Siege of Samarkhel
| Siege of Samarkhel | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Afghan Civil War (1989–1992), Battle of Jalalabad (1989) and Afghanistan–Pakistan skirmishes | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Republic of Afghanistan |
Supported by: | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
|
Shahnawaz Tanai[1] Mohammed Ehsan |
 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Ahmed Gailani Hamid Gul | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Unknown | Unknown | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| Heavy | Unknown | ||||||||
The Siege of Samarkhel (Pashto: د سمرخېل محاصره, Persian: محاصرهٔ سمرخیل) occurred in 1989 during the Afghan Civil War, more specifically, the Battle of Jalalabad. Mujahideen forces and Pakistani forces seized Samarkhel, a village east of Jalalabad, its military base, and advanced towards Jalalabad Airport, only two miles from the city. This resulted in a 4-month siege, where the Afghan government re-captured Samarkhel and the military base by the end of June 1989.[6][7] By July 1989, the mujahideen did not attempt to stop the government from recapturing their lost territory.[8]
According to Kaushik Roy, the Mujahideen managed to temporarily seize the airport as part of their broader offensive on 7 June 1989, although it was recaptured by government forces two days later on 9 March.[9] Osama bin Laden contributed by sending a group of Arab fighters to join the Mujahideen in Nangarhar Province from Al-Qaeda. These fighters were involved in the advance towards Samarkhel.[10] The Afghan Interim Government, composed of seven Jihadi parties and backed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) known as Peshawar Seven, on securing Jalalabad as a key target following the Soviet withdrawal. Organised counterinsurgency operations were launched by the Afghan Armed Forces to slow the Mujahideen's advances.[11]
Operation
[edit]On the morning of March 7, a subunit of the Afghan Army stationed overnight at an outpost came under heavy shelling and missile attacks by insurgents of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. Shortly after, the insurgents launched a direct assault, overrunning the garrison and inflicting significant casualties. The government forces suffered heavy losses, with most of the outpost’s defenders killed.[12]
In response, an intervention detachment consisting of an infantry company (56 soldiers) mounted on six BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers was dispatched to counter the insurgent attack. However, the insurgents anticipated the counteroffensive and subjected the detachment to intense artillery, mortar, and missile fire. After a prolonged and heavy engagement, the intervention force was completely destroyed. Within the next hour, two additional neighboring outposts fell to the rebels, bringing the total losses for government forces in the sector to approximately 70 killed or wounded and 180 captured.[12]
By 10:00am, over 800 NIFA fighters, led by Sayed Mohammed Pahlaman, advanced rapidly towards the Samarkhel military base. The base was defended by a force of approximately 500 personnel, including a motorized infantry battalion, a howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance company, and the headquarters company of the 11th Motorised Infantry Division, which was commanded by General Mohammad Ehsan. To weaken resistance, the rebels bombarded the base with artillery, mortars, and rocket fire for about an hour. By 11:00am, the insurgents launched a direct assault on the base, targeting the 11th Division's headquarters. With government resistance significantly reduced, the division's command, including General Mohammad Ehsan, abandoned the base alongside elements of their forces. The remaining government troops surrendered shortly thereafter, marking a decisive victory for the insurgents.[12]
Aftermath of the capture of Samarkhel
[edit]Following the capture of the Samarkhel military base, Afghan soldiers who surrendered or were captured were transported to Peshawar, Pakistan, in a convoy of eight trucks. While the first seven trucks successfully passed through roadblocks, the eighth truck was intercepted by fighters loyal to Mohammad Yunus Khalis, the leader of Hezb-e Islami Khalis. The fighters executed 25 soldiers and left their bodies in the grass beside the road.
The incident had an immediate psychological impact on the remaining government forces, reinforcing the belief that the propaganda disseminated by the Afghan government regarding the risks of surrendering to insurgents was accurate. This event heightened fears among soldiers and further dissuaded them from considering surrender as a viable option, leading to a far stiffer resistance from the Afghan Armed Forces.
On 10 March 1989, the village of Samarkhel, located 2km north of the captured military base and home to approximately 1,200 households, was taken by rebel forces. According to a rebel commander, Afghan troops had evacuated the village the previous night, leaving only a small number of soldiers who were unable to mount significant resistance against the assault. Following the capture of the village, widespread violence and looting ensued, The mujahideen engaged in indiscriminate violence and plundering, treating the village as enemy territory despite its non-combatant population.[12]
Before the assault, the villagers had lived in relative peace, coexisting with Soviet Army (more specifically the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) and later with the Afghan Army after the beginning of February 1989. trading with both sides of the conflict. However, after the fall of Samarkhel, the rebels ransacked the village, looting carpets, iceboxes, televisions, and other valuables. This plundering disrupted the lives of the villagers and marked a stark shift from the coexistence they had maintained during the war with Soviet and Afghan government forces.[12][13]
Aftermath
[edit]The Afghan Armed Forces successfully regained control of Samarkhel from the Mujahideen and Al-Qaeda volunteers in late June to early July after heavy fighting. Following this victory, the rebels were pushed back 8–20 miles from Jalalabad. Although there were discussions within the government’s military command about advancing into the area between Samarkhel and the Torkham border crossing, as they were lightly defended by the retreating mujahideen forces, caution prevailed and no further major offensives were launched in the area. Instead, the focus remained on securing Jalalabad and using the gains at Samarkhel as leverage for peace negotiations with the Afghan Interim Government and for an end to the war.[14]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ a b "What Happened in the Battle of Jalalabad?". Rebellion Research. 5 April 2022. Retrieved 2019-12-20.
- ^ "Afghanistan Rebels Lose Key Battle". Washington Post. 8 July 1989. Retrieved 2019-12-20.
- ^ "The Lessons of Jalalabad; Afghan Guerrillas See Weaknesses Exposed". New York Times. 13 April 1989.
- ^ Roy, Kaushik (2014). War and State-Building in Afghanistan: Historical and Modern Perspectives. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 45. ISBN 9781472572196.
- ^ Kepel, Gilles; Milelli, Jean-Pierre (2008). Al Qaeda in Its Own Words. Harvard University Press. p. 45. ISBN 9780674028043.
- ^ "Afghanistan Rebels Lose Key Battle". The Washington Post. 7 July 1989.
- ^ Bird, Tim; Marshall, Alex (2011-06-28). Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way. Yale University Press. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-300-15457-3.
- ^ Burns, John F.; Times, Special To the New York (1989-09-13). "Jalalabad Shows Its Recovery As Siege by Rebels Dwindles". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2025-01-26.
- ^ Roy, Kaushik (2014). War and State-Building in Afghanistan: Historical and Modern Perspectives. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 135. ISBN 9781472572196.
- ^ Stenersen, Anne (2017). Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. p. 22. ISBN 9781107075139.
- ^ Azimi, General Nabi (2019). The Army and Politics: Afghanistan: 1963–1993. AuthorHouse. ISBN 9781728387017.
- ^ a b c d e Fleiss, Alex (2024-05-01). "What happened in the battle of Jalalabad?". Rebellion Research. Retrieved 2025-01-25.
- ^ "66th independent Motorised Rifle Brigade". www.ww2.dk. Retrieved 2025-01-25.
- ^ Burns, John F.; Times, Special To the New York (1989-09-13). "Jalalabad Shows Its Recovery As Siege by Rebels Dwindles". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2025-01-26.