Talk:No Gun Ri massacre/Archive 15

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We really must move on

It is past time to get this posted and move on. This now includes (in boldface) elements regarding the second and third days of killings, and it shuffles things a bit to establish a more sequential approach. It also restores Park Sun-yong’s full quote; having a Korean mother and a U.S. soldier both mention the fact that children/people were screaming is hardly overkill. If there are any constructive suggestions, for clarifications, elaborations etc., please let’s hear them quickly. I’d like to move on to Casualties and then Aftermath on Monday. Thanks! Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:56, 20 September 2015 (UTC)

As North Korean forces on July 25 seized the town of Yongdong, 7 miles (11 km) west of No Gun Ri, U.S. troops were evacuating nearby villages, including hundreds of residents of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri. These villagers were joined by others as they walked down the main road south, and the estimated 600 refugees spent the night by a riverbank near Ha Ga Ri village, 3.5 miles (5.5 km) west of No Gun Ri. Seven refugees were killed by U.S. soldiers when they strayed from the group in the night. In the morning of July 26, the villagers found the escorting soldiers had left. They continued down the road, were stopped by American troops at a roadblock near No Gun Ri, and were ordered onto the parallel railroad tracks, where U.S. soldiers searched them and their belongings, confiscating knives and other items. The refugees were resting, spread out along the railroad embankment around midday, when military aircraft strafed and bombed them. Recalling the air strike, Yang Hae-chan, a 10-year-old boy in 1950, said the attacking planes returned repeatedly and “chaos broke out among the refugees. We ran around wildly trying to get away.” He and another survivor said soldiers reappeared and began shooting the wounded on the tracks. Survivors first sought shelter in a small culvert beneath the tracks, but soldiers and U.S. ground fire drove them from there into a double tunnel beneath a concrete railroad bridge. Inside the bridge underpasses (each 80 feet long, 22 feet wide and 40 feet high), they came under heavy machine gun and rifle fire from 7th Cavalry troops from both sides of the bridge. "Children were screaming in fear and adults were praying for their lives, and the whole time they never stopped shooting," said survivor Park Sun-yong, whose 5-year-old son and 2-year-old daughter were killed while she was badly wounded.

Two communications specialists, Larry Levine and James Crume, said they remembered orders to fire on the refugees coming to the 2nd Battalion command post from a higher level, probably 1st Cavalry Division. They recalled the ground fire beginning with a mortar round landing among the refugee families, followed by what Levine called a “frenzy” of small-arms fire.Some battalion veterans recalled front-line company officers ordering them to open fire. "It was assumed there were enemy in these people," said ex-rifleman Herman Patterson. “They were dying down there. I could hear the people screaming," recalled Thomas H. Hacha of the sister 1st Battalion, observing nearby. Others said some soldiers held their fire.

Trapped refugees began piling up bodies as barricades and tried to dig into the ground to hide. Some managed to escape that first night, while U.S. troops turned searchlights on the tunnels and continued firing, said Chung Koo-ho, whose mother died shielding him and his sister. By the second day, the gunfire was reduced to potshots and occasional fusillades when a trapped refugee moved or tried to escape. Some also recall planes returning that second day to fire rockets or drop bombs. Racked with thirst, survivors resorted to drinking blood-filled water from a small stream running under the bridge.

During the killings, the 2nd Battalion came under sporadic artillery and mortar fire from the North Koreans, who advanced cautiously from Yongdong. Declassified Army intelligence reports showed the enemy front line was two miles or more from No Gun Ri late on July 28, third day of the massacre. That night, the 7th Cavalry messaged division headquarters, “No important contact has been reported by our 2nd Battalion.” Unit documents never reported the refugee killings. In the predawn hours of July 29, the 7th Cavalry Regiment withdrew from No Gun Ri. That afternoon North Korean soldiers arrived outside the tunnels and helped those still alive, about two dozen, mostly children, feeding them and sending them back toward their villages.

References

I can get behind it. It definitely answers the second day question. As it stood before it just seemed like continuous fire for days, and I'm thinking "geez, they must've gone through a lot of barrels to continuously fire for 72 hours". Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:02, 20 September 2015 (UTC)

Moving on to 'Casualties'

The edit of the “Events” section has been made. Here’s a proposed edit of “Casualties,” to update, with strikeouts for deletions and additions in bold. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:45, 21 September 2015 (UTC)

In the earliest published account of the killings, three weeks afterward, Chun Wook, a journalist with the North Korean 3rd Division troops who advanced to No Gun Ri, reported finding the area covered with layers of bodies and said about 400 people had been killed. In the earliest published accounts of the killings, in August and September 1950, Korean journalists with the advancing northern troops reported, in one case, finding an estimated 400 bodies in the No Gun Ri area, and in the other seeing some 200 bodies in one tunnel. NOTE 1. Over the years, the survivors' own estimates of dead ranged from 300 to 500, with perhaps 150 wounded.The survivors generally put the death toll at 400, including 100 in the initial air attack, with scores more wounded. NOTE 2. In Pentagon interviews in 2000, 7th Cavalry veterans' estimates of No Gun Ri dead ranged from dozens to 300. NOTE 2 Homer Garza, a retired command sergeant major, One who got a close look, career soldier Homer Garza, who led a patrol through one No Gun Ri tunnel, said he saw 200 to 300 bodies piled up there, and most may have been dead. NOTE 3.

The U.S. Army's 2001 investigative report, citing 1950 aerial imagery, questioned the higher casualty estimates. NOTE 4. In 2005, the South Korean government's Committee for the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri Victims, after a yearlong process of verifying claims through family registers, medical reports and other documents and testimony, certified the names of 150 No Gun Ri dead, 13 missing and 55 wounded, including some who later died of their wounds. It said reports were not filed on many other victims because of the passage of time and other factors. Of the certified victims, 41 percent were children under 15, and 70 percent were women, children or men over age 61. The South Korean government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation, which operates a memorial park and museum at the site, estimated in 2011 that 250–300 were killed. NOTE 5.

References

NOTE 1: In reviewing material, I rediscovered this second source.

NOTE 2: Simplifying to the death toll, 400, finally settled on by the survivors group.

NOTE 3: Don’t want to suggest he was a sergeant major when he went through the tunnel.

NOTE 4: This notion re aerial imagery, vague here, is dealt with more specifically in a later section. It was raised early on, before the SK government inquest certified a minimum death toll.

NOTE 5: This is the most recent authoritative estimate (also now in Lead section).

And so we get this:

In the earliest published accounts of the killings, in August and September 1950, Korean journalists with the advancing northern troops reported, in one case, finding an estimated 400 bodies in the No Gun Ri area, and in the other seeing some 200 bodies in one tunnel. The survivors generally put the death toll at 400, including 100 in the initial air attack, with scores more wounded. In Pentagon interviews in 2000, 7th Cavalry veterans' estimates of No Gun Ri dead ranged from dozens to 300. One who got a close look, career soldier Homer Garza, who led a patrol through one No Gun Ri tunnel, said he saw 200 to 300 bodies piled up there, and most may have been dead.

In 2005, the South Korean government's Committee for the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri Victims, after a yearlong process of verifying claims through family registers, medical reports and other documents and testimony, certified the names of 150 No Gun Ri dead, 13 missing and 55 wounded, including some who later died of their wounds. It said reports were not filed on many other victims because of the passage of time and other factors. Of the certified victims, 41 percent were children under 15, and 70 percent were women, children or men over age 61. The South Korean government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation, which operates a memorial park and museum at the site, estimated in 2011 that 250–300 were killed.

References

--Charles J. Hanley (talk) 18:45, 21 September 2015 (UTC)

No objection here. My only suggestion is perhaps reworking the first sentence so it might read something more like: "In the earliest published accounts of the killings, in August and September 1950, North Korean journalists with the advancing KPA reported finding an estimated 400 bodies in the No Gun Ri area and seeing some 200 bodies in one tunnel." This would clarify regarding the journalists, and would remove the "in one case" parts. I'm sorry that I missed the last edit, but I'm glad that you all have been able to make progress. I will try to find some time in the coming weeks to take a look around here more often. GAB^Hello! 20:01, 21 September 2015 (UTC)

That's a good catch and suggestion, but with a complication: One of the journalists may have been a South Korean leftist, and his newspaper a Seoul-based publication resurrected by the occupying NKs. Even if we confirmed that (and I'll try), it would make for a cumbersome sentence, distinguishing SK and NK journalists. Let's see what I can find out. The rest of the smoothing out looks good. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:21, 21 September 2015 (UTC)

OK, then. Sounds good! GAB^Hello! 20:50, 21 September 2015 (UTC)

It's now clear I recently misinterpreted something I read as suggesting Cho Sun In Min Bo was an occupation newspaper of the south. Good sources identify it as a northern paper that predated the war. Hence, we can return to the original identification of the journalists as NKs and smooth out the first sentence as GAB suggests. Timothyjosephwood, Wikimedes, Iryna Harpy, Irondome, Binksternet, I hope you can rejoin so we can get this done via consensus. This is a relatively simple section, as are the next couple. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 22:07, 23 September 2015 (UTC)

In the earliest published accounts of the killings, in August and September 1950, two North Korean journalists with the advancing northern troops reported finding an estimated 400 bodies in the No Gun Ri area and seeing some 200 bodies in one tunnel. The survivors generally put the death toll at 400, including 100 in the initial air attack, with scores more wounded. In Pentagon interviews in 2000, 7th Cavalry veterans' estimates of No Gun Ri dead ranged from dozens to 300. One who got a close look, career soldier Homer Garza, who led a patrol through one No Gun Ri tunnel, said he saw 200 to 300 bodies piled up there, and most may have been dead.

In 2005, the South Korean government's Committee for the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri Victims, after a yearlong process of verifying claims through family registers, medical reports and other documents and testimony, certified the names of 150 No Gun Ri dead, 13 missing and 55 wounded, including some who later died of their wounds. It said reports were not filed on many other victims because of the passage of time and other factors. Of the certified victims, 41 percent were children under 15, and 70 percent were women, children or men over age 61. The South Korean government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation, which operates a memorial park and museum at the site, estimated in 2011 that 250–300 were killed.

References

"Most may have been dead" seems a little obtuse. It seems implied when you are talking about hundreds of bodies. But other than that I don't see any immediate issues. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 10:29, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

Good point, to be incorporated. Meantime, Wikimedes, Iryna Harpy, Irondome, Binksternet, any other observations, objections? Otherwise, we'll post the edit, and move on to "Aftermath" and "Petitions". Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 14:54, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

Moving on to 'Aftermath'

The "Casualties" edit has been posted to the article. Moving on, here’s a proposed edit of the current “Aftermath” introductory section, with strikethroughs for deletions and an addition in bold:

This 2008 photo shows a concrete abutment outside the No Gun Ri bridge, where investigators' white paint identifies bullet marks and embedded fragments from U.S. Army gunfire in the 1950 shooting of South Korean refugees.

At the war’s outbreak, the United States declared it would abide by the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions' articles regarding protection of civilians during wartime. The Hague Convention and the U.S. Army's own contemporaneous Rules of Land Warfare manual said that belligerents must distinguish non-combatants from combatants and treat them humanely. NOTE 1

Information about the refugee killings reached the U.S. command in Korea and the Pentagon by late August 1950, in the form of a captured and translated North Korean military document that reported the discovery of the massacre. A South Korean agent for the U.S. counterintelligence command confirmed that account with local villagers weeks later when U.S. troops moved back through the area, the ex-agent told U.S. investigators in 2000. NOTE 2 Further evidence of high-level knowledge of the No Gun Ri killings also appeared a month later in late September 1950 in a New York Times article from Korea, which reported without further detail that an unnamed high-ranking U.S. officer told the reporter of the “panicky” shooting of “many civilians” by a U.S. Army regiment that July. No evidence has emerged, however, that the U.S. military investigated the incident at the time.

References

• NOTE 1 – This out-of-place paragraph ought to be in a separate new section on the legal framework of the case.
• NOTE 2 – A review of sources turned up this additional telltale item indicating a 1950 cover-up.

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And so we get this:

Information about the refugee killings reached the U.S. command in Korea and the Pentagon by late August 1950, in the form of a captured and translated North Korean military document that reported the discovery of the massacre. A South Korean agent for the U.S. counterintelligence command confirmed that account with local villagers weeks later when U.S. troops moved back through the area, the ex-agent told U.S. investigators in 2000. Evidence of high-level knowledge also appeared in late September 1950 in a New York Times article from Korea, which reported without further detail that an unnamed high-ranking U.S. officer told the reporter of the “panicky” shooting of “many civilians” by a U.S. Army regiment that July. No evidence has emerged, however, that the U.S. military investigated the incident at the time.

References

--Charles J. Hanley (talk) 16:41, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

I am curious about the legal section. I remember suggesting something similar a while back, but I'd like to hear what others think about it. I think we would have to stay clear from rendering a legal opinion, although there's probably enough material for a short section. GAB^Hello! 23:10, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

Two elements come to mind for a legal section: Comments by the survivors' lawyers could provide an entrée, and I believe the "Committee to Restore" book summarizes a few Korean legal studies of NGR (as well as, I believe, the Baik article in the Notre Dame journal). Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:44, 26 September 2015 (UTC)

Strongly agree on the removal of the first paragraph. It is a complete WP:COATRACK. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 19:18, 27 September 2015 (UTC)

Glad we are in agreement on this point. GAB^Hello! 19:23, 27 September 2015 (UTC)

Moving on to 'Petitions'

The edit to the introductory section of "Aftermath" has been posted to the article. Here's a proposed edit of the "Petitions" section, with strikethroughs marking deletions, and additions in bold:

During the U.S.-supported postwar autocracy of President Syngman Rhee, survivors of No Gun Ri did not file any public complaints were too fearful of official retaliation to file public complaints. NOTE 1 Survivor Yang Hae-chan said he was warned by South Korean police to stop telling others about the massacre. NOTE 2 Following the April Revolution in 1960, which briefly established democracy in South Korea, former policeman Chung Eun-yong filed the first petition to the South Korean and U.S. governments. His two children, a four-year-old son and a two-year-old daughter, small children had been killed and his wife, Park Sun-yong, badly wounded at No Gun Ri. NOTE 3 Over 30 petitions, calling for an investigation, apology and compensation, were filed over the next decades, by Chung and later by a survivors' committee. Almost all were ignored, as was a petition to the U.S. and South Korean governments by the local Yongdong County Assembly. NOTE 4

It goes beyond comprehension why they attacked and killed them with such cruelty. The U.S. government should take responsibility.

— excerpt from Chung's 1960 petition.

In 1994, Seoul newspapers reported on a book Chung published about the events of 1950, raising awareness of the allegations inside South Korea. NOTE 5 In 1994,In that same year, the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service in Korea dismissed one No Gun Ri petition by asserting that any killings took place during combat. The survivors' committee retorted that there was no battle at No Gun Ri, but U.S. officials refused to reconsider.

In 1997, the survivors filed a claim with a South Korean compensation committee under the binational Status of Forces Agreement. This time, the U.S. claims service responded by again citing what it claimed was a combat situation and saying by asserting there was no evidence the 1st Cavalry Division was in the No Gun Ri area, as the survivors' research and the 1961 official Army history of the war indicated. The 1961 official Army history made clear, however, that the division was in the area in late July 1950. NOTE 6

On April 28, 1998, the Seoul government committee made a final ruling against the No Gun Ri survivors, citing the long-ago expiration of a five-year statute of limitations.

References

NOTE 1 – Making fear of official retaliation more explicit, from new source.

NOTE 2 – Inserting concrete example of official pressure, from new source.

NOTE 3 – The children are so identified earlier, in “Events.”

NOTE 4 – Inserting local politicians’ petition.

NOTE 5 – Moving the 1994 book here, where it’s chronologically appropriate, from the “AP Story” section.

NOTE 6 – Combining two sentences into one.

---

And so we get this:

During the U.S.-supported postwar autocracy of President Syngman Rhee, survivors of No Gun Ri were too fearful of official retaliation to file public complaints. Survivor Yang Hae-chan said he was warned by South Korean police to stop telling others about the massacre. Following the April Revolution in 1960, which briefly established democracy in South Korea, former policeman Chung Eun-yong filed the first petition to the South Korean and U.S. governments. His two small children had been killed and his wife, Park Sun-yong, badly wounded at No Gun Ri. Over 30 petitions, calling for an investigation, apology and compensation, were filed over the next decades, by Chung and later by a survivors' committee. Almost all were ignored, as was a petition to the U.S. and South Korean governments by the local Yongdong County Assembly.

It goes beyond comprehension why they attacked and killed them with such cruelty. The U.S. government should take responsibility.

— excerpt from Chung's 1960 petition.

In 1994, Seoul newspapers reported on a book Chung published about the events of 1950, raising awareness of the allegations inside South Korea. In that same year, the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service in Korea dismissed one No Gun Ri petition by asserting that any killings took place during combat. The survivors' committee retorted that there was no battle at No Gun Ri, but U.S. officials refused to reconsider.

In 1997, the survivors filed a claim with a South Korean compensation committee under the binational Status of Forces Agreement. This time, the U.S. claims service responded by again citing what it claimed was a combat situation and by asserting there was no evidence the 1st Cavalry Division was in the No Gun Ri area, as the survivors' research and the 1961 official Army history of the war indicated.

On April 28, 1998, the Seoul government committee made a final ruling against the No Gun Ri survivors, citing the long-ago expiration of a five-year statute of limitations.

References

--Charles J. Hanley (talk) 20:09, 28 September 2015 (UTC)

Regarding the 'AP story' section

The edit to "Petitions" has been posted to the article. Before posting a proposed edit here to the "AP Story" section, it seems necessary to dispose of one issue, i.e., this article's 289-word segment attacking the AP, a section that was wholly the creation of WeldNeck, the now-banned sock puppet.

The material there -- falsehoods presented as fact by one bad-faith editor, and therefore by Wikipedia -- dates back 15 years to a "say it ain't so" moment in mid-2000 when two aggrieved 7th Cavalry association activists (Bateman and his friend Galloway), faced with the AP's confirmation of NGR, cooked up a nonsensical magazine article as a smokescreen intimating that "maybe it ain't so." Everything that came after that (the AP's own and the NY Times' refutations, other journalistic inquiries reconfirming and advancing the NGR story, a parade of new witnesses and new documents, two governments' investigations reaffirming NGR, the SK inquest certifying the names and minimal numbers of victims, a memorial park and museum enshrining the proven truths of NGR) has shown that it was so and is so.

I hope all see, with me, that including a discredited attack on the original messenger, whose message was subsequently affirmed and reaffirmed countless times, adds nothing to a WP reader's knowledge of what happened at NGR. At most, this business could be a footnote in some journalism textbook. Otherwise, the 289 words will have to be doubled to 600 to show how false and pointless the nonsense of 2000 was, which in turn would only show how pointless those 600 words are in a WP article.

In the proposed edit, in lieu of those 289 words (and the added verbiage that would show the long-ago attacks on Hesselman and Flint, for example, to be the falsehoods they were) I'll include a simple paragraph noting the single error in the original story, the misidentification of Ed Daily as an eyewitness. Please be aware that Daily was a president and historian of the 7th Cav vets' association and had written two books about the regiment in Korea. From his own talks with fellow 7th Cav Korea vets over the years, he probably knew more about No Gun Ri than any other American. Ergo, he was telling essential truths about NGR, but lying, for his own reasons, about having been present. (He was with a nearby unit and joined the 2nd Bn. months later.) All in all, a bizarre little sideshow to a major historic event.

Thanks. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 14:43, 1 October 2015 (UTC)

Moving on to 'AP story'

First, here's a proposed insert to the end of the preceding "Petitions" section, which now ends with the April 1998 rejection of the claim in Seoul:

In June 1998, South Korea’s National Council of Churches, on behalf of the No Gun Ri survivors, sought help from the U.S. National Council of Churches, which asked the Pentagon to investigate. In March 1999, the Army told the U.S. council it had looked into the No Gun Ri allegations and "found no information to substantiate the claim" in the operational records of the 1st Cavalry Division and other frontline units. NOTE 1

References

• NOTE 1 – This further improves chronological approach, raising this from its out-of-sync spot in the “Investigations” section and segueing better into next section.

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Now, here's the proposed edit to the "AP Story" section, with strikethroughs for deletions and additions/edits in bold:

In October 1999, after release of the Associated Press report confirming the No Gun Ri refugee killings, Chung Eun-yong, leader of the survivors committee, reads a petition in Seoul, South Korea, calling for a "truthful and speedy" investigation.

Survivor group leader Chung had published a book in 1994 about the events of 1950 which raised awareness inside South Korea. NOTE 1 In 1998, the U.S.-based news agency Associated Press, having begun months of investigative reporting on the allegations, reported on the rejection of the 1997 claim and interviewed 1st Cavalry Division veterans who were at No Gun Ri. Months before the Army’s private correspondence with the church group, Associated Press reporters researching those same 1950 operational records found orders to shoot South Korean civilians. The U.S.-based news agency, which reported the rejection of the survivors’ claim in April 1998, had begun investigating the No Gun Ri allegations earlier that year, trying to identify Army units possibly involved and to track down their ex-soldiers. NOTE 2 On Sept. 29, 1999, after a year of internal struggle over releasing the article, the AP published its investigative report on the incident massacre, based on the accounts of 24 No Gun Ri survivors, and corroborated by a dozen 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans. "We just annihilated them," it quoted former 7th Cavalry machine gunner Norman Tinkler as saying. NOTE 3 The journalists' research into declassified archives military documents at the U.S. National Archives uncovered recorded instructions in late July 1950 that front-line units shoot South Korean refugees approaching their positions. NOTE 4 A liaison officer of the sister 8th Cavalry Regiment had relayed word to his unit from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters to fire on refugees trying to cross U.S. front lines. Major General William B. Kean of the neighboring 25th Infantry Division advised that any civilians found in areas supposed to be cleared by police should be considered enemies and “treated accordingly,” an order relayed by his staff as "considered as unfriendly and shot." NOTE 5 On the day the No Gun Ri killings began, the Eighth Army ordered all units to stop refugees from crossing their lines. The AP reported in subsequent articles that many more South Korean civilians were killed when refugee columns were strafed by U.S. warplanes in the war's first months and when the U.S. military blew up two Naktong River bridges packed with refugees on Aug. 4, 1950the U.S. military blew up two Naktong River bridges packed with refugees on Aug. 4, 1950, and when other refugee columns were strafed by U.S. aircraft in the war’s first months. NOTE 6 The AP's Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, Martha Mendoza and Randy Herschaft were awarded the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting, along with 10 other major national and international journalism awards, for their reporting on No Gun Ri. NOTE 7

The AP report, however, came under criticism in May 2000. U.S. News & World Report reported that one of the key AP witnesses, Edward L. Daily, was not present for the events he described. Another of the AP's sources, Eugene Hesselman, stated that he overheard an order from company commander Captain Melbourne Chandler directing his men to fire on the refugees, but it was later discovered that Hesselman had been injured and evacuated before the incident took place. Another one of the AP's sources, Delos Flint, told the AP he witnessed U.S. forces attacking refugees in the rail tunnels; however, according to the 7th Cavalry's war diary, Flint had been medically evacuated before the event. According to military historian and former 7th Cavalry officer Robert Bateman, who first uncovered discrepancies between Daily's testimony and official records, he informed the AP team of this weeks before their submission to the Pulitzer committee, but the AP team did not disclose this information. Additional sources used by the AP later informed the U.S. Army's investigators and Bateman that they had been misquoted or their interviews had been taken out of context to support events that did not occur. A Pentagon spokesman said this would not affect the Army's No Gun Ri investigation, referring to Daily as "just one guy of many we've been talking to". A May 2000 article in the New York Times weighed the criticism, citing the U.S. News and other reports, and concluded that "in the end, the crucial centerpiece of the A.P. report, the American soldiers killed at least 100 Korean civilians--possibly under direct orders--has been chipped but hardly shattered by the latest revelations". NOTE 8

Still, additional evidence was made public. Expanding on the AP's work, CBS News in June 2000 reported the existence of a U.S. Air Force memo from July 1950 in which the operations chief in Korea said that the air force the Air Force was strafing refugee columns approaching U.S. positions at the army's request. The memo, dated July 25, the day before the No Gun Ri killings began with such a strafing, said the U.S. Army had requested the attacks on civilians and “to date, we have complied with the army’s request”. A U.S. Navy document later emerged in which pilots from the aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge reported the Army had told them to attack any groups of more than eight people in South Korea. “Most fighter-bomber pilots regarded Korean civilians in white clothes as enemy troops,” South Korean scholar Taewoo Kim would later conclude after reviewing Air Force mission reports from 1950. NOTE 9

The AP’s Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, Martha Mendoza and Randy Herschaft AP team (Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, Martha Mendoza and Randy Herschaft) was awarded the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting for their reporting on No Gun Ri, along with 10 other major national and international journalism awards, for their reporting on No Gun Ri. In May 2000, challenged by a skeptical U.S. News & World Report magazine article, the AP team did additional archival research and reported that one of nine ex-soldiers quoted in the original No Gun Ri article, Edward L. Daily, had been incorrectly identified as an eyewitness and instead had been passing on second-hand information. A Pentagon spokesman said this would not affect the Army's No Gun Ri investigation, noting Daily was "just one guy of many we've been talking to", and the Pulitzer committee reaffirmed its award and the credibility of the AP reporting. SEE NOTE 8

References

• NOTE 1 – The 1994 book was raised to the “Petitions” section.
• NOTE 2 – Smoothing out awkward phrasing, and making connection between end of “Petitions” section (re the church council) and start of “AP Story” section.
• NOTE 3 – Brief soldier quote helps illustrate content of article, i.e., “corroboration.”
• NOTE 4 – Eliminates unneeded footnote explaining National Archives.
• NOTE 5 – Completing the 25th Inf Division statements.
• NOTE 6 – Correcting order of two elements in sentence.
• NOTE 7 – This element is dropped toward end of section.
• NOTE 8 - This long-ago magazine attack was refuted point by point, and the AP report was repeatedly reconfirmed by others, making this long section inserted by the now-banned sock puppet WeldNeck pointless. The AP article's only flaw (Ed Daily) is now dealt with in this section's final graf.
• NOTE 9 - The all-important Rogers memo merits this bit longer treatment.

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And so we get this:

In October 1999, after release of the Associated Press report confirming the No Gun Ri refugee killings, Chung Eun-yong, leader of the survivors committee, reads a petition in Seoul, South Korea, calling for a "truthful and speedy" investigation.

Months before the Army’s private correspondence with the church group, Associated Press reporters researching those same 1950 operational records found orders to shoot South Korean civilians. The U.S.-based news agency, which reported the rejection of the survivors’ claim in April 1998, had begun investigating the No Gun Ri allegations earlier that year, trying to identify Army units possibly involved and to track down their ex-soldiers. On Sept. 29, 1999, after a year of internal struggle over releasing the article, the AP published its investigative report on the massacre, based on the accounts of 24 No Gun Ri survivors, corroborated by a dozen 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans. "We just annihilated them," it quoted former 7th Cavalry machine gunner Norman Tinkler as saying. The journalists' research into declassified military documents at the U.S. National Archives uncovered recorded instructions in late July 1950 that front-line units shoot South Korean refugees approaching their positions. A liaison officer of the sister 8th Cavalry Regiment had relayed word to his unit from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters to fire on refugees trying to cross U.S. front lines. Major General William B. Kean of the neighboring 25th Infantry Division advised that any civilians found in areas supposed to be cleared by police should be considered enemies and “treated accordingly,” an order relayed by his staff as "considered as unfriendly and shot." On the day the No Gun Ri killings began, the Eighth Army ordered all units to stop refugees from crossing their lines. The AP reported in subsequent articles that many more South Korean civilians were killed when the U.S. military blew up two Naktong River bridges packed with refugees on Aug. 4, 1950, and when other refugee columns were strafed by U.S. aircraft in the war’s first months.

Expanding on the AP's work, CBS News in June 2000 reported the existence of a U.S. Air Force memo from July 1950 in which the operations chief in Korea said the Air Force was strafing refugee columns approaching U.S. positions. The memo, dated July 25, the day before the No Gun Ri killings began with such a strafing, said the U.S. Army had requested the attacks on civilians and “to date, we have complied with the army’s request”. A U.S. Navy document later emerged in which pilots from the aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge reported the Army had told them to attack any groups of more than eight people in South Korea. “Most fighter-bomber pilots regarded Korean civilians in white clothes as enemy troops,” South Korean scholar Taewoo Kim would later conclude after reviewing Air Force mission reports from 1950.

The AP team (Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, Martha Mendoza and Randy Herschaft) was awarded the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting for their reporting on No Gun Ri, along with 10 other major national and international journalism awards. In May 2000, challenged by a skeptical U.S. News & World Report magazine article, the AP team did additional archival research and reported that one of nine ex-soldiers quoted in the original No Gun Ri article, Edward L. Daily, had been incorrectly identified as an eyewitness and instead had been passing on second-hand information. A Pentagon spokesman said this would not affect the Army's No Gun Ri investigation, noting Daily was "just one guy of many we've been talking to", and the Pulitzer committee reaffirmed its award and the credibility of the AP reporting.

References

--Charles J. Hanley (talk) 16:10, 1 October 2015 (UTC)

Moving on to "U.S. and South Korean military investigations"

Here’s a proposed edit of the section “U.S. and South Korean military investigations.” The article lost flow and cogency in its midsection as the now-banned sock puppet WeldNeck dumped irrelevancies and worse into it, most pointlessly with the overdone “Aerial Imagery” section. This edit reorganizes things into separate, tight subsections for the U.S. and South Korean investigative reports, dealing with “aerial imagery” and “NGR infiltrators” matters in the process.

I’ll propose following it with a section headlined something like “Criticism of the U.S. report; further evidence emerges,” combining some of what’s deleted here with the current “Additional criticism” section. Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:09, 5 October 2015 (UTC)

On Sept. 30, 1999, within hours of publication of the AP report,After the publication of the AP report, Defense Secretary William Cohen ordered Army Secretary Louis Caldera to initiate an investigation. The Seoul government also ordered an investigation, proposing the two inquiries conduct joint document searches and joint witness interviews. The Americans refused.

In the ensuing 15-month probes, conducted by the U.S. Army inspector general's office and Seoul's Defense Ministry, interrogators interviewed or obtained statements from some 200 U.S. veterans and 75 Koreans. The army researchers reviewed 1 million pages of U.S. archival documents. The final weeks were marked by press reports from Seoul indicating of sharp disputes between the U.S. and Korean teams. On January 11, 2001, the two governments issued their separate reports.

(SUBSECTION HEAD: U.S. report)

The U.S. report concluded After years of dismissing the allegations, the Army in its report acknowledged that the U.S. military had killed "an unknown number" of South Korean refugees at No Gun Ri with "small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing.” that preceded or coincided with the NKPA's advance and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week of July 1950," but no orders were issued to fire on the civilians, and the shootings were the result of a perceived enemy threat. But it held that no orders were issued to fire on the civilians, and the shootings were the result of hostile fire from among the refugees or firing meant to control them. At another point, however, it suggested soldiers may have "misunderstood" the Eighth Army's stop-refugees order to mean they could be shot. NOTE 1 At the same time, it described the deaths as “an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing.” The Army report dismissed the testimony of soldiers who spoke of orders at No Gun Ri because, it said, none could remember the wording, the originating officer’s name, or having received the order directly himself NOTE 2

The report questioned an early, unverified South Korean government estimate of 248 killed, missing and wounded at No Gun Ri, citing an aerial reconnaissance photograph of the area, said to have been taken eight days after the killings ended, that it said showed “no indication of human remains or mass graves.” (Four years after this 2001 report, the Seoul government's inquest committee did the work that certified the identities of a minimum 218 casualties.) NOTE 3 Retired marine lieutenant general, Bernard E. Trainor, an investigation adviser, described the events as "an act of desperation by frightened, green troops who acted out of self-preservation" and "not the deliberate murder of innocents". NOTE 4 The U.S. investigators also noted concerns with the reliability of eyewitness accounts. Memories of traumatic events are known to be influenced by factor such as stress, age at the time of the event and at the time of recall, passage of time since the event, bias and witness contamination, as was shown with the AP’s key eyewitness Edward Daily and the American and Koreans who stated that they remembered him being present. NOTE 5

On the day the US Army No Gun RI Report came out, then-President Bill Clinton issued a statement declaring, "I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950", but did not acknowledge wrongdoing on the part of the U.S. Army. Clinton later told reporters "The evidence was not clear that there was responsibility for wrongdoing high enough in the chain of command in the army to say that, in effect, the government was responsible."

The U.S. offered a $4 million plan for a memorial at No Gun Ri and scholarship fund, but not the individual compensation survivors demanded. The survivors later rejected the plan because the memorial would be dedicated to all the war's South Korean civilian dead rather than just the No Gun Ri victims. NOTE 6

(SUBSECTION HEAD: South Korean report)

In their report, South Korean investigators acknowledged a lack of documentation ofthat no documents showed specific orders at No Gun Ri to shoot refugees. However, they pointed out to gaps in the U.S.-supplied documents dealing with 7th Cavalry operations. Missing documents included the 7th Cavalry's journal, or communications log, for July 1950, the crucial record that would have carried No Gun Ri orders. It was missing without explanation from its place at the National Archives. NOTE 7

The South Korean report referred to testimony from said five former Air Force pilots told U.S. interrogators they were directed to strafe civilians during this period, and from17 veterans of the 7th Cavalry testified that they believed there were orders to shoot the No Gun Ri refugees. The Koreans noted that two of the veterans were battalion communications specialists (Levine and Crume) and, as such, were in an especially good position to know which orders had been relayed. Citing the Eighth Army order of July 26 to stop refugees, the Korean report concluded that the 7th Cavalry was "likely to have used all possible means to stop the approaching refugees." NOTE 7a Said Oh Young-ho, the South Korean prime minister’s national security director, “We believe there was an order to fire.” A joint U.S.-Korean “Statement of Mutual Understandings” issued with the reports did not repeat the U.S. report's flat assertion that no orders to shoot were issued at No Gun Ri. NOTE 7b

The Korean investigators cast doubt on the U.S. report’s suggestion of possible gunfire from among the refugees. Surviving documents said nothing about infiltrators at No Gun Ri, even though they would have been the 7th Cavalry's first enemy killed-in-action in Korea. The No Gun Ri survivors denied it emphatically, and only three of 52 battalion veterans interviewed by the U.S. team spoke of hostile fire, and then inconsistently. However, several of the battalion soldiers interviewed said their unit was returning hostile fire from the tunnels. The Korean survivors, by contrast, stated there were no infiltrators in their group, and the South Korean investigative report, arguing the illogic of trapped infiltrators firing on the surrounding battalion, doubted that such a scenario took place. NOTE 8

Regarding the aerial imagery that the U.S. report said suggested a lower death toll, the South Korean investigators, drawing on accounts from survivors and area residents, said at least 62 bodies had been taken away by relatives or buried in soldiers' abandoned foxholes in the first days after the killings, and some remained inside one underpass tunnel, under thin layers of dirt, out of sight of airborne cameras and awaiting later burial in mass graves. In addition, South Korean military specialists questioned the U.S. reconnaissance photos, pointing out irregularities, including the fact that the No Gun Ri frames had been spliced into the roll of film, raising the possibility they were not, as claimed, from August 6, 1950, eight days after the killings. NOTE 9

(SUBSECTION HEAD: Clinton statement, U.S. offer)

On the day the U.S. report was issued, then-President Bill Clinton issued a statement declaring, "I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950". He told reporters the next day that "things happened which were wrong". But the U.S. did not offer the apology and individual compensation sought by the survivors and the South Korean government. did not acknowledge wrongdoing on the part of the U.S. Army. Clinton later told reporters "The evidence was not clear that there was responsibility for wrongdoing high enough in the chain of command in the army to say that, in effect, the government was responsible." NOTE 10 Instead, the U.S. offered a $4 million plan for a memorial at No Gun Ri and scholarship fund, but not the individual compensation survivors demanded. The survivors later rejected the plan because the memorial would be dedicated to all the war's South Korean civilian dead rather than just the No Gun Ri victims. NOTE 10

References

• NOTE 1 – Restores specificity to reasons cited by U.S. report for the shooting.
• NOTE 2 – Expands on U.S. report, adding two important elements.
• NOTE 3 – Raises the “aerial imagery” element to this U.S. report subsection, where it belongs (and to the SK report subsection). The current “Aerial Imagery” section, farther down the article, can be eliminated.
• NOTE 4 – Trainor quote simply echoes U.S. report and is extraneous; he might be useful later, in reaction section.
• NOTE 5 – This business about people’s memories is a pointless truism, especially since it’s not linked to any specific recollection or element of NGR.
• NOTE 6 – The Clinton material now has its own subsection in this edit.
• NOTE 7 – More precise wording.
• NOTE 7a - Inserting a bottom-line conclusion from SK report.
• NOTE 7b - Raises this element from its incongruous placement in the current "Additional criticism" section.
• NOTE 8 – Deals more explicitly with infiltrator element, from SK report point of view.
• NOTE 9 – This is now the SK component of the aerial imagery element, raised from below.
• NOTE 10 – The Clinton material is here separated into its own subsection, including the quote re “wrong things happened” that was put earlier in Lead section.

And so we get this:

On Sept. 30, 1999, within hours of publication of the AP report, Defense Secretary William Cohen ordered Army Secretary Louis Caldera to initiate an investigation. The Seoul government also ordered an investigation, proposing the two inquiries conduct joint document searches and joint witness interviews. The Americans refused.

In the ensuing 15-month probes, conducted by the U.S. Army inspector general's office and Seoul's Defense Ministry, interrogators interviewed or obtained statements from some 200 U.S. veterans and 75 Koreans. The army researchers reviewed 1 million pages of U.S. archival documents. The final weeks were marked by press reports from Seoul of sharp disputes between the U.S. and Korean teams. On January 11, 2001, the two governments issued their separate reports.

(SUBSECTION HEAD: U.S. report)

After years of dismissing the allegations, the Army in its report acknowledged that the U.S. military had killed "an unknown number" of South Korean refugees at No Gun Ri with "small-arms fire, artillery and mortar fire, and strafing.” But it held that no orders were issued to fire on the civilians, and the shootings were the result of hostile fire from among the refugees or firing meant to control them. At another point, however, it suggested soldiers may have "misunderstood" the Eighth Army's stop-refugees order to mean they could be shot. At the same time, it described the deaths as “an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing.” The Army report dismissed the testimony of soldiers who spoke of orders at No Gun Ri because, it said, none could remember the wording, the originating officer’s name, or having received the order directly himself

The report questioned an early, unverified South Korean government estimate of 248 killed, missing and wounded at No Gun Ri, citing an aerial reconnaissance photograph of the No Gun Ri bridge area, said to have been taken eight days after the killings ended, that it said showed “no indication of human remains or mass graves.” (Four years after this 2001 report, the Seoul government's inquest committee did the work that certified the identities of a minimum 218 casualties.)

(SUBSECTION HEAD: South Korean report)

In their report, South Korean investigators acknowledged that no documents showed specific orders at No Gun Ri to shoot refugees. However, they pointed to gaps in the U.S.-supplied documents dealing with 7th Cavalry operations. Missing documents included the 7th Cavalry's journal, or communications log, for July 1950, the crucial record that would have carried No Gun Ri orders. It was missing without explanation from its place at the National Archives.

The South Korean report said five former Air Force pilots told U.S. interrogators they were directed to strafe civilians during this period, and 17 veterans of the 7th Cavalry testified that they believed there were orders to shoot the No Gun Ri refugees. The Koreans noted that two of the veterans were battalion communications specialists (Levine and Crume) and, as such, were in an especially good position to know which orders had been relayed. Citing the Eighth Army order of July 26 to stop refugees, the Korean report concluded that the 7th Cavalry was "likely to have used all possible means to stop the approaching refugees." Said Oh Young-ho, the South Korean prime minister’s national security director, “We believe there was an order to fire.” A joint U.S.-Korean “Statement of Mutual Understandings” issued with the reports did not repeat the U.S. report's flat assertion that no orders to shoot were issued at No Gun Ri.

The Korean investigators cast doubt on the U.S. report’s suggestion of possible gunfire from among the refugees. Surviving documents said nothing about infiltrators at No Gun Ri, even though they would have been the 7th Cavalry's first enemy killed-in-action in Korea. The No Gun Ri survivors denied it emphatically, and only three of 52 battalion veterans interviewed by the U.S. team spoke of hostile fire, and then inconsistently.

Regarding the aerial imagery that the U.S. report said suggested a lower death toll, the South Korean investigators, drawing on accounts from survivors and area residents, said at least 62 bodies had been taken away by relatives or buried in soldiers' abandoned foxholes in the first days after the killings, and some remained inside one underpass tunnel, under thin layers of dirt, out of sight of airborne cameras and awaiting later burial in mass graves. In addition, South Korean military specialists questioned the U.S. reconnaissance photos, pointing out irregularities, including the fact that the No Gun Ri frames had been spliced into the roll of film, raising the possibility they were not, as claimed, from August 6, 1950, eight days after the killings.

(SUBSECTION HEAD: Clinton statement, U.S. offer)

On the day the U.S. report was issued, then-President Bill Clinton issued a statement declaring, "I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950". He told reporters the next day that "things happened which were wrong". But the U.S. did not offer the apology and individual compensation sought by the survivors and the South Korean government. Instead, the U.S. offered a $4 million plan for a memorial at No Gun Ri and scholarship fund. The survivors later rejected the plan because the memorial would be dedicated to all the war's South Korean civilian dead rather than just the No Gun Ri victims.

References

--Charles J. Hanley (talk) 15:09, 5 October 2015 (UTC)