Draft:Battle of Chunj
 | Draft article not currently submitted for review.
This is a draft Articles for creation (AfC) submission. It is not currently pending review. While there are no deadlines, abandoned drafts may be deleted after six months. To edit the draft click on the "Edit" tab at the top of the window. To be accepted, a draft should:
It is strongly discouraged to write about yourself, your business or employer. If you do so, you must declare it. Where to get help
How to improve a draft
You can also browse Wikipedia:Featured articles and Wikipedia:Good articles to find examples of Wikipedia's best writing on topics similar to your proposed article. Improving your odds of a speedy review To improve your odds of a faster review, tag your draft with relevant WikiProject tags using the button below. This will let reviewers know a new draft has been submitted in their area of interest. For instance, if you wrote about a female astronomer, you would want to add the Biography, Astronomy, and Women scientists tags. Editor resources
Last edited by Rahim231 (talk | contribs) 0 seconds ago. (Update) |
| Battle of Chunj | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 | |||||||||
  | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 India |
 Pakistan | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| unknown | unknown | ||||||||
The Battle of Chunj or Operation Chunj, was a military engagement between the Pakistani forces and Indian force, during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 from May-July. It was a decisive battle that resulted in the halting of the Indian summer offensive towards Muzaffarabad from Tithwal.
Background
[edit]In May 1948,[4] Indian 163 Brigade launched an offensive in Tithwal sector which raised the threat to Muzaffarabad and the force's advanced from Handwara to Tithwal and from Uri to Urusa, it caused much panic and desperation to the Pakistani High command.[5][4] The capture of Domel[b] was the main objective of the Indian offensive, Domel was only Eighteen miles from Tithwal and had been captured by Indian forces previously and was a formidable key position for the Pakistani command.[5]
10th Brigade of Pakistan Army under Brigadier Haji Iftikhar Ahmad, was tasked to stop the Indian advance, and defend Muzaffarabad at all costs.[4] It was considered necessary by Pakistani command to drive out the Indian troops from the heights of Chunj range and push the Indian troops back into the left bank of Kishanganga.[6] The regular troops of India and Pakistan fought each other from May onwards.[7]
Plan and Preparations
[edit]Pakistan
[edit]Col Nausherwan organized the force for driving Indian troops away from Chunj Heights.[6] Nausherwan called a session with the Engineers and Gunners who agreed to bring a 3.7 inch howitzer gun given the nick name Shahzadi[c] to point 9444 for Gunfire assistance. A track was created for mules for 25 miles from Muzaffarabad since no proper track existed.[6][8]
A sling and pulley was used to dismantle the gun and boxes full of ammunition were brought beyond the Kahori river across Kishanganga and 200 locals willingly brought them to the point 9444.[6][9] 71 Field Company under the command of Major Sloan had helped in dismantling and carrying the gun.[8] Once the Gun reached the point it was put together and the engineers then removed the Indian mines and built tracks beside other river.[8] Col Nausherwan and his Battalion meantime acquainted their routes and their aims.[6]
Battle
[edit]All bridges between Tithwal and Keran were eliminated by Indian troops to stop Pakistani troops from accessing the west of the river Kishanganga meanwhile the concentration of the Pakistan forces continued.[10]
The Indian positions beyond Kishanganga at Ring contour and Point 7229 were attacked by two Groups of Pakistani forces covertly through the smoke coming out of the mortar fire on June 24, but the attack was repulsed.[10] On Tithwal the shelling increased on Indian positions after this engagement including Ring contour from Point 9444 and the 1 Madras Headquarter for the whole day.[10] The Pakistani force launched a strong attack with mortars and medium machine guns on July 8, After shelling the Point 7229 and ring contour for thirty minutes, the Pakistani troops surged towards the posts for the attack which disheartened the Indian troops and resulted in the post being overrun.[11] An Indian platoon was ordered to backup Ring contour, was engaged with Pakistani troops and shelling meanwhile the machine gun section at Point 7229 gave cover to the force and it retreated to False crest.[11]
Pakistani forces used deception successfully to capitalize on Indian concerns about an impending counterattack on Keran position.[11] Two companies of Indian forces were given orders to attack Shardi on 7th July and set off for this mission on 8th July, they were informed of Ring contour being captured and would return back by 9 July.[11] The Indian forces planned a counter-attack to retake ring contour and requested an airstrike on the Pakistani position, however the airstrike never took place.[12] The brigade commander instructed the troops to withdraw and also to blow up the bridge beyond the river.[12] The Indian troops withdrew along their equipment and heavy arms from kishanganga after facing attacks and the Pakistani troops captured Point 7229 after they saw it unoccupied.[12]
At Kishanganga Eight Indian Platoons were spread throughout including the Group at False crest and were engaged with Pakistani troops.[12] At Tithwal ridge all of the machine guns were assembled and the Indian forces withdrew under the cover of an IAF jet which bombarded the Pakistani troops for 20 minutes, meanwhile the Indian sappers prepared to destroy the bridge and it was destroyed after two attempts.[12] Two Indian Platoons were ordered to collect ammunition which was stored close River Kishanganga and Jarara.[13] Pakistani troops shelled these platoons and they withdrew back.[13] The IAF jets again bombarded the Pakistani positions and the Indian troops made their way back and another party destroyed the track at the junction.[13]
Aftermath
[edit]With the evacuation of all the advanced positions across the kishanganga, the Indian command considered it a major loss.[14] The commanding officer of 1 Madras considered the Brigade Headquarters tactical errors and obstacles including not occupying Point 9444 a tactical blunder. The Major of Brigade 163 discredited the allegations and insisted that the troops were demoralized, which caused the loss. Gen Thimmya therefore held no one accountable for the failure.[14]
The Indian forces had gained success by capturing Tithwal before but with the fall of Chunj feature to Pakistan, the Indian summer offensive towards Muzaffarabad from Tithwal was halted.[15] It added a huge area to the Pakistani controlled side on the left bank of Kishanganga.[16] Major Sloan was praised for his actions which lead to the capture of important peaks in the Tithwal sector of Jammu and Kashmir in July 1948.[17]
For the present, however, we had to accept the fact. that the weather, the terrain and Pakistan’s fresh reinforcements had prevented us from reaching our goal Domel. Yet our gains had been substantial and in this respect we had got the better of the enemy.[18]
— Sinha, Operation Rescue military operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49, Pg 78
References
[edit]Notes
- ^ For the present, however, we had to accept the fact. that the weather, the terrain and Pakistan’s fresh reinforcements had prevented us from reaching our goal Domel [3]
- ^ Domel also spelt as Domail is a neighborhood in Muzaffarabad city
- ^ Shahzadi means princess, it was called princess since it was handled with care
Citations
- ^ Prasad (1987), p. 202
- ^ Ankit (2010), p. 54 : Sinha (1977), p. 78
- ^ Sinha (1977), p. 78
- ^ a b c Ali (2022), p. 28
- ^ a b Sinha (1977), p. 75
- ^ a b c d e Saraf (2015), p. 236
- ^ Ankit (2010), p. 54
- ^ a b c Ali (2022), p. 29
- ^ Bajwa, Lt Gen JS. Indian Defence Review (Oct-Dec 2018) Vol 33.4. Lancer Publishers LLC. ISBN 978-1-940988-41-2.
- ^ a b c Prasad (1987), p. 196
- ^ a b c d Prasad (1987), p. 197
- ^ a b c d e Prasad (1987), p. 198
- ^ a b c Prasad (1987), p. 199
- ^ a b Prasad (1987), p. 199
- ^ Ali (2022), p. 1 : Ankit (2010), p. 54 :Saraf (2015), p. 238
- ^ Saraf (2015), p. 238
- ^ Ali (2022), p. 1
- ^ Sinha (1977)
Works Cited
- Sinha, S.K. (1977). Operation Rescue Military Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-49. Vision Books. Archived from the original on 2021-01-20.
- Prasad, Sri Nandan (1987). History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2017-01-17.
- Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, archived from the original on 2021-03-29
- Ali, Ahmad (2022). "Major Sloan in Kashmir (Story of a British officer serving with the Pakistan Army, killed in action during the Kashmir Liberation War, 1947-48)". 9-Bugle-Trumpet-Summer-2023.PDF. IV. Archived from the original on 2024-07-18 – via Aimh.gov (Army Website).
- Ankit, Rakesh (2010). "1948: The Crucial Year in the History of Jammu and Kashmir". Economic and Political Weekly. 45 (11): 49–58. ISSN 0012-9976 – via JSTOR.