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This article is about the treatise on military strategy. For the manga series, see Neo Gomanism Manifesto Special - On War. For the 2008 film, see On War (film).

Title page of the original German edition Vom Kriege, published in 1832
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Vom Kriege (German pronunciation: [fɔm ˈkʁiːɡə]) is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife Marie von Brühl in 1832.[1] It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on military strategic thinking.[1][2]

Vom Kriege has been translated into English several times as On War. On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.[3]

His ten-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state. On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations.

History

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Clausewitz was among those intrigued by the manner in which the leaders of the French Revolution, especially Napoleon, changed the conduct of war through their ability to motivate the populace and gain access to the full resources of the state, thus unleashing war on a greater scale than had previously been seen in Europe. Clausewitz believed that moral forces in battle had a significant influence on its outcome. Clausewitz was well-educated and had strong interests in art, history, science, and education. He was a professional soldier who spent a considerable part of his life fighting against Napoleon. In his lifetime, he had experienced both the French Revolutionary Army's (1792—1802) zeal and the conscripted armies employed by the French crown. The insights he gained from his political and military experiences, combined with a solid grasp of European history, provided the basis for his work.[1][3][4]

A wealth of historical examples is used to illustrate its various ideas. Napoleon and Frederick the Great figure prominently for having made very efficient use of the terrain, movement and the forces at their disposal.

Regarding Clausewitz’s intellectual-cultural background, Azar Gat argues that he expressed in the field of military theory the main themes of the Romantic reaction against the worldview of the Enlightenment, rejecting universal principles and stressing historical diversity and the forces of the human spirit. This explains the strength and value of many of his arguments, derived from this great cultural movement, but also his often harsh rhetoric against his predecessors.[5][6]

Clausewitz's theory

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An operational map for Napoleon's military expedition to Italy, 1796. Map from Clausewitz: Vom Kriege, 1857.

Definition of war

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Clausewitz argued that war theory cannot be a strict operational advice for generals.[7] Instead, he wanted to highlight general principles that would result from the study of history and logical thinking. He contended that military campaigns could be planned only to a very small degree because incalculable influences or events, so-called friction, would quickly make any too-detailed planning in advance obsolete. Military leaders must be capable to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information since in his opinion "three quarters of the things on which action is built in war" are concealed and distorted by the fog of war.[8]

In his 1812 Bekenntnisschrift ("Notes of Confession"), he presents a more existential interpretation of war by envisioning war as the highest form of self-assertion by a people. That corresponded in every respect with the spirit of the time when the French Revolution and the conflicts that arose from it had caused the evolution of conscript armies and guerrillas. The people's armies supported the idea that war is an existential struggle.[9][10]

During the following years, however, Clausewitz gradually abandoned this exalted view and concluded that the war served as a mere instrument: "Thus, war is an act of violence in order to force our will upon the enemy."[11]

Purpose, goal and means

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Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along the line of the categories Purpose, Goal and Means. He reasoned that the Purpose of war is one's will to be enforced, which is determined by politics. The Goal of the conflict is therefore to defeat the opponent in order to exact the Purpose. The Goal is pursued with the help of a strategy, that might be brought about by various Means such as by the defeat or the elimination of opposing armed forces or by non-military Means (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve as Means to achieve the set goal.[12]

One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes summarizes that idea: "War is the continuation of policy with other means."[11]

That quote in itself allows for the interpretation that the military will take over from politics as soon as war has begun (as, for example, the German General Staff did during World War I). However, Clausewitz had postulated the primacy of politics and in this context elaborated: "[...], we claim that war is nothing more than a continuation of the political process by applying other means. By applying other means we simultaneously assert that the political process does not end with the conclusion of the war or is being transformed into something entirely different, but that it continues to exist and proceed in its essence, regardless of the structure of the means it makes use of [...]."[13]

According to Azar Gat, the "general message" of the book was that "the conduct of war could not be reduced to universal principles [and is] dominated by political decisions and moral forces."[14][15] These basic conclusions are essential to Clausewitz's theory:

  • War must never be seen as having any purpose in itself but should be seen as a political instrument: "War is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of the political process, an application by other means."[16]
  • The military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm" the enemy: "to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent."
  • All else being equal, the course of war will tend to favor the party with the stronger emotional and political motivations, especially the defender.[1]

Some of the key ideas (not necessarily original to Clausewitz or even to his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst) discussed in On War include[17] (in no particular order of importance):

  • the dialectical approach to military analysis
  • the methods of "critical analysis"
  • the uses and abuses of historical studies
  • the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
  • the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
  • the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
  • the nature of "military genius" (German: der kriegerische Genius) - as exemplified particularly in Frederick the Great and in Napoleon Bonaparte[18]
  • the "fascinating trinity" (Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) of war
  • philosophical distinctions between "absolute or ideal war," and "real war"
  • in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited war and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
  • "war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm, rather than to the realms of art or science
  • "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
  • "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
  • the essential unpredictability of war
  • simplicity: Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate.[19] The strength of any strategy lies in its simplicity.[20]
  • the "fog of war"
  • "friction"
  • strategic and operational "centres of gravity"
  • the "culminating point of the offensive"
  • the "culminating point of victory"

Influence and Conflicting Interpretations

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Modern perceptions of war are based on the concepts that Clausewitz put forth in On War, but they have been diversely interpreted by various leaders (such as Moltke, Vladimir Lenin, Dwight Eisenhower, and Mao Zedong), thinkers, armies, and peoples. Modern military doctrine, organization, and norms are all still based on Napoleonic premises, but whether the premises are necessarily also "Clausewitzian" is debatable.[21]

Some prominent critics have interpreted On War as an argument for "total war".[a] The book has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and the Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable developments that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic era.[citation needed] These developments resulted (though the evolution of war has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times".[22]

The "dualism" of Clausewitz's view of war (that wars can vary a great deal between the two "poles" that he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context) seems to be simple enough, but few commentators have been willing to accept that crucial variability[citation needed]. They insist that Clausewitz "really" argued for one end of the scale or the other. Clausewitz's use of a dialectical method to construct his argument, led to frequent modern misinterpretation because he allegedly explores various often-opposed ideas before he came to conclusions.

However, according to Gat, the opposing interpretations of Clausewitz are rooted in Clausewitz’s own conceptual journey.[6] The centerpiece of Clausewitz’s theory of war throughout his life was his concept of all-out fighting and energetic conduct leading to the great battle of annihilation. He believed such conduct expressed the very “nature”, or “lasting spirit” of war. Accordingly, Clausewitz disparaged the significance of the maneuver, surprise, and cunning in war, as distracting from the centrality of battle,[23] and argued that defense was legitimate only if and as long as one was weaker than the enemy.[24] Nevertheless, in the last years of his life, after the first six out of the eight books of On War had already been drafted, Clausewitz came to recognize that this concept was not universal and did not even apply to the Napoleonic Wars, the supreme model of his theory of war. This was demonstrated by the Spanish and Russian campaigns and by guerrilla warfare, in all of which battle was systematically avoided. Consequently, from 1827 on, Clausewitz recognized the legitimacy of limited war and explained it by the influence of politics that harnessed the unlimited nature of war to serve its objectives. Clausewitz died in 1831 before he completed the revision he planned along these lines. He incorporated his new ideas only into the end of Book VI, Book VIII and the beginning of Book I of On War. As a result, when published, On War encompassed both his old and new ideas, at odds with each other.

Thus, against common interpretations of On War, Gat points out that Clausewitz’s transformed views regarding the relationship between politics and war and the admission of limited war into his theory constituted a U-turn against his own life-long fundamental view of the nature of war. Gat further argues the readers’ miscomprehension of the theory in On War as complete and dialectical, rather than a draft undergoing a radical change of mind, has thus generated a range of reactions. People of each age have found in On War the Clausewitz who suited their own views on war and its conduct. Between 1870 and 1914, he was celebrated mainly for his insistence on the clash of forces and the decisive battle, and his emphasis on moral forces. By contrast, after 1945, during the nuclear age, his reputation has reached a second pinnacle for his later acceptance of the primacy of politics and the concept of limited war.

Criticism

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Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticized by other military theorists, like Antoine-Henri Jomini[25] in the 19th century, B. H. Liddell Hart[26] in the mid-20th century, and Martin van Creveld[27] and John Keegan[28] more recently.[29] On War is a work rooted solely in the world of the nation state, states historian Martin van Creveld, who alleges that Clausewitz takes the state "almost for granted", as he rarely looks at anything before the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, and mediaeval warfare is effectively ignored in Clausewitz's theory.[27] He alleges that Clausewitz does not address any form of intra/supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state.[30]

Previous kinds of conflict were demoted to criminal activities without legitimacy and not worthy of the label "war". Van Creveld argues that "Clausewitzian war" requires the state to act in conjunction with the people and the army, the state becoming a massive engine built to exert military force against an identical opponent. He supports that statement by pointing to the conventional armies in existence throughout the 20th century. However, revolutionaries like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels derived some inspiration from Clausewitzian ideas.[30]

Referring to much of the current interpretation of On War as the Emperor’s New Clothes syndrome, Gat argues that instead of critically addressing the puzzling contradictions in On War, Clausewitz has been set in stone and could not be wrong.[6]

English translations

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  • 1873. Graham, J.J. translator. Republished 1908 with extensive commentary and notes by Victorian imperialist F.N. Maude.[31]
  • 1943. O. J. Matthijs Jolles, translator (New York: Random House, 1943). This is viewed by some modern scholars[who?] as the most accurate existing English translation.
  • 1968. Edited with introduction by Anatol Rapoport. Viking Penguin. ISBN 0-14-044427-0.
  • 1976/1984. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-05657-9.
  • 1989. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-01854-6.

See also

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Concepts

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Books

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Notes

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a. ^ : For example, writing in his introduction to Sun Tzu's Art of War, B. H. Liddell Hart stated that "Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars of this century if the influence of Clausewitz's monumental tome On War, which molded European military thought in the era preceding the First World War, had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu's exposition on The Art of War." This comment is tempered by the comment that the "ill-effects of Clausewitz's teaching arose largely from his disciples' too shallow and too extreme interpretation of it," but it remains an influential criticism. Extracted from The Art of War (UNESCO Collection of Representative Works), Samuel B. Griffith https://web.archive.org/web/20060628174003/http://www.kw.igs.net/~tacit/artofwar/suntzu.htm.

References

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  1. ^ a b c d Carl von Clausewitz (2 September 2008). On War. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-3740-3.
  2. ^ Bassford, Christopher. "CLAUSEWITZ AND HIS WORKS". Retrieved 12 April 2022.
  3. ^ a b Andrew Holmes (31 January 2010). Carl Von Clausewitz's On War: A modern-day interpretation of a strategy classic. Infinite Ideas. ISBN 978-1-908189-61-5.
  4. ^ Werner Hahlweg (7 June 1975). "Clausewitz und die Französische Revolution, Die methodische Grundlage des Werkes "Vom Kriege"". Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte. 27 (3). Brill: 240–251. doi:10.1163/15700739-02703005. Retrieved April 23, 2020.
  5. ^ Gat, Azar (2001). A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Oxford (GB): Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-924762-2.
  6. ^ a b c Gat, Azar (2024). The Clausewitz myth: or the emperor's new clothes. Washington: John Hunt Publishing. ISBN 978-1-80341-621-2.
  7. ^ G.H.L. LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare" History Today (Aug 1951), Vol. 1 Issue 8, pp 24-32.
  8. ^ Vasiliĭ Efimovich Savkin (1974). The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics: (a Soviet View). U.S. Government Printing Office. pp. 23–.
  9. ^ Richard Cobb (1987). Les armées révolutionnaires. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-02728-0.
  10. ^ Karen Hagemann (30 March 2015). Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture, and Memory. Cambridge University Press. pp. 132–. ISBN 978-1-316-19397-6.
  11. ^ a b Carl Von Clausewitz (1 October 2010). On War - Volume I - Chapter II. The Floating Press. ISBN 978-1-77541-926-6.
  12. ^ LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare"
  13. ^ Herfried Münkler. "Clausewitz' Theorie des Krieges" (PDF). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. p. 5. Retrieved April 30, 2020. Wir behaupten dagegen, der Krieg ist nichts als eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs mit Einmischung anderer Mittel. Wir sagen Einmischung anderer Mittel, um damit zugleich zu behaupten, dass dieser politische Verkehr durch den Krieg selbst nicht aufhört, nicht in etwas ganz anderes verwandelt wird, sondern daß er sich in seinem Wesen fortbesteht, wir auch seine Mittel gestaltet sein mögen, deren er sich bedient, [...].
  14. ^ Gat, Azar (2001). A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Oxford (GB): Oxford University Press. p. 125. ISBN 978-0-19-924762-2.
  15. ^ Andreas Herberg-Rothe. "Staatenkrieg und nicht-staatliche Kriege in Clausewitz, Vom Kriege". Clausewitz Com. Retrieved April 23, 2020.
  16. ^ On War, Book I, Chapter 1, 24., Carl von Clausewitz, translated by J.J. Graham, p. 18 ISBN 956-8356-20-7
  17. ^ This list is from "Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz," ClausewitzStudies.org, edited by Christopher Bassford.
  18. ^ Handel, Michael I. (12 November 2012) [1986]. "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology". In Handel, Michael I. (ed.). Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 77. ISBN 9781136285479. Retrieved 23 August 2024. Frederick the Great and Napoleon, the models for Clausewitz' military genius, were very different from Carnot (whom Clausewitz never mentions) [...].
  19. ^ Ratcliffe, Susan. "Oxford Essential Quotations, Karl von Clausewitz 1780–1831". Oxford Reference. Oxford. Retrieved December 7, 2021.
  20. ^ Pietersen, Willie. "Von Clausewitz on War: Six Lessons". Columbia Business School. Columbia University. Retrieved December 7, 2021.
  21. ^ Phillip S. Meilinger (29 January 2020). Thoughts on War. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-7891-2.
  22. ^ Robert Osgood, 1979.
  23. ^ On War, IV, 3, pp. 228-229; III, 9, p. 198; III, 10, p. 202.
  24. ^ On War, VI, 1, 2, pp. 358-359; VI, 8, p. 380, and VII, 2, p. 524.
  25. ^ Christoph Abegglen. "The influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's Précis de l'Art de la Guerre - p. 3/30" (PDF). King's College London. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-26. Retrieved April 30, 2020.
  26. ^ Christopher Bassford. "CLAUSEWITZ IN ENGLISH - The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America - Chapter 15. J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart". Clausewitz Com. Retrieved April 30, 2020.
  27. ^ a b K. M. French. "Clausewitz vs. The Scholar: Martin Van Creveld's Expanded Theory Of War". Global Security. Retrieved April 30, 2020.
  28. ^ Bart Schuurman. "Clausewitz and the "New Wars" Scholars" (PDF). Clausewitz Com. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 7, 2021. Retrieved April 30, 2020.
  29. ^ Bradley Potter (January 19, 2016). "B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954)". Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS. Archived from the original on May 14, 2020. Retrieved April 30, 2020.
  30. ^ a b Cormier, Youri (2013). "Fighting Doctrines and Revolutionary Ethics". Journal of Military and Security Studies. 15 (1). Archived from the original on July 29, 2014. Retrieved August 12, 2014.
  31. ^ "Carl von Clausewitz, trans. James John Graham". 1873. Retrieved 2013-10-30.

Bibliography

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  • Bassford, Christopher, 1994. Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America. Oxford University Press.
  • Bernard Brodie, 1976. A guide to the reading of "On War." Princeton University Press.
  • Clausewitz, Carl von (2018). Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-2676-2
  • Clausewitz, Carl von (2020). Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 1. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-3025-7
  • Clausewitz, Carl von (2021). The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 2. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-3034-9
  • Gat, Azar (2001). A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Oxford (GB): Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-924762-2.
  • Gat, Azar (2024). The Clausewitz myth: or the emperor's new clothes. Washington: John Hunt Publishing. ISBN 978-1-80341-621-2.

Further reading

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  • Bassford, Christopher, 2002. "Clausewitz and His Works." Describes the author's intent, and discusses interpretations and common misunderstandings.
  • Coker, Christopher. Rebooting Clausewitz: 'On War' in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford University Press, 2017) online review.
  • Cormier, Youri. War as paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on fighting doctrines and ethics (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2016).
  • Daase, Christopher, and James W. Davis (eds). Clausewitz on Small War (2015) online review
  • Erfourth M. & Bazin, A. (2014). Clausewitz’s Military Genius and the #Human Dimension. Archived 2016-04-08 at the Wayback Machine The Bridge.
  • Hughes, R. Gerald. "Clausewitz, still the Master of War?: On Strategy in the Twenty-first Century." War in History 26.2 (2019): 287-296 [ online].
  • Kornberger, Martin, and Anders Engberg-Pedersen. "Reading Clausewitz, reimagining the practice of strategy." Strategic Organization (2019): online[dead link‍]
  • LeMay, G.H.L. "Napoleonic Warfare" History Today (Aug 1951), Vol. 1 Issue 8, pp 24-32.
  • Simpson, Emile. "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict." Parameters 47.4 (2017): 7-18.
  • Stoker, Donald J. Clausewitz: His Life and Work (Oxford UP, 2014) 376 pp. online review; also excerpt
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