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John Mearsheimer bibliography

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This is a list of works by John Mearsheimer. In his later years, he focused increasingly on current events.[1]

Thesis

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  • Mearsheimer, John J. (August 1981). The Theory and Practice of Conventional Deterrence (Thesis). Ithaca: Cornell University.

Articles

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Journal articles

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  • — (1979). "Precision-guided munitions and conventional deterrence". Survival. 21 (2): 68–76. doi:10.1080/00396337908441802. ISSN 0039-6338.
  • — (1981). "The British Generals Talk: A Review Essay". International Security. 6 (1): 165–184. doi:10.1162/isec.6.1.165 (inactive 2024-06-27). ISSN 0162-2889.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of June 2024 (link)
  • — (1982). "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front". International Security. 6 (3): 104–122. doi:10.2307/2538609. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538609.
    • Described by Barry Posen as "a critical discussion of the possible tactical implications of the military reformers' prescriptions for ground warfare"[7] and regarded as important though not convincing by David P. Calleo,[8] it was referenced in the first years after its publication,[9] but its first detailed critique came from Joshua M. Epstein[10] and several others in the context of the replacement of combined arms with maneuver doctrine in the United States Armed Forces around 1989[11] and in the context of NATO's tactical future after the First Cold War.[12] It has seen occasional treatments in retrospective literature since that time.[13]
  • Mearsheimer, John J.; Schoenbaum, David (1982-01-04). "Correspondence: Clausewitz and the British Generals". International Security. 6 (3): 223–229. doi:10.2307/2538616. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538616.
  • — (1982). "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe" (PDF). International Security. 7 (1): 3–39. doi:10.2307/2538686. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538686.
    • Also published as a chapter of Conventional Deterrence in 1983. The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996,[14] as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington[15] (who had initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably)[16]: 28  and others.[17] Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary.[18] Positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,[19]: 15  Brauch and Unterseher 1984,[20]: 195  Lübkemeier 1985,[21]: 250  Dean 1986[22] and to some extent Weinstein 1983,[23]: 22–23  and Strachan 1985[24] and Simpson 1985.[25]: 85  Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder[26] and with alternative models by William Kaufmann,[27] William Mako[28] and Andrew Hamilton.[29]: 125  With the exception of Corcoran 1983,[30]: 9–10  most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder,[31] by Joshua Epstein[10] and by Eliot A. Cohen,[32] building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg.[33] Although the reception that year was not entirely negative,[34][35]: 141 [36]: 92  most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.[37]: 535 [38] Employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.[39][40]: 3  That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms.[41] The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities[a] or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start"[b] attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger.[44] White followed this up in more detail in 2017.[45] A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou.[46] The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario,[42] echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches.[47] But outside the context of the debate[48] and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,[49][50] especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.[51][52]: 57  More widely read than his previous studies, it is this study along with his 1983 book that propelled him onto the academic scene as an "Optimist"[c] in their debate with the "Pessimists",[54] which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,[55]: 20  in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.[56]: 38 

The credibility of NATO's defences was analysed and discussed ... Many of the contemporary analyses looked at strategy or numbers, taking a wholesale approach, but failed to address the overall capability based on existing force structures. An example is the analysis given by Dr J Mearsheimer, which provides an example contemporary to the period. It provides a useful perspective on the difficulties inherent in assessing the credibility of defence policy from a purely academic standpoint.

— Kenton White, Credibility Analysis – Mearsheimer's viewpoint (2016)

Mearsheimer's article provides an excellent example of scenario analysis being used to extend an existing theory and develop testable hypotheses that were subsequently falsified. Various reasons may explain why his theory was incorrect—such as normative claims, continued reliance on US security guarantees, and so on—but it is at least clear that his scenario-based approach framed a debate in a rigorous and clearly articulated way and has led to new areas of exploration for the discipline.

— Timothy Junio and Thomas Mahnken, Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations (2013)

Magazine and newspaper articles

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Books

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Contributions

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Book reviews

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Lectures

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Notes

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  1. ^ Tecott and Halterman defended Mearsheimer's omission. "He omits airpower variables from his model not because he thinks these variables are irrelevant to the outcome, but because he argues that airpower would favor NATO, only strengthening his argument."[42]
  2. ^ A possibility publicised by senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett in a 1977 report.[43]
  3. ^ Optimistic from a NATO perspective, regarding its ability to defend in the European theatre. Not to be confused with the "Peace movement".[53]: 147 

References

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  1. ^ Gruber, Anton; Tekles, Alexander; Bornmann, Lutz (2023-05-18). "John Mearsheimer's academic roots: a reference publication year spectroscopy of a political scientist's oeuvre". Scientometrics. 128 (1): 3867–3877. doi:10.1007/s11192-023-04721-6. eISSN 1588-2861. On the one hand, the publication years in which Mearsheimer derived his fundamental theory of International Relations can be inferred. On the other hand, later years show his subsequent thematic focuses and his preoccupation with current events and conflicts.
  2. ^ Gouré, Daniel; McCormick, Gordon (1980). "Debate on precision-guided munitions: PGM: No Panacea)". Survival. 22 (1): 15–19. doi:10.1080/00396338008441859. ISSN 0039-6338.
  3. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (1980). "Debate on precision-guided munitions: Rejoinder". Survival. 22 (1): 20–22. doi:10.1080/00396338008441860. ISSN 0039-6338.
  4. ^ Mandel, Robert (2004). "The Wartime Utility of Precision Versus Brute Force in Weaponry". Armed Forces and Society. 30 (2): 171–201. doi:10.1177/0095327X0403000203. ISSN 0095-327X. JSTOR 48608627.
  5. ^ Blagden, David (2020-10-12). "Strategic stability and the proliferation of conventional precision strike: a (bounded) case for optimism?". The Nonproliferation Review. 27 (1–3): 123–136. doi:10.1080/10736700.2020.1799569. ISSN 1073-6700.
  6. ^ Kahn, Lauren; Horowitz, Michael C. (2022-07-11). "Who Gets Smart? Explaining How Precision Bombs Proliferate". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 67 (1): 3–37. doi:10.1177/00220027221111143. eISSN 1552-8766.
  7. ^ Posen, Barry R. (1985). "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment". International Security. 9 (3). ISSN 0162-2889.
  8. ^ Calleo, David Patrick (1983). "Domestic Priorities and the demands of alliance: An American perspective". The Adelphi Papers. 23 (184): 2–11. doi:10.1080/05679328308457436. ISSN 0567-932X.
  9. ^ Facer, Roger L. L. (1985). Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response. ISBN 0-8330-0623-1.
  10. ^ a b Epstein, Joshua Morris (1988). "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe". International Security. 12 (4): 154–165. doi:10.2307/2538999. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538999.: 157 
  11. ^ Lauer, G. S. "Maneuver Warfare Theory and The Operational Level of War: Misguiding The Marine Corps?". Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.
  12. ^ McKeown, Alex Raymond (1990). An Analysis of the Conventional Military Balance on the European Central Front: Some Implications for NATO Strategy and Tactics (Thesis). Madison: University of Wisconsin.
  13. ^
  14. ^ Matthews, John C. III (1996). "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter". International Security. 21 (1): 112–146. doi:10.2307/2539110. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2539110. It was thought by som analysts that NATO forces were at a good force-to-space ratio, and that cuts might jeopardize the ability of the NATO divisions to hold.
  15. ^ Huntington, Samuel Phillips (1984). "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe". International Security. 8 (3s): 32–56. doi:10.2307/2538699. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538699.
  16. ^ Huntington, Samuel Phillips (1983). "Broadening the strategic focus: Comments on Michael Howard's paper". The Adelphi Papers. 23 (184): 27–32. doi:10.1080/05679328308457439. ISSN 0567-932X.
  17. ^
  18. ^
    • Frei, Daniel (1984). Alternatives to the First Use of Nuclear Weapons. ISBN 9781003053828.
    • Garnham, David (1985). "Extending Deterrence with German Nuclear Weapons". International Security. 10 (1): 96–110. doi:10.2307/2538791. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538791. Page 99.
    • Kolodziej, Edward A. (1988). "SDI, Alliance Coherence, and East—West Nuclear Stability". Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe. Houndmills: The Macmillan Press. pp. 29–58. ISBN 978-1-349-09181-2.
  19. ^ Posen, Barry R.; Van Evera, Stephen (1983). "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment". International Security. 8 (1): 3–45. doi:10.2307/2538484. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538484. An excellent essay on the NATO conventional balance
  20. ^ Brauch, Hans Günter; Unterseher, Lutz (June 1984). "Review Essay: Getting Rid of Nuclear Weapons: A Review of a Few Proposals for a Conventional Defense of Europe". Journal of Peace Research. 21 (2): 193–199. doi:10.1177/002234338402100209. ISSN 0022-3433. The ESEC study is in line with the 'bean counting' philosophy, a force balance that only marginally takes into account qualitative aspects — contrasting what Mearsheimer has done recently in a convincing manner.
  21. ^ Lübkemeier, Eckhard (1985). "Extended Deterrence: Implications for Arms Limitation and Reduction". Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 16 (3): 249–254. doi:10.1177/096701068501600306. ISSN 0007-5035.
  22. ^ Dean, Jonathan (1986). "Assessing the Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO's Central Front". The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs. 21 (3): 26–34. doi:10.1080/03932728608456594. ISSN 0393-2729.
  23. ^ Weinstein, John M. (1983-07-15). "All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities and the Future of Deterrence" (PDF).
  24. ^ Strachan, Hew (1985). "Conventional Defence in Europe". International Affairs. 61 (1): 27–43. doi:10.2307/2619778. ISSN 1473-799X. JSTOR 2619778.
  25. ^ Simpson, John (1985). "New conventional weapon technologies and conventional disarmament". Arms Control. 6 (1): 82–96. doi:10.1080/01440388508403813. ISSN 0099-4561.
  26. ^ Snyder, Jack Lewis (1985). "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy". International Security. 9 (3): 89–108. doi:10.2307/2538588. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538588.
  27. ^ Kaufmann, William Weed (1983). "Nonnuclear Deterrence". Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question. Brookings Institution. pp. 88–89. ISBN 0815781180.
  28. ^ Mako, William P. (1983). U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe. Brookings Institution. ISBN 0815754442.
  29. ^ Hamilton, Andrew (1983). "Redressing the Conventional Balance: NATO's Reserve Military Manpower". International Security. 10 (1): 111–136. doi:10.2307/2538792. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538792.
  30. ^ Corcoran, Edward A. (1983-06-01). Improving Europe's Conventional Defense. Strategic Issues Research Memorandum.
  31. ^ Snyder, Jack Lewis (1988). "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options". International Security. 12 (4): 48–77. doi:10.2307/2538994. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538994.
  32. ^ Cohen, Eliot Asher (1988). "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance". International Security. 13 (1): 50–89. doi:10.2307/2538896. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538896.
  33. ^ Friedberg, Aaron Louis (1988). "Review: The Assessment of Military Power: A Review Essay". International Security. 12 (3): 190–202. doi:10.2307/2538805. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538805.
  34. ^ Sens, Allen Gregory (1988-08-17). NATO and the INF Controversy: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and the Atlantic Alliance (Thesis). Vancouver: University of British Columbia.
  35. ^ Makinda, Samuel M. (1988). "Moscow and the INF treaty". Australian Outlook. 42 (3): 133–144. doi:10.1080/10357718808444974. ISSN 1035-7718.
  36. ^ Thomson, James A. (1989). "An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance" (PDF). The Adelphi Papers. 29 (236): 72–102. doi:10.1080/05679328908448874. ISSN 0567-932X.
  37. ^ Borinski, Phillipp (1989). "Mitigating West Germany's Strategic Dilemmas". Armed Forces & Society. 15 (4): 531–549. doi:10.1177/0095327X8901500404. ISSN 0095-327X.
  38. ^ Jones, Peter (1985). "New Conventional Technologies and Their Possible Impact on Conventional Arms Control Verification in Europe". Arms Control. 10 (2): 152–167. doi:10.1080/01440388908403907. ISSN 0099-4561.
  39. ^ Van Evera, Stephen (2009). "Foreword". American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat inflation since 9/11. pp. xi–xvi. ISBN 9780203879092.
  40. ^ Thomson, James A. (2018). "Deterrence Then and Now". SIRIUS - Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen. 2 (2): 1–8. doi:10.1515/sirius-2018-0024. eISSN 2510-2648.
  41. ^ Watts, Barry D. (2007-12-24). "Ignoring reality: Problems of theory and evidence in security studies". Security Studies. 7 (2): 115–171. doi:10.1080/09636419708429344. ISSN 0963-6412.
  42. ^ a b Tecott, Rachel; Halterman, Andrew (2020-09-30). "The Case for Campaign Analysis: A Method for Studying Military Operations" (PDF). International Security. 45 (4). ISSN 0162-2889.
  43. ^ Nunn, Sam; Bartlett, Dewey Follett Sr. (1977). NATO and the New Soviet Threat: Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
  44. ^ White, Kenton (October 2016). "Credibility Analysis – Mearsheimer's viewpoint". British Defence Planning and Britain's NATO commitment, 1979 – 1985 (PDF) (Thesis). pp. 283–288.
  45. ^ White, Kenton (2017). "Mearsheimer's Folly: NATO's Cold War Capability and Credibility". Infinity Journal. 5 (4). eISSN 2312-5888.
  46. ^ Heydarian Pashakhanlou, Arash (2016-10-23). "Fear in the Works of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer". Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered. pp. 23–44. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_2. ISBN 978-3-319-41012-8.
  47. ^ Stoll, Richard J. (1990). "The Russians Are Coming: A Computer Simulation". Armed Forces & Society. 16 (2): 193–213. doi:10.1177/0095327X9001600202. hdl:1911/75021. ISSN 0095-327X.
  48. ^ Hardin, Bristow (June 1991). The militarized social democracy and racism: The relationships between militarism, racism and social welfare policy in the United States (Thesis). Santa Cruz: University of California.
  49. ^ Leah, Christine M. (2015). "Deterrence and Arms Control in a Second Conventional Age". Comparative Strategy. 34 (5): 401–421. doi:10.1080/01495933.2015.1089122. ISSN 0149-5933.
  50. ^ Motin, Dylan (2018-04-20). "The Making of a Blitzkrieg: Russia's Decision to Go to War with Afghanistan, Georgia, but not Ukraine" (PDF). The Institute for Basic Social Science. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2022-04-12.
  51. ^ Rippy, Julian T. (2022-08-17). A Mixed-Methods Approach to Force Estimation in Military Operations Other Than War (Thesis). Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
  52. ^ Motin, Dylan (June 2024). "The Logic of U.S. Deployment in Norway: The Trump Administration and NATO's Northern Front". Journal of Global Strategic Studies. 4 (1): 50–71. eISSN 2798-4427.
  53. ^ Dankbaar, Ben (1984). "Alternative Defense Policies and the Peace Movement". Journal of Peace Research. 21 (2): 141–155. doi:10.1177/002234338402100205. ISSN 0022-3433.
  54. ^
  55. ^ Christian, Joshua T. (2019). "An Examination of Force Ratios" (PDF). Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College.
  56. ^ Rohn, Laurinda L. (May 1990). Conventional Forces in Europe: A New Approach to the Balance, Stability, and Arms Control (PDF). ISBN 0-8330-0687-8.
  57. ^ Epstein, Joshua M. (1989). "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies". International Security. 13 (4): 90–127. doi:10.2307/2538781. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538781.
  58. ^ Kress, Moshe; Talmor, Irit (1999-07-14). "A new look at the 3:1 rule of combat through Markov Stochastic Lanchester models". Journal of the Operational Research Society. 50 (7): 733–744. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2600758. ISSN 0160-5682.
  59. ^ Junio, Timothy J.; Mahnken, Thomas G. (2013-09-17). "Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations". International Studies Review. 15 (3): 374–395. doi:10.1111/misr.12061. ISSN 1521-9488.
  60. ^ — (2006-10-30) [recorded 2006-08-28]. Prof. John Mearsheimer on the Israel Lobby. National Press Club, Bill Hughes – via YouTube.
  61. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2019-08-07). The liberal international order. Centre for Independent Studies – via YouTube. 54:15.
  62. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2022-06-23). "The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War". Russia Matters.
  63. ^ Mearsheimer, John J.; Ikenberry, Gilford John (2021-02-02). The Future of the Liberal International Order. The Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership – via YouTube.
  64. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2022-06-16). The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war. The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – via YouTube. 2:07:15.
  65. ^ Stubb, Cai-Göran Alexander (2022-06-08). Why Mearsheimer is wrong about Russia and the war in Ukraine: Five arguments from Alexander Stubb. Understanding the War – via YouTube.
  66. ^ Anghel, Veronica; Stolle, Dietlind (2022-06-28). "In praise of reality, not realism: An answer to Mearsheimer". EUIdeas.
  67. ^ Kostelka, Filip (2022-07-11). "John Mearsheimer's lecture on Ukraine: Why he is wrong and what are the consequences". EUIdeas.
  68. ^ Mastny, Vojtech (2001-11-01). "A Different World". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  69. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2018-11-22) [recorded 2012-10-17]. Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully. University of Ottawa – via YouTube. 1:30:45.
  70. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2011-08-02). Imperial by Design. The University of Chicago – via YouTube. 45:39.
  71. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2013-03-07) [recorded 2012-10-18]. America's Imperial Impulse. Political Science Speaker Series. Carleton University – via YouTube. 51:03.
  72. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2015-09-25). Why is Ukraine the West's Fault?. The University of Chicago – via YouTube. 1:14:15.
  73. ^ McFaul, Michael Anthony (2014-10-17). "Moscow's Choice" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. Vol. 93, no. 6. pp. 167–171. ISSN 0015-7120.
  74. ^ Sestanovich, Stephen (2014-10-17). "How the West Has Won" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. Vol. 93, no. 6. pp. 171–175. ISSN 0015-7120.
  75. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2014-10-17). "Mearsheimer Replies" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. Vol. 93, no. 6. pp. 175–178. ISSN 0015-7120.
  76. ^ Eisenhower, Susan Elaine (2015-09-01). "Perils of cornering Russia". United States Studies Centre.
  77. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2011-11-04). Can China Rise Peacefully?. Jefferson Literary and Debating Society – via YouTube. Part 1. Part 2. 1:20:34.
  78. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2013-12-18). Can China Rise Peacefully?. Harper Lectures. The University of Chicago – via YouTube. 1:21:47.
  79. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2024-05-02) [delivered 2024-04-16]. Can China Rise Peacefully?. Public Policy Lecture Series. Reed College – via YouTube. 1:24:41.
  80. ^ Ikenberry, John (2022-02-11). "The Real Liberal Bet" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  81. ^ Nathan, Andrew James (2022-02-11). "The China Threat in Perspective" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  82. ^ Ashton Thornton, Susan (2022-02-11). "The Barriers to War" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  83. ^ Zhe, Sun (2022-02-11). "In Search of a Strategy" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  84. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2022-02-11). "Mearsheimer Replies" (PDF). Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  85. ^ Orr, George E. (July 1983). "Effective Command of Combat Operations". Combat Operations C³I: Fundamentals and Interactions. Airpower Research Institute, Air University Press, 4th printing. pp. 90–113. ISBN 1585661023.
  86. ^ Snyder, Jed C. (1985). "Review: Conventional Deterrence". Naval War College Review. 38 (3): 111–112. ISSN 0028-1484.
  87. ^ Mäki-Ullakko, Ilkka (2023). Contribution of Military Logistics to Conventional Deterrence in the Case of Ukraine (Thesis). hdl:1969.1/6465.
  88. ^ Williamson, Corbin (April 2008). Factors Affecting the Feasibility of a Warsaw Pact Invasion of Western Europe (Thesis). Texas A&M University.
  89. ^ Romero, Philip J. (1991). A New Approach for the Design and Evaluation of Land Defense Concepts (PDF). ISBN 0-8330-0936-2.
  90. ^ Mearsheimer, John J.; Walt, Stephen M. (2008-05-23). "Our lobby, his lobby: The Israel Lobby authors reply to Gershom Gorenberg's criticisms in the last issue of Prospect". Prospect. eISSN 2059-6731.
  91. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2007-12-20). Iraq, the Neocons and the Israel Lobby. FORA.tv – via YouTube. 6:24.
  92. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2008-05-29). On AIPAC and Congress. Council for the National Interest, Bill Hughes – via YouTube. Part 1. Part 2. 16:57.
  93. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2011-05-27). Professor John Mearsheimer Speaks at Move Over AIPAC. Code Pink – via YouTube. Part 1. Part 2. 25:28.
  94. ^ Mearsheimer, John J.; Walt, Stephen (2012-08-13) [recorded 2007-10-29]. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt - The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. GBH Forum Network – via YouTube. 1:21:32.
  95. ^ Mearsheimer, John J.; Walt, Stephen (2012-12-02) [recorded 2008-06-17]. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Center for International and Regional Studies – via YouTube. 38:05.
  96. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2015-08-28). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. The University of Chicago – via YouTube. 1:21:11.
  97. ^ Mearsheimer, John J.; Feiler, Bruce (2018-04-05). Debating the Israel Lobby. Nonzero. Bloggingheads.tv. 1:10:22.
  98. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2010-09-23). Lying in International Politics. Centre for International Governance Innovation – via YouTube. 1:35:33.
  99. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2012-03-01). Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics with John Mearsheimer. The University of Chicago – via YouTube. 1:25:46.
  100. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2020). "Response to C. William Walldorf Jr.'s Review". Perspectives on Politics. 18 (3): 894–895. doi:10.1017/S1537592720001796. ISSN 1537-5927.
  101. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2018-10-10). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. The Bush School of Government and Public Service – via YouTube. 1:16:49.
  102. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2020-02-13). The Great Delusion. FPA Research Series. Carleton University – via YouTube.
  103. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2019-01-24) [recorded 2019-01-21]. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. SOAS University of London – via YouTube.
  104. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2018-11-12) [recorded 2018-11-07]. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Center for International Security and Governance – via YouTube.
  105. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2019-02-26). "Book Discussion with John Mearsheimer" (Interview). Interviewed by Duran, Burhanettin – via YouTube. 1:18:09.
  106. ^ Mearsheimer, John J.; Tellis, Ashley J. (2023-10-03). How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy. The Cato Institute – via YouTube. 1:31:54.
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