Draft:Operation Big Pine
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Units Involved |
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United States * U.S.A.F. ** 773rd Tactical Airlift Squadron ** 24th Composite Wing (Special Operations Wing) ** 463rd Field Maintenance Squadron ** 363rd Supply Squadron ** 833rd Supply Squadron ** 82nd Airborne Division * U.S. Army ** 17th Cavalry Regiment * U.S. Navy ** U.S. Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) ** LSD-32 Spiegel Grove and another ship of similar description.[1] |
Honduras * Honduran Air Force * 9th Infantry |
Operation Big Pine or Exercise Ahuas Tara (Either named after the Indigenous Miskito name for Big Pine[2] or after the town of Ahaus on the Gracias a Dios department located on the eastern coast of Honduras.[3]) Lasting from January to February 1983 and costing approximately $5.2 million, this operation saw approximately 1,600 Americans provided logistic and communications support in pitting 4,000 Honduran troops against an imaginary invading “Red army” from a neighboring, equally imaginary country called “Corinth.”[1][4][5] The purpose of Operation Big Pine was to create a credible deterrent in the minds of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in bordering Nicaragua, as well as the Cuban and Soviet governments that were providing materiel to the Sandinistas.[1][2]
Although joint U.S.-Honduran exercises have taken place annually since 1965, this exercise was the first major U.S. training event with the Honduran government. The joint exercise involved about 450 U.S. Army troops, 520 U.S. Navy personnel, and about 175 communications and planning personnel.[2] However, sources vary on the number of troops involved with others claiming up to 1,600 U.S. personnel.[1][5]
Background
[edit]Nicaragua, the largest country in Central America, had undergone a political transformation with the overthrow of the Somoza regime by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1979. The Sandinistas established a left-wing government, prompting opposition from U.S.-supported guerrilla forces known as the Contras. The Central American governments of Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador were worried by the ascension of a second Marxist-led government in the region.[1] Similarly, the United States, under the Reagan Administration, was compelled to act based on the Cold War logic.
In 1980 Honduras, situated to the North of Nicaragua, had elected a civilian government for the first time since 1963. Hondurans elected a constituent assembly in 1980 and voted in general elections in 1981. In 1982, Liberal Party candidate Robert Suazo Córdova took the office of the presidency.
1980 in the United States also saw the election of president elect Ronald Reagan, defeating President Jimmy Carter as he sought reelection. Events around the world, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979), the Sandinista overthrow of Somoza (1979), the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979), ascension of communist Maurice Bishop to power in Grenada (1979), and the ongoing Angolan Civil War, the Cold War was heating up as Reagan entered office in 1981.
Events in Central America, particularly communist activities, were extremely concerning to any government of the United States, who viewed the Americas as part of its exclusive sphere of influence since the Monroe Doctrine (1823).
Operations
[edit]U.S. Air Force C-130 transports, C-141 transports and C5-A Galaxies dropped around 1,300 tons of equipment to the Honduran forces. The U.S. Air Force also helped train Honduran special-forces in parachuting into remote areas of the country.[1]
Two U. S. Navy ships, including dock landing ship Spiegel Grove (LSD-32), participated in Ahuas Tara I. Spiegel Grove left port on January 20, 1983 and arrived at La Cieba, Honduras on January 29, 1983, embarking 479 enlisted and 25 officers of the Honduran Army.[6] The exercise featured LSD-32 landing a battalion of 580 Honduran troops at Puerto Lempira on the remote southeast coast of the country, as well as U.S. airlift of Honduran forces to recapture a town simulated as lost to aggressors.
A mile away from Puerto Lempira, the U.S. Army was constructing and operating a top-secret satellite communications center, and mobile radar station.[1] The mobile radar station, a TPS-43 radar system, was installed at La Mesa Air Base in western Honduras, after the exercise it was placed in storage until May 1983. It was then installed in a facility at Cerro la Mole, in southern central Honduras. The TPS-43 was manned by 65 U.S. Air Force personnel and provided tracking data to a Honduras Air Force Operations Center at Tegucigalpa. The site at Cerro la Mole was prepared by the Honduran military with some assistance from U.S. troops. American units also installed trailers for living quarters.[5]
The Honduran President Suazo and Chief of the Armed Forces attended the exercise.[7][6]
Results
[edit]For the U.S., in terms of logistics support they could provide the Honduran forces, Operation Big Pine could be considered a success. However, for the Honduran forces, the exercise was a failure. One U.S. ranking officer observed, “They [the Hondurans] have a very long way to go before they can be rated as capable of defending their own country."[1] The Honduran forces were unable to organize themselves into an effective fighting force to repel a “Corinthian” counterattack. They were unable to cope with the 1,300 tons of equipment dropped, paratroopers failed to regroup themselves into companies after landing, and unable to provide medical aid to those injured during the exercise.[1] According Honduran General Gustavo Aldofo Álvarez Martínez, the lessons learned in the Ahuas Tara exercises (I & II) dramatically increased Honduran operational efficiency.
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e f g h i Russell, George (1983-02-14). "Central America: The Rising Tides of War". TIME. Retrieved 2024-05-27.
- ^ a b c Wright, Christopher C. "U.S. Naval Operations in 1983". U.S. Naval Institute. 110/5/975.
- ^ Downey, Beau (February 2020). A History of Joint Task Force-Bravo (1st ed.). Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras: Joint Task Force-Bravo. p. 9.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: date and year (link) - ^ "Hundreds of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force troops... - UPI Archives". UPI. Retrieved 2024-05-27.
- ^ a b c Socolar, Milton J. (22 June 1984) "Funding of Joint Combined Military Exercises in Honduras". General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1167213
- ^ a b "Welcome to Kevin's Military WEB Site! (USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32)". www.kevinflatley.com. Retrieved 2024-05-27.
- ^ John Negroponte, (1983-02-14). Telegram 1461 "EXERCISE AHUAS TARA," National Security Archive, George Washington University. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB151/part2/00000023.pdf