does not make those paranoid suspicions true.--Ereunetes (talk) 20:29, 4 September 2008 (UTC)
- The reason I reverted was because we'd already been working through how to deal with the issue of differing sources over these events on this page. It was a fairly major change (and not entirely neutrally phrased), sourced to a website that didn't immediately strike me as definitely being a reliable source. I've asked the author to particiapte here (which he has begun to do), and maybe explain a little about the website so we can evaluate its reliability. David Underdown (talk) 07:36, 5 September 2008 (UTC)
- I suspect that a number of things were happening. Siborne seems to have accurately reflected the opinions of a number of British officers present at Waterloo that some Dutch-Belgian troops did not show the fortitude that they expected. Whether this is an accurate representation of what happened is moot, but Siborne wasn't a monster of iniquity he was merely repeating what he had been told.
- When Siborne's, and indeed other British histories, were published Dutch and Belgian military writers reacted in order to exonerate their army from these slurs. However, just because they are Dutch or Belgian writers does not automatically mean that their accounts are totally free of bias. They were reacting and no doubt, at times, overstating their case.
- It is odd that Wellington, who made sure that his militia formations were largely out of harms way (the bulk of the Hanoverian militia were on the flanks of the position and were not involved in very heavy fighting), allowed Bijlandt's brigade, who were mostly militia, to stand in the front line quite near the centre. It isn't very surprising that they didn't stand and drive off three divisions of French infantry. In fact a shameful number of the 95th rifles decamped to the rear and, if we believe this quote: "Major General Sir Denis Pack calling out at the same time ‘92nd everything has given way on your right and left, and you must charge this Column’, upon which he ordered four deep to be formed and closed in to the centre," it means that all the other regiments in Pack's brigade had also given way and streamed off to the rear.
- Actually it's surprising Wellington left Bijlandt's brigade in a forward position in the morning before the battle started - only Perponcher's interceding on their behalf in resupplying and repositioning them before the battle started, improved that brigade's welfare. Bijlandt's militia units had after all performed astoundingly well at Quatre Bras - defying Ney's initial attempts to capture the crossroads before Wellington arrived just in time with a steady flow of reinforcements. Also, to call the contingent of 95th riflemen as shameful for retiring from their sandpit position is equally unfair. As you said yourself the horde of Frenchmen in dense columns could not be halted by two companies at that spot. It was prudent to retire. But your observance that every unit of Pack, Kempt, and Bylandt's brigades was getting crushed by the weight of the French columns or forced to retire is without doubt. Even the 92nd were being pushed back before the Union Brigade launched their own attack to turn the tide. The fact is not all of Bijlandt's units fled to the second line. Indeed some of his units even took part in the footchase of D'Erlon's retreating troops into the valley below the French Grand Battery itself. After the attack, 400 of Bylandt's men were used to escort the 3000 French prisoners taken back to Brussels. Bylandt's now much reduced brigade did stay in the fight though in a tactical reserve location near their original positions.--Joey123xz (talk) 23:42, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- It is odd that Wellington, who made sure that his militia formations were largely out of harms way (the bulk of the Hanoverian militia were on the flanks of the position and were not involved in very heavy fighting), allowed Bijlandt's brigade, who were mostly militia, to stand in the front line quite near the centre. It isn't very surprising that they didn't stand and drive off three divisions of French infantry. In fact a shameful number of the 95th rifles decamped to the rear and, if we believe this quote: "Major General Sir Denis Pack calling out at the same time ‘92nd everything has given way on your right and left, and you must charge this Column’, upon which he ordered four deep to be formed and closed in to the centre," it means that all the other regiments in Pack's brigade had also given way and streamed off to the rear.
- It wasn't principally the 95th in the sandpit who decamped to the rear, but the elements of 95th further to the rear, at the sunken lane. They were less to be critcised for breaking under the massed French attack than for the fact that many of them skulked in the rear for the rest of the battle and didn't resume their positions in the line (see Mark Urban's "Rifles"). Not entirely on a par with the heroic performance they quite often displayed in the Peninsula. Urselius (talk) 20:16, 27 December 2008 (UTC)
- The French attack came very close to breaking Wellington's left, it would be almost miraculous if Bijlandt's brigade had not broken, and indeed one of his battalions stood their ground. This makes them entirely the equal of Pack's brigade.Urselius (talk) 14:53, 5 September 2008 (UTC)
- I completely agree with Urselius points, except the one concerning the Dutch and Belgian historians overreacting to Siborne's account of what his British correspondents had told him. I think both Eenens and Knoop reacted in a quite measured way. They are both available in google books. Here are the relevant passages: Knoop, pp. 23 ff. [12] mildly points out the Dutch losses, that were commensurate with the British ones (unlikely if the Dutch managed to get to safety), but Eenens, pp. 73ff.[13] goes into great detail, quoting Charras, Jomini, De Vaudoncourt (all French historians, giving the French point of view of the d'Erlon attacks) and captain Arthur Goore of the 30th Foot, who published An historical account of the Battle of Waterloo in 1817 (Eenens, pp. 89-93). If I limit myself to Eenens: he points out that the Bylandt Brigade was hit by a mass of infantry with a tenfold superiority, which nobody was likely to withstand. He admits that the brigade was pushed back over a distance of 300 paces (the distance to the 5th batallion in reserve) and that they were rallied there by De Perponcher. Finally, that general led them in a joint counterattack with the rest of Picton's division (during which Picton died, incidentally). So no "leaving the field," as Siborne claims, to spend the rest of the battle in safety. As the Brigade only retreated a reasonable distance (just like the 95th Foot did) there is no need to gratuitously "explain" this by alleged "Bonapartist" sentiments. My suggestion would be to lose this paragraph and replace it with something more in line with what really happened. (Incidentally, I found more modern, English language books that tell the same story, but those are of course derivative themselves; I'd prefer to stay as close as possible to the original sources).--Ereunetes (talk) 22:40, 5 September 2008 (UTC)
- The 1/95th had to retire from the sandpit in the face of d'Erlon's advance and they retired up the slope onto Mont St Jean plain took up a position behind a hedge. Shortly after 14:00 when attacked by French cuirassiers, some of the 1/95th broke and ran and did not stop "retiring" until they reached the woods behind the Allied army. Those who did not retire formed up to receive cavalry and withstood the attack until the cuirassier were driven off by an allied cavalry counter attack. That some of the men ran was seen as a dishonour to the regiment by the regiments officers "I regret to say that a great number of our men went to the rear without cause after the appearance of the cuirassiers, there were no less than a 100 absentees after the fight and this vexes me very much as this is the first time that such a thing has happened in the regiment."(Andrew Barnard -- Mark Urban "Rifles" page 272) Urban suggests that the regiment had never faced cuirassiers before, and having seen two regiments cut to pieces by French cavalry, the 42nd at Quatre Bras and a Hanoverian militia brigade at 14:00 just moments before the attack on the 1/95th) some of the peninsular veterans ran because they were suffering from battle fatigue having survived 5 years in Iberia often in the thick of the fighting, they thought that they had tempted fate enough. He does not mention why the new recruits (who joined the regiment in England during the last year) ran, but I think it can be taken for granted that they ran for all the reasons that unseasoned troops have always run from cavalry when they see veterans running. --PBS (talk) 10:27, 18 December 2008 (UTC)
- At the start of the battle, in the sandpit across from La Haye Sainte's north, there was only one company of the battalion of 95th Rifles in Picton's division positioned in it. The rest of that battalion was in Picton's main battle-line.
- The 1/95th had to retire from the sandpit in the face of d'Erlon's advance and they retired up the slope onto Mont St Jean plain took up a position behind a hedge. Shortly after 14:00 when attacked by French cuirassiers, some of the 1/95th broke and ran and did not stop "retiring" until they reached the woods behind the Allied army. Those who did not retire formed up to receive cavalry and withstood the attack until the cuirassier were driven off by an allied cavalry counter attack. That some of the men ran was seen as a dishonour to the regiment by the regiments officers "I regret to say that a great number of our men went to the rear without cause after the appearance of the cuirassiers, there were no less than a 100 absentees after the fight and this vexes me very much as this is the first time that such a thing has happened in the regiment."(Andrew Barnard -- Mark Urban "Rifles" page 272) Urban suggests that the regiment had never faced cuirassiers before, and having seen two regiments cut to pieces by French cavalry, the 42nd at Quatre Bras and a Hanoverian militia brigade at 14:00 just moments before the attack on the 1/95th) some of the peninsular veterans ran because they were suffering from battle fatigue having survived 5 years in Iberia often in the thick of the fighting, they thought that they had tempted fate enough. He does not mention why the new recruits (who joined the regiment in England during the last year) ran, but I think it can be taken for granted that they ran for all the reasons that unseasoned troops have always run from cavalry when they see veterans running. --PBS (talk) 10:27, 18 December 2008 (UTC)
- I completely agree with Urselius points, except the one concerning the Dutch and Belgian historians overreacting to Siborne's account of what his British correspondents had told him. I think both Eenens and Knoop reacted in a quite measured way. They are both available in google books. Here are the relevant passages: Knoop, pp. 23 ff. [12] mildly points out the Dutch losses, that were commensurate with the British ones (unlikely if the Dutch managed to get to safety), but Eenens, pp. 73ff.[13] goes into great detail, quoting Charras, Jomini, De Vaudoncourt (all French historians, giving the French point of view of the d'Erlon attacks) and captain Arthur Goore of the 30th Foot, who published An historical account of the Battle of Waterloo in 1817 (Eenens, pp. 89-93). If I limit myself to Eenens: he points out that the Bylandt Brigade was hit by a mass of infantry with a tenfold superiority, which nobody was likely to withstand. He admits that the brigade was pushed back over a distance of 300 paces (the distance to the 5th batallion in reserve) and that they were rallied there by De Perponcher. Finally, that general led them in a joint counterattack with the rest of Picton's division (during which Picton died, incidentally). So no "leaving the field," as Siborne claims, to spend the rest of the battle in safety. As the Brigade only retreated a reasonable distance (just like the 95th Foot did) there is no need to gratuitously "explain" this by alleged "Bonapartist" sentiments. My suggestion would be to lose this paragraph and replace it with something more in line with what really happened. (Incidentally, I found more modern, English language books that tell the same story, but those are of course derivative themselves; I'd prefer to stay as close as possible to the original sources).--Ereunetes (talk) 22:40, 5 September 2008 (UTC)
- The French attack came very close to breaking Wellington's left, it would be almost miraculous if Bijlandt's brigade had not broken, and indeed one of his battalions stood their ground. This makes them entirely the equal of Pack's brigade.Urselius (talk) 14:53, 5 September 2008 (UTC)
External link to add?
Dear fellow Napoleonic fans, does anybody find it useful to add an external link to the site of the Dutch 8th Militia?
http://home.scarlet.be/~tsh40803/8/8st.html
This unit was part of the van Bijlandt brigade, and the site is an enormous source of background information. There is also a full account of Quatre Bras and Waterloo, and the role the 8th played in these battles. The site is fully based in primary sources from, direct from the archives. All secondary literature is passed! The webmaster is closely working together with the site of Erwin van Muilwijk (also noted in the external links). Anyone interested to submit the site as an external link?
greetings, Marco Bijl0130 (talk) 12:54, 14 November 2008 (UTC)
- I have looked at the site and was impressed by the extensive references to original eye-witness accounts of Dutch and Belgian participants in the battle from the Dutch and Belgian national archives (material that is difficult to access by Anglophones). Needless to say, these accounts (from the immediate aftermath of the battle) often contradict the account found in Siborne père et fils that found its way into this article. As Marco is the webmaster of the site he showed commendable reticence in adding the link to the list of articles in the article, so I have taken it upon myself to add it to the list of articles in further reading. I think the quality is at least equal to the Muilwijck link in the same list.--Ereunetes (talk) 21:18, 26 December 2008 (UTC)
copyright violation
Did this edit introduce a copyright violation from here? --PBS (talk) 11:08, 7 January 2009 (UTC)
- Yes it is indeed, and I am removing it now. It is also out of place to boot and much more throughly covered later in the article. Tirronan (talk) 19:39, 7 January 2009 (UTC)
Changes to referencing style
We seem to have had quite a few changes to the referencing style recently, using template {{rp}}. I'm not sure this is entirely useful, as it splits the page numebr from teh book name, which seems to make the referencing less usable to me. Thoguhts? David Underdown (talk) 08:44, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
- ^ napulon.com
- ^ page 272, Napoleon on Napoleon
- ^ David Hamilton's Waterloo New Perspectives
- ^ in Waterloo New Perspectives, page 320
- ^ " Memoires et correspondance du Roi Jerome et de la Reine Catherine [Paris 1861-66, vol. VII, p.23.
- ^ [reported in Le Moniteur, june 24th [ANF]
- ^ Waterloo Perspectives;page 336-337