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Apparently apocryphal

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User:Valjean, regarding this revert of yours, what subsequent reliable source contradicts the reliable source cited? Anythingyouwant (talk) 22:58, 29 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Much of that is one journalist's opinions, so anything would have to be attributed if we use it at all. We already have a lot of similar trash talk claims about the dossier in this article, even though they contradict the fact that little, if anything, has been proven untrue, and most is just uncorroborated. Unfortunately, after the Mueller investigation started, the FBI turned everything over to him and they stopped all attempts to verify the allegations and just left it hanging. Nothing has been done about that since then, so many of those allegations are still in limbo. They hang there as unproven, but likely true. Nothing indicates they are apocryphal or untrue, even if some sources use such words.
Unproven does not mean false or apocryphal. That is unproven trash talk. Some claims are unprovable, unless one can interview the source, and those sources are scared to talk. They said things that explain events that happened, but such background info has to be confirmed with the source to prove the source said them, and those sources won't talk. Even Danchenko was so scared, after he was doxed by William Barr, that he minimized his role, but that didn't mean he wasn't basically honest or providing good info.
See this paragraph about Danchenko's alleged lies:

Right-wing columnist and attorney Andrew C. McCarthy reacted to what he described as the "if not irrational, then exaggerated" reactions by Trump supporters to these reports of arrests. He urged them to be cautious as John Durham's "indictments narrowly allege that the defendants lied to the FBI only about the identity or status of people from whom they were getting information, not about the information itself."[1]

Sources still gave Danchenko plenty of good info for many claims that are proven true. The FBI later found their own sources agreed with Steele's sources. Those claims are confirmed. He was hired by the FBI for a nearly four-year period, from March 2017 to October 2020, and got the highest praise as a confidential human source. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 23:44, 29 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
You say, without citation, that “The FBI later found their own sources agreed with Steele's sources. Those claims are confirmed.” But you just deleted an October 2022 Politico article which said the opposite: “Many of the stories in the so-called Steele Dossier appear to be apocryphal and FBI personnel who testified at the trial said they were unable to corroborate any of it.” Nevertheless, I would be willing to soften the well-sourced “apocryphal” to “unreliable” if doing so is necessary. See the NYT:

Was the dossier a reliable source of information? No. It has become clear over time that its sourcing was thin and sketchy. No corroborating evidence has emerged in intervening years to support many of the specific claims in the dossier, and government investigators determined that one key allegation — that Mr. Trump’s lawyer, Michael Cohen, had met with Russian officials in Prague during the campaign — was false. When the F.B.I. interviewed Mr. Danchenko in 2017, he told the bureau that he thought the tenor of the dossier was more conclusive than was justified; for example, Mr. Danchenko portrayed the blackmail tape story as rumors and speculation that he was not able to confirm. He also said a key source had called him without identifying himself, and that he had guessed at the source’s identity.

Anythingyouwant (talk) 00:12, 30 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Per WP:LEAD, the lead has to summarize the body. And at least skimming the body, we seem to cite a wide range of opinions on the dosser, which don't all say the same thing (see the "Dossier's veracity and Steele's reputation" section.) The lead could possibly summarize this better but it has to be a summary of the entire thing - dropping a single source into the first sentence of the lead and treating it as the last word in a situation where there is clearly conflict between sources is giving it WP:UNDUE weight, even for a source as high-quality as the NYT. If you want the lead to just flatly say (even with attribution) that it's generally unreliable, and nothing else about its reliability, then you'd also need to rewrite the entire massive "Dossier's veracity" section so that that's a reasonable summary of it, which it certainly isn't at the moment. --Aquillion (talk) 18:26, 30 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I’ll take a closer look at the pertinent section of the article body. My initial impression is that it needs to be edited to clarify how views of the dossier have evolved. For example, the Durham Report had a big effect on that. Anythingyouwant (talk) 18:31, 30 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with Aquillion. In fact, I'd warn not to touch the lead with any changes the slight bit controversial. Like the leads in many controversial articles, especially large and complicated ones like this, every word has been discussed, sometimes for months for changing a single word(!), and there is a balance to be maintained. Due weight considerations weigh heavily, and one must remember that single journalists (especially Cohen and Savage) sometimes are not careful with their words. Some aren't fully informed about all the issues, not nearly as well as many Wikipedia editors who edit these various Trump Russia election interference topics.
That many consider it disappointing and unreliable is largely attributable to their initial mistaken impression that "This is going to be a wonderful source of proven, incriminating, information." Well, they were disappointed, and instead of blaming themselves, they blame the dossier. It is an unfinished draft, a collection of unvetted information not designed to ever see the light of day! It was intended to be vetted thoroughly before anyone else saw it. In that sense, it is of course not a "reliable source". We can't check most of the sources, but they exist. Unproven does not mean untrue. Even the mistaken claim that the Prague allegation is proven "false" is itself a false claim, even though made by some RS. Look at all the evidence and every government investigation that mentions it, and you won't find any evidence it's false, just unproven. So some idiot made the mistake of writing in an official document it was "false". So even RS can be misleading. Many RS find confirmation for many of the allegations, contrary to what Savage says, especially in the intelligence community. It's most important allegations are proven very true, and are described as "prescient".
The dossier's infamous and unproven pee tape allegation can be analyzed to some degree without even mentioning the dossier, as there is conclusive proof, independent of and years before the dossier, that the rumor existed long before the dossier was a twinkle in Steele's eye. Cohen testified that he knew of it, and other similar salacious allegations about Trump in Russia, long before the dossier, and that he told Trump about those allegations. Cohen was Trump's "fixer", and that knowledge started Cohen on a hunt to protect Trump's reputation, a hunt that enlisted the aid of others who also knew about the rumor, until the alleged tapes were found and "stopped" in late October 2016. It's all in court records.
You mention the Durham report, and I have already mentioned that to you. It's a pile of shit. You'd be better off forgetting it ever existed and not read it. It's very misleading, which is one of the reasons that political hit job failed so miserably. Durham lost everything and slunk off with his tail between his legs like a dog who discovered his mother was a bitch. (Yes, I played on that word. ) It's very unreliable. He said things in his trials that he didn't dare repeat in the final report. His political agenda just didn't stand up to the facts. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 19:12, 30 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]

What do you think "apocryphal" means, in this connection? -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 19:13, 30 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Of doubtful authenticity, although widely circulated as being true. Anythingyouwant (talk) 00:55, 31 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Okay, that's the normal definition, and one that would be used by those skeptical of the claim. The problem with using that word is that it implies that "unproven" is likely "untrue", which is not a logical conclusion. We don't know. That's our ignorance, and the ignorance of sources and investigators. It puts too much weight on the "untrue" possibility, when a neutral treatment would not put weight on either "true" or "untrue". Neutral words, in this case, are "unproven" or "uncorroborated". That's why I'm cautious about using "apocryphal", and definitely not in wikivoice, or even as a thought allowed in my head. That would be self-deception.
I don't trust a RS that uses that word about any dossier allegations that are still "unproven", and possibly can never be proven. The author's personal bias is showing too much, especially in the face of a lack of evidence. "Lack of evidence is not evidence of lack". It's their attributed opinion, not even the opinion of the RS (like The New York Times, so your appeal to authority there is wrong.). Those journalists are shoddy researchers, at least on this topic. NPOV warns us that we must not confuse opinions for facts, and editors should not take sides by asserting opinions as facts. These are misleading opinions that should be attributed solely to the author, not the source. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 18:14, 31 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Newspapers that are reputable and reliable label opinion as opinion, and label news as news. When one of their reporters is the author of a news article, the newspaper does not allow the reporter to express personal opinion. Sometimes opinion does creep into RS news reports, but we must presume otherwise lest Wikipedia editors label every news report they don’t like as “opinion”. Anyway, when I get some free time, I will look at what RS say about the dossier AFTER the Durham Report was released in 2023. Anythingyouwant (talk) 18:22, 31 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
After they are poisoned by the misleading Durham report? Be cautious. You would need to know about all the debunking and criticism of that report, and then recognize when those bad parts of the report have poisoned some careless journalist's writings. Those who think the Durham report is good and have championed it are dubious sources. Andrew C. McCarthy, Matt Taibbi, and John Solomon are a few that come to mind who likely defended Durham. Apologists for Russia and MAGA tout it, so right there you've got a way to recognize if they are fringe or not. Basically any source that defends Trump and/or pushes conspiracy theories and ignores facts can't be trusted. Wikipedia does not consider them to be RS because they reveal that they don't know how to vet sources and information for reliability.
In defense of McCarthy, who was previously a good researcher, he did warn Trump supporters about part of the Durham report:
Right-wing columnist and attorney Andrew C. McCarthy reacted to what he described as the "if not irrational, then exaggerated" reactions by Trump supporters to these reports of arrests. He urged them to be cautious as John Durham's "indictments narrowly allege that the defendants lied to the FBI only about the identity or status of people from whom they were getting information, not about the information itself."[1]
So that was good of him. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 19:45, 31 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, the Durham indictments had much narrower scope than the Durham Report. Anythingyouwant (talk) 20:20, 31 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
One of the problems with the whole mess was that Durham, as a prosecutor, went into the court cases as a typical lawyer, where one can carry out personal vendettas, and use ones personal political agendas. In this case he was carrying out Trump's and Barr's job for him to find fault with Clinton and Ukraine, and clear Trump and Russia. (Assange was also offered a pardon by Trump if he would clear Russia and blame Ukraine.) Objectivity and full honesty are not part of a lawyer's methods. The result was a disaster, and he lost everything.
Then he made a huge mistake, and reading it is painful. It's filled with obvious mistakes. He took all those losing ideas and losing conspiracy theories behind his losing trials and made a report out of that. He should have left out all the losing stuff. There are some things from the trials that were so obviously bad that he did leave them out, and the stuff about Dolan is part of it. He had no solid evidence that Dolan was behind the salacious allegation in the dossier, so that was not part of the report, IIRC. Dolan denied that very strongly, but he did admit he was behind some of the stuff about Manafort. Danchenko had other sources for the salacious stuff, and Steele had other sources than Danchenko, which explains why Danchenko didn't recognize some things. He wasn't the only source for some of the same topics. Anyway, the point is that one cannot trust anything remotely related to Durham. We have an article dealing with some of it: Russia investigation origins counter-narrative. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 22:12, 31 August 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Your opinion may be correct, maybe not, but we should try to follow what reliable sources say about the Durham Report and its analysis of the Steele Dossier. Anythingyouwant (talk) 00:50, 1 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ a b McCarthy, Andrew C. (December 11, 2021). "John Durham Probe: Michael Sussmann Case Collapsing?". National Review. Retrieved December 13, 2021. the exuberance over Durham's indictments of Sussmann and Danchenko, particularly among Trump supporters, was, if not irrational, then exaggerated. ... Durham may well be convinced that the Trump–Russia narrative was a hoax and that the Alfa Bank angle was similarly bogus, ... [but] His indictments, however, make no such claim. Instead, they narrowly allege that the defendants lied to the FBI only about the identity or status of people from whom they were getting information, not about the information itself. It is therefore irrelevant to Durham's prosecutions whether the Trump–Russia narrative was true or false. (italics original)

Second sentence of article "efforts to corroborate the allegations were short-lived, limited, and weak, is factually wrong, and contradicted by source material

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The current statement in the article, "The veracity status of many of the allegations is still unknown because efforts to corroborate the allegations were short-lived, limited, and weak, with the FBI stopping all efforts to corroborate the dossier in May 2017 when the Mueller investigation took over the Russia investigation," is not accurately supported by the cited source. The source cited, "Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities" from the Senate Intelligence Committee report, does not use the terms "short-lived," "limited," or "weak" to describe the FBI's corroboration efforts. Furthermore, it does not state that the FBI stopped all efforts to corroborate the dossier in May 2017.The relevant quote from the report (page 847) states:"(U) The Committee found that, within the FBI, the dossier was given a veneer of credibility by lax procedures, and layered misunderstandings. Before corroborating the information in the dossier, FBI cited that information in a FISA application. After a summary of the uncorroborated information was later appended to the ICA, the FBI also briefed it to the President, President-elect, and Gang of Eight, while noting that it was unverified." This quote contradicts rather than supports the current statement in the article. It suggests that the FBI used the dossier before corroborating it, rather than making limited or weak efforts to corroborate it. The assertion "efforts to corroborate the allegations were short-lived, limited, and weak, with the FBI stopping all efforts to corroborate the dossier in May 2017" should be removed as it is not supported by the cited source and appears to be an interpretation rather than a fact stated in the report. BostonUniver (talk) 14:56, 17 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

"Efforts to corroborate the dossier's allegations were limited and weak." was added on 7 August 2024, one of many recent changes by Valjean. Reverting will improve. Peter Gulutzan (talk) 16:41, 17 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yeah I would support removal of unsourced or OR material. Also that is a primary source and should not be used that way. It looks like a lot of primary sources are used in violation to our basic sourcing polices. PackMecEng (talk) 17:12, 17 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Those are synonyms and an accurate paraphrase, but only if one looks at the exact parts I cite. Unfortunately, I can't do that right now. I'll explain it when I'm back to civilization with wifi and my PC. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 19:15, 17 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Okay, we are finally back from our camping trip in the Trinity Alps. Very little internet coverage there. Usually, I can catch lots of trout, but this time no luck. We are usually there earlier in the season when the fish are plentiful, and there are lots of nice swimming holes. Otherwise, it's beautiful country with few people.

I have split off other topics into their own sections to be dealt with separately. First of all, I will remove the latest version from the lead so we can analyze and discuss it here. I am not wedded to that exact wording. I just tried to summarize what the sources said, and that sourcing could be improved in the body.

Current wording (begun), now removed:

The veracity status of many of the allegations is still unknown because efforts to corroborate the allegations were short-lived, limited, and weak, with the FBI stopping all efforts to corroborate the dossier in May 2017 when the Mueller investigation took over the Russia investigation.[1]

I'll return to this section after leaving some remarks in the next sections. Please wait before adding more to this section. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 21:56, 21 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Let's take a look at these complaints and see which ones have some merit and which don't. Right off the bat, I see two issues to deal with. Please use these numbers and keep discussion about each in its own thread. We may have to create separate sections.

Number 1. There may be merit to the complaint about my choice of words. These are issues that can be fixed, so let's discuss them and see if we can come up with a better description of what the sources say:

("efforts to corroborate the allegations were short-lived, limited, and weak, with the FBI stopping all efforts to corroborate the dossier in May 2017 when the Mueller investigation took over the Russia investigation.") Synonyms, paraphrasing, etc. are not exact sciences, and I certainly have no patent on always getting it right, so other editors' input is welcome.

Here are some sources for 1:

(U) In May 2017, the SCO was established, ending FBI's attempts to corroborate information in the dossier. In the end, few allegations were definitively corroborated, and SCO said its own leads and research overtook work to verify Steele's findings.[1]: 851 
(U) A further restriction on the Committee's investigative efforts was the centralization of information regarding the dossier within the SCO and the SCO' s decision not to share that information with the Committee. FBI had begun efforts to corroborate accusations within the dossier in the fall of 2016, an effort that progressed slowly through the winter and into the spring of 2017. When the SCO began work in May 2017, however, all those efforts ceased at FBI. After that point, the Committee has limited insights into how or whether SCO pursued the dossier at all. SCO did not share the results of any further inquiries, to the extent any were undertaken, with the Committee. Special Agent in Charge David Archey briefed the Committee in July 2019 on the SCO's investigative process and information management:
We [the SCOJ were aware of the Steele dossier, obviously. We were aware of some of the efforts that went into its verification ... we did not include Steele dossier reporting in the report.... [T]hose allegations go to the heart of things that were in our mandate-but we believed our own investigation. The information that we collected would have superseded it, and been something we would have relied on more, and that's why you see what we did in the report and not the Steele dossier in the report. 5666
Archey declined to provide further information on whether FBI or SCO attempted to verify information in the dossier, although he noted that the SCO did not draw on the dossier to support its conclusions.[1]: 852 
(U) FBI Counterintelligence Division's efforts to investigate the allegations in the dossier were focused on identifying Steele's source network and recruiting those people to serve as sources for, or provide information to, the FBI. FBI also made efforts to corroborate the information in the dossier memos, but the Committee found that attempt lacking in both thoroughness and rigor. The FBI pursued FISA coverage of Carter Page in October 2016, including information from the dossier, but at the time it had very little information on Steele's subsources or corroboration of Steele's information.
(U) As of May 2017, when the SCO began its own investigation, the FBI had taken the following investigative steps:[1]: 902 
(U) The Committee reviewed a redacted version of that spreadsheet, which reflected progress made until May 2017, when the SCO began its work and FBI halted efforts on the dossier.[1]: 907 

My sources for the Senate Committee's criticizms of the FBI:

  • "FBI also made efforts to corroborate the information in the dossier memos, but the Committee found that attempt lacking in both thoroughness and rigor."[1]: 902 
  • "FBI had begun efforts to corroborate accusations within the dossier in the fall of 2016, an effort that progressed slowly through the winter and into the spring of 2017. When the SCO began work in May 2017, however, all those efforts ceased at FBI."[1]: 852 

My wording was: "short-lived, limited, and weak" Feel free to improve on that.

Those sources address 1. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 02:46, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I developed the body by adding precise page numbers to sources and a quote as a note. See here. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 05:49, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Here's a new version, using exact quotes and exact page numbers in the sources:

The veracity status of many of the allegations is still unknown. The Senate Intelligence Committee criticized the FBI's efforts to corroborate the allegations because they were "lacking in both thoroughness and rigor",[1]: 902  with the FBI stopping all efforts to corroborate the dossier in May 2017 when the Mueller investigation took over the Russia investigation.[a]

How's that? It is attributed and sourced better. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 06:08, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Since no one has objected or suggested other changes to this new version that resolves the old version's "short-lived, limited, and weak", I have now installed this new version It resolves the issues mentioned by adding attribution, exact quotes and exact page numbers in the sources. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 21:41, 27 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Number 2. I'm not sure I understand this second complaint and therefore question its merits. Maybe it's just me, so help me understand it: ("This quote contradicts rather than supports the current statement in the article. It suggests that the FBI used the dossier before corroborating it, rather than making limited or weak efforts to corroborate it.") What comes before that does not relate to May 2017. It is a fact that the FBI made efforts to corroborate the dossier's allegations, and my wording does not deny that. It also had to give up fairly quickly as it could not contact the original sources. (It also had a rather "devious" motive as it wanted to contact those sources and employ them as confidential human sources for the FBI to use.) It is also a fact that the FBI misused the dossier by using some of its words that were not as yet, and maybe never could be, corroborated to support the FISA warrants on Carter Page. (It is also a fact that some politicians and FBI personnel have asserted that the dossier was not essential to those applications, and that they were on the cusp (50/50) of doing it anyway, even without citing the dossier. While interesting, that is another matter and not relevant to this discussion.) So, I think this second complaint needs to be explained better. Boil it down. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 02:46, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  1. ^ "FBI had begun efforts to corroborate accusations within the dossier in the fall of 2016, an effort that progressed slowly through the winter and into the spring of 2017. When the SCO began work in May 2017, however, all those efforts ceased at FBI."[1]: 852 

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i "Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities" (PDF). intelligence.senate.gov. Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC). August 18, 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on January 22, 2021. Retrieved December 27, 2023.

Attribution needed for "not established facts...."

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So as not to clutter this Talk page, I hope no one objects to me adding two further issues I've spotted in the opening paragraphs.
1. In the very first sentence of the article, it should be made clear that the quote characterising the dossier as "not established facts, but a starting point for further investigation" actually comes from Steele himself. See expanded quote from the New York Times: "Mr. Steele has made clear to associates that he always considered the dossier to be raw intelligence — not established facts, but a starting point for further investigation." [1]https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/us/politics/steele-dossier-mueller-report.html
BostonUniver (talk) 20:52, 17 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. See here. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 21:56, 21 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

"Steele was the first..."?

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2. In the second paragraph of the article it is stated "Steele was the first to warn that Russia was seeking to elect Trump." The source for this claim is an Op-ed written by Paul Wood in The Spectator's Coffee house section, [2]https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/was-the-pee-tape-a-lie-all-along-/. There doesn't appear to be any other source to back up this claim.
The first report in the Steele Dossier was dated 20 June 2016.[3]https://regmedia.co.uk/2018/02/02/steele-dossier-trump.pdf
However, on June 14 2016, The New York Times and other media reported; "two groups of Russian hackers, working for competing government intelligence agencies, penetrated computer systems of the Democratic National Committee and gained access to emails, chats and a trove of opposition research against Donald J. Trump, according to the party and a cybersecurity firm." [4]https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/us/politics/russian-hackers-dnc-trump.html
At this point it would have been apparent to some that this was part of an effort by Russia to assist Donald Trump, given the Kremlin's interest in him over Clinton. For example, see articles like "From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump" from Reuters, March 2016 - [5]https://www.reuters.com/article/world/from-russia-with-love-why-the-kremlin-backs-trump-idUSKCN0WQ1LY/ BostonUniver (talk) 20:52, 17 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
You are quite correct about 2 -- I think this was raised before on this talk page, Steele was not the first.
In general, this whole article has issues with large swaths of OR from primary sources, and quoting opinions as facts in various places. Endwise (talk) 09:02, 18 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Endwise:, I have started a new section to deal with your concerns. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 22:53, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yes 2's been raised before on this talk page in 2017 and in 2021 but without effect. Re "In general, ...": in general attempts to fix are met with opposition and I'd not be optimistic. Peter Gulutzan (talk) 20:44, 18 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

BostonUniver, that's a good catch, but it's an apples vs oranges situation. A Russian preference is not the same as a "covert operation to elect" Trump. The Russians have always had "preferences", but have never cooperated with an entire presidential campaign that was willing to fully cooperate, both openly and covertly, with the Russians to get the Russian's preferred candidate elected. This was a new situation. Russian intelligence started preparations in early 2014 (or late 2013, see below) and expanded their efforts on all fronts, developing their election interference into the "sweeping and systematic" Russian interference in the 2016 elections. When Trump became the GOP's chosen candidate, they focused their efforts to help him. Their efforts have never stopped, their preference is unchanged, but they are adding more facets to their efforts. The 2024 Tenet Media investigation is just one facet. The Russians are pumping huge amounts of money into right and far-right media supportive of MAGA and Trump.

That NYTimes source says nothing about a Russian preference for Trump or any attempt to help him. If anything, it suggests that the Russians could exploit the DNC's opposition research on Trump, and that would not be good for him as a person, but it would enable them to better blackmail him as they support his candidacy. Be careful not to synthesize that source with your March 2016 source. That source expresses some Russian preference for Trump, but it says nothing about a "covert operation to elect Donald Trump". That was Steele's contribution, and he was right. Here's the new version with proper attribution:

According to Paul Wood, "Steele was first to warn that Russia was mounting a covert operation to elect Donald Trump. Fusion GPS – his partners in Washington DC – have called this the dossier's 'foundational initial assertion' and it was correct."[1]

Trump had obviously discussed his presidential plans with Russians when he was in Moscow for the November 2013 Miss Universe pageant, so Russians knew, long before Americans, that Trump was going to run for president in 2016, and they promised to help him. He was even photographed by Yulia Alferova (Yulya Klyushina) and others while huddling with some of those who later worked in the election interference efforts to aid Trump's campaign. This was potentially known by the few Americans who watched Yulia Alferova's tweets and pictures she posted during the pageant in early November 2013 and during January 2014. Yulia Alferova's significant January 22, 2014, tweet is still available and quoted below.

Alferova worked for the Agalarovs and Crocus Group to help "organize Trump's Miss Universe contest". The Senate Intelligence Committee report implied that Aras Agalarov and his Crocus Group were part of a Russian intelligence effort to compromise and gain leverage over Trump.[2]

The Senate Intelligence Committee report's "Footnote 2510" mentioned her tweets, one shortly after the Miss Universe pageant, showing she had foreknowledge, long before the American public, of Trump's planned presidential run. She promised Russian support for his candidacy:[3]: 396 

On January 22, 2014, Klyushina wrote on social media that, 'I'm sure @realDonaldTrump will be great president! We'll support you from Russia! America needs an ambitious leader!'; On January 28, 2015, Klyushina announced on Twitter that Trump would be running for President of the United States. Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, January 28, 2015. The Committee has no insight into the nature of Klyushina's knowledge of these matters or what prompted these statements.

This Russian support was later manifested in the "sweeping and systematic" Russian interference in the 2016 elections, which included efforts by her then-husband, Artem Klyushin. The Senate Committee had "significant concerns regarding [Artem] Klyushin"[3]: 396  and devoted a whole section to him and his associates: "Artem Klyushin, Konstantin Rykov, and Associates".[3]: 395  They were deeply involved in election interference efforts in Ukraine and later in the United States.[3]: 397  -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 21:56, 21 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you for taking the time to revise the piece, but the new version still falls short in highlighting that Paul Wood’s op-ed in The Spectator is a rather unconventional interpretation of the Dossier. For example, a 2019 analysis by The Washington Post noted that "a case could also be made that the memo’s political analysis about Russia’s motivations might have been made by any close reader of the newspapers. By the time this memo was written, The Washington Post had already broken the news that Russia had hacked the Democratic National Committee." [6]https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/24/what-steele-dossier-said-vs-what-mueller-report-said/ Given this, I’m uncertain why Wood’s opinion, published in a low-reliability outlet, is placed so prominently—appearing as early as the fourth sentence of the article. BostonUniver (talk) 10:19, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@BostonUniver: I like that you are taking the time to analyze this and also to speculate about it. That is allowed on talk pages. Speculation and SYNTH violations are allowed on this page. That's all part of how we try to figure out what really happened. Now do RS back up our speculations? In the end, it is what RS say that gets included, without any trace of the editorial discussions and speculations that occurred behind the scenes. So, press on. This is good. Let's analyze this.
On May 18, 2016, the public are informed that BOTH presidential campaigns are targeted by hackers, but does not say if they were successful:

He did not indicate whether the attempted intrusions were successful or whether they were by foreign or domestic hackers. Nor did he specify whether the websites or campaign networks of Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders or Republican presumptive nominee Donald Trump were targeted.
We’re aware that campaigns and related organizations and individuals are targeted by actors with a variety of motivations — from philosophical differences to espionage — and capabilities — from defacements to intrusions,” said Brian P. Hale, director of public affairs for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.[4]

On June 14, 2016, the public learns that Russians have hacked the DNC (and "gained access to the entire database of opposition research on GOP presidential candidate Donald Trump") and also targeted the Clinton and Trump campaigns, RNC, and Republican figures (they never succeeded in hacking Clinton's private server):

"The intrusion into the DNC was one of several targeting American political organizations. The networks of presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump were also targeted by Russian spies, as were the computers of some Republican political action committees, U.S. officials said. But details on those cases were not available."[5]

So the public learns that BOTH parties are being attacked. There is no clear hint that Trump is being favored or helped, and certainly nothing like Steele's description of a "covert operation to elect Donald Trump". This June 14 report leaves the impression that the Russians were successful in all their attacks, something we later learn was not entirely true. The public just thinks the Russians are attacking the elections and both presidential campaigns, something they had already been told on May 18, 2016.
The Republicans were also hacked to some degree, but we later learned that information was not released in the same way as the DNC material. From Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections#Hacking of Republicans:
On January 10, 2017, FBI Director James Comey told the Senate Intelligence Committee that Russia succeeded in "collecting some information from Republican-affiliated targets but did not leak it to the public".[6] In earlier statements, an FBI official stated Russian attempts to access the RNC server were unsuccessful,[7] or had reportedly told the RNC chair that their servers were secure,[8] but that email accounts of individual Republicans (including Colin Powell) were breached. (Over 200 emails from Colin Powell were posted on the website DC Leaks.)[7][9][8][10] One state Republican Party (Illinois) may have had some of its email accounts hacked.[11]
So, returning to your quote: "But a case could also be made that the memo’s political analysis about Russia’s motivations might have been made by any close reader of the newspapers. By the time this memo was written, The Washington Post had already broken the news that Russia had hacked the Democratic National Committee."[7] Yes, such a case could be made, but the public learned about attacks on the DNC and the RNC. Both campaigns were attacked, and the public knew about it. So "a case could also be made", but a very weak one, that the public thought that the attacks were part of a "covert operation to elect Donald Trump". That part is Steele's interpretation, and he was right.
(These timelines are very informative: Timeline of Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections#June_2016 and Timeline of Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections (July 2016–election day).)
So, do you still think that "case could also be made" is strong enough to be worth also mentioning Kessler's much later speculation from April 24, 2019? He's normally very good, but this time he seems to be "a bit off". I don't currently see it, but maybe you can persuade me. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 18:31, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Your argument to keep a op-ed from The Spectator on Steele being the first while dismissing the Washington Post analysis article as "a very weak [case]" is interesting and original, and would be relevant as your original published research. Are you able to provide more high quality sources on the claim that Steele was "first to warn"? Perhaps as you insist on keeping this claim you should "persuade us", the readers of Wikipedia without resorting to your personal views? BostonUniver (talk) 20:09, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I've re-read your response multiple times and what I can understand is that you are not defending the point was "Steele was the first to warn that Russia was seeking to elect Trump", which is what the page currently says. Instead you are defending the notion that Steele was first to warn of his theory of collusion, which is not what the page says, nor what I'm disputing.
See your analysis of the contemporary new sources of the DNC hack "There is no clear hint that Trump is being favored or helped, and certainly nothing like Steele's description of a "covert operation to elect Donald Trump"."
It was not especially challenging to find the following from Vice's Motherboard from June 16, 2016: "But why would Russia want to hack the DNC? First of all, it would make sense just from an intelligence collection standpoint. That’s what spies do. But in this election cycle, there’s another reason: the Russian government would like to have Donald Trump as president.
“Look, the coming elections is of high priority for Russia as many people close to the Kremlin believe that Trump could help to lift the sanctions and ease the tensions between Russia and the US,” Andrei Soldatov, an independent journalist who has written extensively about Russia’s surveillance powers, told Motherboard in an email.
And hacking the DNC and embarrassing Hillary Clinton would help with that." [8]https://www.vice.com/en/article/guccifer-20-is-likely-a-russian-government-attempt-to-cover-up-their-own-hack/ BostonUniver (talk) 22:17, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
??? "Steele was the first to warn that Russia was seeking to elect Trump" is what the lead used to say. Now it says "According to Paul Wood, "Steele was first to warn that Russia was mounting a covert operation to elect Donald Trump." That's not really a "collusion" twist because it says nothing about Trump's involvment or collusion, only the Russian's actions. But you're right that Steele was indeed proposing that there was active cooperation between his campaign and the Kremlin, and that's described as collusion. Whether there was a "conspiracy" to cooperate has not been proven, but the cooperation has been proven in spades.
Your source[12] demonstrates that some sources were speculating at Russia's motives. The end of the article says: "Let’s spell this out,” Rid said. “We have a foreign intelligence agency that is picking sides, that is doing a sophisticated hack and influence operation in support of the presumptive nominee of the Republican Party in the US general elections. That’s craziness, if that’s actually the case." They were speculating.
Steele didn't guess or speculate. He said it to the FBI, with evidence besides just the hacking. Are you suggesting that he might have gotten the idea from stuff he read? That's certainly possible. I'm sure he read everything available. Yet his Russian sources were telling him stuff that confirmed those speculations, and he provided many unknown details to back them up. Those details were not what Vice or other sources were saying.
To see if we can find a way forward here, please propose improved wording, with sources (including Wood's source), that would resolve this to your satisfaction. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 22:49, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The claim that "Steele was the first to warn that Russia was seeking to elect Trump" is misleading, as shown by the Motherboard source. While the current phrasing shifts this to Paul Wood's opinion that "Steele was first to warn that Russia was mounting a covert operation to elect Trump," it's still not entirely accurate. I see the argument has now shifted to saying "Steele was the first to warn the FBI," which could be true—though it's possible other sources warned the FBI earlier, those weren't made public.
The point is, any sources who gave such warnings didn't actively publicize their findings by sharing them with the media in the way Steele's dossier was eventually leaked. This distinction matters when considering the dossier's visibility and influence.
My suggestion is to revise the passage to avoid overinflating the dossier's significance without clear justification. Cite a proper source that makes a verifiable, balanced point. Whether the dossier was "first" in any particular way isn't for me to decide, but the text should reflect a more cautious view.
I’m also not opposed to Paul Wood being cited, but balance is needed. For example, why not include this perspective from a CIA analyst who helped write the initial 2017 intelligence assessment on Russian interference? He recently told *Rolling Stone* that the Steele Dossier was "garbage" and "a joke" [source: Rolling Stone]. It would provide a fuller picture of how the dossier was viewed by intelligence professionals. BostonUniver (talk) 23:14, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Starting with the last... . We already include many very negative personal opinions, and many clearly false ones, about the unvetted allegations, and, unfortunately, those opinions are often used to judge the whole dossier, which is just plain careless and false. Even a judge ruled against Trump's nonsense denials. So we need to be careful to not overload the article with such opinions as people think that unproven equals false. None have been proven false. We already have many negative descriptions in the body, and a few examples in the lead. We also have an RfC that says not to say "unverified" allegations in the lead, at least not without clarification.
Back to the analyst.... He was suddenly confronted with unvetted allegations and expected to include them in the ICA report, which would have been very wrong, and it didn't happen. His reaction was understandable at that time. I doubt he was used to seeing such raw intelligence. His reaction was similar to the reactions of those who describe the dossier as "discredited". That word has many meanings, but one aspect is false to apply to the dossier. It is not proven false. It is just disappointing to those who mistakenly think it's a collection of proven facts. It never was. It never pretended to be. The disappointment is then used as an accusation against the dossier, and that's unfair. It is the reader's fault. It is their false expectations that are "discredited".
On January 4, 2018, U.S. District Court Judge Amit P. Mehta ruled on Trump's repeated tweets describing the dossier as "fake" or "discredited":

None of the tweets inescapably lead to the inference that the President's statements about the Dossier are rooted in information he received from the law enforcement and intelligence communities. ... The President's statements may very well be based on media reports or his own personal knowledge, or could simply be viewed as political statements intended to counter media accounts about the Russia investigation, rather than assertions of pure fact.[13]

What we're dealing with here is not the general opinions of all stripes about the dossier, or even about the unproven allegations. We already deal with them. Here we are solely dealing with the allegations that turned out to be true, and only one of them. Let's stay on point here.
Please attempt to formulate something that includes the various sources we mention above. Summarizing conflicting views can be difficult, but these are not really conflicting. They are more like variations on the same theme. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 23:58, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Edit conflict written while the 22:17, 26 September 2024 comment above was posted. I'll respond to it.

This is not "original published research" in the article. On this talk page, we all express our opinions. The Spectator is a RS that mostly publishes opinions, which are perfectly acceptable content when attributed and framed properly, and more importantly, the author is a renowned correspondent, journalist, and subject matter expert. We value such opinions, and his opinion is worth documenting. I don't know if there are others who make the same claim, but neither have I seen any RS contradict it. Above, I have looked at the sources we know of on the topic of early reporting, and they don't contradict Wood's assertion either. In fact, they can't be used to build a case against it as it's an apples vs oranges situation.

So, lacking anything else, we cite the opinion of an experienced expert on the topic. That's pretty much par for the course here. It's how we roll. We don't use our own opinions to undermine a source, unless we can use other RS to do it. If we had other RS that contradicted Wood, you'd have a strong case. I'd love to see other RS that can be used as evidence either way for this situation.

While the mention in the lead was added on 15:51, 8 August 2024, the attributed mention in the body has been there since 19:03, 24 April 2023, so about 17 months. I added attribution to the lead on 21:34, 21 September 2024 after your reasonable request.

This is worth mentioning in the lead as Steele's warning was just one of the notably true and "prescient" claims Steele made, and they show that Steele had some good sources, and, according to the FBI, Danchenko was also exceptionally well-connected. Steele, Danchenko, and Galkina all had sources in the Kremlin itself, and the CIA had a key one, mentioned below, whose reporting aligned with some of Steele's reporting. He was a mole who had to be extricated quickly, with his family, because of the danger posed by Trump.[14] Trump would likely have told Putin about him, and he would have been killed. Several other key dossier allegations made in June 2016 about the Russian government's efforts to get Trump elected, were later described as "prescient" because they were corroborated six months later in the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment and the Mueller Report. Simpson and Fritsch write that:

"a spy whose sources get it 70 percent right is considered to be one of the best,” and that, while reporters focussed on the most salacious details, they “tended to miss the central message,” about which they say Steele was largely correct. They note that, in his first report, in June, 2016, Steele warned that Russian election meddling was “endorsed by Putin” and “supported and directed” by him to “sow discord and disunity with the United States itself but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance”—six months before the U.S. intelligence community collectively embraced the same conclusion. Steele also was right, they argue, that “Putin wasn’t merely seeking to create a crisis of confidence in democratic elections. He was actively pulling strings to destroy Hillary Clinton and elect Donald Trump,” an assessment the U.S. intelligence community also came to accept. And they note that, as of September, 2019, U.S. officials confirmed that the C.I.A. had “a human source inside the Russian government during the campaign, who provided information that dovetailed with Steele’s reporting about Russia’s objective of electing Trump and Putin’s direct involvement in the operation."[15]

BTW, Steele was not the first to "know" that there was a covert effort to support Trump. British intelligence (and seven allied foreign intelligence agencies) first knew (starting in 2015) and alerted the CIA chief, John Brennan:

"GCHQ first became aware in late 2015 of suspicious “interactions” between figures connected to Trump and known or suspected Russian agents,.."

“It looks like the [US] agencies were asleep,” the source added. “They [the European agencies] were saying: ‘There are contacts going on between people close to Mr Trump and people we believe are Russian intelligence agents. You should be wary of this.’

“The message was: ‘Watch out. There’s something not right here.’”

According to one account, GCHQ’s then head, Robert Hannigan, passed material in summer 2016 to the CIA chief, John Brennan. The matter was deemed so sensitive it was handled at “director level”. After an initially slow start, Brennan used GCHQ information and intelligence from other partners to launch a major inter-agency investigation.

In late August and September Brennan gave a series of classified briefings to the Gang of Eight, the top-ranking Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and Senate. He told them the agency had evidence the Kremlin might be trying to help Trump to win the presidency, the New York Times reported.[16][17] with some Russian officials arguing about how much to interfere in the election.[18]

Read more here: Links between Trump associates and Russian officials#2015–2016 foreign surveillance of Russian targets

That information from GCHQ was part of the reason for opening the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, but it wasn't enough on its own. It was the "intelligence from other partners" (Australian info about Papadopoulos) that provided the necessary legal probable cause to justify opening the investigation. Brennan's actions to protect America are part of the real reason that Trump removed Brennan's security clearance.[9] He didn't want Brennan revealing anymore damning information about Trump's cooperation/collusion with Putin's attacks on America. Don't forget that Trump took top-secret Russia intelligence that is STILL missing since the end of his term.[10] -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 22:31, 26 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]


References

  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference Wood_8/12/2020 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  2. ^ Wittes, Benjamin (August 21, 2020). "A Collusion Reading Diary: What Did the Senate Intelligence Committee Find?". Lawfare. Retrieved October 17, 2023.
  3. ^ a b c d Cite error: The named reference SICv5_8/18/2020 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ Nakashima, Ellen (May 18, 2016). "National intelligence director: Hackers have targeted 2016 presidential campaigns". The Washington Post. Retrieved September 26, 2024.
  5. ^ Nakashima, Ellen (June 14, 2016). "Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 5, 2018.
  6. ^ Schreck, Carl (January 10, 2017). "FBI Director: No Evidence Russia Successfully Hacked Trump Campaign". RFERL. Archived from the original on February 3, 2019. Retrieved February 2, 2019.
  7. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference NYT Aid Trump was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ a b Rossoll, Nicki (December 11, 2016). "Reince Priebus: 'RNC Was Not Hacked'". ABC News. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
  9. ^ cf. Tau, Byron (September 14, 2016). "Colin Powell Blasts Donald Trump, Criticizes Hillary Clinton in Leaked Messages". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on December 10, 2016. Retrieved December 11, 2016.
  10. ^ Johnstone, Liz (December 11, 2016). "Priebus: "I Don't Know Whether It's True" Russia Is Responsible for Election Hacks". Meet the Press. NBC News. Archived from the original on March 6, 2017. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
  11. ^ Pearson, Rick. "FBI told state GOP in June its emails had been hacked". Chicago Tribune. Archived from the original on December 11, 2016. Retrieved December 11, 2016.
  12. ^ Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo (June 16, 2016). "'Guccifer 2.0' Is Likely a Russian Government Attempt to Cover Up Its Own Hack". VICE. Retrieved September 26, 2024.
  13. ^ Gerstein, Josh (January 4, 2018). "Judge: Trump tweets don't require more disclosure on dossier". Politico. Retrieved August 18, 2018.
  14. ^ Agence France-Presse (September 21, 2024). "Trump's Loose Lips Force US to Extract Spy From Kremlin". Courthouse News Service. Retrieved September 26, 2024.
  15. ^ Mayer, Jane (November 25, 2019). "The Inside Story of Christopher Steele's Trump Dossier". The New Yorker. Retrieved November 27, 2019.
  16. ^ Cite error: The named reference Harding_11/15/2017 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  17. ^ Harding, Luke; Kirchgaessner, Stephanie; Hopkins, Nick (April 13, 2017). "British spies were first to spot Trump team's links with Russia". The Guardian. Retrieved May 13, 2019.
  18. ^ Cite error: The named reference Rosenberg_Goldman_Schmidt_3/1/2017 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

"quoting opinions as facts"?

[edit]

In general, this whole article has issues with large swaths of OR from primary sources, and quoting opinions as facts in various places. Endwise (talk) 09:02, 18 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Please provide specific and exact quotes of instances of "quoting opinions as facts". That shouldn't normally happen, unless the opinion is an established fact. NPOV says to "Avoid stating opinions as facts.​​" It also says "Avoid stating facts as opinions." So this coin has two sides.
There are at least two types of opinions, (1) those that are identical to the facts, and (2) others that are personal opinion commentary about certain facts. My very old motto here is "When in doubt, use attribution." That usually applies to Number 2 type of opinion. Number 1 type of opinion is rarely attributed, as that inserts editorial doubt about the facts and leaves the reader with the impression that the author's statement is not fully credible and even possibly doubtful. That's a violation of "Avoid stating facts as opinions."
So please provide examples so we can improve the article. -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 22:53, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

First paragraph: need to clarify BuzzFeed's 'fair report privilege' defence was based on Steele Dossier being part of official proceedings

[edit]

In the opening paragraph of the article, it’s noted that the Steele Dossier “was published by BuzzFeed News on January 10, 2017, without Steele's permission.[2] Their decision to publish the reports without verifying the allegations was criticised by journalists.[20][21] However, a judge defended BuzzFeed's action, stating that the public has a right to know so it can ‘exercise effective oversight of the government.’[22]”

While this passage correctly mentions the judicial defence of BuzzFeed’s decision to publish the Dossier, it leaves out some key legal context. The ruling wasn’t just about the public’s right to know, but was grounded in the "fair report privilege." This legal principle protects media outlets when they report on official proceedings, even if the information is unverified or part of a non-public investigation. Without this context, the passage risks giving the impression that the court broadly defended BuzzFeed’s actions, when in fact the protection came from this specific legal shield.

The source cited (Variety) clarifies this right at the beginning: “A federal judge ruled in favour of BuzzFeed in a defamation lawsuit over its publication of the so-called ‘Steele dossier’ in January 2017, ruling that because the document was part of an official proceeding, the site was protected by fair reporting privilege.” [11]https://variety.com/2018/politics/news/buzzfeed-steele-dossier-trump-1203093603/

To be accurate, the article should explain that the court’s ruling wasn’t a general defence of BuzzFeed’s decision to publish, but rather a legal protection based on the fair report privilege. This is a crucial distinction, as it shows that BuzzFeed was shielded because the Dossier was connected to an official proceeding, not because of a broad endorsement of the public interest. Full judgment: [12]https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000167-c8cb-d657-a37f-dcff49f10000 BostonUniver (talk) 08:11, 24 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Too much detail for the lede. Slatersteven (talk) 10:08, 24 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not suggesting everything I wrote should be inserted instead, if the sentence could be changed to something like "However, a judge defended BuzzFeed's action on the basis that the dossier was part of an official proceeding, and therefore protected by fair reporting privilege" BostonUniver (talk) 10:44, 24 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I have now installed that version. Thanks! -- Valjean (talk) (PING me) 14:02, 24 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]