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Cambodian–Vietnamese War

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Cambodia-Vietnamese War
Part of Third Indochina War, Indochina Wars, Cold War

Vietnamese-led forces entering Phnom Penh in 1979.
DateMay 1975 – December 1989
Large scale fighting lasted between December 25, 1978 and January 7, 1979
(invasion of Democratic Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces until the fall of Phnom Penh).
Full scale fighting between China and Vietnam lasted between February 17 and March 16, 1979.
Location
Cambodia, southern Vietnam, eastern Thailand
Result

Vietnamese victory

Belligerents
Vietnam Vietnam
Cambodia Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation		 Cambodia Democratic Kampuchea
Supported by:
 People's Republic of China
Vietnamese border raids in Thailand:
Commanders and leaders
Vietnam Văn Tiến Dũng Cambodia Pol Pot
Strength
150,000+ Vietnamese regulars, supported by around 20,000 KNUFNS 23 divisions with 90,000+ personnel
Casualties and losses
1979-1989:
10,000 killed
~20,000 wounded [1]		 ~90,000 killed and wounded
56,000 captured (1988) [citation needed]

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The Cambodian–Vietnamese War, also known as the Third Indochina War, began on December 25, 1978 when Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia). The People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) achieved a rapid victory in two weeks, seizing the capital city, Phnom Penh, on January 7, 1979.[2] A portion of the ousted Khmer Rouge regime, however, would survive to stage a counterinsurgency campaign against the Vietnamese sponsored state, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), compelling Vietnam to maintain troops in the country for the next decade.[3] Although Vietnam received financial backing from the Soviet Union and Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) throughout its intervention, it faced diplomatic and economic isolation from the majority of the international community.[4] Until 1988 the United Nations passed resolutions condemning the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and calling for its withdrawal. China, and to a lesser degree the United States, provided vital economic and military assistance to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the organization comprising of the remnants of the Khmer Rouge and two other noncommunist insurgent groups.[5] In 1989, the last Vietnamese troops left Cambodia, ushering in a long peace process that concluded with the October 23, 1991 Paris conference, which approved the United Nations supervision of a cease-fire, the demobilization and disarmament of militias, the repatriation of Cambodian refugees in Thailand, and free and fair elections.[6]

Background

The Cambodian-Vietnamese History

Vietnam began to exercise its influence over Cambodia as early as the Angkar civilization in the thirteenth century. The majority of its rule was gradual and indirect, and it was not until the early 1800s that Vietnam exercised direct control [7]. In 1813, Nak Ong Chan gained the Cambodian throne with the help of Vietnam, and under his rule Cambodia became a protectorate (Ibid). Following his death in 1834, Vietnam colonized Cambodia: it was governed under a Vietnamese administration and termed a Vietnamese ‘province’ [8]. Throughout the 1830s, Vietnam attempted to erase the Khmer culture, which had derived the basis of its society, dress and religion from India, (as opposed to China).[9] This trend of Vietnamese dominance continued during French colonization, under which Cambodia was forced to cede much of its southern cone (what would be Saigon, the Mekong delta and Tay Ninh) to the Vietnamese [10]. Attempts to regain this territory became the later justification for border incursions committed by the Khmer Rouge regime prior to the Vietnamese invasion. [11]

The Rise of Communism

The communist movement in Cambodia and Vietnam began before World War II, with the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), almost exclusively dominated by the Vietnamese, to fight French colonialization of Indochina.[12] In 1941, Nguyen Ai Quoc (commonly known by his alias Ho Chi Minh) founded the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, or the Viet Minh. When the Japanese suffered defeat at the end of WWII, he initiated the first Indochinese war of independence against the French. During this time, Vietnamese forces had made great use of Cambodian territory in transporting weapons, supplies, and troops.[ACIG 1] This relationship lasted through the Vietnam War, when Vietnamese communists used Cambodia as a transport route and staging area for attacks on South Vietnam. In 1951, Vietnam guided the establishment of a separate Cambodian communist party, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which allied with a nationalist separatist Cambodian movement, the Khmer Serei (Free Khmers) in order to pursue independence. In accordance with the 1954 Geneva Accords negotiating the end of the French domination, newly created communist North Vietnam pulled all its Viet Minh soldiers and cadres out of Cambodia; but because the KPRP was staffed primarily by ethnic Vietnamese or Cambodians under its tutelage, approximately 5,000 communist cadres went with them.[13]

The leftist vacuum Vietnam left in its wake in Cambodia was soon filled by the return of a young group of revolutionaries, many of who received their Communist schooling in France.[14] In 1960, the KPRP changed its name to the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP), which was later adopted by the majority coalition forming around Saloth Sar (Pol Pot), Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan as the ‘true’ date memorializing the KCP. This clique became the genesis of the Khmer Rouge, and it embodied the communist branch most influenced by Maoist doctrine.[15]

Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and the Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge government first adopted the mysterious term Angkar, or “the organization,” and until 1977 the identity of its leaders remained confidential.[16] The official head of state was Khieu Samphan, but the two men in control of the Party were Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.[17] The ultimate objective of the Khmer Rouge was to erase the structure of the Cambodian state, which they viewed as feudal, capitalist, and oriented around the agendas of both the landholding elite and imperialists. In its place, they hoped to create a classless society, based entirely on worker-peasants. The radical ideologies and goals of the Khmer Rouge were alien concepts to the masses.[18] In fact, the socialist revolution, while perhaps socialist, held very little popular appeal. To combat this, Pol Pot and his cadres resorted to ultra-nationalist sentiment, repressive and murderous rule, and propaganda aimed at demonizing the Vietnamese to maintain their tenuous control.[19]

During the five years of the Khmer Rouge rebellion from 1970-1975, the support of North Vietnam, in conjunction with China, was essential to their eventual triumph.[20] However, even before the war between Vietnam and the United States ended, the relationship between the Khmer Rouge—which was in the process of seizing power from a US-backed regime headed by Lon Nol—and Vietnam was strained. Clashes between Vietnamese communists and the Khmer Rouge forces began as early as 1974, and the following year Pol Pot signed a treaty codifying the ‘friendship’ between the Khmer Rouge and China.[21]

Hostilities in border areas

1975-1976

The hostilities between Vietnam and the Democratic Kampuchea began a day after the fall of Saigon on May 1, 1975 when a team of Khmer Rouge soldiers raided Phu Quoc Island, encountering only meager Vietnamese resistance. [22][ACIG 1][23][24] A mere ten days later they launched an attack on Tho Chu Island, in which they encountered a far stronger Vietnamese force. However, the Khmer Rouge nevertheless succeeded in escaping with an estimated five hundred and fifteen captives in tow, who were subsequently executed. [ACIG 1] In response to the Khmer Rouge's aggression, Hanoi's Navy launched a counter-attack and seized the Cambodian island of Poulo Wai in addition to regaining both Phu Quoc and Tho Chu.[ACIG 1] The following month Pol Pot and Ieng Sary visited Hanoi to propose a treaty of friendship between the two countries, but the invitation received a cool reception by Vietnam. Although the Vietnamese evacuated Poulo Wai in August, incidents had continued along Cambodia's northeastern border, and thousands of ethnic Vietnamese had been forced to flee across the boundary.[ACIG 1]

Relations between Cambodia and Vietnam improved in 1976, in part because of Pol Pot's preoccupation with intraparty challenges.[25] In May of that year, Cambodian and Vietnamese representatives met in Phnom Penh in order to establish a commission to resolve border disagreements. The Vietnamese, however, refused to recognize the Brévié Line—the colonial-era demarcation of maritime borders between the two countries—and the negotiations broke down.[ACIG 1]

1977-1978

Following the raids on Phu Quoc and Tho Chu, the Khmer Rouge conducted two major incursions into Vietnam. The first attack occurred on 30 April 1977, when regular units of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army advanced 10 kilometres (6 mi) into Vietnam, occupying some parts of An Giang Province. Reports later surfaced of the large-scale massacre perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge in the town of Chau Doc; thousands of civilians were killed and many Khmer Kroeum (Vietnamese of Cambodian assent) were deported to Cambodia where they massacred Vietnamese civilians. [ACIG 1]. The assault also extended into the Tay Ninh Province, slightly northeast of An Giang, and resulted in the deaths of another five hundred Vietnamese. [26] By October 1977, the Khmer Rouge had advanced approximately 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) into Vietnamese territory.[ACIG 1]

The second attack began in September; this time the Khmer Rouge forces advanced as far as 150 kilometres (93 mi) into Vietnam.[citation needed] The raid coincided with a series of purges by Pol Pot in response to a rival communist faction's attempted revolt. Six division of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) briefly invaded as far as Neak Luong in order to escort refugees out, including future Prime Minister Hun Sen.[27] The invasion was intended only as a "warning" to the Khmer Rouge although it resulted in significant casualties. [ACIG 1] Pol Pot retaliated by ordering the execution of other cadres in Tuol Seng he suspected might defect.[28] The Vietnamese suggested the establishment of a demilitarized zone along the border, but this diplomatic solution was rejected by Pol Pot and the bloody border clashes continued.

In addition to the two larger-scale attacks, villages in Vietnam's border areas experienced reinvigorated attacks. On the 14th April, 1978, the Khmer Rouge released two divisions into Ba Thuc, killing approximately 2,500 civilians and deporting a further 20,000 Khmer Kroeum.[ACIG 1] Vietnam, in turn, launched air strikes against Cambodia and deployed seven divisions along the border prior to the full-scale invasion in December.[ACIG 1] By September, Vietnamese border casualties amounted to approximately 1,000 civilians.

Invasion of Cambodia

Faced with growing Khmer Rouge belligerence, the Vietnamese leadership decided in early 1978 to support internal resistance to the Pol Pot regime.On December 3, 1978, Radio Hanoi announced the formation of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS). This was a heterogeneous group of communist and noncommunist exiles who shared an antipathy to the Pol Pot regime and virtually total dependence on Vietnamese backing and protection. In addition to the border skirmishes, the KNUFNS provided the semblance, if not the reality, of legitimacy for Vietnam's invasion of Democratic Kampuchea and for its subsequent establishment of a satellite regime in Phnom Penh.[29]

Employing tactics the Vietnamese had learned from the war against the United States, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia on December 25, 1978.[30] Pol Pot's decision to station almost half of his nineteen divisions in provinces to as the “Parrot’s Beak” and “Fish Hook,” resulted in abject failure. While both were strongholds of the most revolutionary members of the Khmer Rouge, their geographical position adjoining Vietnam allowed PAVN to rapidly outflank and encircle them. Moreover, the comparatively obsolete weaponry of Cambodia posed no match for the Vietnamese, who possessed superior firepower and more seasoned soldiers. The Vietnamese encountered only minimal resistance from the emptied provincial centers and many KR cadres turned on their own organization or fled.[31] Despite the easy conquest of the capital, however, the Vietnamese did not attain secure control of the country until the summer, when Khmer Rouge forces were finally eradicated from the northwest provinces.[32]

Tactics

The Vietnamese troops remained in relatively consistent strength, stationing approximately 150,000 men until their 1989 withdrawal.[33] The Vietnamese and the armed branch of the government it installed, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), operated according to conventional warfare tactics. They employed developed artillery and technology and pursued dry season offensives, while acting defensively during monsoons.

Rebel forces opposed to the Vietnamese-backed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) included the surviving Khmer Rouge forces and two noncommunist groups: the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) which was a combination of Lon Nol supporters and the nationalist Khmer Serei, and the Front Uni Nationale pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC), which was formed from the remnants of Prince Sihanouk’s supporters.[34] On June 22, 1982, under the supervision (and due to impressive diplomatic skills) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the three strongest opposition groups formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).[35]

Unified only by their fervent hostility against the Vietnamese sponsored government and its military presence, all three factions maintained their own leadership, command posts, and military branches. Moreover, while both the FUNCINPEC and KPNLF maintained a deep suspicion of the PDFGNUK, without its numbers and military, they lacked the means to constitute a threat or present themselves as a viable alternative government to the PDK (Country Study: Cambodia). For the next ten years, the Khmer Rouge’s People’s National Liberation Armed Forces of Kampuchea (PNLAFK) was composed of approximately 30,000-35,000 combatants. They employed basic guerrilla tactics: attacking from behind, raiding, laying mines to disrupt communication and transport lines, dividing up their strength for increased mobility and intimidating village leadership.[36]

In addition to threatening the security of the PRK, the Khmer Rouge relied on propaganda to undermine the government’s legitimacy abroad and domestically. They accused the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF; the armed branch of the PRK) of colluding with the Vietnamese “to swallow Cambodia.” [37] They attempted to manipulate recollections of the past, alleging that the Khmer Rouge “do not kill Khmer, they only kill Vietnamese.”[38] Other cases show bribery efforts, in which Khmer Rouge agents promised medicine, cloth, radios, dollars and even gold in attempts to recruit Cambodians.[39]

China Invades Vietnam

One of the central goals of the Vietnamese invasion was to deter a Chinese attack. However, in February 1979, China dispatched troops along the Sino-Viet border, and within ten days had reached the provincial capitals.[40] Fighting bogged down due to the maze of tunnels the Chinese encountered, nevertheless, only six days later they captured Lang Son, from which roads led directly into the center of Vietnam. Confident that the threat of their invasion had been a success, the Chinese then retreated, leaving a path of destruction spanning 500km in their wake.[41]

Although Chinese total losses were estimated higher than those of the Vietnamese (12-50,000 compared to the Vietnamese death toll of approximately 10,000???It is not very likely. It must be from Vietnamese sources), the diversion of troops from Cambodia facilitated a strong resurgence in Khmer Rouge insurgent operations, making it unavoidable for the adolescent PRK regime in Cambodia to implement conscription and requiring Vietnam to station a large portion of its army along the Sino-Vietnamese border.[42]

The Demise of Pol Pot

Pol Pot escaped Phnom Penh by helicopter as the Vietnamese forces were advancing in early 1979.[ACIG 1] After initially headed for Thailand, Pol Pot went into hiding in the jungle.[ACIG 1] Pol Pot was never brought before a court of justice for the full extent of his crimes. However, in 1997 Pol Pot ordered the assassination of Son Sen, a close associate of his, and for this crime he was captured and placed on trial.[43] Pol Pot was sentenced to life imprisonment on home arrest, where he died in bed 10 months later.[43] The death officially occurred in 1998 with the cause reportedly being a heart attack.[44] After his death, many more Khmer defected to the new government of the State of Cambodia.[45]

The People's Republic of Kampuchea

Main article: People's Republic of Kampuchea

The When Vietnamese forces entered the country, their options were limited by the state they inherited. The economy, already strained from the civil war before the Khmer Rouge, suffered complete destruction. The banking system and currency were abolished. All land was collectivized and owned by the state, all businesses and industries nationalized. Urban dwellers were forced into the countryside to begin tilling the land.[46] In the Khmer Rouge’s attempt to erase classes they fragmented society; splitting up families, and reorganizing them into communal groups patrolled by soldiers. Rice distribution and harvest was erratic, at best, and the majority of the population lacked sustainable nutrition.[ACIG 1]

The newly formed PRK state and government remained proxy to the interests of Vietnam, but the country possessed few alternatives. The PRK needed to rebuild an entire nation; Cambodia lacked the basic institutions of law, bureaucracy, education, and commercial networks. Moreover, because of Pol Pot’s thorough purges of the intellectual class, without Vietnam’s extensive supervision and assistance, government officials had no knowledge with which to run a country. Ironically, therefore, the majority of the government staff was mainly composed of co-opted old KR cadres or petty bourgeoisie; it bore little resemblance to the Marxist-Leninist state that Vietnam was attempting to introduce.[47] By 1985, the government sacrificed communist reforms for a more liberal agenda.

There is no doubt that the majority of Cambodians gained their lives back under the PRK; life expectancy at birth in 1975 was just sixteen years, but by 1987 it had increased to forty-nine. Likewise, the growth rate rocketed from -3.9% in 1975 to 3.7% in 1987.[48] An established constitution laid the ground for a system of administration and rule of law that extended from Phnom Penh into the countryside. Basic infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals and housing, were rebuilt. The economy and agricultural yields returned to the modest levels of the late 1960s, and though they experienced very slow growth, the threat of famine and the desperate poverty of the masses the Vietnamese had encountered in 1979 declined significantly by the time Vietnam withdrew.[49]

The Role of External Support

Sino-Soviet rapprochement began in 1982, when Brezhnev delivered a speech in Tashkent announcing Moscow’s desire to hold border talks and reduce tensions with the Chinese [50]. During consultations later that year, China outlined three obstacles pending a normalization of relations with the USSR: (i) a reduced military presence along their shared border, (ii) a withdrawal of the USSR force in Afghanistan and (iii) the cessation of Soviet support for Vietnam in Cambodia.[51] When Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the Communist party, his series of reforms reflected an attempt to mitigate the strain of the Cold War.[52] The naval and military bases that Vietnam granted paled in comparison to the amount of economic aid the Soviet Union provided, which had ballooned in size from $800 million in 1978 to $1.5 billion by Gorbachev’s appointment.[53]

During Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, almost all external economic aid was blocked by the joint US-ASEAN embargo. By 1985, the financial aid provided by the Soviet Union had ballooned from $800 million to $1.5 billion. By 1985, however, domestic policies within the USSR necessitated a gradual reduction in expenditures and activities abroad. Moscow began to diminish its economic aid to Vietnam and remained conspicuously silent in March when skirmishes between Vietnam and China broke out over Nansha (Spratly) island.[54] In addition to its silence, the USSR cut down its military and naval operations in Cam Ranh Bay.

A joint summit from February 2-4, 1989, between Gorbachev and Xiaoping, covered nine points on Vietnam and Cambodia, including the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops before the end of September 1989 and a free election in Cambodia. On April 5th, Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh announced the withdrawal of 50-70,000 troops followed by a total reduction of forces in Cambodia in September 1989[55] and “[e]ventually, the Vietnamese inability to eliminate the Cambodian resistance, combined with drying up of Soviet aid forced an end of the direct Vietnamese presence in Cambodia.” [56]

The external support of the conflict was not, however, one-sided. Chinese support was vital to the salvation of the Khmer Rouge and the legitimacy of the CDGK.[57] The Sino-American alliance translated into another, less typical element conditioned on the Cold War. The United States pursued a détente with China as a security measure against the USSR; therefore, China’s positions on Cambodia became, more often than not, the positions of the United States. In 1981, at the United Nations conference on Cambodia, ASEAN proposed negotiations brokered by the UN to disarm the military factions within Cambodia and to establish a temporary government administered by the UN. China opposed the policy, however, because it called for all factions to disarm, including the Khmer Rouge. The United States followed China’s lead, although it originally pledged to ‘stand by’ ASEAN regarding Cambodia.[58]

Rebuilding Cambodia and the Paris Agreement

An International Conference on Cambodia was convened in Paris from July until August 30, 1989, but negotiations continued until October of 1991.[59] The Paris Agreements were a significant step toward turning the country into a liberal democracy, establishing political processes, human rights and political freedoms.[60] It provided for an international presence to stabilize the country, which experienced renewed civil war following the Vietnamese withdrawal. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) undertook the task of implementing the Paris Agreements. “Its central mandate consisted of: (1) overseeing the disarmament and cantonment of each military faction, (2) repatriating refugee populations, (3) taking over the civil administration of specified state functions to ensure a neutral political environment, (4) conducting national elections and (5) ensuring respect for human rights.”[61]

Throughout the Paris agreements, the Khmer Rouge retained up to fifteen percent of Cambodian territory (including gem-rich areas), and maintained a population of about 400,000 and a military force of approximately 30,000 troops.[62] The resurgence of attacks prompted the UN to deploy a further 28,000 peace keeping force to achieve a stable level of security within the country. Approximately ninety percent of eligible voters participated in the May 1993 elections which resulted in a coalition between the royalist FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party.[63][64] The humanitarian intervention played by the UN ultimately cost over US$2 billion at the end of 1993.[65]

Between the end of the invasion and the 1993 elections, Cambodia established significant human rights protections. The Paris Agreement states: “Above all, ... the States participating in the Conference commit themselves to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia”.[66] In 1993 the national constitution was drafted, which included provisions reinstating Prince Sihanouk as the monarch (albeit with constrained powers), the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion, and the abolition of the death penalty.[67]

In July, 1994, the Cambodian National Assembly exiled the remaining Khmer Rouge by passing the Law on the Outlawing of the ‘Democratic Kampuchea’ Group; . The Act stated that the Khmer Rouge failed to fulfill the Paris Agreements by never cantoning their troops, continuing attacks on UNTAC personnel and failing to register as a legitimate political party. Most significantly, the Act also specfically recognised the years of genocide and terrorism under the regime of Democratic Kampuchea.[66][68] By 1998, the Khmer Rouge had dissolved. [69]

Order of battle

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

  • 2nd Division
  • 4th Division
  • 5th Division
  • 7th Division
  • 8th Division
  • 9th Division
  • 302nd Division
  • 309th Division
  • 330th Division
  • 339th Division
  • 126th Marine Brigade
  • 950th Marine Brigade

Air support was provided by the Vietnam People's Air Force 901st Air Group.

Democratic Kampuchea

  • 164th Division
  • 170th Division
  • 290th Division
  • 310th Division
  • 450th Division
  • 502nd Division
  • 703rd Division
  • 801st Division
  • 920th Division
  • 106th Division

See also

References

Notes
  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Albert Grandolini, Tom Cooper, & Troung (Jan 25, 2004). "Cambodia, 1954-1999; Part 3". Air Combat Information Group(ACIG). Retrieved 25/8/2010. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
Citations
  1. ^ "Hài cốt của 163 binh sĩ Việt Nam tử thương trong cuộc chiến Kampuchia được đưa về nước. - 2004-07-12 | VOA Tiếng Việt | VOA Tiếng Việt". Voanews.com. Retrieved 2010-12-28.
  2. ^ Hervouet, p. 257 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  3. ^ Ross, p. 1172 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  4. ^ Mei, pp. 70–80 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  5. ^ Hervouet, p. 260 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  6. ^ Hervouet, p. 280 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  7. ^ Thu-Huong, p. 6 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  8. ^ Morris, p. 25 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  9. ^ SarDesai, p. 7 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  10. ^ Morris, p. 32 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  11. ^ Young, p. 305 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  12. ^ Morris, p. 159 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  13. ^ Slocomb, p. 267 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  14. ^ Jackson, p. 246 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  15. ^ Jackson, p. 250 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  16. ^ Kiernan, p. 188 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  17. ^ Etcheson, p. 125 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  18. ^ Young, p. 312 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  19. ^ Jackson, p. 244 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  20. ^ SarDesei, p. 124 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  21. ^ Van der Kroef, p. 29 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  22. ^ Peou, p149.
  23. ^ Chandler, p219.
  24. ^ Hammer, p4.
  25. ^ Etcheson, p. 191 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  26. ^ Burchett, p155-157.
  27. ^ Carvin, Andy (1999). "The Fall of the Khmer Rouge". From Sideshow to Genocide: Stories of the Cambodian Holocaust. edwebproject.org. Retrieved 24/8/2010. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  28. ^ Chandler, p222.
  29. ^ Morris, p230.
  30. ^ Wilfred, Burchett (1981), The China Cambodia Vietnam Triangle, . Chicago: Vanguard, p. 148
  31. ^ Wilfred, p. 207 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  32. ^ Slocomb, p. 53 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  33. ^ Slocomb, p. 145 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  34. ^ Burchett, pp. 260–61 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  35. ^ Hervouet, p. 260 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  36. ^ Slocomb, p. 156 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  37. ^ Slocomb, p. 143 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  38. ^ Slocomb, p. 156 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  39. ^ Slocomb, p. 156 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  40. ^ Thu-Huong, pp. 139=140 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  41. ^ Mei, p. 78 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  42. ^ Slocomb, p. 260 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  43. ^ a b Chandler, p243.
  44. ^ Hammer, p30.
  45. ^ Morris, p219.
  46. ^ Etcheson, p. 240 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  47. ^ , p. 174 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Text "Slocomb" ignored (help)
  48. ^ "Cambodia Demographic Indicators". US Census Bureau. December 28, 2010. Retrieved 12/29/10. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  49. ^ , p. 242 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Text "Etcheson" ignored (help)
  50. ^ Mei, Yan (Fall 1985), ""The Maturing of Soviet-Chinese Relations"", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: 74 {{citation}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  51. ^ Mei, p. 74 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  52. ^ Wilentz, p. 247 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  53. ^ Mei, p. 75 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  54. ^ Ross, Robert S. (Winter 1991), ""China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy"", Asian Survey, 31 (12 ed.): 1170–1185 {{citation}}: line feed character in |title= at position 32 (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  55. ^ Young, p. 289 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  56. ^ Morris, p. 221 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  57. ^ Young, p. 312 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  58. ^ Van der Kroef, pp. 69–72 {{citation}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  59. ^ Guan, p171.
  60. ^ Peou, p166.
  61. ^ Hammer, p17.
  62. ^ Hammer, p16.
  63. ^ Peou, p168.
  64. ^ Chandler, p228.
  65. ^ Chandler, p240.
  66. ^ a b The Global Viet Diaspora 2008. Political History of Vietnam & Cambodia. Bauer College of Business, University of Houston. <http://blogs.bauer.uh.edu/vietDiaspora/2008/political-history-of-vietnam-and-cambodia> Retrieved 30/8/2010.[dead link‍]
  67. ^ Chandler, p241.
  68. ^ Hammer, p22
  69. ^ The New York Times - Khmer Rouge Leaders Indicted

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  • Nguyen-vo, Thu-Huong. Khmer Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict. Jefferson, NC: McFarland &, 1992. Print.
  • Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945 to 1990. New York: St. Martin's, 1991.
  • Peou, Sorpong (2000) Intervention and Change in Cambodia; Towards Democracy? St. Martin’s Press, New York. ISBN 0312227175
  • Ross, Robert S. (Winter 1991). “China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy.” Asian Survey 31: 12. 1170-1185.
  • SarDesai, D. R. Vietnam, past and Present. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998. Print.
  • Vannal, Huy (2003) The Khmer Rouge Division 703: From Victory to Self-Destruction. Documentation Centre of Cambodia
  • Van der Kroef, Justus M. (Winter 1981). “The United States and the Cambodian Problem: Political Realities and Policy Options.” Asian Affairs 9:2. 69-84.
  • Wilentz, Sean. The Age of Reagan: a History, 1974-2008. New York, NY: Harper, 2008. Print.
  • Young, Marilyn Blatt. The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Print.
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