Talk:Instrumentalism/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Not much information about instrumentalism

The article seems to contain more information about what the critics of instrumentalism had to say than information about instrumentalism itself. I think a new/separate section explaining the concepts important to instrumentalism, and perhaps a list of well-known instrumentalists, would be helpful. I agree with User:Blainster, the differences between the three is subtle, and fleshing out more about instrumentalism would help clarify those differences.

Charlesreid1 (talk) 07:41, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

A good starting point: http://www.google.com/search?q=instrumentalism+science&tbs=bks%3A1 Kmarinas86 (Expert Sectioneer of Wikipedia) ^{19+9+14 + karma = 19+9+14 + talk = 86} 02:01, 16 December 2010 (UTC)

Philosophic hairsplitting?

Not being a professionally trained philosopher, I am having a difficult time finding more than a paper thickness of difference betweeen instrumentalism, pragmatism, and utilitarianism, other than the deployment of the terms by thinkers in different fields. I would appreciate a clearer differentiation, or alternatively, is there an extraordinary amount of effort being expended to build academic reputations by attempts to stake out their own positions (referring to the scholars, not the Wiki editors, of course!). This is not to say that the concepts are not complex, just that there seems to be more overlap among, than separation between them. --Blainster 18:12, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Pragmatic Epistemology considers that things can be true. Instrumentalisme rejects the concept of truth. Theories are useful or not. Utilitarianism is a normative concept. It argues that things are right or wrong. Instrumentalisme does not have anything to do with right and wrong. 76.27.192.231 (talk) 19:45, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Functions, Not Black boxes

"Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable, and that they should be treated like a black box into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions." I could be wrong, but black boxes involve unknown transformations by definition, whereas theories themselves are explicit & thus given data, we know why it predicts what it does. As further proof, we can manually change a theory at any time. : Waxwings 23:07, 24 July 2005 (UTC)

The inside of a black box is not necessarily unknown. In this case, the term black box is used to mean that the inner workings of the theory are unimportant. 76.27.192.231 (talk) 19:40, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Ambiguous sentence

The sentence quoted above may not say what is intended. Does instrumentalism deny that theories should be treated like a black box? I think this sentence should read "Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable; rather, it suggests they should be treated like a black box into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions."

Popper is not an instrumentalist

...and anyone who's read his Conjectures and Refutations should know this, since he directly attacks instrumentalism in more than one place. He is quite explicit on this point, so I have no idea why he's included in this article.

Then you should edit the article to reflect that. Providing citations would also be helpful.--droptone 22:00, 17 November 2005 (UTC)

Dear editors, please refer to Popper's Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge included in Conjectures and Refutations (Chapter 3). In this paper he presents 3 different positions: and it is quite clear that his position is neither instrumentalism nor essentialism. Jackbars 20:31, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

Well OK, I set that straight. (Stuck out like a sore thumb to me too, Popper distances himself from instrumentalism so often.) --_Felix 213.122.64.118 (talk) 11:45, 27 November 2008 (UTC)

O and T terms

Whom among the instrumentalitst makes this distinction between O and T? What is problematic is that what is meant by 'meaning' is unclear. I am a gene but my meaning (not any meaning?) cannot be derived from observation so I am a theoretical entity, likewise I am Simon (the one writing this remark) but yet my meaning cannot be derived from observation, so am I likewise a theoretical construct? I can directly experience acidity though I might use a more precise theory to define it, the same with the quality red...

Re: O & T terms

The analysis given in the article is flawed. Where it states:

"... Observation statements (O-statements) have their meaning fixed by observable truth conditions, e.g. "the litmus paper is "red", whilst observation terms (O-terms) have their meaning fixed by their referring to observable things or properties, e.g. "red". Theoretical statements (T-statements) have their meaning fixed by their function within a theory and aren't truth evaluable, e.g. "the solution is acidic", whilst theoretical terms (T-terms) have their meaning fixed by their systematic function within a theory and don't refer to any observable thing or property, e.g. "acidic". Though you may think that "acidic" refers to a real property in an object, the meaning of the term can only be explained by reference to a theory about acidity, in contrast to "red", which is a property you can observe. ..."

Both "red" and "acidic" are matters of perception and, therefore, equally subjective. To someone who is color blind or otherwise impaired, the litmus paper is not red. Contrarily, we can taste for acidity; and our taste-sense is as valid for determining properties as is sight. They are just different senses with which to "observe". From sensory organ to brain to interpretation a number of things happen, making each of these properties subject to what we "know" or have learned of our environment. Every individual having normal eye-sight and brain function sees an object of color red, and learns through rote that others consistently identify and register the same object as "red" as he does. But, we have no means of knowing perfectly that they see the color red as the same precise hue. How are we to know that the person with whom we agree it is red is not seeing a color that to us might by a little more cyan or magenta? Through long experience, each person registers his "red" as uniquely red, just as you register yours; the only consistency being that you register and label the same objects as having the same color - whatever its true color may be. Logically we know that however we interpret the color it must be have the same "true" color to everyone, regardless of personal interpretation. We analyze and determine no further than this because it is sufficient that we all recognize color consistently.

While the example given is flawed, the underlying idea still has some merit. Accepting both of these forms of "observation" as equally valid, what other property might constitute an un-observable statement or term (i.e., "theoretical"). An unobservable term is one we cannot observe directly or indirectly because we either lack the necessary sensory apparatus or for which there is no phenomenon capable of being sensed. Heat is detectible by humans but not temperature, which is only a measure of heat. Yet, humans can and do estimate temperature over a very limited range. This is a learned skill obtained from frequent reference to thermometers and "remembering" the relative sensation of heat correspondsing to a given temperature. Until the concept of temperature was first postulated and a measurement devised, the best people could say of heat was an object was either hot, cold or indifferent. Thus, temperature is extrinsic rather than intrinsic, and is unobservable only by indirect detection. There are other properties that are still less observable (e.g., entropy) and are normally detected as estimates made by long or painstaking observation. However, do these constitute "theoretical" properties or real ones. Using the same measuring apparatus, we get consistent results which are "observable", moving many extrinsic properties from the realm of theoretical to observable; with our senses extended through inventive means.

Self, good, cognition, and temperment, are a few more likely properties with which to illustrate this idea regarding the 'evaluability of truth', or, so called, 'subjective truth'. We all accept these terms as having some kind of validity, yet are hard pressed to verify them as measureable properties. I can only prove self and cognition to myself; all others having to take my word for it I have such properties. Similarly, all things we deem good are not invariably or universally so, but may only be good in some context of consensus or personal gratification. For example, an impulse to charity is generally considered a positive good, but not if it creates a permanent and burdensome condition of dependence. Sexual desire may feel "good" to the person having it, yet may feel threatening to others or disruptive to the society in which he resides when expressed.

When all means of detection and proof are exhausted, we fall back on faith. Faith is an acceptance that allows us to operate as though a truth were determined that is, otherwise, indeterminable. Faith is not the same as subjective truth, because the one enables us to operate in a consistent manner, where the other denies consistency is possible. There are many things we do and accomplish without ever taking stock of the reality underlying our decisions to act. We get into cars and airplanes having faith the brakes won't fail or airframe fracture; yet these are real possibilities. We investigate the universe in which we live and hypothesize possible explanations for everything we can see or conceive relying on base assumptions we know can never be proved or disproved. Ultimately, we have faith either in our theories or in something beyond our limited abilities of observation and conception. Either way, we are convinced of their truth.

John Dewey was wrong to see politics as "just" a means to an end. Moreover, if it was just a means, then which means should not have mattered so much to Dewey as results. Yet, Dewey strongly advocated a particular political philosophy over all others, one that was at odds with the prevailing political philosophy in which he operated. This means he had to start his program by supplanting the prevailing philosophy to reach his ends. It takes far more work to achieve an objective when you first have to replace an entire system and culture before you can make an inroad. Yet that is exactly what Dewey did.

Dewey was a socialist with a decidedly socialist agenda. The United States in which he operated was predominently geared toward the individual and recognized the ability and right of individuals to fend for ourselves. Dewey felt the individual was over emphasized, and his activism helped promote the movement that ultimately stigmatized individualism while codifying cultural conformity (regardless of his intent). The resulting culture is less resilient and robust than the one preceding it, as demonstrated by its vulnerability and inability to operate outside of collectivized norms wherever the norms breakdown. Ends over means tend to be myoptic, often with forseeable results. Emphasizing ends deemphasizes any system of values that serve as a guage for those ends or of the means to accomplish them. Dewey, himself, was a moral man, yet the consequence of his philosophy was to disconnect ends from means in the minds of those who followed after. For all Dewey's intellect (and it was considerable), he did not have sufficient forsight or willingness to determine wither he would take us.

Instrumentalism in 2009

I need(ed) to get a good reference or two for "Instrumentalism"; as usual I looked up Wikipedia. Now I see that the article is a little bit "unclear". This will not do! It is said (?) that the "World of Western Science" today is essentially instrumentalist! That is what I believe to be true... So! I wonder just how one might be able to add to or improve this article. Where would one start? Currently, the article is dominated by the "Critics" section. That doesn't look good. I wonder what sources I ought to use (for references) in order to "ground" a rewrite? --Михал Орела (talk) 20:06, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

One way in which to make some sort of progress (without digging a bigger hole of disputation) might be to (re-)define Instrumentalism directly in the article. I am thinking of beginning with the simple idea of "instrument" and its uses: musical instrument, scientific instrument, writing instrument, and so on.

• the flute is a musical instrument; it does not play music by itself. There is an agent that uses the instrument to produce the music...
• the telescope is one of the more interesting scientific instruments of early days (Galileo) which was instrumental (a deliberate reuse...) in showing us how things are in the sky...
• the writing instrument that usually springs to mind is the pen (and with it the saying that it is mightier than the sword). The key thing about the pen as instrument is that it produces writing which is not the same thing as speaking...

So, the idea is that instrumentalism is all about the use of instruments to perceive/create/understand reality... Philosophically, one might then deduce that everything we know can only be perceived by use of instrument. Is that the story? I will look to see how this view might be supported directly (by strong reference to sources). --Михал Орела (talk) 20:32, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Another way in which to "update" Instrumentalism for 2009 might be to pair it with things like Education, Health, Religion, Psychology, and so on. And then one might consider how deeply embedded the philosophy is "in certain parts of the world"? For example, in Education (specifically that part usually denoted by "Teaching and Learning") assessment plays a major role. Searching in the "usual" way

• instrumentalism+teaching+learning

brings up the text (via Google Books, of course) "Teaching Technology", edited by Frank Banks, Open University, Routledge, 1994. ISBN 0415102545, 9780415102544. 5 general features of Instrumentalism are listed (from Merson 1980, p17).

A third way might be the formulation of the hypothesis (and subsequent testing thereof) that Instrumentalism already existed (in practice) before Dewey. --Михал Орела (talk) 18:41, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

Technocratic Instrumentalism

Now I have stumbled across "an active topic" in 2009 — "Technocratic Instrumentalism". So what exactly is this? A quick search throws up some surprises:

• "When Is It Unconstitutional to Call Nonsense Nonsense?" Comment by Chip Poirot, May 5, 2009 6:10 PM
• "The Ideology of SS Bureaucrats L. M. Stallbaumer-Beishline. Review of Allen, Michael Thad, The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps. H-German, H-Net Reviews. July, 2003.

--Михал Орела (talk) 13:39, 17 June 2009 (UTC)

John Dewey and Instrumentalism

A different approach to developing the main article might be to examine the first two paragraphs of the existing article in "forensic detail".

In the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the view that concepts and theories are useful instruments whose worth is measured not by whether the concepts and theories are true or false (or correctly depict reality), but by how effective they are in explaining and predicting phenomena.

Instrumentalism relates closely to pragmatism, especially in the work of John Dewey and his student Addison Webster Moore. This methodological viewpoint often contrasts with scientific realism, which defines theories as specially being more or less true. However, instrumentalism is more of a pragmatic approach to science, information and theories than an ontological statement. Often instrumentalists (like pragmatists) have been accused of being relativists, even though many instrumentalists are also believers in sturdy objective realism.

To ground the assertion that "Instrumentalism relates closely to pragmatism" one might begin by considering the works of Dewey, such as

• Democracy and Education John Dewey

Since the text is fully searchable, it is easy to see that the phrase "instrumenalism" does not occur. However, both instrument and instrumentality occur frequently. If we look carefully at the use of the phrase "instrumentalities" will we then be in a position to grasp "Instrumentalism"? --Михал Орела (talk) 14:10, 17 June 2009 (UTC)

Dewey's instrumentalism, and its relation to pragmatism, is a rather complex issue. Deweyian terminology does not really translate that well into the language of non-American golden age philosophy. In the context of this article, I think one would be better served looking at The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism, and Experience and Nature (particularly chapeter 4). It is is very important to note that Dewey himself rarely used the word pragmatism to describe his thought. I would suggest that one look into the work of Thomas Alexander and Larry Hickman, if one is interested in a fuller understanding of his thoughts. Democracy and Education isn't really the place to start with Dewey, if your concerned with his instrumentalism. ***I'm not sure if this is the right place or format for this comment.*** — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.81.251.27 (talk) 09:09, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

"When all means of detection and proof are exhausted, we fall back on faith"

No, not quite, I think. We fall back on proceeding 'as if' our axioms were, indeed, fact. The difference between religious faith and true philosophical acuity, to me, is that the philosopher knows he doesn't know, but proceeds as if he does, whereas the religious faithful, believes that he does know, because he is unable to proceed in uncertainty.

In essence, this also provides the dividing criterion between those who are true Instrumentalists, and those who are at heart Realists.

Realists assume ultimately, or have faith, that their models are close to reality. Instrumentalists point out that not only is there no proof that this is so, but there never ever can be. They merely note that, in order to proceed, it is necessary to assume for the purposes of analysis that there is at least some correlation between the model, and some unspecified reality. But they are fully aware of the assumptions, I think.

So: A Realist thinks he knows, and proceeds as if he does.
An Instrumentalist knows he doesn't know, but proceeds as if he does.
A Pragmatist, doesn't know if he knows or not, but proceeds with what simply works.
A Relativist is a more general case of an Instrumentalist.

This also counters the proposition that an Instrumentalist rejects the concept Truth, No, he doesn't reject the concept of Truth. How can one do that? The concept exists all right. He merely notes it as an unattainable goal. Like infinity. Its useful, you just cant walk there. The true instrumentalist position is more like Wittgenstein's 'whatever is the case' Its not that there is no case, its just that its undecidable by the use of abstract modelling. I.e. the construction of theoretical models that map it into entities with which we can dicker.

An instrumentalist that rejected the concept of Truth, would be an Idealist. Its all in the mind. The Instrumentalist surely says most of it is in the mind, but that doesn't mean something is not.

The Instrumentalist proceeds as if there is a Truth, he just accepts the fact that what he does, in no way clarifies, or ever can clarify, exactly what it is. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.89.132.226 (talk) 08:47, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

--The Natural Philosopher, posting anonymously in an idle moment —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.89.132.226 (talk) 08:30, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

Pragmaticism and Instrumentalism

I gave a short summary of a reference on pragmaticism and instrumentalism. In fact pragmaticism rejected instrumentalism from the start.

I removed the previous paragraph on pragmaticism and instrumentalism, which was unsourced and seemingly erroneous. If Dewey did have a bad student writing badly about instrumentalism, then there should be a precise citation establishing the notability of that student and describing the statements precisely.

I would ask that a philosopher check the definition of instrumentalism, which seems nonstandard to me. ThanksKiefer.Wolfowitz (talk) 23:23, 12 June 2010 (UTC)

Instrumentalism update 2011

I have made some small additions to this page and removed the disputed banner. Funnily enough, there is much useful information on the discussion pages. I am not a regular wiki editor, but I have removed the "disputed" tag, as I don't see the relevance any more. If you want me to add more to this page I will. Instrumentalism has a long history from Plato to the Post-Kuhn generation. I think the context of Pierce/Pragmatism piece is slightly misplaced, but that'll do for my edit today. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jonathan.mark.lingard (talk • contribs) 06:46, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

I propose activating this leisurely discussion with some basic revisions of the existing article. I suggest two for starters. What do you think?

1) Delete section 1.1, Ancient Greece. Whether or not the Greeks debated realism and anti-realism/idealism parallel to the current debate might interest beginners in the philosophy of science. It is not useful for people familiar with the field or people seeking to understand the modern school of instrumentalism—particularly since one of the main contributors to that school, John Dewey, dismissed the positions taken by both sides of the debate. See Gouinlock, James (1984) “Introduction.” John Dewey: The Later Works. v. 2. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press; Hickman, Larry A., John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 31.

2) Delete the lone title in Sources, Torretti, The Philosophy of Physics. The book makes no reference to instrumentalism, and the pages referenced simply discuss George Berkeley. It might be appropriate to make Sources a bibliography of all materials referred to, eliminating that information from the notes.TBR-qed (talk) 13:12, 8 July 2014 (UTC)

Some further cleanup?

This benighted page could use some copy editing, right? I fixed a couple of instances of the horrible misspelling of "Peirce" (where to be clear, "Peirce" is correct) -they occurred in the same paragraph as the proper spelling. Such things as "...Einstein's special relativity, also arriving in 1905, bore exhibited the consequence of..." [emphasis added] abound, surely due to furtive editing by more scholarly contributors than myself. Would anyone object to a bit of content-neutral stylistic polish? Rt3368 (talk) 08:11, 10 July 2014 (UTC)

More than cleanup.

I'm a beginner. Please explain to me why this article has a single title in sources, but a handful of titles in footnotes. Shouldn't sources include all?

Also, why that one title--Torretti's Philosophy of Physics--does not have "instrumentalism" in its index, and the pages referenced in sources just concern George Berkeley. Popper attributed the introduction of instrumentalism to Berkeley, but the article attributes it to Pierre Duhem. If either name is significant for understanding the modern school of instrumentalism, should not the article explain that significance? Thanks.TBR-qed (talk) 19:52, 21 July 2014 (UTC)TBR-qed.

No relevance to Greek thought

I have deleted section 1.1, Ancient Greece. Whether or not the Greeks debated realism and anti-realism or idealism parallel to the current debate might interest beginners in the philosophy of science, but not people familiar with the field or people seeking to understand the modern school of instrumentalism—particularly since one of the main contributors to that school, John Dewey, dismissed the positions taken by supporters of both sides of the debate. See Gouinlock, James (1984) “Introduction.” John Dewey: The Later Works. v. 2. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press; Hickman, Larry A., John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 31.TBR-qed (talk) 19:01, 1 August 2014 (UTC)

The cited source explicitly says it's relevant... maybe add to it using other sources?—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 19:45, 1 August 2014 (UTC)

Hello, Machine Elf. Let’s talk.

An encyclopedia should not just repeat careless word usage, but should identify it for what it is, which will discourage it. I feel the existing article “Instrumentalism” just repeats, and would like to improve that entry. One example of careless expression is pinning that modern label on all opponents of realism in its ageless debate with idealism. I am not disputing that ancient Greeks can be covered by the current philosophy-of-science equation of “instrumentalism” with “anti-realism.” I am raising two other issues. One is whether or not the philosophy-of-science definition should be the basic meaning of instrumentalism for general readers, with other presumably distinct and subordinate definitions shunted to a disambiguation article. Two is whether understanding modern usage of instrumentalism is advanced by historical details of debates about realism. One: Popper is doubtless the source of the modern definition, and of assigning that definition to physicists—with or without their acceptance of it. But his definition was not limited to physical sciences. He applied it universally, as this article does, to empiricism, idealism, and pragmatism. Popper’s definition included more than opposition to realism—especially instrumentalist dependence on induction—as instrumentalism’s defining trait. An accurate encyclopedia entry would identify all defining traits, and give the minimum historical background necessary to understand current usage. Two: If avowed instrumentalists (i.e., Dewey) bypass the realism-idealism debate—as paragraph 2 of the present article admits—then details of such debates in Greece appear irrelevant—which is why I deleted that section. I see the deletion of Ancient Greece as a first step toward making “Instrumentalism” the generic entry on the modern school, sending all discipline-specific discussion to the disambiguation page. Unless you can persuade me that my reasons for deletion are in error I may do it again. ThanksTBR-qed (talk) 14:48, 17 August 2014 (UTC)

Totally missed your reply on my watchlist, thanks for the reminder. I think you clearly know what you're doing and that you intend to move the article forward in a good direction. We can't really move content to dab pages per se because they're meant for disambiguation purposes only. I'll go ahead and look for a new home in a related article when I get a chance but you've convinced me so meanwhile I'll restore the bold delete. Thanks for your patience and again sorry I missed your follow up post.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 20:39, 22 August 2014 (UTC)

Deciding relevance

Hello, Machine Elf. Let’s talk.

An encyclopedia should not just repeat careless word usage, but should identify it for what it is, which will discourage it. I feel the existing article “Instrumentalism” just repeats, and would like to improve that entry. One example of careless expression is pinning that modern label on all opponents of realism in its ageless debate with idealism.

I am not disputing that ancient Greeks can be covered by the current philosophy-of-science equation of “instrumentalism” with “anti-realism.” I am raising two other issues. One is whether or not the philosophy-of-science definition should be the basic meaning of instrumentalism for general readers, with other presumably distinct and subordinate definitions shunted to a disambiguation article. Two is whether understanding modern usage of instrumentalism is advanced by historical details of debates about realism. One: Popper is doubtless the source of the modern definition, and of assigning that definition to physicists—with or without their acceptance of it. But his definition was not limited to physical sciences. He applied it universally, as this article does, to empiricism, idealism, and pragmatism. Popper’s definition included more than opposition to realism—especially instrumentalist dependence on induction—as instrumentalism’s defining trait. An accurate encyclopedia entry would identify all defining traits, and give the minimum historical background necessary to understand current usage. Two: If avowed instrumentalists (i.e., Dewey) bypass the realism-idealism debate—as paragraph 2 of the present article admits—then details of such debates in Greece appear irrelevant—which is why I deleted that section.

I see the deletion of Ancient Greece as a first step toward making “Instrumentalism” the generic entry on the modern school, sending all discipline-specific discussion to the disambiguation page. Unless you can persuade me that my reasons for deletion are in error I may do it again. Thanks. TBR-qed. — Preceding unsigned comment added by TBR-qed (talk • contribs) 14:12, 6 August 2014 (UTC)

Where is the name?

Will someone please show me where in Suppes, the single source for the Ancient Greece section, the name "instrumentalism appears, or any discussion of the relevance of Greek debates to understanding the current meaning of the school so-named.TBR-qed (talk) 13:11, 10 August 2014 (UTC)

Just want to document: I'm in total agreement with TBR-qed ancient greeks should not be included in this article. The ancient greeks thought about just about everything in one way or another. If you squint hard enough you can find ways to reference them on just about any topic in philosophy or psychology but the article should be about things that are directly relevant to Instrumentalism which I agree should not include ancient Greeks. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 19:26, 5 November 2014 (UTC)

Relevance of pragmatism

I have deleted section 1.4, American pragmatism, and footnote 15. It states that Peirce founded pragmatism, but does not mention instrumentalism, or the fact that Peirce did not mention it. Does the section assume that pragmatism is just the same as instrumentalism, since both are anti-realist? Nor does it demonstrate that Peirce—a mathematician—accepted the definition imputed to physicists and treated from paragraph 1 as the universal meaning of instrumentalism. The failure to link pragmatism to instrumentalism and to mention Dewey, who developed Peirce’s analysis and accepted the name instrumentalism, makes the section irrelevant to understanding the modern school named instrumentalism. A comprehensive presentation of this school would necessarily describe and contrast Dewey’s contribution to it and Popper’s critique of it.TBR-qed (talk) 16:42, 19 August 2014 (UTC)

I have revised the lead section to begin correcting the errors I identified in earlier talks as existing in it. I intend quickly to provide further sections so that the article will become a consistent whole ready to be evaluated.TBR-qed (talk) 22:03, 30 August 2014 (UTC)

Revising lead section

I have revised the lead section to begin correcting the errors I identified in earlier talks as existing in it. I intend quickly to provide further sections so that the article will become a consistent whole ready to be evaluated. — Preceding unsigned comment added by TBR-qed (talk • contribs) 22:08, 30 August 2014 (UTC)

explaining revisions

I would like to propose major revisions of Instrumentalism. I invite comments on the following proposal.

I find three major shortcoming in the existing article.

1) It is written rather narrowly as a subject in the philosophy of science—in particular physics— presenting many historic and academic distinctions that would be little meaningful to readers seeking to understand the current significance of the movement. The article Instrumentalism (disambiguation) identifies four kinds of instrumentalism not identified in the primary article. I conclude that the scope of the primary article is narrow and unrepresentative.

2) It reflects the definition and analysis of Karl Popper with little attribution, and completely ignores the analysis of John Dewey, who is widely considered to have been a major contributor to the movement.

3) It ignores recent controversies about and contributions to the movement.

I propose a primary article developing the philosophical contributions of Popper and Dewey, followed with recent examples of people noted for following the practice of each. The disambiguation article could provide references for the multitude of uses in distinct disciplines.

I append a few sentences that might serve as the lede section of a revised article.TBR-qed (talk) 14:43, 7 October 2014 (UTC)

Instrumentalism

In the 20th century, philosophers and the general public came to apply the name instrumentalism to one of a group of modern schools, movements, or doctrines, including pragmatism, logical positivism, operationalism, experimentalism, and behaviorism. The logical compatibility of characteristics covered by these labels is rarely considered, but adherents of all these schools mistrust formal logic and traditional schools which assume unbridgeable differences between physical phenomena observed in practice and mental phenomena organized in theories: realism versus idealism; empiricism versus rationalism.

The defining characteristic of instrumentalism is to derive theories from inductions to serve as instruments or tools to answer questions or solve problems. Instrumentalists judge how well theoretical tools “work” to answer or solve—applying the criterion of instrumental efficiency—rather than judging whether theories are “true to reality"—the criterion applied in formal logic.

Two renowned philosophers, Karl Popper and John Dewey, became identified with instrumentalism, the former as a critic and the latter as a participant. They differed little in identifying the school’s characteristics, but differed fundamentally in evaluating those characteristics. Since their differences were never resolved, the modern meaning of the name is ambiguous.TBR-qed (talk) 21:16, 10 October 2014 (UTC)

TBR-qed I spent a little more time looking over the talk page and just saw your comment. Just wanted to say I agree with the approach you describe here and that is the way I'm going with my attempt at a rewrite. I'm essentially going to replace everything that is currently in the Background section. And I'm trying to avoid some of the detailed discussions elsewhere on this talk page and that are currently in the article. From the research I've done I agree with you absolutely, Instrumentalism means different things to different authors and it is not practical to try and resolve all the subtle differences between people like Dewey and Popper in an article like this but instead to focus on the high level ideas and approaches that they had in common. That is the approach I'm trying to take and I will post a revision sometime within the next few days. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 19:22, 1 January 2015 (UTC)

References

TBR-qed (talk) 14:44, 7 October 2014 (UTC)

Instrumentalism as pragmatism (Dewey) vs. falsification of instrumentalism (Popper)

For Dewey, a measure of the truth of something ('instrumentalism') was most closely concerned with whether it was useful. Because truth itself is a value and we don't value things known not to be true, this is about as pragmatic an approach to the philosophy of science as possible. From my previous example of the periodic table, we value the science of chemistry over alchemy because the former is true and useful, and the latter is so much rubbish. Alchemy was not a body of knowledge that could be built upon. Chemistry was.

For Popper, a scientific theory's truth was only valuable until some or all of it could be falsified, and this process was deemed similar to the process of natural selection, aka Darwin's theory of evolution.

Popper's genius was to select a scientific theory that so clearly delineates what a scientific theory should be that it stands apart from even science itself. Who could possibly falsify any of the statements: 1) individuals of a particular species are of diverse genetic variability 2) that competition exists for resources and for mating, or 3) the best adapted of a particular species will be the one(s) which survive?

No other scientific theory before or since can even come close to this specificity of cause and effect. Theories of gravitation do not, for when a stone is dropped, without the aid of instrumentation nor the mathematician or geometer's sense of where a center is, it unfailingly seeks to fall in that direction. Newton actually called this a "divine hand". Without such complete knowledge, is this science? Evidently, it is not. With the discovery of the Higgs boson to a degree of certainty unsurpassed by any other atomic particle, we now know the origin of inertia itself, and it apparently comes from the energy of the vacuum. A great many theories that derive of similar ideas will no doubt be falsified when the exact couplings of the Higgs field are determined. And when it is, any theories that are based on exotic geometries with no good reason for a stone to fall in any particular direction other than in the mind of a mathematician will be falsified.

Dewey's approach was correct in terms of at least having some portion of the truth to teach while the rest of the science is being sorted out. Popper's only shortcoming was in not delineating a method to sort out philosophy from pseudo philosophy before taking on science. Danshawen (talk) 18:25, 15 October 2014 (UTC)danshawen

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Stylistic monstrosities and typos:

This is one of the worst-written articles I have seen on Wikipedia; it contains far too many stylistic monstrosities and typos (some of which I have cleaned up), and it reads as if it has been written by someone with a tenuous grasp of English, but who has an excellent grasp of flowery language. Nearly every sentence needs to be re-written. I have managed to reconfigure about a third of them. I'll do the rest another day!

There are, however, several sections that are impossible to improve, since it is far from clear what its author was trying to say. I have, as I said, cleaned up several sections, but more work needs to be devoted to it if it is to attain even the minimum standards we expect of Wikipedia.

However, the comments on Kant are a joke, and I defy anyone to understand them! They appear to have been written by someone who has been hit around the head with a heavy object.

Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 11:14, 19 October 2014 (UTC)

I agree with your judgments, Rosa Lichtenstein, and would appreciate your help changing both style and substance. Would you be willing to comment critically on several sections I am developing? Thanks.TBR-qed (talk) 17:07, 20 October 2014 (UTC)

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I don't in fact want to become embroiled in this; I merely wished to clean up the language used in the article. So forgive me if I pass up on your offer.

Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 15:11, 22 October 2014 (UTC)

Challenge a sentence in the Intro; and excessively long quotes in reference

"Initially a novel perspective introduced by Pierre Duhem in 1906, instrumentalism is largely the prevailing theory that underpins the practice of physicists today.[2]" I don't think it's correct to make that statement about ANY philosophy of science. The fact of the matter is that most scientists don't really give a damn about philosophy of science. They do what they do and leave it to the philosophers to worry about that stuff. I also don't really see how that reference supports the claim but even if someone can explain how it does I don't think one person commenting on Pierre Duhem can be said to represent "the prevailing theory that underpins the practice of physicists today". Also, I'm a big fan of using quotes in a reference. It really makes the support unambiguous. But those quotes are way too long. If those quotes are needed (I don't think they are) then they should be trimmed down and added as direct quotes in the article. If not (what I think is better) trim out most of the text of the quotes and leave one or two sentences that are DIRECTLY RELEVANT to support part of the article. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 19:21, 5 November 2014 (UTC)

I agree with MadScientist, and am deleting several long quotes preparatory to major revisions. Who will help me, as suggested in talk #20 above?TBR-qed (talk) 18:06, 29 December 2014 (UTC)

deleted references

I have deleted two references which I will soon replace.TBR-qed (talk) 18:21, 29 December 2014 (UTC)

Questioning all the Duhem refs in this article

I've been reading through this article a bit more carefully. There seems to be an awful lot of emphasis on Duhem and many of the statements are very difficult for me to even understand let alone determine if they are consistent with the references. For example this sentence from Background:

"In 1906, Duhem had introduced the problem of the underdetermination of theory by data, since any dataset could be consistent with several different explanations, how the success of any prediction does not, by affirming the consequent, a deductive fallacy, logically confirm the truth of the theory in question."

Can anyone paraphrase in simple English what this actually means? The only sense I can make out of it is that he is saying that since at times data may have two different theoretical interpretations any scientific conclusion is a fallacy. Which I think is clearly nonsense. Yes, it's true that at times we may have data that has two equally valid theoretical interpretations. That is why we have controversies in science. When that happens we collect more data, design better experiments, tweak the theories, etc. Am I missing something here? If no one can paraphrase this statement (or rework it so that it does make sense) I think it makes sense to just delete it. And there are other parts of this article that I think merit similar drastic editorial cuts. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 16:54, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

underdetermination of theory by data just means that any set of data will always have more than one theory capable of explaining it (rather in the way that any n points can be fit by any number of polynomials of degree n). This is fairly trivial, but must have been new at some point.

My suspicion, though, is that much of this article was written by a naive editor using only one or a few popsci sources. Likely the whole thing should be burnt to the ground and rebuilt William M. Connolley (talk) 18:13, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

William M. Connolley Your definition of undeterminism is consistent with what I thought it meant. I agree it is trivial although I'm not convinced it was really new at any point. It just seems like an obvious result of using the experimental method. For example you can go back to Ptolemy and Copernicus. Up to a point the two theories fit the data more or less equally well. But I still don't understand the second part of the quote above: "how the success of any prediction does not, by affirming the consequent, a deductive fallacy, logically confirm the truth of the theory in question" That just seems like gibberish to me. Also, it's not at all clear what undeterminism has to do with Instrumentalism anyway. It seems to me like a red herring. Anyway, I guess that is just my long winded way of agreeing with you, I think this article needs a major rewrite. There are more issues, I think I may just take a shot at some editing and see how people react rather than try to document every issue ahead of time. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 18:42, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

I believe that by how the success of any prediction does not, by affirming the consequent, a deductive fallacy, logically confirm the truth of the theory in question he's asserting that successful predictions don't "logically" confirm theories. This is true, in philosophical wank-world, but false in the real world, where successful predictions do immensely strengthen theories William M. Connolley (talk) 20:19, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

That makes sense. Thanks. I've done some work on the intro and I'm looking now at the Background section. I see what you meant in an earlier comment. For example "but physicists knew better" hardly encyclopedic language. I was surprised though that "just shut up and calculate" was actually a real thing and found this rather interesting article while researching this: http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/17/the-most-embarrassing-graph-in-modern-physics/ Sorry... I know I'm kind of going off on a tangent there, not directly relevant to editing, I just liked the article. Back to more on topic issues: can anyone take a stab at explaining how Instrumentalism differs from Logical Positivism? My first reading of this article a long time ago was "oh Instrumentalism is just another word for positivism" but the more I read the more that seems not to be the case. Although these things get so convoluted, I thought of Kuhn as a positivist but apparently he wasn't either. It's been a while since I read this stuff. If anyone would offer an opinion or good reference as to how to simply define these three: 1) Logical positivism 2) Pragmatism (i.e., Dewey, James, Pierce) and 3) Instrumentalism that would be some great input. My best understanding right now is that Instrumentalism is essentially a synonym for Pragmatism (consistent with the encyclopedia of philosophy which I consider very authoritative) but I'm not completely sure and would welcome some feedback. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 17:55, 31 December 2014 (UTC)

Just when I thought I was narrowing in on a definition (as Pragmatism not Logical Positivism) I found this: "The most influential advocates of instrumentalism were the logical empiricists (or logical positivists), including Carnap and Hempel, famously associated with the Vienna Circle group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere" from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/#MirArg It's starting to look to me as if "Instrumentalism" is one of those terms that can be used in different ways depending on context. I think in those cases the best thing to do is to take the superset, define it in the broadest sense as an idea that runs through various schools of though such as Pragmatism and Logical Positivsm. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 18:24, 31 December 2014 (UTC)

Im sorry, but we dont need someone with no knowledge of instrumentalism coming here and editing. We dont need you going and doing homework now and clouding the article and suppressing facts. Any scientific epistemology which is based on a criticism of causality or A priori principles can be seen as related to instrumentalism. Ive been reading you Madscientist, and what ive been reading is you basically challenging well known concepts and having trouble making sense of basic sentences. Whatever you do, dont take a shot at rewriting the article, please. Underterminism is related to instrumentalism in that both are skeptical to knowledge due to the problem of induction. Both schools are skeptical of a priori justifications. If your actually going to deny the fallaciousness of induction then your going to have to destroy 2 milllenia worth of scientific foundation. Induction is an informal, rather than formal fallacy, since induction can never prove with 100% certainty, and takes for granted the gap in between premise and conclusion. The past comments youve made are really nothing more than you having trouble understanding concepts on a page your trying to edit. Your also making baseless claims and trying to argue against concepts with your own justifications. " It just seems like an obvious result of using the experimental method. For example you can go back to Ptolemy and Copernicus. Up to a point the two theories fit the data more or less equally well." --madscientist "Can anyone paraphrase in simple English what this actually means? The only sense I can make out of it is that he is saying that since at times data may have two different theoretical interpretations any scientific conclusion is a fallacy. Which I think is clearly nonsense." --madscientist You keep saying what "i think" , when talking about the article. Its not about what " i think" or what "we think". On wikipedia, We need to give the facts- both sides of the story- and talk through academics and scholars and cited material, not through ourselves. Im sorry if i sound harsh, its just that i really do hate it when information and knowledge is suppressed unfairly. Nothing is worse then when a minority is suppressed, albeit this article is exempted from any schisms, at first glance. Wikipedia's climate change articles are well known for information suppression. Those pro global warming editors are wolverines.

The point im trying to make is that when we come across an article which does not meet acceptable standards, dont start going an an edit frenzy. Just take it easy and let some senior editors take over, or editors with more knowledge in the area. If you are hesitant and dubious of your own understanding, dont do homework halfway through your edit, just leave it be.Saintobalys (talk) 18:56, 24 January 2015 (UTC)

Definition of Instrumentalism

A fundamental starting point is to define the essential idea of Instrumentalism. I think the opening of this article is far too strong to be a workable definition: " a successful scientific theory reveals nothing known either true or false about nature's unobservable objects, properties or processes." That kind of definition is either obviously false or true but meaningless. If by "unobservable" it means "unobservable by any possible measurement" then it is a vacuous definition of the scientific method. But if it means unobservable in the sense that you can't see it with the naked eye, or even with a telescope or some other observing tool then it's clearly false. Consider gravity, you can't see gravity. You see the effects of it and in so doing you develop a theory. And that theory absolutely does "reveal [things] about nature" Or consider a Nash Equilibrium or an Environmentally Stable Strategy (ESS) you can't directly observe an ESS, you deduce that one exists by game theoretic analysis and observation of groups of organisms. An ESS is an example of one of nature's unobservable objects or processes that science enables us to find. Or consider a grammar in Linguistics. Again, you can't see a grammar but you can model it formally and prove things about the computational power required to parse one.

I looked up Instrumentalism in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It defined it as "See Dewey, John: Laws and Theories; Pragmatism" Is Instrumentalism the same as Pragmatism? From this article it sounds to me like it's more in line with the Logical Positivists but I consider that encyclopedia to be pretty authoritative. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 19:36, 30 December 2014 (UTC)

I can't tell you how its defined from my own knowledge. But looking online, the EB article http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/289412/instrumentalism says:

Alternate title: experimentalism

Instrumentalism, in the philosophy of science, the view that the value of scientific concepts and theories is determined not by whether they are literally true or correspond to reality in some sense but by the extent to which they help to make accurate empirical predictions or to resolve conceptual problems. Instrumentalism is thus the view that scientific theories should be thought of primarily as tools for solving practical problems rather than as meaningful descriptions of the natural world. Indeed, instrumentalists typically call into question whether it even makes sense to think of theoretical terms as corresponding to external reality. In that sense, instrumentalism is directly opposed to scientific realism, which is the view that the point of scientific theories is not merely to generate reliable predictions but to describe the world accurately.

Instrumentalism is a form of philosophical pragmatism as it applies to the philosophy of science. The term itself comes from the American philosopher John Dewey’s name for his own more general brand of pragmatism, according to which the value of any idea is determined by its usefulness in helping people to adapt to the world around them.

That fits, I think. It then continues with our old friend underdetermined by the available data. Interestingly, the OED http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/instrumentalism gives it a wider scope than just science:

A pragmatic philosophical approach which regards an activity (such as science, law, or education) chiefly as an instrument or tool for some practical purpose, rather than in more absolute or ideal terms:

The Standford Enc is often useful but in this case (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progress/) doesn't seem to be William M. Connolley (talk) 21:21, 1 January 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the useful discussion of the need for clearer definition. It should include reference to schools often related to instrumentalism. I'm pursuing the following line of thought, and would appreciate your reactions.

"Instrumentalism is the name of a modern schools of thought developed by scientists and philosophers in the 20th century. It is associated with other schools seeking to make traditional logic more useful in developing scientific and technological knowledge—schools such as positivism, pragmatism, operationalism, experimentalism, behaviorism.(Popper, 1965:4-5, 11, 62; Dewey, 1984:3, 20-1; Chakravartty, Anjan, "Scientific Realism”, §4.1: "Empiricism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). They all challenge traditional beliefs that theoretical thinking can be isolated from practical doing, that ends can exist independently of means, that describing facts does not require making value judgments.

"Advocates of instrumentalism try to eliminate such dichotomies by developing tools-of-the-trade of logical thinking. They identify thinking and doing as mutually dependent stages of inquiry, not as things-in-themselves. According to Webster’s Dictionary, advocates hold “a conception that the significant factor of a thing is its value as an instrument, … the doctrine that ideas are instruments of action and that their usefulness determines their truth.”(Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged. (1986:1172) Springfield, MA."TBR-qed (talk) 18:42, 5 January 2015 (UTC)

Here are a few reactions. First, I'm not a big fan of using standard dictionary definitions for deep topics like philosophy. More than once I've looked up a technical term in a dictionary and just thought what was printed was unclear or even wrong. The people that edit standard English dictionaries IMO just don't have the depth to do justice to these kinds of topics. That's quite different of course than using sources like the Stanford encyclopedia which I think is quite good. I agree with most of what you said with the exception of this: "that describing facts does not require making value judgments" I think that is probably true for the Pragmatists but not for people like Popper or Kuhn or especially Skinner or Watson. For those guys I think they would say that "values" are really not even legitimate things to study scientifically or if we can study them scientifically we would find that our standard way of talking about value and ethical statements is mostly just incoherent and meaningless. It's been a long time since I read Beyond Freedom and Dignity by Skinner but I think that was pretty much the gist of what he said: that talking about things like "freedom" is just a by product of non scientific thinking and that once we have a true science of human behavior we will mostly do away with such terms or they will take on completely different meanings. But in general I agree with everything you said above. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 19:29, 5 January 2015 (UTC)

Thanks. I share your skepticism of dictionary definitions. But I suggest this one not as an authority but to anticipate the school's position on value and truth.TBR-qed (talk) 14:52, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

That makes sense. Also, I re-read what I wrote in the previous response and I think it was a bit confused, essentially I'm in total agreement with the direction you are going. I kind of took an axe to the previous version (although I think it merited it) and I think adding more and fleshing it out with more detail would be great and everything you said above sounds good. One thing I was thinking of adding, but this is just an idea right now haven't written any drafts or even collected the proper refs, is a "Criticisms" section. I remember Chomsky especially wrote what I thought were some very pointed critiques where he describes how essentially the idea that we have to remove intermediate constructs or have an overly reductive approach to science is mis-guided and he gave some excellent examples. I especially remember him talking about how some philosophers of science want to reduce science to "meter reading" a phrase I always liked. If you know of any other interesting critiques of Instrumentalism please let me know. Also, there is another issue I thought anyone monitoring this page should be aware of but it's kind of distinct from this discussion so I'm going to also create a new section below. --MadScientistX11 (talk) 15:32, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

I nominated the Disambiguation Page at the top for Deletion

Sorry, I should have announced this earlier. As of now there is a disambiguation page for Instrumentalism at the top of the article: Instrumentalism_(disambiguation) If you look at that page though there are no actual links. I've never seen a disambiguation page that doesn't point anywhere. And most of the other forms of Instrumentalism are things I've never heard of. I've read a LOT of moral philosophy for example and I've never heard of "Ethical Instrumentalism". (BTW, I'm sure if we searched we could find some refs to it, that's the thing about these philosophy discussions look hard enough and somewhere someone has written a paper with just about any combination of long words). Anyway, I nominated that disambiguation page for deletion a few days ago and just realized people here might want to comment on it so here is the deletion discussion if you are interested: Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Instrumentalism_(disambiguation) --MadScientistX11 (talk) 15:41, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

Our great minds appear still to be in sinc. I had thought of keeping disambiguation to refer to the multitude of pages using the adjective "instrumental" in various ways, saving "instrumentalism" for the school at large. I hope to post a few new sections in a few days, and look forward to your reactions.TBR-qed (talk) 16:47, 9 January 2015 (UTC)

new lead and background sections

I am proposing major reform of the existing article, starting with these two sections. I hope reviewers will let me develop my case before finding fault.TBR-qed (talk) 01:38, 13 January 2015 (UTC)

George Soros's practice of instrumentalism

I'm dubious this section belongs in the article. It might belong in the GS article; but does GS actually add anything? William M. Connolley (talk) 20:55, 20 January 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for your observation. If one accept that Popper's understanding of the school is widely accredited, and that Soros claims in detail to accept Popper's thinking, i find Soros's theory and practice to be appropriate evidence of the current significance of Popper.TBR-qed (talk) 15:13, 24 January 2015 (UTC)

reconstruction over

I have finished reconstructing this article, and now welcome critique, corrections, and clarifications.TBR-qed (talk) 15:45, 29 January 2015 (UTC)

Shut up and Calculate

Shut up and calculate redirects here, however that phrase is mentioned nowhere in the article explicitly. Maybe there should be added a few lines about that phrase. (As far as I know this was also used by physicists wondering about the *meaning* of their abstract quantum mechanic calculus.) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.130.131.85 (talk) 09:07, 6 February 2015 (UTC)

add paragraph to lede and concluding section

I added a clarifying paragraph to the lede, and a concluding section.TBR-qed (talk) 17:03, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

I removed the concluding section, again [1]. Per wp:bold, discussion and consensus for inclusion is needed for contentious material to be added. It's not sourced, but worse it is flat wrong stating that all four premises are widely accepted when they are not. --Modocc (talk) 18:02, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Original research

I tagged the article for original research. TBR-qed replaced this article's original content [2] for what appears to be largely original research [3]. For instance, we now have "The article then traces the theory and practice of four men (including a Nobelist in economics and a billionaire financier) trying to follow this incoherent legacy." Per WP:OR we present information from reliable sources, however we are not to string together material like this to synthesize or illustrate an idea or claim. Unless I am mistaken this synthesis needs to be taken out. -Modocc (talk) 19:21, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

I respect the rule, but perhaps do not understand. What I have done is report existing publications, but I have identified relationships that have not been identified before. Does that constitute original research? Does that mean that Wikipedia articles cannot report that some relationships have been ignored or overlooked? Can one not report the consequences of such overlooking? Please explain. For example, Soros has never before been linked to the school, but the sources I use show the existence of that link. Thanks.TBR-qed (talk) 14:10, 8 April 2015 (UTC)

Hi. I should perhaps have pointed out the specific policy section: Synthesis of published material which says "Do not combine material from multiple sources to reach or imply a conclusion not explicitly stated by any of the sources." So yes the presentation linking Soros to the school is original research. Modocc (talk) 15:17, 8 April 2015 (UTC)

WOW. That destroys my whole article. I hope I can have some time to rethink, because the article I replaced was completely inadequate. I think I can easily prove the role of Popper and Dewey, but I see no way to show the current relevance of what they did in the 1930s--which strikes me as a significant and legitimate issue--without marshaling the evidence I did. Any suggestions will be welcome. After a short trip, I'll start trying revisions.TBR-qed (talk) 19:18, 8 April 2015 (UTC)

Reading the synthesis rules was very helpful, and I am busy revising places I violated them. This will take a few weeks.TBR-qed (talk) 17:45, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

Eliminated original research

I have finished editing out sections that appear to contradict the No Original Research rule. I hope you can confirm my judgment, and removal the questionable label from this article.TBR-qed (talk) 19:47, 30 April 2015 (UTC)

Response to Modocc

Modocc: Let me respond to your concluding comments of 18 May which, I think, state your main concerns: “As for the article template, it still concerns me that previous referenced content was completely removed and not incorporated along with the extensive use of primary sources when ideally we depend more on secondary sources, ….”

The content I removed from the existing article was based largely on Okasha, Philosophy of Science. That book mentions instrumentalism once in the index, referring to anti-realism on page 58, where he makes instrumentalism a synonym of anti-realism. My evidence shows that instrumentalism is not a simple footnote to traditional anti-realism, but is a truly modern school closely associated with a host of other modern schools. Okasha mentions Popper only in relation to falsification, and ignores Dewey. He does not name one person self-identified or identified by others as an instrumentalist. Popper traced the school to George Berkeley, which I considered reporting. But I concluded that such history is both misleading and insignificant for understanding the current meaning of the name.

You question the use of original sources. If modern users of the name trace it to Popper and Dewey, how better understand what they meant than reporting their words?TBR-qed (talk) 19:11, 23 May 2015 (UTC)

Because of our neutral content policy at wp:NPOV, relevant content that is properly referenced to wp:reliable sources usually stays put unless it is completely obvious why it should be removed, otherwise we often contextualize it with attribution to the source(s). Also, since this article initially didn't equate four premises with instrumentalism this has the appearance (even if it is not) of being a synthesis where you happen to find common ground between Popper and Dewey. Initially you wrote that the four premises of instrumentalism according to Popper are:

• • "1. Theories are hypotheses about how things "work". They are tools suggesting how facts and ideas are related, permitting prediction of consequences. 2. Like all tools, theories are tested and judged by the instrumental criterion of judgment instrumental value: how well they predict relations between means and ends, facts and values. 3. Theories use inductive reasoning to establish facts-of-the-case, and deductive reasoning to predict consequences. 4. There are no deductive truths or values. True theories derive from accurate assumptions and observable consequences, established in the continuity of successful problem-solving, rather than by conformity to pre-existing logical forms."

But now the article states premise four somewhat differently, which is a sign of synthesis, as:

• • "4) There are no realities beyond what can be known using instrumental theories.".

[Note, that this second version of premise four is anthropocentric for who is to say alternative realities don't exist and as a Bayesian scientific realist myself I'm pretty confident that deductive truths do exist (i.e. that we and everything we entail exists would be one) as well as unknowns which can often be either observed and/or deduced, thus validated (but although that increases our confidence level that doesn't change a theory's validity which is why we get paradigm shifts). To be sure, instead of inductivism (that looks like a well-developed article) I was taught the Hypothetico-deductive model where inductive reasoning plays a much smaller role than this.]. -Modocc (talk) 19:47, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

Thanks. I better understand your concerns. When I first read the existing article, I hoped to “contextualize” with amendments. But when I found the main source changing the topic from instrumentalism to anti-realism—which he rejects—by treating the words as synonyms, I saw no alternative to rewriting. I expressed my concerns on multiple talk pages for several months before starting to reconstruct.

I did not “happen to find common ground between Popper and Dewey.” I was acquainted with literature unreferenced by the original editor, which I was unable to relate to the existing article. I judged it “completely obvious” that an article ignoring that literature was seriously misleading.

I quote Popper’s and Dewey’s definitions, but I guess I am guilty of “synthesis” when I state the school’s premises in my own words to help readers compare and judge. My rewording is an attempt more accurately to express the philosophers’ positions. Whether one calls any of the premises “anthropocentric” or “anti-realism” is not my concern. They could also be called “anti-idealism,” “anti-individualism,” anti-utilitarianism,” etc.

You reject premise 4, as did Popper, and imply that my statement defends that premise. It is a statement of Dewey’s position representing the school and affirmed by Popper. I do not defend the validity of any premises.TBR-qed (talk) 15:33, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

I came across this article simply out of a curious glance, but theory development is also more complex than the inductivism of premise three. More importantly, I've other pressing engagements that are vastly more important than this thus I need to severely limit my participation here (so you might want to initiate an RfC if I don't followup on any of this again). The previous third-party authors sourced included: de Neufville, Robert; Torretti, Roberto (1999); Stanford, P Kyle (2006); Meinard Kuhlmann, 2013; Anjan, Chakravartty (April 27, 2011); Kaiser, David (8 January 2014); Tegmark, Max (25 September 2007); Freud, Sigmund (1933); Marx, Karl; Engels, Frederick; Milligan (Translator), Martin; Thayer, H.S. (1972); Goodman, Russell; Edward N. Zalta (ed.); Graham, George; Zalta (ed.), Edward N. "Behaviorism". (Fall 2010 Edition). Only Anjan, Chakravartty remains and he writes "The most influential advocates of instrumentalism were the logical empiricists (or logical positivists), including Carnap and Hempel, famously associated with the Vienna Circle group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere." But apparently their influence waned until it was "dead", see Logical_positivism#Retrospect. Again, content that can be verified normally remains, so please review our policies at wp:npov and read wp:verification. The origin of the premises as a set (i.e. why only four?) should definitely be made clearer and the current lack of third-party sources for significant parts of your revision [which reads like a thesis or argument but we cannot peer-review these claims like a journal would] means I'm of the opinion that the original research template should stay. [To be more precise, I've replaced the template with the science review template which is similar.] -Modocc (talk) 20:00, 27 May 2015 (UTC)

You place great store in Chakravartty’s article on realism, specifically the section on antirealism (which I reference). You appear to feel that my failure to discuss Carnap and Hempel—who he claims without sourcing were the “most influential advocates of instrumentalism” and have been proven wrong—constitutes some kind of bias on my part. You are mistaken.

Chakravartty arrives indirectly at instrumentalism. He first classifies an unnumbered collection of empiricisms as antirealism. He then classifies an unnumbered collection of instrumentalisms (which apparently excludes pragmatism, since he treats that school separately as one that rejects the realism-idealism debate) as empiricisms. This leads him to express the four premises I identify. His definition encompasses premises 1 and 2, almost quoting Popper: that theories are tools that work when their application produces predicted consequences. His classification of the school as antirealist is my premise 4. His classification of the school as empiricist is my premise 3.

Chakravartty identifies Carnap and Hempel as advocates of logical positivism, taken as a form of instrumentalism. I see no reason why an article on instrumentalism should deal with any subcategories into which one may divide that school, even though the article on logical positivism chose to name both schools as failures. That is why I exclude other previous third-party authors sourced.TBR-qed (talk) 22:13, 30 May 2015 (UTC)