Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

Sudanese civil war (2023–present)
Military situation as of 3 December 2024   Controlled by Sudanese Armed Forces and allies   Controlled by Rapid Support Forces   Controlled by SPLM-N (al-Hilu)   Controlled by SLM (al-Nur)   Controlled by Joint Darfur Force (Detailed map) (Engagements)
Date 15 April 2023 – present (1 year, 8 months, 1 week and 2 days) Location Sudan Status Ongoing Territorial changes Rapid Support Forces occupy most of Darfur and Gezira State, and parts of Khartoum State, White Nile, Sennar, Al Qadarif, North and West Kordofan. SPLM-N (al-Hilu) occupies parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State.
Belligerents
Government of Sudan Sudanese Armed Forces Popular Defence Forces Popular Resistance SPLM-N (Agar) SLM (Tambour) (since August 2023) Joint Darfur Force (since November 2023) JEM SLM (Minnawi)	Rapid Support Forces non-RSF Janjaweed militias Tamazuj (since August 2023)	SPLM-N (al-Hilu) (since June 2023) SLM (al-Nur) Sudanese Communist Party
Commanders and leaders
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan Yasser al-Atta Shams al-Din Khabbashi Malik Agar Mustafa Tambour Minni Minnawi Gibril Ibrahim	Hemedti Abdelrahim Dagalo Abdel Rahman Jumma	Abdelaziz al-Hilu Abdul Wahid al-Nur Muhammad Mukhtar al-Khatib
Strength
~300,000	~100,000	Unknown
Casualties and losses
61,000–150,000 killed 7,720,119 internally displaced 2,170,592 refugees

A civil war between two major rival factions of the military government of Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies (collectively the Janjaweed coalition) under the Janjaweed leader Hemedti, began during Ramadan on 15 April 2023. Three minor (neutral) factions have also participated in the fighting: the Darfur Joint Protection Force; the SLM (al-Nur) under Abdul Wahid al-Nur; and the SPLM-N under Abdelaziz al-Hilu. Fighting has been concentrated around the capital city of Khartoum (the largest and initial battle of the war) and the Darfur region. As of 14 November 2024, at least 61,000 people had been killed in Khartoum State alone, of which 26,000 were a direct result of the violence. As of 5 July 2024, over 7.7 million were internally displaced and more than 2.1 million others had fled the country as refugees, and many civilians in Darfur have been reported dead as part of the Masalit massacres.

The war began with attacks by the RSF on government sites as airstrikes, artillery, and gunfire were reported across Sudan. The cities of Khartoum and Omdurman were divided between the two warring factions, with al-Burhan relocating his government to Port Sudan as RSF forces captured most of Khartoum's government buildings. Attempts by international powers to negotiate a ceasefire culminated in the Treaty of Jeddah in May 2023, which failed to stop the fighting and was ultimately abandoned.

Over the next few months, a stalemate occurred, during which the two sides were joined by rebel groups who had previously fought against Sudan's government. By mid-November, the Minni Minnawi and Mustafa Tambour factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement officially joined the war in support of the SAF, alongside the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In contrast, the Tamazuj movement joined forces with the RSF, while the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North attacked SAF positions in the south of the country.

Starting in October 2023, momentum began to swing toward the RSF, as the paramilitary defeated army forces in Darfur and made gains in Khartoum State, Kordofan, and Gezira State. Since February 2024, the SAF has made gains in Omdurman. Since June 2024, the RSF has made gains in Sennar State. Further negotiations between the warring sides have produced no significant results, while many countries have provided military or political support for either al-Burhan or Hemedti. As of September 2024, the SAF has made notable gains in Khartoum and Khartoum North (alternatively referred to as Bahri).

In August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) confirmed famine conditions in parts of North Darfur.

Background

Main articles: History of Sudan and Coups d'état in Sudan

Sudan has been inhabited since prehistory and has seen many conflicts, with foreign invasions and resistance, ethnic tensions, religious disputes, and disputes over resources throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages. Sudan was conquered by Egypt in 1821, and in 1881 the religious leader Muhammad Ahmad led a nationalist revolt and established an "Islamic and national" Mahdist State in much of the territory of modern Sudan. After Ahmad's death, a British-Egyptian force commanded by Lord Kitchener retook Sudan. In 1899, the country became a condominium of Egypt and the United Kingdom, but was de facto ruled by the UK alone and would remain under British control until 1956, when it gained independence and inherited its pre-1911 borders. In 1916, after the British government suspected that the Sultanate of Darfur was falling under the influence of the Ottoman government, an expedition was launched from Egypt to capture and annex Darfur into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The colonial government directed financial and administrative resources to the tribes of central Sudan near Khartoum, while the outlying regions such as Darfur remained mostly forgotten and ignored.

Since gaining independence, Sudan has experienced 19 military coup attempts, the most of any African nation. Sudan has usually been ruled by the military, interspersed with short periods of democratic parliamentary rule.

Two civil wars – the first from 1955 to 1972 and the second, 1983 to 2005 – between the central government and the southern regions, which led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, killed 1.5 million people, and a conflict in the western region of Darfur displaced two million people and killed more than 200,000 others.

War in Darfur and the formation of the RSF

Location of Darfur within Sudan

By the turn of the 21st century, Sudan's western Darfur region had endured prolonged instability and social strife due to racial and ethnic tensions and disputes over land and water. In 2003, this situation erupted into a full-scale rebellion against government rule, against which president and military strongman Omar al-Bashir vowed to use forceful action. The resulting War in Darfur was marked by widespread state-sponsored acts of violence, leading to charges of war crimes and genocide against al-Bashir. The initial phase of the conflict left approximately 300,000 dead and 2.7 million forcibly displaced; even though the intensity of the violence later declined, the situation in the region remained far from peaceful.

To crush uprisings by non-Arab tribes in the Nuba Mountains, al-Bashir relied upon the Janjaweed, a collection of Arab militias that were drawn from camel-trading tribes which were active in Darfur and portions of Chad. In 2013, al-Bashir announced that the Janjaweed would be reorganised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and he also announced that the RSF would be placed under the command of the Janjaweed's commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as Hemedti. The RSF perpetrated mass killings, mass rapes, pillage, torture, and destruction of villages. They were accused of committing ethnic cleansing against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. Leaders of the RSF have been indicted for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC), but Hemedti was not personally implicated in the 2003–2004 atrocities.

In 2017, a new law gave the RSF the status of an "independent security force". Hemedti received several gold mines in Darfur as patronage from al-Bashir, and his personal wealth grew substantially. Bashir sent RSF forces to quash a 2013 uprising in South Darfur and deployed RSF units to fight in Yemen and Libya. During this time, the RSF developed a working relationship with the Russian private military outfit Wagner Group. These developments ensured that RSF forces grew into the tens of thousands and came to possess thousands of armed pickup trucks which regularly patrolled the streets of Khartoum. The Bashir regime allowed the RSF and other armed groups to proliferate to prevent threats to its security from within the armed forces, a practice known as "coup-proofing".

Political transition

Main article: Sudanese transition to democracy

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, Commander of the Rapid Support Forces

In December 2018, protests against al-Bashir's regime began, starting the first phase of the Sudanese Revolution. Eight months of sustained civil disobedience were met with violent repression. In April 2019, the military (including the RSF) ousted al-Bashir in a coup d'état, ending his three decades of rule; the army established the Transitional Military Council, a junta. Bashir was imprisoned in Khartoum; he was not turned over to the ICC, which had issued warrants for his arrest on charges of war crimes. Protests calling for civilian rule continued; in June 2019, the TMC's security forces, which included both the RSF and the SAF, perpetrated the Khartoum massacre, in which more than a hundred demonstrators were killed and dozens were raped. Hemedti denied orchestrating the attack.

In August 2019, in response to international pressure and mediation by the African Union and Ethiopia, the military agreed to share power in an interim joint civilian-military unity government (the Transitional Sovereignty Council), headed by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, with elections to be held in 2023. In October 2021, the military seized power in a coup led by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti. The Transitional Sovereignty Council was reconstituted as a new military junta led by al-Burhan, monopolizing power and halting Sudan's transition to democracy.

Origins of the SPLM-N and the SLM

The Sudan Liberation Movement (or Army; SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group active in Darfur, primarily composed of members of non-Arab ethnic groups and established in response to their marginalization by the Bashir regime. Since 2006, the movement has split into several factions due to disagreements over the Darfur Peace Agreement, with some factions joining the government in Khartoum. By 2023 the three most prominent factions were the SLM-Minnawi under Minni Minnawi, the SLM-al-Nur under Abdul Wahid al-Nur, and the SLM-Tambour under Mustafa Tambour. The SLM-Minnawi and SLM-Tambour signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, ceasing hostilities and receiving political appointments, but the SLM-al-Nur refused to sign and kept fighting.

The SPLM-N was founded by units of the predominantly South Sudanese Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army stationed in areas that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for independence in 2011. These forces then led a rebellion in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile a few months later. In 2017, the SPLM-N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and one led by Malik Agar, with al-Hilu demanding secularism as a condition for peace while Agar did not agree with this. During the Sudanese Revolution, al-Hilu's faction declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. In 2020, a peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and Agar's faction, with Agar later joining the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Khartoum. Al-Hilu held out until he agreed to sign a separate peace agreement with the Sudanese government a few months later. Further steps to consolidate the agreement stalled following the 2021 coup, and the al-Hilu faction instead signed an agreement with the SLM-al-Nur and the Sudanese Communist Party, agreeing to co-operate to draft a 'revolutionary charter' and remove the military from power.

Prelude

In the months after the 2021 coup the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fueling wide protests demanding that the junta return power to civilian authorities. Tensions arose between al-Burhan and Hemedti over al-Burhan's restoration to the office of old-guard Islamist officials who had dominated the Omar al-Bashir government. Hemedti saw the appointment of these officials as a signal that al-Burhan was attempting to maintain the dominance of Khartoum's traditional elite over Sudanese politics. This was a danger to the RSF's political position, as said elites were hostile to Hemedti due to his ethnic background as a Darfuri Arab. Hemedti's expression of regret over the October 2021 coup signalled a widening divide between him and al-Burhan.

Tensions between the RSF and the SAF began to escalate in February 2023, as the RSF began to recruit members across Sudan. Throughout February and early March the RSF built up in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, until a deal was brokered on 11 March and the RSF withdrew. As part of this deal negotiations were conducted between the SAF, RSF, and civilian leaders, but these negotiations were delayed and halted by political disagreements. Chief among the disputes was the integration of the RSF into the military: the RSF insisted on a 10-year timetable for its integration into the regular army, while the army demanded integration within two years. Other contested issues included the status given to RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the command of the army chief rather than Sudan's commander-in-chief, al-Burhan.

On 11 April 2023, RSF forces deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum. Government forces ordered them to leave and were refused. This led to clashes when RSF forces took control of the Soba military base south of Khartoum. On 13 April, RSF forces began their mobilization, raising fears of a potential rebellion against the junta. The SAF declared the mobilization illegal.

Course of the war

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2023) and Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2024).

See also: List of engagements during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

April–May 2023

Battle of Khartoum

Main article: Battle of Khartoum (2023–present)

On 15 April 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across Sudan, including Khartoum and its airport. There were clashes at the headquarters of the state broadcaster, Sudan TV, which was later captured by RSF forces. Bridges and roads in Khartoum and its hinterland were closed by RSF command. The next day saw a SAF counteroffensive, with the army retaking Merowe Airport alongside the headquarters of Sudan TV and the state radio.

The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority closed the country's airspace as fighting began. Telecommunications provider MTN shut down Internet services, and by 23 April there was a near-total Internet outage attributed to attacks on the electricity grid. Sudanese international trade began to break down, with Maersk, one of the largest shipping companies in the world, announcing a pause on new shipments to the country.

With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, his deputy Malik Agar became de facto leader of the Sudanese government.

Hemedti directed his forces to capture or kill al-Burhan, and RSF units engaged in pitched and bloody combat with the Republican Guard. Ultimately al-Burhan managed to evade capture or assassination, but his base at the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters was placed under RSF siege, rendering him unable to leave Khartoum. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Hemedti accused al-Burhan and his commanders of forcing the RSF to start the war by scheming to bring deposed leader Omar al-Bashir back to power. He called for the international community to intervene against al-Burhan, claiming that the RSF was fighting against radical Islamic militants.

Following the first few days of war the SAF brought in reinforcements from the Ethiopian border. Although a ceasefire was announced for Eid al-Fitr, fighting continued across the country. Combat was described as particularly intense along the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan and in the industrial zone of al-Bagair. Intercommunal clashes were reported in Blue Nile State and in Geneina.

By the beginning of May the SAF claimed to have weakened the RSF's combat capabilities and repelled its advances in multiple regions. The Sudanese police deployed its Central Reserve Forces in the streets of Khartoum in support of the SAF, claiming to have arrested several hundred RSF fighters. The SAF announced it was launching an all-out attack on RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and artillery. Air strikes and ground offensives against the RSF over the next few days caused significant damage to infrastructure, but failed to dislodge RSF forces from their positions.

Following further threats to his life from Hemedti, al-Burhan gave a public video address from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, vowing to continue fighting. On 19 May, al-Burhan officially removed Hemedti as his deputy in the Transitional Sovereignty Council and replaced him with former rebel leader and council member Malik Agar. With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, Agar became de facto leader of the Sudanese government, assuming responsibility for peace negotiations, international visits and the day-to-day running of the country.

Treaty of Jeddah

Main article: Treaty of Jeddah (2023)

International attention to the conflict resulted in the United Nations Human Rights Council calling a special session to address the violence, voting to increase monitoring of human rights abuses. On 6 May, delegates from the SAF and the RSF met directly for the first time in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for what was described by Saudi Arabia and the United States as "pre-negotiation talks". After diplomatic lobbying from the Saudis and Americans the warring sides signed the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May, vowing to ensure the safe passage of civilians, protect relief workers, and prohibit the use of civilians as human shields. The agreement did not include a ceasefire, and clashes resumed in Geneina, causing more casualties. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths expressed frustration at the lack of commitment from both sides to end the fighting.

The situation remained volatile, with both sides trading blame for attacks on churches, hospitals, and embassies. Casualties mounted, particularly in Geneina, where Arab militias loyal to the RSF were accused of atrocities against non-Arab residents. A temporary ceasefire was signed and faced challenges as fighting persisted in Khartoum, and the agreed-upon ceasefire time saw further violence. Between 28 and 97 people were reportedly killed by the RSF and Arab militias when they attacked the predominantly Masalit town of Misterei in West Darfur on 28 May.

June–September 2023

The RSF took control of the National Museum of Sudan in June.

Continued fighting in Khartoum

As June began, Khartoum witnessed tank battles resulting in casualties. The RSF took control of several important cultural and government buildings, including the National Museum of Sudan and the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex. Acute food insecurity affected a significant portion of Sudan's population.

By July, al-Burhan was still trapped at the Army Headquarters and unable to leave, and to break him out the SAF elected to send a column of troops to lift the siege of the base. This force was ambushed by the RSF and defeated, with the paramilitary claiming it had killed hundreds of soldiers and captured 90 vehicles, along with the column's commander.

In response to the escalating violence in Khartoum, the SAF increased the intensity of their airstrikes and artillery bombardment, leading to heightened civilian casualties often numbering in the dozens per strike. Shelling by the RSF also increased in intensity, leading to many civilian casualties in turn.

Heavy fighting continued in Khartoum throughout August, with clashes breaking out across the city. The RSF laid siege to the SAF's Armoured Corps base, breaching its defences and taking control of surrounding neighbourhoods. The SAF also made offensives, with the RSF-controlled Republican Palace and Yarmouk Complex coming under SAF air bombardment. An offensive was launched against Yarmouk, but this was beaten back after the RSF shipped in reinforcements. One of the few remaining bridges between Khartoum and Khartoum North was also destroyed by the SAF, in an attempt to deny the RSF freedom of movement.

On 24 August an SAF operation successfully rescued al-Burhan from his besieged base at the Army Headquarters, allowing him to head to Port Sudan and hold a cabinet meeting there.

Diplomatic efforts

Ceasefires between the warring parties were announced but often violated, leading to further clashes. The SAF and RSF engaged in mutual blame for incidents, while the Sudanese government took action against international envoys. The Saudi embassy in Khartoum was attacked and evacuations from an orphanage were carried out amid the chaos. Amidst the turmoil, Sudan faced diplomatic strains with Egypt, leading to challenges for Sudanese refugees seeking entry.

With al-Burhan out of Khartoum for the first time since the start of the war, he was able to fly to Egypt and hold a meeting with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Following this visit al-Burhan went on a tour of numerous countries, heading to South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkey, and Uganda. He then proceeded to New York City as head of the Sudanese delegation to the 78th United Nations General Assembly, where he urged the international community to declare the RSF a terrorist organization.

SPLM-N (Al-Hilu) involvement

The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) broke a long-standing ceasefire agreement in June, attacking SAF units in Kadugli, Kurmuk and Dalang, the latter coinciding with an attack by the RSF. The SAF claimed to have repelled the attacks, while the rebels claimed to have attacked in retaliation for the death of one of their soldiers at the hands of the SAF and vowed to free the region from "military occupation". More than 35,000 were displaced by the fighting. Speculation arose as to whether the attacks were part of an unofficial alliance between al-Hilu and the RSF or an attempt by al-Hilu to strengthen his position in future negotiations concerning his group. Civil society organizations supporting the SPLM-N claimed its operations sought to protect civilians from possible attacks by the RSF.

Al-Hilu's faction launched further offensives in July, moving into South Kordofan and gaining control of several SAF bases. In response the SAF brought in artillery and heavily bombarded SPLM-N positions. Further attacks by the group largely petered out after this, with an assault on Kadugli in September being pushed back by the SAF.

Darfur front

In Darfur, fighting and bloodshed were particularly fierce around the city of Geneina, where hundreds died and extensive destruction occurred. RSF forces engaged in frequent acts of violence against the Masalit population of Geneina, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing. On 4 August the RSF claimed that it had taken full control over all of Central Darfur.

A United Nations investigation discovered numerous mass graves in Darfur that contained Masalit civilians. The RSF and Arab militias were additionally accused of having killed lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders. The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed by armed men in June, hours after accusing the RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV interview. The SAF, for their part, conducted indiscriminate airstrikes against Darfur that killed many civilians, especially in Nyala.

Tribal and rebel groups in Darfur began to declare allegiance to one or the other of the warring parties. A faction of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Tambour (SLM-T) joined the conflict in support of the SAF. In contrast the controversial Tamazuj rebel group formally declared its alliance with the RSF, joined by the leaders of seven Arab tribes, including that of Hemedti's.

As September arrived both sides made offensives in Darfur. The RSF took control of several towns in West Darfur and also attacked the market of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur. SAF offensives saw success in Central Darfur, with the army retaking parts of Zalingei from the RSF. Fighting in Darfur also began to increasingly spill over into North Kordofan, with the SAF attacking RSF positions in the state capital of El-Obeid and clashes over the town of Um Rawaba. Both sides made withdrawals to end the month, with the RSF retreating from Um Rawaba while the SAF withdrew from Tawila.

October–December 2023

SAF collapse in Darfur

By the end of November, Al-Fashir was the last of the five state capitals in Darfur under SAF control.

By October 2023, the SAF in Darfur was experiencing acute shortages in supplies due to RSF-imposed sieges and had failed to utilize its air superiority to stem RSF advances. On 26 October, the RSF captured Nyala, Sudan's fourth-largest city, after seizing control of the SAF's 16th Infantry Division headquarters. The fall of Nyala, a strategic city with an international airport and border connections to Central Africa, allowed the RSF to receive international supplies more easily and concentrate its forces on other Sudanese cities. After Nyala's fall, RSF fighters turned their focus to Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur. The SAF's 21st Infantry Division, stationed in Zalingei, fled the city without a fight and allowed the RSF to take it over.

In Geneina, reports emerged that tribal elders were attempting to broker the surrender of the SAF garrison in the city to prevent bloodshed. The army rejected the proposal, raising fears of an imminent RSF assault on the city and causing civilians to flee across the border into Chad. The RSF besieged the headquarters of the SAF's 15th Infantry Division in Geneina, giving the garrison a six-hour ultimatum to surrender. The base was captured two days later when the 15th withdrew from the area before fleeing to Chad. Those left behind, numbering in the hundreds, were taken prisoner and paraded in RSF media with signs of abuse. Witnesses later reported mass atrocities perpetrated by the RSF in the city shortly after its seizure, with a local rebel group claiming up to 2,000 people were massacred in Geneina's satellite town of Ardamata. With Geneina's fall, Ed Daein and Al-Fashir were the last remaining capitals in Darfur under government control, with both cities under heavy RSF pressure.

The RSF stormed and plundered the town of Umm Keddada, east of Al-Fashir, after the SAF garrison withdrew. SAF troops in Al-Fashir itself were reported to be running low on food, water, and medicine due to the city being under siege, and external forces noted the SAF seemed incapable of stopping the RSF advance. Ed Daein fell in the early hours of 21 November, with RSF forces taking control of the city after seizing the headquarters of the SAF's 20th Infantry Division. SAF garrisons in East Darfur subsequently abandoned their positions and withdrew, allowing the RSF to occupy the area. In response to RSF gains in Darfur and subsequent abuses, the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minnawi), and other smaller rebel factions renounced their neutrality and declared war on the RSF.

Peace negotiations stall

Attempts by other nations and international organisations to negotiate peace had largely been dormant since the failure of the Treaty of Jeddah, but in late October the RSF and SAF met once more in Jeddah to attempt to negotiate peace. This new round of talks was a failure, with neither side willing to commit to a ceasefire. Instead, the warring factions agreed to open channels for humanitarian aid. On 3 December negotiations were indefinitely suspended due to the failure of both the SAF and the RSF to open up aid channels.

With the failure of the talks in Jeddah, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hosted a peace summit in early December. Earlier attempts by IGAD to open negotiations had floundered after the SAF had accused Kenyan President William Ruto of supporting the RSF. IGAD's talks appeared to make more progress than the Jeddah negotiations, with Hemedti and al-Burhan agreeing to meet in person at some point in the future.

RSF Crossing of the Nile

Further information: Battle of Wad Madani

The RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October along a key commercial route. In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with the RSF assaulting a "vital" oil field in Baleela, south of Al-Fulah. Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport after allegedly capturing it. The Battle of Khartoum continued with the RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun, southeast of the capital, on 6 October. In the process, the paramilitary gained control of key oil infrastructure. By late October the RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military bases, while al-Burhan's government had largely relocated to Port Sudan.

The Shambat Bridge in Khartoum was destroyed on 11 November.

The RSF sought to capitalize on its gains by stepping up attacks on SAF positions in Khartoum and Omdurman. Days of fighting culminated in the destruction of the Shambat Bridge, which connected Khartoum North to Omdurman over the Nile; the bridge's destruction severed a critical RSF supply chain. This effectively cut the RSF off from its forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage. In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, the RSF launched an assault on the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of Jabal Awliya. As Jebel Aulia could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give the RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and its surrounding village, which ended in an RSF victory. The force captured the dam on 20 November, and all SAF resistance ceased in the village the following day.

On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM-N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma, southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of 4 people and the destruction of the village. The RSF leadership, not wanting hostilities with the neutral al-Hilu faction to escalate, issued a statement condemning this attack and denouncing it as "tribal violence". On 8 December, the RSF entered Gedaref State for the first time.

Pushing south from their gains around Jebel Aulia and Khartoum, RSF forces began to move into Gezira State on 15 December, advancing toward its capital Wad Madani. Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state's east and entering the Butana region. After several days of fighting the RSF seized the Hantoob Bridge on Wad Madani's eastern outskirts, crossing the Blue Nile and entering the city. The army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing from the city as the RSF took over.

The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to the SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives. The city's fall allowed the RSF to capture most of Gezira and to make inroads in White Nile State, capturing the town of El Geteina. Within a few days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25 km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State. Over the next few weeks RSF forces ventured into rural areas of Al Qadarif State and River Nile State, without establishing a significant presence. In Sennar State the RSF made some further minor advances but had not attacked Sennar City by the year's end.

Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF was reported to be arming civilians while government officials in the east called on the population to mobilize. Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against 'colonialism', which was viewed by observers as a reference to the United Arab Emirates support of the RSF.

January–April 2024

Hemedti travels abroad

Following the fall of Wad Madani efforts by IGAD to negotiate a ceasefire made progress, as the SAF's weakened position made them more eager to enter talks. Whereas previously opposition from Islamist political groups to negotiation had prevented al-Burhan from committing to a specific date, now both he and Hemedti agreed to meet on 28 December. A day before the meeting was due, it was cancelled as Hemedti recanted his desire to attend.

Instead the RSF leader went on a diplomatic tour, travelling on a chartered Emirati jet and meeting with several African national leaders. One visit that was particularly promoted was his visit to Rwanda, where he met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial. On the tour Hemedti also met with former Prime Minister Hamdok and his Taqaddum organisation in Addis Ababa, with the RSF agreeing in a declaration negotiated with the Taqaddum to release political prisoners, open up humanitarian aid corridors and negotiate further with the SAF. This tour was regarded by observers as an attempt by Hemedti to portray himself as the leader of Sudan and improve his international image, as his reputation had been severely damaged since the fall of Wad Madani due to large-scale looting by RSF fighters.

On 5 January, al-Burhan vowed to continue the war against the RSF and rejected the latest peace efforts, declaring that war crimes committed by the RSF precluded negotiation. On 14 January, both Hemedti and Burhan received official invitations from IGAD to attend its upcoming summit on 18 January. Hemedti agreed to attend, but Burhan refused to do so. On the 16th of January, the Sudanese government suspended its ties with IGAD, accusing the body of violating Sudanese sovereignty. This effectively marked the end of IGAD's attempts to mediate peace talks.

Fighting in Kordofan and Gezira

As 2024 began the RSF made attacks into South Kordofan, defeating SAF forces in the town of Habila in the Nuba Mountains and pushing toward Dalang. On 7 January the RSF attacked SAF positions in Dalang, meeting fierce resistance from the army and civilian militias. During the fighting the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) entered the city, taking control of several neighbourhoods. SPLM-N forces proceeded to attack the RSF, and the paramilitary retreated from the city. RSF fighters withdrawing from Dalang entered the city of Muglad in West Kordofan, easily taking control as the city had no organised SAF presence. West Kordofan had been relatively free of fighting for several months due to a local truce brokered by leaders of the Messiria tribe, but as tensions escalated rumours spread that the RSF was planning an attack on the encircled city of Babanusa and the SAF 22nd Infantry Division garrisoning it.

In January 2024, the RSF focused on consolidating its gains in Gezira State. Fighting was reported on 17 January east of El Manaqil, the last major town not under RSF control. The SAF delivered weapons to the city by helicopter, including selectively distributing them among civilians in the town, attempting to bolster its defences. Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) selectively recruited and armed civilians based on perceived loyalty. On 24 January 2024, the RSF launched an attack on Babanusa after encircling the city for months. By 25 January, the RSF gained control of the city centre and entered the headquarters of the 22nd infantry division.

Until March 2024, the RSF maintained its position in Gezira State but was unable to break through. The RSF is recruiting in Gezira State to try to capture territory in El-Gadarif from the SAF. The JEM, which has allied with the SAF, helped the SAF build up its forces in El-Gadarif for a counteroffensive to try to retake Wad Madani. In April 2024, the SAF and its allies began the counteroffensive, attacking from the east and west of Wad Madani in an attempt to retake it. Clashes were reported in Al-Madina Arab on 15 April.

A sketch map of Omdurman with Khartoum and Khartoum North. The White Nile flowing from the south is joined by the Blue Nile flowing from the east.

SAF gains in Omdurman

The SAF gained ground in Omdurman in February 2024, linking up their forces in the northern part of the city and relieving a 10-month siege of their forces in the city centre. The SAF also took control of the Al-Hilal Stadium. As of February 2024, the Omdurman front is the only area in Sudan where the SAF has carried out a sustained offensive operation and represents the first breakthrough for the SAF.

On 12 March, the SAF defeated an attempted RSF counteroffensive in Omdurman and took control of the headquarters of the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation. The RSF maintains its control of Khartoum and continues to threaten Khartoum North.

As of April 2024, fighting in Khartoum State is ongoing, with the RSF in control of the southern and western parts of Omdurman and the SAF in control of the northern and eastern parts of Omdurman, with the RSF controlling the majority of Khartoum and Khartoum North. The SAF continued to prepare an offensive to relieve its surrounded bases in Khartoum North.

April 2024–present

Fighting in Darfur

On 15 April, during the Battle of El Fasher, at least nine civilians were killed in a renewed offensive by the RSF on the city of Al-Fashir in North Darfur. The Joint Darfur Force declared war on the RSF and allied with the SAF.

The fighting in El Fasher has diverted SAF resources from other areas, hampering planned counter-offensives to retake Khartoum and Wad Madani. In particular, the SAF has been using its limited aviation resources to carry out airstrikes in North Darfur and resupply El Fasher using airdrops.

Since April 2024, the conflict had been escalating in El Fasher, while the civilians remained trapped with no safety or food. In a June 2024 report, the International Crisis Group said the intensifying battle could lead to mass slaughter, and that there was a need for all sides to de-escalate. The report said the UN and the US should broker the de-escalation and must put pressure on the RSF and its main supporters, including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Crisis Group said the UAE should push the RSF to stand down, and urged all parties to allow the civilians to flee, open the region for aid delivery and resume national peace talks.

On 14 June 2024, the SAF announced that it had killed Ali Yaqoub Gibril, a top RSF commander, in El Fasher. The United States had sanctioned Yagoub in May 2024 for endangering civilians in Darfur. In June 2024, The New York Times reported that more than 40 villages had been burned in El Fasher since April 2024.

Fighting is ongoing in El Fasher, which remains the SAF's last holdout in Darfur. As of September 2024, the RSF has advanced into central areas of El Fasher, with the SAF's territorial control at its lowest point since intense fighting began in May 2024.

Fighting in Kordofan

As of May 2024, fighting is ongoing in Babanusa, West Kordofan. The RSF is conducting an offensive to attempt to take control of West Kordofan. Fighting was also reported in North Kordofan.

On 20 June 2024, the RSF captured Al-Fulah, the capital of West Kordofan, after the SAF withdrew from the city after several hours of fighting. The SAF retreated to Babanusa, its one remaining base in Kordofan.

Fighting along the Nile

Further information: Sennar offensive

Map of the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers

In May 2024, the RSF launched attacks against the SAF between Khartoum State and River Nile State, as well as in White Nile State near the border with Gezira State. The SAF prepared its forces in River Nile State, ahead of a potential invasion of Khartoum Bahri. In June 2024, the RSF was still in control of Khartoum and Khartoum North, though the SAF controlled one enclave in each that it supplies by airdrop.

In late June 2024, the RSF began an assault in the areas surrounding the city of Sennar. RSF forces struck out to the west of the city, causing the SAF to bring in reinforcements in anticipation of an attack on Sennar itself. Instead RSF forces avoided Sennar and attacked south towards Singa, the capital of Sennar State, capturing the lightly defended town on 29 June. This prevented the SAF from reinforcing Sennar from the south, placing the city under increased pressure.

Following the fall of Singa, SAF resistance collapsed across much of southern Sennar, which led to the RSF occupying the towns of Dinder, Mazmoun and Wad an-Nail with minimal SAF resistance. A united force consisting of the Gedaref-based 2nd SAF Infantry Division and a battalion of the JEM assaulted and retook Dinder on 1 July, but were driven out again by the RSF over the next few days.

On 20 July, the RSF announced the death of Brigadier General Abdel Rahman Al-Bishi, it is head of operations in Sennar and Blue Nile States, with Sudanese media reporting that he had been killed in a SAF airstrike.

On 3 August, the RSF launched its first attack on Blue Nile State since the beginning of the war, with the group and the SAF contesting control over Al-Tadamun. On 15 August 2024, the Galgani massacre was carried out by the RSF, which killed at least 108 people, including at least 24 women and children.

SAF offensives

As September 2024 came, for the first time since the start of the war the balance of power seemed to be tipping towards the SAF. On 26 September, the SAF launched a major offensive against RSF positions in Khartoum. The attack on the city came from three fronts striking from the south, east and west of the capital. SAF airstrikes, which killed four and wounded 14, began at dawn followed by clashes within the city. The SAF reportedly captured three key bridges connecting Khartoum to other nearby cities, including the Omdurman Bridge which had previously acted as a line of separation between government and RSF control. Faced with an elusive enemy, the SAF became bogged down in urban fighting, with RSF snipers routinely paralyzing infantry advances.

October 2024 was the deadliest month for Sudanese civilians since the war began. In Khartoum, the RSF have relentlessly shelled areas controlled by the SAF, which has amounted to daily indiscriminate bombardments of civilian areas. Escalating SAF airstrikes on RSF positions have caused dozens of civilian deaths. In October 2024, the SAF also launched a counteroffensives in the states of Sennar and Gezira, which were successfully recaptured from the RSF. Starting on 20 October 2024, the RSF carried out the 2024 eastern Gezira State massacres, which killed at least 300 people and wounded at least 200 more.

According to a report by the French newspaper Le Monde, as of November 2024 the war in Sudan has possibly entered its most dangerous phase since it began in April 2023. Both the SAF and RSF have officially ruled out settling the civil war through negotiations, with the only option on the table being total war. During the recent rainy season which brought a lull in the fighting, each side rearmed and restructured their forces. Many ordinary Sudanese, extending to the most serious critics of the SAF, have increasingly supported the SAF in response to RSF war crimes and atrocities. The SAF has become increasingly dependent on Islamist networks, as these movements have mobilized many civilians from popular resistance brigades. The Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion in particular is presently fighting on the Khartoum front lines against the RSF and has consequently gained popularity. On 23 November, the SAF retook Singa following an offensive.

Sexual violence

Main article: War crimes during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present) § Sexual violence

In July 2023, authorities reported at least 88 cases of sexual assault on women across the country, most of them blamed on the RSF. NGOs estimated that the figure could possibly reach 4,400. Activist Hala al-Karib stated that war rape had become an everyday occurrence with both fighting parties participating. In 2024, Al Jazeera reported that Sudanese women were forced to exchange sex for food or become mistresses to RSF fighters to ensure their families’ safety and access to food.

In July 2024, Human Rights Watch released a report which stated that sexual violence in Khartoum has been "widespread". The report states that most of this violence has been committed by the RSF, but added that the SAF has also participated in crimes against humanity. The report states that countless women and girls have been raped, gang-raped, forced into marriage and experienced sexual slavery. Girls and women from ages nine to 60 have been subjected to sexual violence.

Casualties

Further information: War crimes during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

According to a report published by Le Monde in November 2024, the war may have killed over 150,000 civilians through the combined tolls of bombardments, massacres, starvation and disease. A November 2024 report from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine estimated more than 61,000 deaths in Khartoum State alone, for the period between April 2023 and June 2024.

Early in the conflict doctors on the ground warned that reported figures did not include all casualties as people could not reach hospitals due to difficulties in movement. Soon after the war broke out a spokesperson for the Sudanese Red Crescent was quoted as saying that the number of casualties "was not small". The Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed on 20 June 2023 that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in fighting in West Darfur alone, while a Masalit tribal leader told the Sudanese news outlet Ayin Network on 22 July 2023 that more than 10,000 people had been killed in the state. Sudanese prosecutors recorded over 500 missing persons cases across the country, some of which were enforced disappearances, and were mostly blamed on the RSF. On 2 May 2024, a US Senate hearing on the war estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 people had died but considered that to be an underestimation by a factor of 10 to 15 times, saying the real death toll could be as high as 150,000. As of 27 May 2024, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data reported 17,044 fatalities.

Darfur

In Geneina, West Darfur, ethnic clashes that began in the last week of April 2023 had killed at least 1,100 people, while the Sultanate of Dar Masalit claimed that more than 5,000 people were killed and about 8,000 were wounded in the city. In July 2023, a Masalit tribal leader claimed that more than 10,000 people had been killed in West Darfur alone, and that 80% of Geneina's residents had fled.

Massacres were recorded in towns such as Tawila and Misterei, while a mass grave was discovered in Geneina containing the bodies of 87 people killed in clashes. Several intellectuals, politicians, professionals and nobility were assassinated. Most of these atrocities were blamed on the RSF and allied Arab militias. The UK government, witnesses and other observers described the violence in the region as tantamount to ethnic cleansing or even genocide, with non-Arab groups such as the Masalit being the primary victims. Mujeebelrahman Yagoub, Assistant Commissioner for Refugees in West Darfur called the violence worse than the War in Darfur in 2003 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

Eastern Sudan

Main article: 2024 eastern Gezira State massacres

Attacks on healthcare

The World Health Organization’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) reported 116 attacks on healthcare, resulting in 188 casualties and 140 injured since April 15, 2023. There have been almost daily reports of violence, damage, looting, intimidation, and other infractions against health workers, facilities, services such as ambulances, and patients.

Casualties among humanitarian workers

In the Battle of Kabkabiya, three employees of the World Food Programme (WFP) were killed after being caught in the crossfire at a military base. Two other staff members were injured. On 18 April 2023, the EU's top humanitarian aid officer in Sudan, Wim Fransen of Belgium, was shot and injured in Khartoum. On 21 April 2023, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that one of its local employees was killed in a crossfire while traveling with his family near El-Obeid. On 20 July 2023, an 18-member team of Médecins Sans Frontières was attacked while transporting supplies to the Turkish Hospital in south Khartoum. By then, the World Health Organization had verified 51 attacks on medical facilities and personnel since the conflict began, resulting in 10 deaths and 24 injuries. On 25 July 2023, Humanitarian Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-Salami said 18 aid workers had been killed and over two dozen others were detained or unaccounted for. The conflict has led the United Nations to declare Sudan the most dangerous country in the world for humanitarian workers after South Sudan.

The situation was further compounded by attacks on humanitarian facilities, with more than 50 warehouses looted, 82 offices ransacked, and over 200 vehicles stolen. On 2 June 2023, the WFP reported that the looting of WFP warehouses in El Obeid jeopardised the food supply of up to 4.4 million people.

Attacks on journalists

Media organizations accused both the SAF and the RSF of threatening, attacking and even killing several journalists during the conflict, with the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate documenting more than 40 such violations during the second half of May alone. Several journalists were injured or killed, and 13 newspapers ceased operations. Aside from the occupation of state media channels, the RSF raided the offices of the newspapers El Hirak El Siyasi, El Madaniya and the Sudanese Communist Party's El Midan and shot and injured photojournalists Faiz Abubakr, and Ali Shata, while the SAF was accused of circulating lists of journalists it accused of supporting the RSF.

BBC journalist Mohamed Othman was reportedly attacked and beaten in Khartoum while a correspondent and cameramen for the El Sharg news outlet were detained for hours near Merowe airport on the first day of the fighting on 15 April 2023. On 16 June 2023, Al Jazeera journalists Osama Sayed Ahmed and Ahmed El Buseili were shot by snipers in Khartoum, while the RSF detained two of the channel's other reporters, Ahmed Fadl and Rashid Gibril, in Khartoum on 16 May 2023, and subsequently looted Fadl's residence. During a live report on 29 April 2023, al-Arabiya correspondent Salem Mahmoud was interrupted and questioned by the RSF. On 30 June 2023, Radio Zalingei journalist Samaher Abdelshafee was killed by shelling at Hasaheisa refugee camp near Zalingei, where she and her family had fled after fighting in the city. Sudan TV photographer Esam Marajan was shot dead inside his home in the Beit El Mal neighbourhood of Omdurman in the first week of August 2023. Sports photojournalist Esam El Haj was killed during clashes around the Al-Shajara garrison in Khartoum on 20 August 2023. Halima Idris Salim, a reporter for Sudan Bukra was killed on 10 October 2023 after she was reportedly struck by an RSF vehicle while covering the fighting in Omdurman.

The Sudanese Journalists Syndicate (SJS) reported on 10 August 2023 that 13 newspapers had ceased operations due to the conflict, while FM radio stations and channels also halted broadcasts, with journalists grappling with unpaid wages. It later reported in December 2023 that the RSF had turned the premises of the Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) into a detention center and was involved in the looting of other media outlets, including the BBC's Khartoum branch, and the sale of media equipment, including that of the SBC, in markets in Omdurman.

Intermittent telecommunications and internet since the beginning of the conflict, and in particular a near total blackout in February and March 2024 severely limited reporting in and from Sudan. The RSF is reportedly selling access to Starlink to get around the blackout, which allegedly allows them to track journalists. In April 2024, the government suspended the licenses of three foreign media outlets (UAE-based Sky News Arabia, Saudi-based Al Arabiya and Al Hadath), while the editor of the now-closed Al-Sudani said that 23 local print outlets had shut down. Casualties in 2024 include Khalid Balal (a media director), who was fatally shot at his home in North Darfur on 1 March, as well as many journalists who were beaten. Harassment—including sexual harassment—and detention were also reported, including the editor-in-chief of al-Maidan, a local news outlet, who is under RSF custody as of April 2024.

Foreign casualties

Foreign casualties in the Sudanese civil war

Country	Deaths	Ref.
Ethiopia	15
Syria	15
Democratic Republic of the Congo	10
Eritrea	9
Egypt	2
United States	2
India	1
Turkey	1

Civilians, including 15 Syrians, 15 Ethiopians and 9 Eritreans have been killed across the country. An Indian national working in Khartoum died after being hit by a stray bullet on 15 April. Two Americans were killed, including a professor working in the University of Khartoum who was stabbed to death while evacuating. A two-year-old girl from Turkey was killed while her parents were injured after their house was struck by a rocket on 18 April. Two Egyptian doctors were killed in their home in Khartoum and had their possessions stolen on 13 June. Ten students from the Democratic Republic of the Congo were killed in an SAF airstrike on the International University of Africa in Khartoum on 4 June. The SAF claimed that the Egyptian assistant military attaché was killed by RSF fire while driving his car in Khartoum, which was denied by the Egyptian ambassador.

Two Greek nationals trapped in a church on 15 April sustained leg injuries when caught in crossfire while trying to leave. A Filipino migrant worker and an Indonesian student at a school in Khartoum were injured by stray bullets. On 17 April, the European Union Ambassador to Sudan, Aidan O'Hara of Ireland, was assaulted by unidentified "armed men wearing military fatigues" in his home, he suffered minor injuries and was able to resume working on 19 April. On 23 April, a French evacuation convoy was shot at, injuring one person. The French government later confirmed the casualty to be a French soldier. An employee of the Egyptian embassy was shot and injured during an evacuation mission.

Notable deaths

• Asia Abdelmajid, an actress, was killed in a crossfire in Khartoum North.
• A singer, Shaden Gardood, was killed in a crossfire in Omdurman, as was former football player Fozi el-Mardi and his daughter.
• Araki Abdelrahim, a member of the music group Igd al-Jalad, was killed by the shelling of a mosque in the El-Shajara neighborhood of west Khartoum.
• The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed by armed men hours after accusing the RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV interview.
• Ahmed Abkar Barqo Abdel-Rahman, a former member of parliament and a Zaghawa, was killed by the RSF in a raid on his house in Nyala.

Foreign involvement

Egypt

On 16 April 2023, the RSF claimed that its troops in Port Sudan were attacked by foreign aircraft and issued a warning against any foreign interference. According to former CIA analyst Cameron Hudson, Egyptian fighter jets were a part of these bombing campaigns against the RSF, and Egyptian special forces units have been deployed and are providing intelligence and tactical support to the SAF. The Wall Street Journal said that Egypt had sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese military. On 17 April, satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone revealed that one Egyptian Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been destroyed and two others had been damaged or destroyed at Merowe Airbase. A Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 was among the destroyed aircraft. After initial confusion, the RSF accepted the explanation that Egyptian combat and support personnel were conducting exercises with the Sudanese military before the outbreak of hostilities.

Egyptian POWs

On 15 April, RSF forces claimed, via Twitter, to have taken Egyptian troops prisoner near Merowe, and a military plane carrying markings of the Egyptian Air Force. Initially, no official explanation was given for the Egyptian soldiers' presence, while Egypt and Sudan have had military cooperation due to diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia. Later on, the Egyptian Armed Forces stated that around 200 of its soldiers were in Sudan to conduct exercises with the Sudanese military. Around that time, the SAF reportedly encircled RSF forces in Merowe airbase. As a result, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that it was following the situation as a precaution for the safety of its personnel. The RSF later stated that it would cooperate in repatriating the soldiers to Egypt. On 19 April, the RSF stated that it had moved the soldiers to Khartoum and would hand them over when the "appropriate opportunity" arose. Of the captured Egyptian troops, 177 were released and flown back to Egypt aboard three Egyptian military planes that took off from Khartoum airport later in the day. The remaining 27 soldiers, who were from the Egyptian Air Force, were sheltered at the Egyptian embassy and later evacuated.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE has been accused of providing military support to the RSF. A report published by the Wall Street Journal on 10 August 2023 quoted Ugandan officials as saying that an Emirati plane on a stopover at Entebbe Airport en route to Amdjarass International Airport in eastern Chad turned out upon inspection to have been carrying dozens of green plastic crates in the plane's cargo hold filled with ammunition, assault rifles and other small arms", rather than food and other aid officially listed on the aircraft's manifest supposedly meant for Sudanese refugees. Despite the discovery, the plane was allowed to take off, and the officials said they received orders from their superiors not to inspect any more planes from the UAE. Before this, the UAE had long been accused of supporting the RSF. The UAE Foreign Ministry subsequently denied the allegations, saying that the country "does not take sides" in the conflict.

In September 2023, The New York Times reported that the UAE had set up a base in Amdjarass airport to support the RSF. Officials from the US, European and African countries claimed that the UAE was running a covert operation to back the RSF. Since June, Emirati cargo planes were identified landing in Amdjarass in Chad, where an airfield and a hospital were being used for the operation. These flights began just as Chad's president Idriss Déby secured a $1.5 billion loan agreement from the UAE. The UAE insisted its operation was purely humanitarian, but officials stated that it involved supplying powerful weapons and drones to the RSF, treating their injured fighters and airlifting serious cases to their military hospital. The relationship between UAE and the leader of the RSF reportedly dates back to 2018, when Hemedti sent combatants into southern Yemen to fight against the Houthi. SAF deputy commander Yasir El Atta also claimed that the UAE was also using N'Djamena International Airport in Chad and another airport in the Central African Republic to deliver weapons to the RSF. Following these allegations, protests erupted in Port Sudan on 1 December demanding the expulsion of the UAE's ambassador, while al-Burhan was reported to have cancelled his participation at the COP28 summit held in Dubai.

On 10 December 2023, Sudan ordered the expulsion from the country of 15 Emirati diplomats. No reason was provided, but it came amid reports that the UAE had been providing weapons to the RSF. The day before, three Sudanese diplomats were ordered expelled from the UAE following comments made by SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta during which he accused the UAE of supporting the RSF and called the country a "mafia state". Sudan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith Mohamed criticized the UAE in a letter to the UN Security Council. In the 78-page complaint, he claimed that the UAE planned and supported the RSF campaigns against the SAF, adding that the UAE used Chad to transport military supplies and mercenaries through its territory. The letter also urged the council to take action and push the UAE to stop supporting the RSF.

In April 2024, the Sudanese government said that the UAE sent new supplies to the RSF through Cameroon and Chad. Sudan's representative to the UN, Al-Harith Idriss submitted a request for an emergency UN Security Council meeting to discuss the UAE's provision of weapons to the RSF, saying that it "makes the UAE an accomplice in all its crimes". On 24 May 2024, a closed-door meeting was held by the UN Security Council on Sudan. Al-Harith Idriss criticized the meeting's format for not addressing the UAE's alleged aggressive acts against Sudan. He said that instead of meeting Sudan's expectations or addressing the seriousness of the situation, the UN meeting impaired the urgency of Sudanese concerns. Meanwhile, another meeting scheduled for April 2024 to discuss Sudan's complaint against the UAE was also postponed at the UK's request to protect its economic interests with the Emirates. Mozambique's Ambassador broadly discussed Sudan's grave situation, which was acknowledged by Idriss.

A report in May 2024 revealed that the RSF was getting weapons from the UAE via networks in Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, and Khalifa Haftar and the Wagner Group. The RSF were carrying out their business, finance, logistics and PR operations from the Emirates. Besides, Hemedti reportedly travelled to a few African countries in an Emirati aircraft belonging to a firm of an Emirati royal and an adviser to Mohamed bin Zayed. In Sudan, the UAE is interested in its gold and is also planning to build ports along the Sudanese Red Sea coast. US Democratic members of Congress called on the UAE to stop backing the RSF, warning that a "crisis of epic proportions is brewing" in a letter to Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan that expressed "grave concern over the arms supply by the Emirates to the RSF". The UK also called on the UAE to end its support to the RSF, following which the Emirates cancelled multiple ministerial meetings with British officials.

In June 2024, a BBC investigation found evidence of the involvement of Iran and the UAE in violating the UN arms embargo by providing drones in the Sudanese conflict. In March 2024, video evidence showed that Sudanese soldiers recaptured the state broadcaster's headquarters in Khartoum with the assistance of Iranian-made drones. A drone expert, Wim Zwijnenburg also observed that an army drone shot down by the RSF in January 2024 resembled the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone. Evidence also revealed the use of quadcopter drones by the RSF, which Brian Castner claimed belonged to the UAE. The drones are capable of dropping 120mm mortar shells, which had been supplied by the Emirates to its allies in the Yemen and Ethiopian wars.

In June 2024, a 41-page document was sent to the UN Security Council alleging that UAE nationals were involved in the RSF's campaign. Photographs of four passports belonging to male UAE nationals were provided, allegedly having been recovered from a wrecked vehicle in Omdurman in February 2024.

US representative Sara Jacobs said the Sudan war could be ended quickly if the involvement of foreign players like the UAE is ended. She said the US is morally obligated to respond to the situation and that it must stop providing arms to the UAE, to ensure that it does not supply weapons to the RSF.

American rapper Macklemore cancelled a concert that was to take place in Dubai in October 2024, citing the UAE's involvement "in the ongoing genocide and humanitarian crisis" in Sudan.

The UAE's involvement in the conflict was linked to its agricultural investment in Sudan since the 1970s. The UAE imports 90% of its food, but it is hard to quantify how much comes from Sudan because of smuggling and illicit trade. Meanwhile, the UAE's International Holding Company (IHC) and Jenaan Investment are involved in farming in Sudan. The IHC leads the Abu Hamad farming project, under which the agricultural area will be linked to the Red Sea's Abu Amama Port. Initially, the UAE made an investment of $6 billion in the project. Sudanese analyst Amgad Fareid Eltayeb mentioned that the UAE intended to ensure that its investments and its influence in Sudan continued, and hence it is ensuring to maintain the RSF's presence in the country.

In September 2024, the Coalition of Patriots for Change, a rebel group based in the Central African Republic, revealed that the UAE was using Russia's Wagner group to supply arms to the RSF. The coalition captured various shipments of weapons that were supplied by the UAE and transported to the RSF by the Wagner mercenaries through the CAR. These shipments reportedly continued until April 2024. In a report released by Human Rights Watch on 9 September 2024, evidence suggested that the warring sides were using newly acquired modern weapons from foreign nations. Photos and videos posted on social media were analyzed by the HRW, revealing that the UAE was supplying weapons and equipment to the RSF. It identified crates of Yugoimport munitions, which were manufactured in 2020 and originally procured by the UAE Armed Forces Joint Logistic Command before the conflict began. The munitions were sent to the UAE under a consignment that banned re-exports. The contract involved Adasi, a subsidiary of EDGE Group, as per the contract number observed on the crates. The group also called for the UN Security Council to extend and broaden the arms embargo and its restrictions on Sudan, ensuring that violators were held accountable. The hospital just across the border in Amdjarass, built by the UAE branch of the Red Crescent without informing the international federation, is also home to a drone hangar and weapons bunker. Chinese-made drones based there with a range of 1,000 miles have been spotted flying over El Fasher and providing surveillance for weapons convoys. These drones can be controlled either from the control centre in Amdjarass or from the UAE.

On 30 September 2024, the UAE reported that the residence of its ambassador in Khartoum was attacked by an SAF aircraft, condemning the incident as a “heinous attack.” In response, Sudan's foreign ministry rejected the UAE's claims, labelling them as “false allegations.” The SAF blamed the RSF for the incident. On 14 October 2024, Sudan rejected the Emirati claims of the aircraft attack, saying that it will resort to international law to take legal action against the UAE and compel it to compensate for the damages caused by its long-standing backing of the RSF. Foreign Minister Hussein Awad said that Sudan already submitted memos to the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. The UAE's allegations were called “unfounded”, following the footage from the next day of the bombing that displayed the building intact. Sudan claimed the UAE's lies were out of frustration over reports of its direct support to the RSF.

In October 2024, the RSF mistakenly shot down a military plane in Sudan's Malha region, killing two Russian crew members and three Sudanese on board. Conflict Observatory identified the aircraft as an Ilyushin Il-76, affiliated with Kyrgyzstan's New Way Cargo. Evidence suggested that the plane was involved in arms shipments from the UAE to the RSF. Identity documents found at the crash site included a passport and an ID of a Russian, Viktor Granov, linked to a UAE-based company, Airline Transport Incorporation FZC.

Russia

For much of the Sudanese civil war Russia has sent weapons to both the RSF and SAF. This began to shift during mid-2024, with the Russian government beginning to favour the SAF, concurrent with Russia–SAF discussions around the construction of a Russian naval base north of Port Sudan. The SAF had at this stage of the conflict suffered several successive defeats at the hands of the RSF, which analysts suggest makes them more eager to make concessions to win international support.

Wagner Group

According to CNN, Wagner supplied surface-to-air missiles to the RSF, picking up the items from Syria and delivering some of them by plane to Haftar-controlled bases in Libya to be then delivered to the RSF, while dropping other items directly to RSF positions in northwestern Sudan. American officials said that Wagner was offering to supply additional weapons to the RSF from its existing stocks in the Central African Republic. On 6 September, Wagner reportedly deployed a convoy of more than 100 vehicles carrying weapons to the RSF garrison in al-Zurug from Chad. SAF Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta also accused the Wagner Group of bringing in mercenaries from several African nations to fight alongside the RSF.

The head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, denied supporting the RSF, saying that the company has not had a presence in Sudan for more than two years. The RSF denied allegations that Wagner Group was supporting them, instead stating that the SAF was seeking such support.

As relations between the Russian government and the SAF improved during mid-2024, the latter publicly claimed that the Wagner Group was no longer operating in Sudan. This claim was contradicted by a diplomatic source and eyewitnesses speaking to Middle East Eye.

Iran

In June 2024, a BBC investigation found evidence of the involvement of Iran and the UAE in violating the UN arms embargo by providing drones in the Sudanese conflict. In March 2024, a piece of video evidence showed that Sudanese soldiers recaptured the state broadcaster's headquarters in Khartoum with the assistance of Iranian-made drones. A drone expert, Wim Zwijnenburg also observed that an army drone shot down by the RSF in January 2024 resembled the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone. Evidence also revealed the use of quadcopter drones by the RSF, which Brian Castner claimed belonged to the UAE. The drones are capable of dropping 120mm motor shells, are had been supplied by the Emirates to its allies in the Yemen and Ethiopian wars.

Despite longtime frosty relations between the Sudanese government and Iran, the Iranian government gave military and political support to the SAF. Most prominently, the Iranian government has supplied Mohajer-6 drones to the SAF, which are viewed by journalist Wim Zwijnenburg as a major tactical boon for the Armed Forces. The drones were later credited with the SAF's success in retaking the Sudanese state media company's headquarters from the RSF in March 2024. Iran's support for the SAF was viewed by analyst Jihad Mashamoun as being motivated by a desire to gain access to the Red Sea, as well as an attempt to undermine the United Arab Emirates' support for the RSF. Senior Sudanese government officials denied receiving such aid from Iran. On 10 April, Reuters reported that Iranian-made drones had helped the army push back the RSF.

In October 2023, Sudan reestablished diplomatic relations with Iran which had been broken off since 2016. In July 2024, Hassan Shah Hosseini became the Iranian ambassador to Sudan.

Other foreign actors

Weapons supply

In July 2024 Amnesty International reported that large numbers of recently manufactured weapons and ammunition were being transported into Sudan from China, Russia, Turkey, Yemen, the UAE and Serbia.

Chad

On 7 June 2023, Hissein Alamine Tchaw-tchaw, a Chadian dissident who belongs to the same ethnic group as Hemedti and claims to be the leader of the Movement for the Fight of the Oppressed in Chad (MFOC), which is fighting the government of President Mahamat Déby, posted a video showing his participation in an RSF attack on the Yarmouk munitions factory in Khartoum.

On 17 November 2023, the SLM-Minnawi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) accused the Chadian government of supporting the RSF, and "supplying it with military equipment and mercenaries by opening its territory and airspace". A report from Africa Analyst alleged that Chadian soldiers belonging to a joint Chadian-Sudanese command under Osman Bahr intercepted a shipment of military equipment intended for the RSF on its way from N'Djamena and gave it instead to the JEM, which the latter denied. The Economist linked Chad's junta receiving financial support from the UAE in exchange for allowing it to support the RSF through Amdjarass airport.

Following accusations by SAF deputy commander Yasser al-Atta of Chadian government support for the RSF, the Chadian government unsuccessfully demanded an apology from the Sudanese ambassador and expelled four Sudanese diplomats from the country on 17 December.

On 5 November 2024, the government of Sudan filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights demanding reparations from Chad for their support of the RSF, accusing Chad of violating international law.

Kenya

Kenyan President William Ruto was frequently accused by the SAF of supporting the RSF.

The SAF rejected Kenya's involvement in mediation efforts to end the conflict in July after al-Burhan accused President William Ruto of having a business relationship with Hemedti and providing a haven to the RSF. In response to proposals for a peacekeeping force composed by African countries to be deployed in Sudan made in an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) committee chaired by Ruto, the SAF's Assistant Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Yasir Alatta accused Ruto of being a mercenary of another country, whom he did not identify, and dared Ruto to deploy the Kenyan army and that of his alleged backer. On 7 September, the Sudanese government threatened to withdraw the country's membership in IGAD unless Ruto was removed as chairman of the mediation committee.

In response, Kenyan Foreign Secretary Abraham Korir Sing'oei called these allegations "baseless", while the Kenyan Foreign Ministry insisted on the country's neutrality in the conflict.

A hacking group calling itself Anonymous Sudan launched cyberattacks on Kenyan government and private websites in the last week of July.

Libyan National Army

The Egypt-backed Libyan National Army, under the command of Khalifa Haftar, dispatched aircraft to fly military supplies to the RSF before the outbreak of hostilities. Haftar and the LNA collaborated with the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, to conduct these flights.

Haftar's support for a different faction in Sudan than the Egyptian government was commented on by The New Arab, which viewed it as a sign of Egyptian weakness due to economic malaise and reliance on Haftar to police Eastern Libya, which constitutes a security concern for the Egyptian government. The New Arab also viewed the LNA's role in the conflict as signifying a shift in its diplomatic orientation, from being primarily backed by Egypt to being primarily backed by the United Arab Emirates.

Ukraine

See also: Sudan–Ukraine relations

On 19 September 2023, CNN reported that it was "likely" that Ukrainian special forces were behind a series of drone strikes and a ground operation directed against the Wagner Group-backed RSF near Khartoum on 8 September. Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence, stated in an interview on 22 September that he could neither confirm or deny Ukraine's involvement in the conflict, but said that Ukraine "will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals ... sooner or later".

On 6 November, the Kyiv Post released drone footage of what it claimed was Ukrainian special forces attacking Wagner Group personnel in an unidentified urban area in Sudan with an explosive projectile, which was believed to have been taken about two weeks before its publication. Two months later on 30 January 2024, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces had launched three drone strikes targeting the Wagner Group and other Russian organisations in Sudan as well as their Sudanese partners in the preceding weeks. The Kyiv Post released a report on 5 February 2024 with a video showing the aftermath of an attack allegedly by Ukrainian special forces on a Wagner Group unit which had purportedly suffered several deaths and the capture of at least one member of the unit who was seen being interrogated on camera.

United Kingdom

In June 2024, The Guardian reported that according to multiple sources, UK government officials "attempted to suppress criticism" of the United Arab Emirates and its alleged role in supplying arms to the RSF. Furthermore, the UK is the UN Security Council's "penholder" for Sudan. In early 2023, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office initiated secret talks between the RSF and the UK.

Evacuation of foreign nationals

Main article: Evacuation of foreign nationals during the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

Repatriations through the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism

Foreign nationals being evacuated to port of Jeddah

The outbreak of violence has led foreign governments to monitor the situation in Sudan and move toward the evacuation and repatriation of their nationals. Among some countries with several expatriates in Sudan are Egypt, which has more than 10,000 citizens in the country, and the United States, which has more than 16,000 citizens, most of whom are dual nationals. Efforts at extraction were hampered by the fighting within the capital Khartoum, particularly in and around the airport. This has forced evacuations to be undertaken by road via Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which lies about 650 km (400 miles) northeast of Khartoum. from where they were airlifted or ferried directly to their home countries or third ones. Other evacuations were undertaken through overland border crossings or airlifts from diplomatic missions and other designated locations with direct involvement of the militaries of some home countries. Some transit hubs used during the evacuation include the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti, which hosts military bases of the United States, China, Japan, France, and other European countries.

Sanctions

United States

The repeated violations of the ceasefire agreements and other atrocities during the conflict led to U.S. President Joe Biden issuing an executive order on 4 May 2023 authorizing sanctions for those deemed responsible for destabilizing Sudan, undermining the democratic transition and committing human rights abuses. On 1 June, the US government imposed its first sanctions related to the conflict, targeting two firms associated with the SAF and two others linked to the RSF. It also imposed visa restrictions against individuals involved in the violence but did not divulge any names.

On 6 September, the US State Department and the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the RSF's deputy commander and Hemedti's brother Abdelrahim Dagalo, and Abdel Rahman Jumma, the RSF's top commander in West Darfur, over "extensive" human rights violations during the conflict, with Jumma in particular being accused of masterminding the assassination of the state's governor Khamis Abakar in June. On 28 September, it sanctioned former foreign minister and leader of the Sudanese Islamic Movement Ali Karti, the Sudan-based GSK Advance Company Ltd, and the Russia-based military company Aviatrade LLC, accusing Karti and other Islamist hardliners of obstructing efforts toward a ceasefire and accusing the firms of supporting the RSF.

On 4 December, the State Department imposed sanctions on three former officials of the Bashir regime, namely former minister and presidential aide Taha Osman Ahmed al-Hussein and former directors of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah aka Sala Gosh and Mohamed Etta Elmoula Abbas, citing Al-Hussein's involvement in coordinating with regional actors to support the RSF, Gosh's plotting to overthrow the civilian-led transitional government, and Elmoula's attempts to restore the Bashir regime to power.

On 15 May 2024, the US imposed sanctions on the RSF's head of operations Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed and its commander in Central Darfur Ali Yagoub Gibril for their role in the fighting in North Darfur.

Other countries

On 12 July 2023, the United Kingdom announced sanctions on firms linked to the SAF and the RSF for providing funds and weapons in the conflict. On 15 April 2024, Canada imposed sanctions on two individuals and four entities linked to the SAF and the RSF. On 23 June 2024, the European Union imposed sanctions on six entities for manufacturing and procuring weapons for the SAF and the RSF.

Humanitarian impact

Main article: Humanitarian impact of the Sudanese civil war (2023–present)

The humanitarian crisis following the fighting was further exacerbated by the violence occurring during a period of high temperatures, and drought starting during the fasting month of Ramadan. Civilians were unable to venture outside of their homes to obtain food and supplies for fear of getting caught in the crossfire. A doctors' group said that hospitals remained understaffed and were running low on supplies as wounded people streamed in. The World Health Organization (WHO) recorded around 26 attacks on healthcare facilities, some of which resulted in casualties among medical workers and civilians. The WHO said 80% of hospitals in conflict areas were out of service with 32 forcibly evacuated by soldiers or caught in the crossfire. This included about half of Khartoum's 130 medical facilities and all hospitals in West Darfur. Outbreaks of diseases such as measles, cholera and diarrhea were reported across the country. In August 2024 cholera was declared an epidemic in the country and as of 8 September 2024, there were 5,692 cases of cholera including 185 deaths.

In April 2023, the United Nations reported that shortages of basic goods, such as food, water, medicines and fuel have become "extremely acute". The delivery of badly-needed remittances from overseas migrant workers was also halted after Western Union announced in the same month that it was closing all operations in Sudan until further notice. The World Food Programme said that more than $13 million worth of food aid destined for Sudan had been looted in the twenty days since the fighting broke out. The looting of the WFP's warehouses in El-Obeid on 1 June led to the loss of food aid meant to feed 4.4 million people. An estimated 25 million people, equivalent to more than half of Sudan's population, were said to be in need of aid in June 2023. On 25 July, Humanitarian Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-Salami said attacks on humanitarian facilities had led to more than 50 warehouses looted, 82 offices ransacked, and over 200 vehicles stolen.

In September 2023, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that 1,200 children had died from disease outbreaks in refugee camps in White Nile State since May. In Central Darfur, the head of the Hamidiya refugee camp said at least 43 children had died in the camp since July. UNICEF also estimated that the conflict had led to the number of children being out of school in Sudan to rise from seven million prior to the fighting to 19 million in October 2023. By 2024, the war's economic costs had surpassed all prior armed conflicts since Sudanese independence in 1956 due to extensive destruction of infrastructure, particularly in urban areas such as the capital city of Khartoum.

The dramatic decrease in agricultural activity ("cereal production in 2023 was nearly halved") caused increases in food prices, and the conflict led to infrequent aid convoys. According to an army official cited by Al Jazeera, as of 29 March 2024, "70 aid trucks have been stuck in North Kordofan since October". The UN estimated that 25 million people still needed aid, with 5 million facing famine and 18 million enduring "acute food insecurity". Mobile networks being cut for nearly two months compounded the problems for those being helped by remittances from relatives abroad. According to the United Nations, both the SAF and RSF are posing obstacles to food aid because they want to prevent food from getting to areas controlled by the other.

In June 2024, Amnesty International's report, "New Weapons Fuelling the Sudan Conflict", stated that the constant flow of foreign weapons is fueling the war and breaching the Darfur arms embargo. The organization found that the recently manufactured or transferred weapons and ammunition were being imported in large quantities into Sudan from China, the UAE, Russia and Turkey. The weapons supply has impacted the war by causing massive civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Both warring sides were using Chinese-manufactured advanced drone jammers, mortars and anti-material rifles. The RSF was also reported to be using recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE.

Famine

Main article: 2024 Sudan famine

On 1 August 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) concluded that IPC Phase 5 famine conditions are prevalent and ongoing in parts of North Darfur, including the Zamzam camp south of El Fashe and that there was a high risk of similar conditions throughout internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.

Refugees

Main article: Sudanese refugee crisis (2023–present)

Sudanese refugee camp in Chad, 16 May 2023.

As of July 2024, nearly 10 million residents of Sudan have been displaced due to the fighting. The United Nations said that the conflict had produced more than 7.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), while more than 2.1 million had fled the country altogether as of June 2024. This made Sudan the largest host of IDPs globally. The International Organization for Migration estimated that around 36% of IDPs came from the Khartoum region. In November, the UN said the conflict created the largest child displacement crisis in the world, affecting three million children.

Of those who fled abroad, more than 160,000 were Masalit who fled to Chad to escape ethnically based attacks by the RSF and allied militias. Fighting between the SAF and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) reportedly displaced more than 35,000 people in Blue Nile State alone, with 3,000 fleeing to Ethiopia, while more than 83,000 were displaced in South Kordofan. As of August, more than 400,000 people had fled to Chad, making it the largest single destination of refugees from the conflict, while others fled to other neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic, Egypt, and South Sudan.

Criticism was levelled at diplomatic missions operating in Sudan for their slow response in helping Sudanese visa applicants whose passports were left behind in embassies following their closure during evacuation efforts, preventing them from leaving the country.

Economic impact

The UN estimated that economic activity in Sudan fell by more than a third during the first three weeks of the conflict. In July, Sudanese economists estimated the total amount of damage brought by the conflict at $9 billion, or an average of $100 million per day, while the value of property and goods looted was estimated at another $40 billion, with the most affected areas being Khartoum and South Darfur. The exchange rate of the US dollar against the Sudanese pound in the black market rose to SDG730 in September, while it reached SDG625 at the official rate. This later reached SDG1250 in February 2024. The formal economy was described as being in a "near standstill". Gold production was also reduced to just 2 tons from the previous year's output of 18 tons. Sudanese minister for minerals Mohamed Bashir Abu Nammu accused the RSF of looting around 15 tons of silver and 1,273 kilograms of gold from the Sudan Gold Refinery at the start of the conflict.

In February 2024, finance minister Gibril Ibrahim said that the Sudanese economy had contracted by 40 per cent in 2023 due to the fighting, with an additional decline of 28 per cent expected in 2024. He added that state revenues had also decreased by 80 per cent. Sudanese port authorities estimated that international trade had fallen by 23 per cent in 2023. The Sudanese finance ministry was unable to set a national budget for 2023 or 2024 and stopped issuing quarterly reports. It also raised the exchange rate for imports and exports from SDG650 to SDG950. The fighting also rendered more than 60 per cent of Sudan's agricultural land out of service, according to Fikra for Studies and Development.

In May 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported that both the RSF and SAF were using revenue from the sale of gum arabic, which is primarily grown in Sudan, to finance their operations.

War crimes investigations

Both the SAF and the RSF are accused of committing war crimes. The RSF in particular have been denounced by Human Rights Watch and numerous governments for committing crimes against humanity.

On 13 July 2023, the office of the International Criminal Court's Chief Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan said that it had launched investigations into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the course of the 2023 conflict, within the context of its Darfur investigation, which started in 2005 based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593. In his report to the UNSC on 29 January 2024, he expressed that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that crimes outlined in the Rome Statute were taking place in Darfur. On 5 September, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Alice Wairimu Nderitu acknowledged that the conflict and related abuses had "strong identity-based components". In an interview with the BBC, Burhan said that he would cooperate with the ICC to bring those responsible to justice.

On 3 August 2023, Amnesty International released its report on the conflict. Titled Death Came To Our Home: War Crimes and Civilian Suffering In Sudan, it documented "mass civilian casualties in both deliberate and indiscriminate attacks" by both the SAF and the RSF, particularly in Khartoum and West Darfur. It also detailed sexual violence against women and girls as young as 12, targeted attacks on civilian facilities such as hospitals and churches, and looting.

On 6 September 2023, the US State Department and the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the RSF's deputy commander and Hemedti's brother Abdelrahim Dagalo, and Abdel Rahman Jumma, the RSF's top commander in West Darfur, over "extensive" human rights violations during the conflict, with Jumma in particular being accused of masterminding the assassination of the state's governor Khamis Abakar in June. Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State, accused the RSF of ethnic cleansing in December 2023.

In September 2023, the United States, Britain, Norway, and Germany planned to propose a motion to the UN Human Rights Council for an investigation into the alleged atrocities in Sudan. The draft motion, which condemns the human rights violations during the conflict, aimed to establish a three-person Fact-Finding Mission to investigate these allegations. The experts would document the violations and provide updates to the 47-member Council. The draft has been circulated among member countries but has not yet been formally submitted to the Council. On 11 October, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted 19–16 with 12 abstentions to adopt a resolution creating a fact-finding committee on crimes and violations in Sudan since the start of the conflict.

Early March 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, mandated by Resolution 2620 (2022) of the UN Security Council, published its latest report. It described the wide-ranging devastation and violence in the country, caused in many cases by the RSF and associated militias. With regard to war crimes in West Darfur, the report estimated the death rate through ethnic cleansing of the Masalit community in El Geneina between 10,000 and 15,000. In her speech before the Security Council Committee, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US Representative to the United Nations, commented: "It is my hope that the sobering report will at long last shake the world from its indifference to the horrors playing out before our eyes."

In April 2024, the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights released a report into breaches of the Genocide Convention in Darfur. The independent report found that there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the RSF and its allied militias "have committed and are committing genocide against the Masalit", a non-Arab ethnic group, and that all 153 states that have signed the Genocide Convention are "obligated to end complicity in and employ all means reasonably available to prevent and halt the genocide." It goes on to say that there is "clear and convincing evidence" that Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Russia via the actions of the Wagner Group are "complicit in the genocide".

Disinformation

During the conflict, many instances of disinformation were observed, which aimed to manipulate public opinion, spread false narratives, and create confusion. Both the SAF and the RSF engaged in disinformation campaigns on social media platforms. The RSF heavily relied on tweets and inauthentic behaviour to spread its agenda and influence local and international opinions. The SAF used Twitter to refute RSF claims and boost army morale with false victory claims. The RSF had dedicated teams based in Khartoum and Dubai to engage in a digital propaganda war. They used social media, including officially verified Facebook and Twitter accounts, to showcase their activities and spread disinformation.

Various misleading videos were shared on social media platforms, falsely depicting scenes of violence in the ongoing fighting between the SAF and the RSF. Some videos were taken from other conflicts or events, and misattributed to the current crisis in Sudan. Some viral images on social media were unrelated or misleadingly attributed to the ongoing fighting in Sudan.

Examples

On 14 April, the official SAF social media page published a video which it said was of operations carried out by the Sudanese Air Force against the RSF. Al Jazeera's monitoring and verification unit claimed the video had been fabricated using footage from the video game Arma 3 that was published on TikTok in March 2023. The unit claimed the video showing Sudanese army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan inspecting the Armoured Corps, in Al-Shajara, was from before the fighting. A video reportedly of helicopters flying over Khartoum to participate in operations by the SAF against the RSF, which circulated on social media, turned out to be from November 2022.

Two photos circulated on social media that depicted a burning bridge reported as Bahri bridge and a bombed building allegedly in Khartoum, were both revealed to be from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In April, a video supposedly showing the RSF in control of Khartoum International Airport on 15 April circulated on social media. The fact-checking website Lead Stories found that the video had appeared online three months before the conflict. A video posted in June and taken by an RSF soldier showing purported victims of the Bashir regime turned out to have been that of mummies and human remains used as props from the M. Bolheim Bioarchaeology Laboratory in Khartoum, which were thought to date from 3300 to 3000 BCE.

On 5 May, the British newspaper I reported that the RSF had sent "special bulletins" to UK politicians, which it claimed were to combat "the disproportionate amount of disinformation" about the conflict. The bulletins were created with the assistance of Capital Tap Holdings, a Dubai-based investment firm that has mining interests in Sudan. The I reported that the RSF's Facebook page was being run jointly from UAE and Sudan, and its Instagram account appeared to be based in Saudi Arabia, with the RSF saying its media team was based in Khartoum.

In June, a picture of Hemedti hospitalised in Nairobi, Kenya, was circulated in the social media and reported by the Turkish Anadolu Agency. News websites Fatabyyano and Juhainah checked the images and found it to be fabricated with the original image which belonged to Elijah McClain, who was killed in the United States in 2019. Also in June, dominant social media account holders supporting the SAF attacked the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate, accusing the organization of being partial toward the RSF and collaborating with the so-called "Janjaweed" militia. These false accusations endangered the reputation and safety of the medical professionals.

Footage of a SAF warplane reportedly shot down by the RSF in Khartoum on 20 September was found to be that of an Su-25 fighter jet that crashed in Mali, while a video showing an Egyptian Air Force warplane reportedly shot down by the RSF while on a mission in northern Sudan was found to be that of a Libyan aircraft taken outside Sudan in 2020.

Responses

On 11 August, Facebook shut down the main pages of the RSF due to a violation of its policy, "Dangerous Organizations and Individuals". In an alternate account, the RSF accused the SAF of lodging complaints based on false reports that led to the removal of its pages and said it was in contact with Facebook's parent company Meta Platforms to restore them.

Kyle Walter of Logically, a British disinformation analysis firm, said in May: "What's most concerning from this latest example of potential foreign interference is that it provides a look into how the nature of these threats are evolving, particularly in the context of the rapid onset of generative AI being used to create fake images and text. Although we don't know if this so-called sophisticated 'special bulletin' was created by this technology, it is symbolic of the wider issue at hand: an inability to trust what you're seeing, and reading, and the undermining of the entire information landscape."

In popular culture

• Sudan, Remember Us, a 2024 documentary film directed by Hind Meddeb

See also

• Sudanese Civil War, an index of at least three separate conflicts in Sudan
• Human rights in Sudan
• War in Darfur
• Darfur genocide
• 2021 Sudan coup d'état
• Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2023)
• Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2024)
• Genocide of Indigenous peoples § Darfur
• Genocides in history (21st century) § Darfur
• List of civil wars
• List of conflicts in Africa
• List of ethnic cleansing campaigns
• List of genocides
• List of ongoing armed conflicts
• List of wars: 2003–present
• Sudanese National Forces Coordination

External links

• Media related to 2023 Sudan conflict at Wikimedia Commons