Makoto Matsutani

Makoto Matsutani (松谷誠, Matsutani Makoto) (January 13, 1903 – October 7, 1998) was a Japanese military officer, and military secretary to the prime minister of Japan.

Career

In November 1944, Colonel Matsutani became the secretary to Sugiyama Hajime, the newly appointed Army Minister. In this role he began to consult with others and a four-man team (Matsutani, Toshikazu Kase, Matsudaira,^[1] and Rear Admiral Sokichi Takagi^[2]) put together a secret report recommending practical strategies for handling the defeat of Japan.

When Matsutani retired he was commanding officer of the Northern Self-Defence Force.^[3]

Views

In a textbook issued to officers at the National Defence College in May 1973, Matsutani expressed the view that in the Vietnam War the Americans had underestimated the power of nationalism, as they were fighting from a purely ideological perspective,^[3] and said that the Japanese should learn this lesson.^[3]

Bibliography

Makoto Matsutani (1980). Dai Tōa sensō shūshi no shinsō (The True Account of the Conclusion of the Greater East Asian War). Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō.^[4]

References

^ Forrest E. Morgan (2003). Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan: Implications for Coercive Diplomacy in the Twenty-first Century. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 242, footnote 60. ISBN 9780275977801.
^ Hoi Sik Jang (2007). Japanese Imperial Ideology, Shifting War Aims and Domestic Propaganda During the Pacific War of 1941--1945. ISBN 9780549267065.
^ ^a ^b ^c United States Congress. House.Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs (1982). United States-Japan Relations : Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, March 1, 3, 9, 17, 24 ; April 27 ; June 2, 15 ; August 4, 1982. US Government Printing Office. p. 271. Retrieved 8 November 2014. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
^ Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism. Robert J. Maddox (Editor). University of Missouri Press. 2007. p. 39, footnote 56. ISBN 9780826265876.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)

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[1] Forrest E. Morgan (2003). Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan: Implications for Coercive Diplomacy in the Twenty-first Century. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 242, footnote 60. ISBN 9780275977801.

[2] Hoi Sik Jang (2007). Japanese Imperial Ideology, Shifting War Aims and Domestic Propaganda During the Pacific War of 1941--1945. ISBN 9780549267065.

[Cong-3] United States Congress. House.Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs (1982). United States-Japan Relations : Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, March 1, 3, 9, 17, 24 ; April 27 ; June 2, 15 ; August 4, 1982. US Government Printing Office. p. 271. Retrieved 8 November 2014. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)

[4] Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism. Robert J. Maddox (Editor). University of Missouri Press. 2007. p. 39, footnote 56. ISBN 9780826265876.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)

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