Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China
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Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China | |||||||
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Part of Chinese Civil War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
30,000+ | unknown | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
29,000+ | unknown |
The Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China was a counter-insurgency campaign in Northern China conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against the Nationalist guerrilla movement during the Chinese Civil War. The Nationalist guerrilla movement, which mostly consisted of bandits and nationalist regular troops, was left behind after the nationalist government withdrew from mainland China. The campaign was fought during the Chinese Civil War in the post-World War II era and resulted in a CCP victory.
Campaign
[edit]Before the nationalist government withdrew from North China, it ordered troops left behind to join local bandits to wage a guerrilla war against the CCP. To further boost the fighting capabilities of bandits, many military professionals were sent to the bandits, so that their military operations could be strengthened. Each bandit group was different in size, ranging from the smallest of a dozen to the largest of several thousand. Typically, a band of bandits numbered in the hundreds. The bandit activity peaked in March 1949 with a total of 103 incidents.[citation needed]
The future field marshal of the People's Liberation Army, Nie Rongzhen was in charge of eradicating bandits in northern China. In April 1949, orders were given to suppress local bandits, emphasizing not underestimating them. A month later, a conference on bandit suppression was held, setting the strategies that included adopting political pressure against the bandits, and mobilizing the general populace to eliminate the social bases of bandits. In June 1949, further strategies were devised, concentrating on using small strike forces in quick assaults, instead of ineffective large formations that were easily discovered and slow-moving.[1]
The nationalist forces had left behind deserters, many of whom could become bandits if left unattended. Knowing this, Nie Rongzhen ordered CCP forces to immediately accept the surrender of deserters of nationalist forces and provide for them so that their livelihoods would be stabilized, thus preventing them from joining the bandits. By June 1949, over thirty-seven thousand former nationalist troops who were left behind had surrendered, and the CCP had eliminated a huge potential threat. After a year of fighting, the campaign was finally concluded with a CCP victory and the annihilation of over twenty-nine thousand bandits. The CCP victory ensured that Beijing, the new capital of the People's Republic of China, became relatively safe during the infancy of the new nation.[citation needed]
Outcome
[edit]Although sharing the common anti-communist goal, the nationalist guerrilla campaign and insurgent warfare were largely handicapped by the enlistment of bandits, many of whom had fought and killed nationalist troops before in a previous eradication/pacification campaign, and also looted, kidnapped and even killed landlords and business owners, an important base of support for the nationalist government. Now forced to be united against a common enemy, their cooperation was half-hearted at best. Compounding the problem further were additional differences within the ranks of the nationalist guerillas themselves. The nationalist attempt at guerrilla and insurgency warfare against its CCP enemy was ultimately futile.
See also
[edit]- Outline of the Chinese Civil War
- National Revolutionary Army
- History of the People's Liberation Army
- Chinese Civil War
References
[edit]- ^ "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian". history.state.gov. Retrieved 2022-07-26.
![]() | This article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. (September 2014) |
- Zhu, Zongzhen and Wang, Chaoguang, Liberation War History, 1st Edition, Social Scientific Literary Publishing House in Beijing, 2000, ISBN 7-80149-207-2 (set)
- Zhang, Ping, History of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Chinese Youth Publishing House in Beijing, 1987, ISBN 7-5006-0081-X (pbk.)
- Jie, Lifu, Records of the Liberation War: The Decisive Battle of Two Kinds of Fates, 1st Edition, Hebei People's Publishing House in Shijiazhuang, 1990, ISBN 7-202-00733-9 (set)
- Literary and Historical Research Committee of the Anhui Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Liberation War, 1st Edition, Anhui People's Publishing House in Hefei, 1987, ISBN 7-212-00007-8
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- Huang, Youlan, History of the Chinese People's Liberation War, 1st Edition, Archives Publishing House in Beijing, 1992, ISBN 7-80019-338-1
- Liu Wusheng, From Yan'an to Beijing: A Collection of Military Records and Research Publications of Important Campaigns in the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Central Literary Publishing House in Beijing, 1993, ISBN 7-5073-0074-9
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