Talk:Battle of Gembloux (1940)

"Strategically inconclusive" ?

It would seem to be a decisive Allied victory, based on the quote already given in the citation. The quote admits that the continued cohesion and organised fighting retreats of the 1st army paved the way for the succesful withdrawal of the BEF and (I believe, no sources to hand) over 200,000 French troops to the Dunkirk perimeter. We all know the result. Its a stretch, but not a huge one, to safely say on the basis of that quote that Gembloux and its aftermath, doomed Nazi Germany in the long term. I would like to see some viewponts Irondome (talk) 00:58, 17 September 2012 (UTC)

It doesn't say what you want it to. It’s quite clear what it does say. Both sides got allot out of the battle. The Germans defeated the French; the British did not lose their army. It doesn't say anything about the survival of the BEF dooming Nazi Germany, a thought that is quite preposterous. The Germans did not lose the war because of the Dunkirk debacle - a derivatively insignificant battle taking the entire ETO into account. There were battles/campaigns that were far more critical than Dunkirk. Such a statement tends to suggest we should ignore Barbarossa, Stalingrad and all the rest of them. Dapi89 (talk) 12:38, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

• How is it "preposterous"? If the core of the British Army would have been lost in France, the political ramifications would have been quite staggering. Churchill would have been toppled (his preminership predicated as it was to continuing the struggle) and Halifax would have become PM. It would have meant a negotiated peace and the final removal of all Western resistance. The US would never have entered the war and Hitler, no longer destracted by a Western front still in being, would have been more likely to have defeated the USSR the following year. I am surprised by your lack of knowledge here. In the sense that Hitler lost the war in the summer of 1941, then Stalingrad was just an incident. Dunkirk was an action which had the greatest strategic effect on the outcome of the war. Maybe Midway would have been equally significant if the Japanese plan had managed to destroy the US carrier force. Nothing should be "ignored" as you put it, but due weight should be given to the staggering strategic significance of Dunkirk. Irondome (talk) 18:45, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

Hi there.

None of this true for the simple fact is we don't and can't know. It is alternative history, which is rather pointless. There is no evidence whatsoever that Churchill would have stepped aside or that the British would have been prepared to negotiate. There was absolutely nothing to gain by seeking terms with the Germans. Behind the Royal Navy the British did not have any realistic fears of invasion. Moreover, the BEF made up less than a quarter of the British Army that served in the Second World War – a fact worth remembering.

Its just guesswork. Arm-chair generalship assumes much but proves little. Usually such explanations are over-simplistic and lack any detailed understanding of the problems confronting the combatants, not least the Wehrmacht. The Germans were not strong enough to defeat the British period. Sealion was a fantasy whether the Luftwaffe wins the battle of Britain or not. The Atlantic campaign could not have been won before the American entry into the war. As for the Eastern Front, you, as most Westerns tend to do, is exaggerate German strength and underplay the power of the Soviet State. While unprepared intially, the industrial organisation, intelligence, strategic and operational-logisitical system of the Red Army was vastly better. If was a betting man, I'd put money on the Soviet Union; 80% of German casualities fell in the East which puts the American-British contribution into perspective.

Comparing a tiny battle with the Eastern Front really is going way, way too far, much less trying to argue is was more important.

It isn't wise to assume or make assertions about others' knowledge. It is a sure-fire way to get your fingers burned. I have studied the ETO for the best part of my life. I start my PhD this year. So I'm pretty clued up. I could quite easily take you apart. But I don't really contribute to Wikipedia anymore and am unwilling to spend the time to do so. Sufficed to say, the MILHIST editors, I'm sure, would agree with me.

Besides, the source really does give the outcome as described in the info box. Arguing that the escape of the BEF was the deciding factor in Hitler’s defeat is shoddy history and way off base. A British wet dream to be sure! Best regards, Dapi89 (talk) 19:36, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

• Hello. I doubt whether you could take me "apart" as you claim. You are not the only qualified historian on wiki. I have been studying the subject since probably before you existed, and it seems clear you have neglected British political history in your studies. Do you not know about the Italian and Swedish mediation attempts and the role of Halifax in the critical cabinet meetings in the last week of may and first days of june? No, your view of WW2 seems rather niave from the political standpoint. The bottom line is that Churchill managed to stave off repeated attempts to respond to Axis overtures from within his own cabinet. The succesful evacuation of the army from France was critical to Churchills' policy of continuing the struggle, which was unpopular amongst the majority of the "establishment" of the time, and indeed the hostility continued for some months, until at least september, not least within the Conservative party itself, which Churchill now led.

• With Britain out of the war, it is difficult to concieve of a combination of events which would have denied Hitlers' ultimate realisation of his goals. The US was too weak and politically split at that point to intervene even if it had wanted to. So no more "wet dreams" chat please. Your knowledge seems confined to military history. Brush up on politics too. Regards Irondome (talk) 20:38, 6 October 2012 (UTC)

I'll be quick!

Of course I do. We learn that at O-level. Even Halifax was aware there was no alternative. Being a Nazi lackey is no better than being occupied. The British were not interested in entering into negotiations with the Italians until the Germans were in danger of marching up Whitehall. I can assure you, continuing the war was not unpopular. It was the only recourse. Negotiation, surrender, defeat would mean the loss of Britain and its Empire - the very reason the First World War was fought (by way of maintaining the Allies on the continent) and a million dead suffered. And you believe that after that, the British would give it all up without a shot? No way. You're displaying the same misunderstanding of the British mentality as the Germans did – they never understood British psychology.

Politics plays second fiddle. Without the BEF, the British can still survive; bottom-line. No landing, no reason to negotiate.

The last point is so inaccurate. The Soviet Union could and did absorb the bulk of the German war effort. If you really think the German Reich could have defeated the Soviet Union you're mad. Particularly since the Germans were lousy at organisation, were bad strategists, poor logisticians, and outmatched in both industry and manpower. The Reds would have done it with or without the help of the Western Allies, particularly the British.

Any way, we've digressed too much, so I'll call it there. Brush up your military history and never mind the politics - after all this is a MILHIST article. Regards. Dapi89 (talk) 21:25, 6 October 2012 (UTC)