Talk:Nuclear weapons of the United States

This article was originally meant to be a sub-set article of The United States and weapons of mass destruction, going into detail about the history of the U.S. program and ending with a bit about the current stockpile and delivery system status. I am imagining that articles of this nature could be constructed for all of the main countries on the WMD template, though obviously it takes time to do so (the initial writeup here took about five hours time, a tremendous effort of procrastination). There was previously no page on Wikipedia which unified the historical and current approaches to the U.S.'s endeavor specifically, so it seemed like a worthwhile addition. Any thoughts on improvements and changes would be appreciated; I tried to cite all of the sources for figures I used.

I would personally like this to be kept as jargon-free as possible (it should be generally accessible to anyone who understands the basics of U.S. history and nuclear weapons, and there are many other sites which try to be extraordinarily comprehensive in such things), but I understand that with this subject such is not always the case (and I may have committed a few abuses myself in this respect). My original text likely has lots of grammatical atrocities in it (such is what happens when I crank out copy), and so I am appreciative of anyone who corrects any you see!

I have tried to be neutral in my descriptions of things, I apologise to people who feel I should have leaned more one way than the other. --Fastfission 21:22, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC)

I edited a couple of sentences about delivery systems: the original text implied that the aircraft used in WWII to deliver Fat Man and Little Boy were special designs made solely to carry nuclear weapons; of course the B-29's used were actually conventional aircraft designed for traditional bombing. The aircraft used were, however, heavily modified. I hope I captured the intent of the original author. I also slightly toned down the wording of the requirements for bomb assembly: the early weapons required special experts, but not necessarily Nobel Prize level physicists.....I think the current version is more accurate and less colloquial. 6/13/05 KMC

Well, In particular I was referring to Luis Alvarez, who I'm faily sure was involved in the final assembly for the Fat Man unit. But anyway, you're right, it is a little cheeky, especially since a number of the other people involved in the assemblies never did win such Prizes! --Fastfission 18:04, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Infobox

I made a little infobox for the side. I wondered if anybody objected to it. This seemed like an appropriate article for such a thing -- a brief summary of the basic numbers and dates. I figured that a map of the world was more useful than the flag of the country for something of a military nature. If nobody objects, I'll make it into a generic template, so that it could be used in other articles of a "((Country)) and nuclear weapons" format. --Fastfission 19:18, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Does it have to be so BIG?!

Somebody changed the image file to a high-res one. It's fixed now. --Fastfission 04:32, 14 June 2006 (UTC)

Name change?

I think the name of this article is a bit odd. Perhaps a better one could be found? Lord Anon

It is modeled after The United States and weapons of mass destruction and the rest in the WMD series. I'm not sure what is better about reversing them. --Fastfission 01:22, 14 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Honestly, I think it was better the other way around, considering I think this model of article could be developed for a number of other countries. I think Iran and nuclear weapons makes more sense than Nuclear weapons and Iran, because the subject is really Iran (and its work or lack of work towards said weapons, which they don't currently have). I can't find any other great analog articles off-hand -- all of the sub-articles linked from the article United States are in the format of "X of the United States" which doesn't really work here. Anyway, those are my two cents on it, any other input would be appreciated. --Fastfission 01:46, 14 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Either title all the pages of countries with nuclear weapons as "_____ and weapons of mass destruction" or "Nuclear weapons and _____" for the sake of continuity and to avoid sounding biased.75.2.247.166 11:26, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

Humorously, only the "third world" countries have the "_____ and weapons of mass destruction" so... I'll get on my Wikipedia account and go to or address this naming convention.

69.158.49.111 21:03, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Patronizing words, request change

"The debate over the ethical implications of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, begun in private amongst scientists and statesmen during the war, has continued to this day, both in the lay populace and amongst scholars"

Sorry to nitpik, but I find the combination of terms 'lay populace' and 'scholars' rather offensive and patronizing. Why is a view of mass death and destruction segregrated with this description ?

I would replace lay populace with general public and scholars (?) with something more appropriate like military experts, military historians, military strategists. The word scholar has somewhat loaded and outdated overtones of superiority. Also it may not be strictly relevant; the opinon of a "scholar" may not be as informed as that of someone with experience militarily.

How about, "general public and historians"? "Lay public" isn't meant to be a patronizing term but I don't mind changing it. The point is that it is something in debate both about people casually discussing it and people whose jobs it is to discuss and study such topics. --Fastfission 13:53, 16 July 2005 (UTC)

DU

What about DU weaponry? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.54.202.82 (talk • contribs)

• Depleted uranium weaponry really doesn't have much to do with this page in my view. DU weapons are not nuclear weapons in the slightest. The strongest statements against them are that they might be considered very weak radiological weapons, but even that is a pretty silly thing to say given how weakly radioactive they are (and their radiation is not in the slightest the property which makes them a useful weapon). --Fastfission 14:39, 11 July 2006 (UTC)
  • Yes, we all know that DU is used for its super-density; yes going to the extreme, DU could be used for a dirty shrapnel bomb.

69.158.49.111 21:05, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

• Indeed, utterly hilarious how weakly radioactive DU (cum decay-chain) is, and how perfectly non-toxic, too! --mag.rer.nat. Wda (talk) 19:45, 30 October 2016 (UTC)
• Depleted Uranium (DU) bombs and ammunition aren't nuclear weapons. They aren't even radiological weapons as that term is correctly used. They are conventional weapons. Any radioactivity DU has (some DU in our bombs and shells is a by-product of nuclear fuel reprocessing and has neutron-activated radioactive material in it) doesn't contribute to its military utility, any more than lead bullets are chemical weapons because lead is chemically toxic and a carcinogen. The military value of lead and depleted uranium in projectiles and bombs comes from the kinetic energy they transfer to damage or destroy whatever they strike. loupgarous (talk) 08:01, 17 March 2018 (UTC)

Reclassification of Cold War Missile Numbers

I read today the US is reclassifying numbers of missiles from the cold-war era. Will this impact Wiki in any way, ie government censors coming in here and editing or anything? I would hope not.

• No, it won't. What this means in practical terms is that when declassifying documents in the future and potentially with documents currently in archives the government is blacking out old stockpile data. That does not mean that they will attempt to curtail previous or even current publication of such data, or estimates of them. There is very little legal precedent for the latter when the sources in question were undeniably in the open literature originally. (Unfortunately for Igor Sutyagin this is not the case in Russia.) In any case if there were policies which sought to censor the public domain Wikipedia would be pretty down the chain of important places to go (since our info just parrots that of other places). --Fastfission 18:32, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Last nuclear weapon created by the US

I'd like to know when the US stopped making nuclear weapons.

There seem to be two articles with two different dates: Stockpile stewardship (1992) and Enduring Stockpile (1989)

Well, it could just be the fact that I'm sorta sleepy atm, but I'm pretty sure the articles assert these dates. Logically, one or both of them has to be incorrect.

Oh, and just randomly, does anyone know why wikipedians insist on making a hyperlink to a particular year every time it occurs in an article? It seems a tad inappropriate. I guess it could be to provide a social backdrop for the event in question. If someone could help me understand that custom, it would be nice. Thanks. Glooper 12:24, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Usually we discourage from linking to every year, though in the early days it was quite common.

But anyway... the articles are non inconsistent. Stockpile stewardship refers to testing stopping in 1992, Enduring Stockpile refers to production stopping in 1989. These are different. --24.147.86.187 19:08, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

Hold on. The article on stockpile stewardship says: "Because no new nuclear weapons have been developed by the United States since 1992, even its youngest weapons are at least 15 years old." Doesn't 'developed' imply produced, not tested? And if the youngest is 15 yrs old, this puts its birthday in 1992. If what you are saying is true, then the article on stockpile stewardship needs altering. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Glooper (talk • contribs) 06:36, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

Yucca Mountain

The Yucca Mountain radioactive waste facility is almost exclusively designed to receive the radioactive waste originating from civilian nuclear power plants and used nuclear power reactor fuel.

However, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, which is already in operation in New Mexico, is almost exclusively dedicated to the disposal of radiologically contaminated waste originating from the production of nuclear weapons.

As such, the latter facility should certainly be mentioned in the list of nuclear weapons production related sites in the article, and not Yucca Mountain. AWeishaupt (talk) 19:04, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

Bombing of hiroshima image

Someone says they are "overused images." Are you scared of the images and facts. How are they overused. It is fact. I don't see duplicate image in this article. These are all facts. Removing them will be POV. 97.124.248.185 (talk) 18:45, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

I did not say those specific images were overused, but that the article itself is overloaded with illustrations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki already have been mentioned under Public Reactions, which section also contains a photograph of the bombed area. That should be sufficient. --The Fifth Horseman (talk) 19:02, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

That is not sufficient. Remove that bombed out city image and put the actual bombing image in there. Actually there are way too many "testing" images and not the actual use. Those images are looking too redundant. I don't care whether any of the images are controversial. This article is starting to look like slight POV. I honestly don't care whether these explosion images are controversial or not, but it is what it is. 97.124.248.185 (talk) 19:06, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

I don't want to argue with you, but you can remove one of those explosions images. Get rid of the bombed out city image and put the explosion image in it is fine. The reason why I say that is whenever you hear "nuclear weapons" an "us" almost everyone thinks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki without a doubt, and finally they land on the page, the wikipedia page is all written rosy with bunch of innocent tests and mockup images. That is my point. Peace 97.124.248.185 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 19:11, 26 October 2009 (UTC).

My point is that the primary subject of this particular article is US' nuclear weaponry and it's overall history. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomings are covered in exhaustive detail in the Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki article.

Remember that Wikipedia is supposed to be neutral - it doesn't matter if we're talking about Russian legal system, Korean censorship of the internet, US' nuclear weapons or anything else. I might agree with your point of view, but that does not mean it can be allowed to overtake the article. --The Fifth Horseman (talk) 19:19, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

I'm not trying to overtake anything. Ok we will resolve this. I will remove one of the bombing images and replace the bombed out city. We will resolve this. I can also say that you are trying to overtake the article and make it all rosey. It goes both ways. 97.124.248.185 (talk) 19:22, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

If anyone else agree or disagree feel free to comment. 97.124.248.185 (talk) 19:27, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

Nevermind. I change my mind. It is reverted back to its original version. 97.124.248.185 (talk) 19:30, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

Incomplete description

"It maintains an arsenal of 5,113 warheads"

These are *actively deployed* warheads. The cited sources note that an additional "several thousand" warheads are not deployed or are scheduled for demolition. According to nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Wpngall.html

there are at least 4,000 additional weapons in storage.

The sentence should be amended: "It maintains an active, deployed arsenal of 5,113 warheads and several thousand additional warheads in storage." Westmiller (talk) 19:11, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

That figure is the amount of stockpiled weapons both active and inactive (about half of each). Inactive weapons are stored in a depot without their tritium caps and are included in that figure because they can be reactivated if needed. The additional 4000-5000 stored weapons you're talking about are retired weapons awaiting dismantlement that will never be used in the future and as such should not be included as part of the US nuclear arsenal.

Out of date table

The table under current arsenal is two years out of date. I tired to update it myself but managed to screw up the page formatting so I undid the change. If someone wants to the information is here: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/2/66.full.pdf+html. It's the same source just for 2011 and not 2009.

Changes were made to the table data in Nov 30, 2014, by Abattoir666. There is an HTML comment on the table that it is taken from the article New START, but with the changes even that is no longer true. There must be references on this table to the data. I'm tagging it. SkoreKeep (talk) 22:52, 1 December 2014 (UTC)

Were America’s nuclear codes set to zero? Looks like it. And worse.

http://tomnichols.net/blog/2014/01/08/were-americas-nuclear-codes-set-to-zero-looks-like-it-and-worse/

Is this notable as it relates to the USA's stewardship of WMD? Hcobb (talk) 07:48, 8 January 2014 (UTC)

I would say not much; it probably has more to do with 40-50 year old technology and the class of people crewing the bombs then. The military has changed, leadership has changed, and the technology (particularly that of permissive links) has changed. But go ahead and go for it, just report the facts and stay away from the "implications". And you can find more acceptable reports that discuss it than a one-man blog. SkoreKeep (talk) 08:57, 8 January 2014 (UTC)

http://www.stripes.com/news/on-nuclear-tour-hagel-is-told-of-another-misstep-in-force-1.261305

So what is the correct article to list out the USAF's daily buffoonery with nuclear weapons? Hcobb (talk) 17:23, 10 January 2014 (UTC)

Questions:

1) What the hell does an article on discovering some drug hanky-pankey in the AF have to do with "nuclear weapons and the US"?

2) What is your need to tie some such "daily buffonery" to an encyclopedia?

3) Why ask me, who you don't know and likely would not likely agree with philosophically in any case?

As I said above, wail on. If you try to be factual and not let your institutional biases show, then it's less likely your contribution will be hacked by another editor. Perhaps a blog would be better suited to the sort of writing you appear to really want to do. SkoreKeep (talk) 19:03, 10 January 2014 (UTC)

"two nuclear missile launch officers have been implicated in an illegal narcotics investigation." seems to impact directly on America's handling of nuclear weapons. Especially as it is part of notable pattern of sloppy handling of the nuclear enterprise. Hcobb (talk) 19:25, 10 January 2014 (UTC)

Whatever. You obviously aren't here to form a consensus on an article, and I haven't got the time. SkoreKeep (talk) 19:47, 10 January 2014 (UTC)

My math on US aggregate megatonnage was wrong before

Please, could anyone check my math here. [1]

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Abattoir666 (talk • contribs) 02:29, 27 January 2015 (UTC)

I know this is very late, but your numbers check (I made a spreadsheet in Excel to verify them) except for total megatonnage, which the numbers you give come out to 550.22 Mt, not your calculated figure of 549.7 Mt.

However, these are three year-old numbers. I've found a more recent set of figures (below).

"United States nuclear forces, 2017", Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2017 Vol 73, no 1, pp 48-57 is the most up-to-date published tabulation of US strategic nuclear forces. I would rely on Kristensen and Norris' figures for our article's purposes.

This is Table 1. "The US nuclear arsenal, 2017" loupgarous (talk) 22:38, 15 March 2018 (UTC)

Another editor further down the page found "Nuclear Notebook - United States nuclear forces, 2018", Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris Pages 120-131 | Published online: 05 Mar 2018 the very latest version of this table (by the same authors, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists). If no one else has updated our article with this tomorrow, I will. loupgarous (talk) 03:22, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

External links modified

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US nukes stationed elsewhere,

a section a/o list seems missing; conspicuously absent? (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey, to start with, Diego Garcia?, Israel?, ... No nukes in Afghanistan, Iraq (yet), one hopes.(?) ) --Wda (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 19:46, 30 October 2016 (UTC)

I think these countries have nuclear sharing programs.--Bolzanobozen (talk) 18:37, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

NATO members Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey do have nuclear sharing agreements with the US. Diego Garcia is in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The US built all of its tenant facilities at Diego Garcia, but the UK is the host country, just as they are in RAF Akrotiri for US reconnaissance units based there. Nuclear sharing isn't an issue in Diego Garcia, as any nuclear weapons on the base are (presumably) under the control of their respective owning countries.

Any nuclear weapons in Israel are solely manufactured by and the property of Israel.

As far as writing about US nuclear weapons outside of the US and NATO nuclear sharing countries, the policy of the United States is to neither confirm nor deny the existence of such weapons. That is all we can say unless you have a WP:RS source on the subject stating otherwise. Many of us would doubtless love to see any such source, if you have it. loupgarous (talk) 19:43, 10 April 2018 (UTC)

Second citation leads to a dead link

I'm not very good at source editing, so could someone update the link or add a {citation needed}?

EDIT: The first link is also dead.

Thanks, ^–User_Dude 06:28, 6 May 2017 (UTC) 03:44, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

Operational American strategic nuclear forces, July 1, 2016

The table headed Operational American strategic nuclear forces, July 1, 2016 in the United States strategic nuclear weapons arsenal section cites https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/259273.htm in support. That url redirects to page on the target website which says that the page cannot be found. The 20170808 archive (currently most recent) also leads to a similar page. OK, WP:Linkrot.

The table is as of July 1, 2016. The July 14 archive is not retrievable ([2]). The 20160822 archive is retrievable, but does not agree with the table in the article. A note in the source says that the table will be updated every six months, but the first retrievable archive beyond that six months is the first one to show linkrot.

I've changed the link in the supporting cite to point to the un-rotted 20160822 archive. Since that source does not agree with the table asserted in the article, I've tagged the Ref as {{fv}}. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 00:59, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

US use of nuclear weapons

This article sorely lacked a section about this. So I added it. Feel free to comment.

Against Japanese cities

The US is the first and only country to have used nuclear weapons against another country. Debate has continued about whether the nuclear bombings of Japan were legally or morally justifiable. On 6 August, 1945 the US military detonated a uranium-gun design bomb, Little Boy, over the Japanese city of Hiroshima with an energy of about 15 kilotons of TNT, killing approximately 70,000 people, among them 20,000 Japanese combatants and 20,000 Korean slave laborers, and destroying nearly 50,000 buildings (including the 2nd General Army and Fifth Division headquarters). Three days later, on 9 August, the US attacked Nagasaki using a plutonium implosion-design bomb, Fat Man with the explosion equivalent to about 20 kilotons of TNT, destroying 60% of the city and killing approximately 35,000 people, among them 23,200–28,200 Japanese munitions workers, 2,000 Korean slave laborers, and 150 Japanese combatants. The human toll in addition included tens of thousands of babies born with major birth defects for decades after the nuclear attacks.

The last reference you cite, Nuke-Rebuke: Writers & Artists Against Nuclear Energy & Weapons is very shaky by WP:NPOV standards, being compiled by antinuclear activists. Wikipedia prefers secondary sources which do not have an activist agenda, such as newspapers, encyclopedia (but not Wikipedia itself), books compiled by technical experts (SIPRI and IAEA may be useful sources for secondary and tertiary material regarding the nuclear bombings of Japan which aren't unduly influenced by the US government) and similar material. loupgarous (talk) 20:48, 15 March 2018 (UTC)

The US is "the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon," said Pres. Obama.

This AFSC source also provides casualty figures. Here are some additional sources for casualties. --NYCJosh (talk) 00:54, 29 March 2018 (UTC)

Nuclear threats against countries

The U.S. has also used its nuclear weapons as part of its nuclear diplomacy to force other countries to get its way, for example, against China. and against North Vietnam.

It would be better if you cited Seymour Hersh's book "The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House" (New York: Summit Books, 1983) directly rather than relying on Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick to accurately represent Hersh's statements. Seymour Hersh is the authoritative source for the statements you're making. Citing his book directly eliminates concerns about Oliver Stone's objectivity as a source for information regarding contentious areas of US policy. loupgarous (talk) 20:48, 15 March 2018 (UTC)

Thanks for the input, loupgarous.--NYCJosh (talk) 01:51, 28 March 2018 (UTC)

More consistently, the US threatened the Soviet Union with full scale nuclear attack in case of any clash with the USSR, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear clash. US nuclear doctrine called for mutually assured destruction (MAD), which entailed a massive nuclear attack against military targets and major populations centers of the Soviet Union and its allies. The term "mutual assured destruction" was coined in 1962 by American strategist Donald Brennan. MAD was implemented by deploying nuclear weapons simultaneously on three different types of weapons platforms.

This section has some POV issues, stemming from your reliance on Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick's book for encyclopedic facts, as it presents a one-sided account of US nuclear policy during the Cold War.

As written, this subsection describes US nuclear policy without mentioning corresponding Soviet nuclear threats. The doctrine of Massive Retaliation was used by both sides in the Cold War - the Soviet Union used it during the Suez Crisis to prevent military action by Israel, France and Britain to secure the Suez Canal, and there are indications that Stalin threatened nuclear attack if United Nations forces pursued retreating North Korean troops past the Chinese border; General Douglas MacArthur requested US nuclear weapons be used against Communist forces while he commanded the UN's military forces in Korea, so threats of use of nuclear weapons were made by both sides. The Soviet Union also threatened to intervene with nuclear weapons during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Richard Rhodes' history of the development of thermonuclear weapons, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1995), ISBN 978-0-684-82414-7 describes nuclear threats made by the US and by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Rhodes is also critical of US nuclear policy, but his coverage of the threats made by both sides in the Cold War is much more balanced and a sounder reference than the Stone/Kuznick book. loupgarous (talk) 20:48, 15 March 2018 (UTC)

loupgarous, you may be right about Soviet threats, and if you have the "Dark Sun" book please propose some content here together with a FN to the book so it can be added. I don't have the book.

In the 1956 Suez Crisis, the US initiated an effort to force out UK/France through a "United for Peace" UN resolution, so that may be a bad example. But some points should be kept in mind:

(1) This is obviously an article about the US and nuclear weapons, so while Soviet nuclear doctrine is certainly worth mentioning, we should keep the focus of the discussion on the US primarily.

(2) If editors feel that a section or paragraph has a POV issue, they should feel free to propose edits so as to make a positive contribution. They should not just delete large sections, together with their footnotes.

(3)The Stone/Kuznick book may have a point of view but it is certainly a sound reference and is reliable in the facts it presents. Kuznick is a professor of American history at a major US university. --NYCJosh (talk) 01:51, 28 March 2018 (UTC)

Answering your points, I hope in a collegial spirit:

* Your lead sentence, "The U.S. has also used its nuclear weapons as part of its nuclear diplomacy to force other countries to get its way," does push a POV. Whether or not Massive Retaliation was nuclear blackmail, an attempt to use US nuclear forces as nuclear deterrent against invasion of Western Europe by numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the European theater, a little of both, or something entirely else is controversial. If you advance the idea that the US was in the nuclear blackmail business during the Cold War, you need to balance that viewpoint with other viewpoints.

* I haven't touched your changes to our article yet, and I've made suggestions for specific edits to your changes. While the statements of activists critical of US nuclear policy are often notable (e.g., the Pugwash movement), we have to be careful to explicitly say "According to (author), the US did this.. ", instead of giving the impression that these are uncontroversial facts - "lending wikivoice" to them.

* I agree that the US's Cold War policies with respect to the use of nuclear weapons are notable enough to deserve mention in this article. Interestingly, you didn't mention the doctrine of Massive retaliation specifically, which lends needed context to US statements about use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against possibly non-nuclear threats (what Herman Kahn called "Type III Deterrence" in his book on nuclear policy in the 1950s-1960s On Thermonuclear War).

A Soviet invasion of Europe was seen at the time to be a sufficient threat to peace and the lives of the people of Western Europe that the Law of Armed Conflict concept of proportionality was probably satisfied by preparations to use nuclear weapons in the event such an invasion occurred. You can't call such statements preparations "nuclear blackmail" without mentioning the context in which they were made, that's pushing a point of view, and not one supported by all or even most commentators on the era.

Threats of nuclear force against China during the Korean police action and the Quemoy crises are a different matter. Arguably, fighting between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China did not threaten legitimate US interests to the degree that Soviet forces amassed on the border between the Iron Curtain and Western Europe did. On the other hand, the Chinese weren't defending themselves in Korea, they were (arguably) enabling Kim Il Sung in a war of aggression against the non-Communist South of Korea, The US, however, didn't go to the United Nations (under whose authority they were fighting in Korea as part of a multinational alliance) and request specific authority to use nuclear weapons against North Korea or China. Those were notable cases in which US policy tended toward, if not nuclear blackmail, then a controversial and non-consultative policy on how and when to use nuclear weapons.

* Merely being on the faculty of a major US university doesn't make one's pronouncements on all matters uncontroversial enough to be repeated in wikivoice. Noam Chomsky is a leading authority on psycholinguistics and Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with non-mainstream views on politics. Likewise, Steven E. Jones is notable as a researcher on muon-catalyzed fusion, but has published controversial and non-mainstream theories on the nature and cause of the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Their positions in academia, like Peter Kuznick's, don't mean we can rely on what they say on controversial subjects without an attempt to balance it with the views of others.

* I gave you Richard Rhodes' Dark Sun as an example of a more mainstream work which makes some of the same points your other references do, but with an undeniably greater body of research behind them. I encourage you read that, as well as Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War and Freeman Dyson's Weapons and Hope as three well-researched and diverse commentaries on US Cold War nuclear policy, each of which makes distinct criticisms of that policy. There are other books on the topic worth reading. I encourage you to broaden your perspective on US nuclear policy rather than basing part of our article on the work of people who support one particular point of view, e.g., "the US was in the nuclear blackmail business during the Cold War".

I hope that you take these criticisms in the spirit in which they are offered, which is to help you help make an encyclopedia. loupgarous (talk) 21:09, 10 April 2018 (UTC)

Use for civilian purposes

The US government had also advocated the "peaceful" uses of nuclear weapons as part of Project Plowshare. This was a program for the development of techniques to use nuclear explosives for peaceful construction purposes. Shot Sedan of Operation Storax in July 1962 (see section on testing, above), was a demonstration testing the feasibility of using nuclear weapons for "civilian" and "peaceful" purposes as part of Operation Plowshare. The aim of the Plowshare program was to generate favorable publicity for and acceptance of nuclear weapons. Lewis Strauss, chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, stated that the goal of the Plowshare project was to "highlight the peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices and thereby create a climate of world opinion that is more favorable to weapons development and tests."

This last subsection is excellent and has no problems with POV. loupgarous (talk) 20:48, 15 March 2018 (UTC)

References

Latest 2018 numbers

The latest 2018 totals provided by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists are at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/00963402.2018.1438219?scroll=top&needAccess=true

Can someone update the article to reflect? I have updated the infobox. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.246.254.12 (talk) 17:49, 14 March 2018 (UTC)

"Development History - Post Cold-War" section needs updating

Reading the "Development History - Post Cold-War" section, I was struck by a few things.

First, the reference to "bunker-busting nukes" lacks proper weight. The George W. Bush administration asked Congress for funds for the bunker-busting nukes, other specialty nuclear weapons and for restoring the National Nuclear Security Administration's capacity to fabricate plutonium pits for life extension of existing weapons such as the W76 on a more rapid basis that the existing small-throughput facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. These funds weren't approved by the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development until the Trump administration's budget requests were approved in 2017-2018.

The section needs to mention that we were never close to bunker-busting nukes until 2017, with the life-extension program for the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb, because Congress wouldn't pay for them. Even in 2013, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development was skeptical about the desirability of that life-extension program.

Second, prior to 2017, the only Post-Cold War changes in the US nuclear arsenal to reach late implementation stages were the 1997 Mod 11 and proposed Mod 12 upgrades to the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb. These are notable enough changes to the post-Cold War US nuclear arsenal to merit mention:

• The Mod 11 upgrade of the B-61 is able to penetrate several meters into the ground prior to detonation, giving it some bunker-busting capacity. The limited accuracy of the B-61 (striking from 110-170 meters from its intended target) required it to be set to a 400-kiloton (strategic) yield to reliably damage the structures it was intended to destroy. About 50 B-61s were modified in this way.

• The Mod 12 upgrade's addition of a JDAM "tail kit" makes the B-61 a "smart bomb" capable of much greater precision (hitting within 30 meters of a target as opposed to the Mod 11's 110-170 meter accuracy) than existing B-61s, and enabling it to be carried internally in F-35 Joint Attack Fighters.

• The Mod 12 upgrade also allows the B-61-Mod 12 to be set for one-eighth the B-61-Mod 11's nuclear yield (50 kilotons instead of 400 kilotons) with correspondingly lower fallout and collateral civilian damage while still reliably destroying enemy targets. This modification's still in development and is mentioned as part of the future US nuclear arsenal in the US Department of Defense's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

Third, Post-Cold War policy on development of new US nuclear weapons and delivery systems has evolved since this section was last edited.

The US Department of Defense's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report described a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States, declaring "Russia is not an enemy, and is increasingly a partner in confronting proliferation and other emerging threats."

According to the 2010 nuclear posture review,

"In summary, the following principles will guide U.S. nuclear policies:

• The United States will meet its commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament and will make demonstrable progress over the next five to ten years.
• We will work to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons while enhancing security for ourselves, and our allies and partners.

The Obama administration expanded on that policy in its July 2013 FACT SHEET: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States:

"After a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the President has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty. The U.S. intent is to seek negotiated cuts with Russia so that we can continue to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures."

The most recent US announcement of policy on development of nuclear weapons, the US Department of Defense's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review describes the current perception of nuclear threats faced by the United States:

"While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenals, increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior, including in outer space and cyber space. North Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in direct violation of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions. Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Nevertheless, it retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so.

There now exists an unprecedented range and mix of threats, including major conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, space, and cyber threats, and violent nonstate actors. These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk.

This rapid deterioration of the threat environment since the 2010 NPR must now shape our thinking as we formulate policy and strategy, and initiate the sustainment and replacement of U.S. nuclear forces. This 2018 NPR assesses previous nuclear policies and requirements that were established amid a more benign nuclear environment and more amicable Great Power relations. It focuses on identifying the nuclear policies, strategy, and corresponding capabilities needed to protect America in the deteriorating threat environment that confronts the United States, allies, and partners. It is strategy driven and provides guidance for the nuclear force posture and policy requirements needed now and in the future."

The boldfacing in that quote is mine, and indicates where US emphasis on development of new nuclear weapons has changed since the prior administration. Further in the 2018 NPR, there's repeated emphasis on "sustainment and replacement of U.S. nuclear forces", which includes new nuclear delivery systems such as the Long Range Stand-Off nuclear cruise missile for carriage on the B-52 strategic bomber, replacement of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine with the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, and replacement of the Minuteman III (LGM-30G) land-based ICBM with a new land-based ICBM, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent.

The 2018 NPR specifically mentions the development of low-yield "non-strategic" nuclear weapons to counter Russian deployment of such weapons to support its stated policy of first use of small nuclear weapons in non-nuclear conflicts:

"Enhancing Deterrence with Non-strategic Nuclear Capabilities

Existing elements of the nuclear force replacement program predate the dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment. To meet the emerging requirements of U.S. strategy, the United States will now pursue select supplements to the replacement program to enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces. It is a reflection of the versatility and flexibility of the U.S. triad that only modest supplements are now required in this much more challenging threat environment.

These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies. Russia’s belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow’s perception that its greater number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow’s first-use of nuclear weapons. Russia demonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems provide through numerous exercises and statements. Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative."

This indicates that the future US nuclear arsenal will include ways of effectively delivering small-yield nuclear weapons in order to create a proportional nuclear deterrent to use of small nuclear weapons by other nations. The stated goal of adding this capacity is to keep the "nuclear threshold" high enough to deter use of nuclear weapons at any yield level.

I don't want to add all of the above material to my proposed changes to this section of our article, but to present enough information here in the talk page to give other editors an idea of how post-Cold War US nuclear weapons development policy has evolved. I hope we can get discussion started so that our article represents a consensus on the topic of post-Cold War US nuclear weapons development policy.

My change would be along the lines of "We went from seeking bunker-busters (comparatively low-yield precision-delivered nuclear weapons to destroy hardened enemy command and control bunkers) to a policy of reducing the nation's total nuclear arsenal, and most recently back to a policy of deterring a range of nuclear threats to the United States by widening the range of flexible responses available to the National Command Authority", with citations to document each point. --loupgarous (talk) 19:16, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Number of tests

I've discovered an odd item that I'm not quite sure how to rectify. The official US tally does seem to be 1,054 tests.[3] But other sources, that seem to have done the math, come up with 1,030 or 1,032 depending on if you count Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [4] [5] [6]. CaptainEek ^{Edits Ho Cap'n!}⚓ 02:49, 6 July 2022 (UTC)

Well, I think the best way to resolve that is to walk through all the test series and see where your list of tests clashes with the lists on Wikipedia. But then, I'm biased because I wrote most of the pages, or rather my database did. If it would help to have a copy of my database, I think I'm still able to do that. If you want help or what-have-you to resolve it, I'm here.

There was an official list published by the DoE, which was simply copied by various sources. My list was several off from it for several reasons; I'd have to go back and look at notes. There are discrepancies because of planned tests that never happened (I'm a radical inclusionist) and some arguments about which tests are Britain's and which are our's as we both tested at the NTS. There were a couple of tests that got stuck in holes and never went off, and so on. SkoreKeep (talk) 03:28, 6 July 2022 (UTC)

United States strategic nuclear weapons arsenal

The table in this section seems helpful but is actually a bit confusing. Why are vehicles, warheads and launchers totalled together? Isn't this double-counting or is there a reason relevant to the treaty? What about other launchers, if any? Is there comparable data for other countries? 2600:1700:6530:2F00:C99E:7183:1077:9E51 (talk) 18:22, 1 January 2023 (UTC)

The source explains it. New START Treaty in 2011 between USA & Russia defined respective limits of 700, 1550 and 800 pieces of equipment for both USA & Russia. As to why exactly these equipment categories were agreed upon you must ask Medvedev and Obama.--J. Sketter (talk) 16:22, 15 January 2024 (UTC)

Diagram

The diagram shows under "First Fission Bombs" the "Fat Man" as Mk IV (1945) but the first Fat Man (1945) was "Mark III", replaced by Mark IV (Mark 4 nuclear bomb) in 1949. Hugo999 (talk) 23:21, 7 April 2023 (UTC)

Move discussion in progress

There is a move discussion in progress on Talk:France and weapons of mass destruction which affects this page. Please participate on that page and not in this talk page section. Thank you. —RMCD bot 00:31, 6 December 2023 (UTC)