United National Movement (Georgia)
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United National Movement ერთიანი ნაციონალური მოძრაობა | |
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Chairman | Tinatin Bokuchava |
Honorary Chairman | Mikheil Saakashvili |
Leader of Women's Wing | Tinatin Bokuchava |
Political Secretary | Petre Tsiskarishvili |
Founder | |
Founded | October 2001 |
Split from | Union of Citizens |
Headquarters | Tbilisi |
Ideology | |
Political position | Centre-right |
National affiliation |
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European affiliation | European People's Party (affiliate)[1] |
International affiliation | International Democracy Union |
Colors | Red and White Maroon (customary) |
Seats In Parliament | 15 / 150 |
Municipal Councilors | 441 / 2,068 |
Seats In Supreme Council of Adjara | 7 / 21 |
Seats In Tbilisi City Assembly | 10 / 50 |
Seats In Kutaisi City Assembly | 5 / 35 |
Seats In Batumi City Assembly | 7 / 35 |
Seats In Rustavi City Assembly | 11 / 35 |
Municipal Mayors | 1 / 64 |
Website | |
unm | |
![](http://up.wiki.x.io/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2d/UNM_old_logo.png/220px-UNM_old_logo.png)
United National Movement (Georgian: ერთიანი ნაციონალური მოძრაობა, romanized: ertiani natsionaluri modzraoba; UNM) also colloquially known as the Natsebi[a] is a liberal and pro-Western political party in Georgia founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, which rose to power following the Rose Revolution.
The party was established in 2001 by Mikheil Saakashvili, who separated from the then ruling Union of Citizens of president Eduard Shevardnadze, and came to power after challenging the incumbents in the 2003 parliamentary election and the subsequent Rose Revolution. UNM followed a pro-western course with neoliberal economic policies and cultural liberalism. Its rule has been characterized as liberal autocracy.[2][3][4] The party lost the 2012 parliamentary election to Georgian Dream, following the Gldani prison scandal. Since then, it has been the main opposition party.
History
[edit]Founding
[edit]The 1995 Georgian presidential and parliamentary elections, the first elections since the end of the Georgian Civil War, established Eduard Shevardnadze as the President of Georgia and his Union of Citizens party as the governing party, which largely functioned as an extension of the executive branch controlled by the President in a strongly presidential system of governance put in place by the 1995 Constitution of Georgia. The Union of Citizens served as a big tent party united under the leadership of Shevardnadze. It attracted a number of young politicians, including Mikhail Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze. The imposition of electoral thresholds led to a rapid decrease in multi-partisanship: the number of parties in Parliament decreased to 14 in 1995 and four in 1999. The Union of Citizens became the largest political force in the country and its only strong opposition was the regionalist Democratic Revival Union of Adjara's strongman governor Aslan Abashidze. However, the government's inability to deal with deep-seated corruption and rebuild crippled state institutions that had been inherited after a decade of civil conflicts led to upsurge of various factions within the Union of Citizens which turned out to be more effective in opposing President Shevardnadze than opposition parties.
The divisions in the Union of Citizens and more apparent public discontent with Shevardnadze led to the defection of numerous parliamentary deputies from the ruling party and allowed for the formation of new parties after 2000. The first group to leave the Citizens' Union represented the business community and formed the New Rights Party (NRP) in 2001. This departure began the collapse of the party, as many party officials and deputies defected to join or form other parties. The parliamentary speaker and leader of the Reformers Faction, Zurab Zhvania, left the Union of Citizens and established a new party, called the United Democrats. He was soon joined by another prominent parliamentary deputy from the Union of Citizens, Nino Burjanadze. This left Shevardnadze with few allies.
In September 2001, Mikheil Saakashvili (then Minister of Justice) resigned and left the ruling party, saying that corruption had penetrated to the very center of the Georgian government and that Shevardnadze lacked the will to deal with it, warning that "current developments in Georgia will turn the country into a criminal enclave in one or two years". Saakashvili formed the National Movement opposition party one month later. The party campaigned against corruption, crime, promised to restore control over Georgia's breakaway regions and pursue more forceful policy of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Having achieved significant success in the 2002 local election, the party looked forward to the 2003 parliamentary election as an opportunity to challenge the long-lasting rule of the increasingly unpopular ruling party. In June 2002, Saakashvili was elected as the Chairman of the Tbilisi Assembly ("Sakrebulo") following an agreement between the United National Movement and the Georgian Labour Party. This gave him a powerful new platform from which to criticize the government.
Rose Revolution
[edit]Saakashvili and other Georgian opposition leaders formed a coalition in 2003 to bring together the United National Movement, the United Democrats, the Republican Party, Union of National Forces and the movement "Kmara" in a loose alliance against the government of President Eduard Shevardnadze. The NM actively campaigned around the country and opened its office in Gori in January 2003 to coordinate its actions. In his pre-election campaign, Saakashvili called Shevardnadze to resign, saying that under his rule the country could not continue to exist "under normal circumstances". Prior to the election, Saakashvili resigned as a Chairman of the Tbilisi Assembly, aiming at more higher position in the parliament. In September 2003, one month before the election, Saakashvili paid visits to Washington, Moscow and Kyiv. When the election date came, Saakashvili called his support to go out and vote and hope for the better future. The elections were held on November 2, 2003 and gave party 18% of the votes. The ruling party got only 22% of votes, which meant that it could not form a government on its own, although the ruling party could broker a coalition government excluding the NM and its allies. The opposition parties strongly contested the outcome of the November 2, 2003 parliamentary elections, which local and international observers criticized for numerous irregularities.[5] The allegations of ballot fraud were proceeded by the political crisis and mass protests. Several non-governmental organizations, like Liberty Institute, were active in all protest activities. An increasingly tense two weeks of demonstrations put pressure on Shevardnadze, who decided to resign as President on 23 November. This became known as a Rose Revolution – the first color revolution of the post-Soviet world. The National Movement and its partners played a central role in the November 2003 political crisis.
After the fall of Shevardnadze, the party joined forces with the United Democrats and the Union of National Forces to promote Saakashvili as the principal candidate in the presidential elections of January 4, 2004. Saakashvili won the election with overwhelming majority and was inaugurated on January 25. The National Movement and the United Democrats amalgamated on February 5, 2004; the bloc National Movement - Democrats, which also featured the Republican Party and the Union of National Forces, secured the constitutional majority in the fresh parliamentary elections (with ca. 75% of the votes). The new Parliament ratified constitutional amendments in 2004 that increased the powers of the President and divided powers among the revolutionary trio leaders: Mikheil Saakashvili as president, Zurab Zhvania as Prime Minister, and Nino Burjanadze as Speaker of Parliament. The position of Prime Minister was explicitly created by these constitutional amendments, replacing the Minister of State.
2004–2007: Centralization, reforms, strong executive
[edit]![]() | This section may contain material not related to the topic of the article. (February 2024) |
The main result of the 2004 constitutional amendments was strengthening of the presidential powers, weakening of Parliament and initiation of a process of concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch. The new government argued that the broad executive powers were necessary to allow the revolutionary leaders to implement swift reforms. The new government faced little opposition as only the Rightist Opposition coalition managed to reach necessary electoral threshold to secure seats in Parliament among all opposition groups. In May 2004, the Republican Party and the Union of National Forces withdrew from the ruling coalition, although in no avail. The broad powers, as well as popular support, gave the government a strong mandate to implement its programme.
Under the new government, Georgia implemented several reforms. The education was brought under the centralized control. The government introduced a common entrance exams in 2005. The National Assessment and Examinations Center (NAEC) was created to develop and administer these exams. Under the previous university entrance system, universities were free to develop and administer their own exams; however, President Saakashvili described this system as a source of corruption and said that this bribe-based system deprived many people of their right to education. In 2006, National Civil Registry Agency was created, a centralized body tasked with providing public services, including the services of the Civil Registry Agency, the National Agency of Public Registry, the National Archives, the National Bureau of Enforcement and the Notary Chamber of Georgia. President Saakashvili said that the reform was necessary to eliminate corruption. In 2004, the entire policy was fired and the entire Traffic Police Department was abolished. In its place, a totally new Patrol Police Department was created, which hired new police officers to root out corruption in this agency.
The new government pursued economically liberal policies. Under the Shevardnadze government, Georgia already pursued free market percepts recommended by the International Monetary Fund; however, Saakashvili administration restarted the massive privatization and accelerated all those policies. In 2004, Kakha Bendukidze, a Russian-based Georgian businessman and prominent free market advocate, was appointed by Saakashvili as a Minister of Economics. Under Bendukidze's supervision, a capital control was abolished, as well as many taxes and the income tax rate was lowered to 20%, many state-owned enterprises were privatized, a labor legislation was significantly liberalized, import tariffs were lowered, a ban on foreign ownership of Georgian land was repealed and many governmental regulatory agencies were disbanded. The new government's economic doctrine was based on a belief in trickle-down economics and foreign investments. The government prioritized attracting foreign direct investments to stimulate economic growth and significantly relaxed state's involvement in the economy.
The Saakashvili administration sought to push for liberal reforms, which put it in discord with the conservative values of Georgian population.[6] In the 1990s, various religious sects appeared in Georgia, which led to concerns about foreign religions taking roots in Georgia and threatening Georgian national identity and cultural values. Various groups have been organized to fight religious sects. Basil Mkalashvili, a defrocked former Georgian Orthodox Church priest, led Orthodox Eparchy of Gldani and was especially active against Jehovah's Witnesses in Georgia. His group burned their literature and stopped their gatherings and assemblies. In the words of Basil, "I was defending the motherland and the faith of our fathers". His group was not endorsed by the Patriarch of Georgian Orthodox Church Illia II, although he wrote to President Eduard Shevardnadze to help "with the cults flooding the country". In April 1999, at the special session of the Parliament, Ilia II demanded a restriction of these "sects". In one of his sermons, Patriarch declared: "The Georgian people have been Christian from the first century and must stay so. Sects and foreign religions should not influence our nation. Georgia was saved by Orthodox Christianity and will save it another time. Our people should walk on this way, and the ones betraying Orthodoxy, our church, Svetitskhoveli, will be the traitor of the nation, that is why every man, who would support spreading a sects beliefs and various religions, is declared as an enemy of the Georgian nation".
In 2004, the Georgian special forces arrested Basil Mkalavishvili. During the arrest, a confrontation between the Orthodox believers and the police led to several injuries, as well as the damage of the church. The government was criticized for the excessive use of force during the event and many critics accused it of purposefully provoking confrontation with the Orthodox believers to "demonstrate its power". Although Saakashvili initially reacted by suggested that "it is the state, not the extremist groups, which should guard Georgia against alien influence", he later stated that he wears it as a "badge of honor" that his administration allowed Jehovah's Witnesses to practice freely. While the previous government refused permits for Jehovah's Witnesses to organize assemblies, and law enforcement officials often dispersed those gathering, the new government allowed the Jehovah's Witnesses to operate in the country legally for the first time. The polls, on the other hand, suggested that many Georgians perceived Jehovah's Witnesses as a threat to Georgian national identity, cultural values, and the GOC, while supporting restrictions on their propaganda. This led to public criticism of the Saakashvili administration, especially of the actions of special forces during the arrest of Basil Mkalavishvili. The government further took steps take to religion out of public education, which caused public backlash. In 2005, the Parliament passed the General Education Act, restricting the teaching of religion in schools and the use of religious symbols in the school space for devotional purposes.
Under the Saakashvili administration, the government promoted civic nationalism and took active steps to reassert centralized control over the whole Georgian territory. This led to upsurge of tensions with the government of Adjarian Autonomous Republic under Aslan Abashidze who enjoyed broad autonomy under previous administrations and often disobeyed central authorities. Abashidze denounced the Rose Revolution as an unconstitutional coup, which further intensified the tensions. The crisis culminated in May 2004 when Abashidze stepped down as the mass demonstrations in Batumi called for his resignation.
The new government achieved considerable progress in eradicating corruption. In 2008 Transparency International ranked Georgia 67th in its Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 3.9 points out of 10 possible. This represented the best result among the CIS countries and a dramatic improvement on Georgia's score compared to 2004, when the country was ranked 133rd with 2.0 points. Georgia also strengthened fight against the thieves-in-laws. In December 2005 Georgian Criminal Code was reorganized to charge the criminal authorities with aggravating circumstances. The approach was focusing on harsher enforcement and penalties as ways to reduce crime and break criminal syndicates.
On October 29, 2004, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO approved the Individual Partnership Action Plan of Georgia (IPAP), making Georgia the first among NATO's partner countries to manage this task successfully.
Relations with Russia remained problematic. Since 1990s breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia retained de facto independence from Georgia, with Russia passively supporting separatist movements. Russian troops remained garrisoned at two military bases in Georgia and as peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Saakashvili pledged to resolve the matter of territorial integrity and return separatist regions under Georgian control. Success in Adjara encouraged the new president to intensify his efforts towards bringing the South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under the Georgian jurisdiction. In August 2004, several clashes occurred in South Ossetia, which threatened military escalation.
2007–2011: mass demonstrations, defections, war
[edit]Although the government enacted many reforms, many people were not satisfied with them and the public discontent against Saakashvili mounted. This reached the boiling point in October 2007, when accusations floated about the corruption in the Saakashvili's inner circle. Such allegations were made by former Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who resigned from his position and harshly criticized Saakashvili's administration. Okruashvili accused Saakashvili of corruption and lobbying the interests of his own family. Okruashvili claimed that he caught the President's uncle with a $200,000 bribe but had to hush up the scandal at the president's request. The opposition also accused President Saakashvili of overseeing a system of elite corruption encompassing oil and minerals. They claimed that Saakashvili's family members acquired large number of state property under president's decrees, and as a result, Saakashvili's family emerged as one of the richest families in Georgia. According to allegations, Saakashvili's family took control of much of the higher education sector (his mother owning shares in several universities in Tbilisi), the spa industry and the advertisement sector. Saakashvili denied accusations of his political opponents, claiming that his administration had been one of the most successful in eliminating corruption. He accused his opponents of spreading lies and not being honest. Saakashvili further suffered a blow to his reputation after Okruashvili accused him of plotting to kill his main political opponent, Badri Patarkatsishvili, similarly to Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister murdered in a car bomb attack. In late October, Orkuashvili was arrested on charges of corruption, which triggered public demonstrations. Discontent over unemployment, low pensions and poverty despite Saakashvili's economic reforms, served as catalysts to the demonstrations. According to statistics, one-fourth of the nation was living under the poverty rate. The demonstrations continued in November, spearheaded by an ad-hoc coalition of the opposition parties which demanded Saakashvili's resignation.
On 7 November 2007, mass protests in Tbilisi and Batumi were violently dispersed by the Georgian police using tear gas, batons, water cannons and high tech acoustic weapons. Saakashvili accused the protests of being directed by Russia and alleged that Russia was trying to overthrow the Georgian government. This claims came amid straining of the Georgia-Russia relations, caused by the crises in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with Saakashvili's increasing use of the anti-Russian rhetoric and juxtaposing of Russia against Georgia's national security. The opposition accused Saakashvili of trying to distract public attention from the country's internal problems; however, Saakashvili pointed out at the statements of some Russian officials which supported anti-Saakashvili demonstrations. Saakashvili's rhetoric towards Russia was considerebly mild in previous years as Saakashvili expressed his desire to build friendly relations with Russia in 2005 and even accused the Shevardnadze administration of ostracizing Russia. As a result of negotiations between the government and the opposition, Saakashvili announced early presidential elections to be held in January 2008, effectively cutting his term in office by a year.
Saakashvili secured a victory in the 2008 presidential election with 53.7% of the votes. Despite the victory, Saakashvili's support dropped significantly and public trust lowered. In the parliamentary election the UNM won 59.1% of the vote and emerged as a single ruling party.
August 2008 saw military escalation of frozen conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with the involvement of Georgia as well as Russia. After a series of clashes between Georgians and South Ossetians, Russian military forces intervened on the side of the South Ossetian separatists and invaded Gori in Shida Kartli. The war ended with Russian victory and Georgian defeat. Its aftermath, leading to the 2008–2010 Georgia–Russia crisis, was tense. Georgia lost control over all of its territorial possessions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
As a result of military seatback in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, mass demonstrations against Saakashvili restarted in 2009 and the UNM suffered several defections. Nino Burjanadze left the position of parliamentary speaker and declared the establishment of "a clear-cut opposition party" called Democratic Movement–United Georgia. In December 2008, former Prime Minister of Georgia Zurab Nogaideli announced that he was quitting United National Movement, setting up the Movement for a Fair Georgia party and unleashing heavy criticism of foreign and domestic policies of Mikheil Saakashvili. Both of them pledged to manage relations with Russia more wisely and accused Saakashvili of failing to prevent the disastrous consequences of the war with Russia. The tensions intensified between the government and the opposition on 5 May 2009, when the Georgian police said large-scale disorders were planned in Georgia of which the failed army mutiny was part of. According to the police, Saakashvili's assassination had also been plotted.
In response to 2008 worldwide economic crisis, Saakashvili diminished the size of the government, cutting government spending, abolishing several departments and cutting the military budget. The government continued to pursue economic liberalisation. In 2011, the Georgian Parliament adopted The Economic Liberty Act of Georgia, which brought all economic reforms under a single legislation. The 2010 Georgian constitutional amendments significantly shifted country towards the economic liberalism. These constitutional amendments banned progressive taxes and required referendum to introduce any new taxes except five existing ones: a 20% personal income tax, 15% corporate profit tax, 18% value added tax (VAT), 0, 5, or 12% import tax, and property tax of up to 1%.
During this time, the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Georgian government developed ambivalent relationship as the popularity of the Church increased and the government sought to implement liberal reforms. In 2011, the Georgian government granted permission to build a mosque in Batumi, which caused backlash by the conservative Georgian population and the Georgian Orthodox Church, fearing that the growth of Islamic presence in Adjara would pose risks of Turkish influence and undermine the national security. Despite the ambivalent relations, the government increased the subsidies of the Church and Saakashvili publicly announced his respect for the GOC. The government handled to the Georgian Orthodox Church the control over disputed churches contested by Armenians and Georgians. The move was criticized by ethnic Armenians in Georgia and caused straining of the Georgia-Armenia relations; however, Georgians claimed that the churches rightfully belonged to the Georgian Orthodox Church and the government was obliged to return them as they were unlawfully confiscated by the Soviet authorities.
The government significantly relaxed its visa policy, granting a visa-free regime to citizens of many countries, such as Turkey, Iran and other countries with dominant Islamic populations. This led to a backlash from many Georgians, who feared that the growing immigration would threaten Georgian national identity. The growing Turkish presence in Batumi caused particular concerns. These concerns were motivated by religious, nationalist and historical reasons, but the government claimed that it prioritized foreign investments and did not see any threats.
On May 21, 2011 over 10,000 people protested against Mikheil Saakashvili's government in Tbilisi and Batumi. Nino Burjanadze and her husband Badri Bitsadze as well as other leaders of opposition were main figures. Protesters tried to prevent a parade commemorating Georgian Independence Day. Georgian police suppressed the demonstrations with tear gas and rubber bullets. Saakashvili accused the protesters of attempting to orchestrate the government takeover using paramilitary groups.
2012–2019: loss of power, defections
[edit]Despite several attempts to build a coalition of opposition parties, which would be able to challenge the Saakashvili administration, no such attempt was successful, and the 2010 local elections confirmed popular support for the ruling party, which received 65% of votes. As result, many opposition coalitions split, and no cohesive force managed to emerge in the Georgian politics which would be able to mount significant opposition to the Saakashvili government. Despite this fact, the public discontent over Saakashvili's presidency was high, but no opposition party managed to unite the population around its platform.
This situation lasted until late 2011, when famous Georgian tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili admitted the rumors that he was entering the Georgian politics. In December, he established opposition political movement Georgian Dream and announced his desire to take part in the parliamentary election scheduled for October 2012. The Georgian Dream formed coalition with five other opposition parties with the intention to challenge the ruling United National Movement party. Ivanishvili personally enjoyed high public trust among the population, as he was largely known to the public as a businessman who gave large amount of money in charity. He also had backing of many influential Georgian Orthodox priests and helped to build the Holy Trinity Cathedral of Tbilisi, a fact that brought him popularity among religious people. Ivanishvili's platform was based on increasing welfare spending, pursuing more pragmatic foreign policy with Russia and bringing country closer to the EU and NATO. The coalition often criticized Saakashvili for violently dispersing public protests, failing to improve economic conditions and growing Turkish immigration in Adjara. The Georgian Dream managed to mobilize the growing discontent over the government of United National Movement. The discontent climaxed two weeks before the elections after the Gldani prison scandal, which confirmed long-standing allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners, as video footage was released showing prisoners being tortured and beaten by the penal servants. The further investigation revealed that the head of Penitentiary Department of Ministry of Justice of Georgia Bachana Akhalaia was the one who had been managing the process of torturing the prisoners. The government's harsh policy against crime led to mass incarceration and overcrowding of Georgian penal system, which was kept under control by torture and sexual violence. The government was accused of giving police a free hand to fight crime to the point where they could mistreat the suspects. The new regime was described as "an extremely punitive and abusive criminal justice, law-and-order system, which ended up with the highest per capita prison population in Europe – even higher than in Russia – in which torture became absolutely routine... Almost zero acquittal cases in criminal trials, mass surveillance, telephone tapping, and a lot of pressure put on businessmen, including intimidation, so they contribute to government projects." Prior to the scandal, the government was praising the prison reform for breaking down the thief-in-law culture and the practice of managing criminal underworld from prison facilities. While the footage was labeled as having been made by "politically motivated persons," the national prosecutor's office announced the arrests of 10 people, including the head of the Prison No.8 in Tbilisi, two deputies and prison guards, while several high-level officials resigned from their positions. The disclosure of videos triggered a wave of anti-government protests and increased the chances for the opposition to do well in the elections. The United National Movement fell to 40.3% and failed to secure majority, which meant that Georgian Dream would form the new government. Saakashvili admitted his party's defeat and promised not to obstruct peaceful transition of power. In 2013 presidential election the United National Movement suffered another defeat at the hands of Georgian Dream as the election was stated to be "efficiently administered" and "transparent."[7] After elections, several former high-ranking officials were convicted on numerous charges, including Vano Merabishvili and Bachana Akhalaia. On 28 July 2014, criminal charges were filed by the Georgian prosecutor's office against Saakashvili over allegedly "exceeding official powers" during the 2007 Georgian demonstrations, as well as a police raid on and "seizure" of Imedi TV and other assets owned by the late tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili. Saakashvili fled the country and accused the government of using the legal system as a tool of political retribution. He continued to manage the party from abroad.
The defeat in the elections forced the NM party into opposition, and it emerged as the only opposition party in the parliament since no other party besides GD and NM managed to secure any seats. During this time, the Georgian politics shifted towards two-party system and was marked by confrontation between the Georgian Dream and United National Movement. This confrontation seriously shaped the identity of these parties, and the United National Movement became a front for the people disillusioned with the new Georgian government. The UNM built its identity on being the only party capable of challenging the Georgian Dream; however, at the same time, it remained loyal to his founder, Mikheil Saakashvili, and continued to be perceived as a "Party of Saakashvili supports". This caused significant rifts within the party as many politicians thought that the UNM had to break with its past to mount any kind of serious opposition to the Georgian Dream. This circumstances led to several defections of UNM's parliamentary deputies to new parties, including that of the libertarian New Political Center — Girchi by former UNM member of parliament Zurab Japaridze and three others.[8] Shortly afterward, the party split on 12 January 2017, as a result of a conflict between Davit Bakradze, former Mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava, their supporters, and members of the party loyal to former President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili had rejected the party's decision to enter parliament after the 2016 election, calling for boycott, and had furthermore opposed the initiative of party members to appoint a new chairman in his place. A majority of the UNM's electoral list defected to European Georgia, leaving the UNM with six members in parliament. Some believe these defections were encouraged by the ruling Georgian Dream Coalition in order to weaken its opposition.[9]
Despite suffering continued failure to rehabilitate its reputation, the UNM remained the largest opposition party after the 2016 parliamentary election, in which it garnered 27.11% of the vote. The 2018 presidential election was seen as an opportunity for the party to restore its positions, since it was nearly successful in defeating the Georgian Dream-backed candidate Salome Zurabishvili, receiving 40.48% of the vote. However, the name of the United National Movement remained tainted by torture and rape during its political tenure. On 24 March 2019, Mikheil Saakashvili stepped down as the party's chairman. The attempt was launched to bring new faces in the party and give opportunities to the new leaders. Saakashvili remained the most influential figure in the party, being succeeded by his own nominee, Grigol Vashadze.[10] On 15 December 2020, Grigol Vashadze resigned as the party chairman. The following election was won by Nika Melia, against Levan Varshalomidze.
2020–present: the opposition coalition, arrest of Saakashvili
[edit]The 2018 constitutional amendments allowed minor parties to gain momentum as they lowered to electoral threshold to 1% for the 2020 parliamentary election. This led many to think that the Georgian Dream could only be defeated by a coalition of opposition parties and that the NM would not be able to bring changes on its own. Previously, the NM already had experience of cooperating with other parties in the Strength is in Unity coalition, which was set up by the NM in 2018 to bring opposition parties together for the 2018 presidential election. However, many of the minor opposition parties feared of the alliance with NM since they thought that they would lose their political identity by aligning with the NM. This especially concerned the parties set up by former NM members, since they sought to differentiate themselves from the NM and to build their own platform. They categorically opposed the Georgian Dream government and declared as their priority to remove the GD from power. Because of this, they recognized that some kind of cooperation with the UNM would be necessary since they would not be able to replace the GD without UNM's support. These minor parties did not have enough support to form a coalition without GD and UNM. At the same time, the supporters of these parties were largely anti-UNM, and these parties feared that aligning with UNM would result in losing independent political identity and losing significant number of votes. Because of this, the opposition parties came up with a compromise - they decided to cooperate in majoritarian districts but run their own lists in the proportional elections. As such, ahead of the elections, UNM, European Georgia, Labour Party, and Strategy Aghmashenebeli formed an alliance. On 19 June 2020, they announced a joint slate of six candidates, who would compete in elections in Tbilisi. However, not all opposition parties joined the alliance since many still did not want to be associated with UNM. Newly formed party Lelo for Georgia refused to join the alliance. Alliance of Patriots party refused to cooperate with UNM in any way, describing it as a criminal party that should be banned. Citizens party left the alliance before the elections, accusing the opposition of acting in their own self-interests. The opposition, in turn, accused Elisashvili of trying to ruin the alliance's unity
The 2020 pre-election campaign was significantly stifled by the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, which seriously affected the ability of the parties to run their campaigns. At the same time, its relatively successful handling of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a boost in popularity of the Georgian Dream government. Because of this, the Georgian Dream managed to secure victory in the election. The UNM party got only 28% of votes. The opposition refused to recognize the results and boycotted the parliament, accusing the ruling party of the election fraud. The crisis culminated in April 2021 when the agreement was signed between the opposition and the Georgian Dream on electoral and judiciary reforms. However, the United National Movement refused to join the agreement citing disagreement over "some controversial clauses". Soon the Georgian Dream annulled its signatory status to the document, stating that the main reason for the withdrawal was that "the opposition [UNM] party which won the most opposition seats in parliament refused to join the agreement and other opposition parties were consistently violating the agreement, the ruling party was the only which was fulfilling the agreement". The tensions between the ruling Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party and the opposition United National Movement (UNM) culminated in the arrest of ex-president and ex-UNM leader, Mikheil Saakashvili. Former President Saakashvili claimed to have returned to Georgia prior to the 2021 local elections after an eight-year exile, and called on his followers to march on the capital, Tbilisi. The Georgian police, however, claimed that Saakashvili was not in Georgia. He was arrested later on 1 October 2021. The MIA stated that Saakashvili had illegally crossed the border and was hiding in the flat in Tbilisi. He was transferred to the prison in Rustavi. On October 14, tens of thousands of Georgians have rallied in Tbilisi to demand the release of Mikheil Saakashvili.[11] It was claimed that Saakashvili returned to Georgia to influence the results of the local elections. However, the United National Movement failed to defeat the Georgian Dream, finishing second with 30.67% of the vote.
In January 2023, Levan Khabeishvili was elected as Chairman of the United National Movement, defeating his predecessor Nika Melia.
Ideology
[edit]Originally a center-left party, the UNM moved its position to center-right[12] since the Rose Revolution and combines political, economic and cultural liberalism with cultural and civic nationalism. Its main political priorities include fighting corruption and crime, strengthening law and order, improving social services to the poor and reducing administrative barriers for doing business. It supports small government, deregulation of the economy, privatization, free market and policies of economic liberalism. The party advocates attracting foreign direct investments through business-friendly environment, low tax rates, abolition of capital control, and political stability with a goal of stimulating high economic growth in a short time frame. The UNM also supports increasing of government spendings in the social protection, education, military and infrastructure. Its economic model strongly resembles that of Four Asian Tigers. The government of the National Movement has been characterized as "perhaps the freest market government in the world" drawing influence from the theories of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, and policies of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US.[13]
The party has been varying on the topics of the social and cultural politics. Signing of the memorandum with the Tbilisi Pride on LGBT rights in May 2021 has cemented its status as a culturally liberal party. Nevertheless, the party itself tries to avoid clear association with either cultural liberalism or conservatism and tries to garner support from both sides. For example, in 2019 Mikheil Saakashvili has stated that he was always in support of traditional Georgian values and blamed Giga Bokeria for devaluing the image of the National Movement in the eyes of the conservative public.[14] Giga Bokeria called this statement ridiculous, claiming that he was never in the position of power to make such decisions.
The National Movement supports a cultural form of nationalism, trying to reconcile it with culturally liberal values, resembling a national liberal party. Thus, it abandoned the traditionally ethnic-based form of Georgian nationalism, defining the nation in terms of culture and shared values instead of ethnicity and bloodline. The party's nationalist agenda encompasses ethnic minorities, including Abkhazians and Ossetians in respective breakaway republics, which are deemed as inseparable parts of Georgian nation like other minorities.
The UNM's foreign policy programme has a strong emphasis on Euro-Atlantic integration.[15] During the first years in government, the party has tried to reconcile with Russia on topics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Mikheil Saakashvili visiting Vladimir Putin in Moscow numerous times to hold negotiations.[citation needed] Although its stance changed drastically since the 2008 war, when Russia was identified as the number one threat of Georgian national security. The party deems Russian actions against Georgia as imperialistic attempts to preserve its sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, blocking Georgian integration into the EU and NATO.
The United National Movement presented itself as the "revolutionary movement" aimed to align Georgia with the "modern" and "civilized" Western world as opposed to Soviet and post-Soviet "backwardness". Saakashvili positioned himself as a radical Westernizer, and portrayed the West as the "civilized world". Saakashvili described Russia as a "backward and "unmodern" state and positioned it as a chief ideological rival.[16] Saakashvili built his foreign policy on anti-Russian and pro-Western narrative and discredited any discussion on dealing with Russia by likening it to "supporting the enemy".[17]
The UNM has received public criticism for crackdown on peaceful protests in 2007 and 2011, police brutality, zero tolerance policy, torture of inmates in the prisons and cronyism. Some critics have characterized the UNM regime as a "liberal autocracy".[2][4][3]
Electoral performance
[edit]Parliamentary elections
[edit]Election | Leader | Votes | % | Seats | +/– | Position | Government |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2003 | Mikhail Saakashvili | 345,197 | 18.1 | 42 / 235
|
new | 3rd | Opposition |
2004 | Nino Burjanadze | 1,027,070 | 67.0 | 135 / 150
|
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Government |
2008 | Davit Bakradze | 1,050,237 | 59.18 | 119 / 150
|
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Government |
2012 | Vano Merabishvili | 873,233 | 40.34 | 65 / 150
|
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Opposition |
2016 | Davit Bakradze | 477,143 | 27.11 | 27 / 150
|
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Opposition |
2020 | Mikhail Saakashvili[b] | 523,127 | 27.18 | 30 / 150
|
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Opposition |
Presidential elections
[edit]Election year | Candidate | 1st round | 2nd round | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
# of overall votes | % of overall vote | # of overall votes | % of overall vote | ||
2004 | Mikheil Saakashvili | 1,692,728 | 96% (#1) | ||
2008 | Mikheil Saakashvili | 1,060,042 | 53.73% (#1) | ||
2013 | David Bakradze | 354,103 | 21.72% (#2) | ||
2018 | Grigol Vashadze | 601,224 | 37.74% (#2) | 780,680 | 40.48% (#2) |
Local elections
[edit]Election | Votes | % | Seats | +/– |
---|---|---|---|---|
2002 | 15 / 4,801
|
New | ||
2006 | 78.8 | 1,539 / 1,733
|
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2010 | 1 119 641 | 65.75 | 1,492 / 1,738
|
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2014 | 317 395 | 22.42 | 281 / 2,088
|
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2017 | 256 547 | 17.08 | 183 / 2,058
|
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2021 | 541 188 | 30.67 | 509 / 2,068
|
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Further reading
[edit]- Ghia Nodia, Álvaro Pinto Scholtbach: The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects. Eburon, Delft 2006, ISBN 90-5972-113-6
- Lincoln A. Mitchell: Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution. University of Pennsylvania Press 2008, ISBN 0-8122-4127-4
See also
[edit]- Category:United National Movement (Georgia) politicians
- Rose Revolution
- Politics of Georgia (country)
References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Natsebi serves as an abbreviation for the name "ნაციონალური მოძრაობა" (National Movement)
- ^ UNM nominated Saakashvili as a prime ministerial candidate
Citations
[edit]- ^ "Parties & Partners". epp.eu.
- ^ a b "საქართველოს პოლიტიკური ლანდშაფტი (ნაწილი მეორე - ნაციონალური მოძრაობა)". 2013-12-25. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ a b "Georgia's neoliberal agony". OC Media. 2019-12-06. Retrieved 2022-08-07.
- ^ a b "The Biopolitics of Iron Lady". 2019-09-10. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ "Shevardnadze quits to avoid bloodshed". The Sydney Morning Herald. November 24, 2003.
- ^ Nodia, Ghia (20 February 2011). "Georgia's Showdown Between Church And State". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 2023-07-28.
- ^ "Fundamental freedoms respected in well-administered presidential election in Georgia, international observers say". OSCE. 27 October 2013. Retrieved 29 October 2013.
- ^ "Civil.Ge | Parliament Endorses Credentials of Two New MPs". old.civil.ge.
- ^ "Georgia: Proposed Reform Could Tilt Electoral Field Toward Incumbents", Eurasianet, 10 April 2017
- ^ "UNM Elects New Chairman, Governing Body". Civil Georgia. 25 March 2019. Retrieved 28 March 2019.
- ^ "Tens of thousands in Georgia demand Saakashvili's release". Al Jazeera. 14 October 2021. Retrieved 13 February 2022.
- ^ Nodia, Ghia; Pinto Scholtbach, Álvaro (2006), The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, Eburon, p. 123
- ^ "Georgia's Wise Decisions". 2008-10-15. Archived from the original on 2013-07-03. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ "Ex-President Saakashvili accuses his former ally Bokeria of 'anti-Christian, anti-Georgian' activities". 2019-09-10. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ "Georgia: political parties and the EU" (PDF). January 2015. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ "Georgian-Russian Relations: The role of discourses and narratives" (PDF). Heinrich Böll Foundation. 2021. p. 10.
- ^ "Georgian-Russian Relations: The role of discourses and narratives" (PDF). Heinrich Böll Foundation. 2021. p. 4.
External links
[edit]- 2001 establishments in Georgia (country)
- Centre-right parties in Georgia (country)
- International Democracy Union member parties
- Parties related to the European People's Party
- Political parties established in 2001
- Political parties in Georgia (country)
- Pro-European political parties in Georgia (country)
- Rose Revolution