Jurisprudence of concepts
The jurisprudence of concepts was the first sub-school of legal positivism[1][2], according to which, the written law must reflect concepts, when interpreted[3]. It's main representatives were Ihering, Savigny and Puchta.
This school was, thus, the preceding trigger of the idea that law comes from a dogmatic source, imposition from man over man and not a natural consequence of other sciences or of metaphysical faith.
Among the main characters of the jurisprudence of concepts are:
- formalism, search of rights in written law
- sistematization
- search for justifying specific norm with basis from more generic ones[4].
So, according to this scholl, law should have prevailing sources based upon the legistative process, although needing to be proven by more inclusive ideas of a social sense.
See also
- Jurisprudence of values
- Jurisprudence of interests
- Philosophy of law
- Legal positivism
- Legal naturalism
- Hermeneutics
References
- ^ Costa, Alexandre Araújo. "A Jurisprudência dos Conceitos". Retrieved 17 December 2011.
{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter|published=ignored (help) - ^ "A importância da Jurisprudência dos Conceitos para a Metodologia Jurídica" (PDF). Retrieved 17 December 2011.
{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter|autor=ignored (|author=suggested) (help) - ^ that means that the interpretation of the words stated in the law must be guided by the scientific concepts that these words represent.
- ^ Rocha, Sérgio André (2009). "Evolução Histórica da Teoria Hermenêutica - do Formalismo do Século XVIII ao Pós-Positivismo". Retrieved 25 January 2012.
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